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ABSTRACT
While startups’ interactions with early potential customers may occur long before
product creation, entrepreneurs often fail to recognize how these interactions impact
startup development. My research proposes that early customers are central influences
and develops a model of customer interactions. More specifically, my dissertation focuses
on answering: When and how do startups interact with early customers during the
venture creation process, and how do these interactions create path dependence for the
type of organization being created?
I undertook an inductive, qualitative process study of nine startups located in
incubators and studied customer interactions in near-real-time. My findings show that
types of customers and validation received are important during new venture creation.
First, I introduce a model of self-reinforcing mechanisms - the customer interactionvalidation-spiral - that occurs when startups receive customer feedback. Positive feedback
is interpreted as justification to move forward in revising the business to meet initial
customers’ needs and in seeking out additional validation. Over time, other options for
startups are gradually eliminated, efficiencies gained, and resources allocated to create
processes and infrastructure that propel startups down a given path. Second, this spiral is
incorporated into a novel model of customer interactions during the new venture creation
process that requires multiple levels of validation to be met.
My contributions refresh existing theories of new venture creation and expand on
customer-centric, practitioner-based lean startup concepts to demonstrate that customers
not only provide validation on products and markets, but also on founders’ abilities to
create fully functioning and productive organizations. Finally, I apply existing literature
on path dependence to new venture creation and demonstrate that self-reinforcing
mechanisms and multiple validation stages trigger a narrowing of options available to
startups, making pivoting more challenging over time. The customer interactionvalidation-spiral offers further insights into path dependence mechanisms, further
opening the black box of organizational paths.
The practical implications of this research help startups understand the importance
of thoughtfulness in early customer selection. Despite a narrowing development path,
there is the potential for entrepreneurs to continue to exhibit agency and reflexivity in
startups’ path formation by regularly reflecting on the results of their actions.

Keywords: startup, customer interaction, validation, path dependence, new venture
creation, process, entrepreneurship
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background and Motivation
“Every week, every time you speak with a potential customer, you learn
something new. [You ask] do I still feel there’s an opportunity? You’re
digging in deeper and deeper each time to see how people behave and
what they want to engage with and you ask the question - is my original
thinking of the opportunity still the same or has it changed, or is it gone
altogether?”- Participant Entrepreneur
“We choose to follow what customers want. [But] the thing is, we built the
[product web] site for hardcore users, and now we find we are attracting
casual ones that want certain features. Right now, the system doesn’t allow
you to change features, so we have to decide whether we want to rebuild it
or not [for these other potential users].”- Participant Entrepreneur

Organizations are open systems that encounter uncertainty and risk in the external
environment (Shepherd, McMullen, & Jennings, 2007; Thompson, 1967). Further
complexity and ambiguity are experienced by startups that are concurrently creating
novel products and building a new firm to bring a product to the market (e.g. Gartner,
1985; Katz & Gartner, 1988; Bhave, 1994; Liao & Welsch, 2008). The founding team
must develop and establish a business concept, secure finances and other resources,
design a new product, and distinguish the startup from competition. Concurrently, a
startup begins interactions with multiple stakeholders, including customers, mentors,
venture capitalists, industrial networks, professional forums, family and friends,
competitors, suppliers, and potential first employees (Ozgen & Baron, 2007). Finally, the
process may involve the setup of equipment and infrastructure to produce a product
before it is sold to customers (e.g. Bhave, 1994).
Interactions with external stakeholders have a large role in either clarifying or
contributing to the ambiguity of the venture creation process. Stakeholders are important
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sources of information for a startup that can help entrepreneurial founders interpret the
external world (Stinchcombe, 1965). Such stakeholder relationships hold social capital “resources embedded in a social structure of relationships which are accessed and, or,
mobilized in purposive actions” (Lin, Cook, & Burt, 2001), and having the right social
capital can facilitate innovation (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) and create unique
economic opportunities that can be challenging to replicate in the market (Pirolo &
Presutti, 2010). On the other hand, these stakeholders may also have different
expectations and demands. This can create conflict and complexity for the direction the
business should take (Boyd & Gumpert, 1983; Ozgen & Baron, 2007; Ravasi & Turati,
2005).
In this dissertation, I define an interaction as an occasion when two parties
communicate with or react to each other. I argue that out of all stakeholders of a startup,
early customers, the potential and actual purchasers and end users of a product or service,
are essential stakeholders that provide information that contributes to the survival,
direction, and growth of a startup (Levitt, 1960). Customers have certain values they are
seeking, and have a self-serving bias (Bendapudi & Leone, 2003) in providing feedback
to startups about their preferences, their needs, and their contexts (Etgar, 2008). The
products desired have functional and social-symbolic meanings for the customer and can
make a new startup see itself as an organization that provides a certain type of product to
a certain type of customer. Knowing what potential early customers are looking for, their
demographics, personalities, lifestyles, values, and purchasing habits can help a startup
develop a customer-focused mission and products that meet these needs. Furthermore,
having a clear understanding of customers’ needs can create a shared purpose among the
entrepreneurial project team, increase productivity, and reduce time-to-market (Zhang &
Doll, 2001).
On the surface, it may seem obvious that customers play an essential role in the
development and survival of startups, given that they purchase products and services that
generate revenue for the business. However, customers have a larger role in influencing
an organization. For instance, customers can signal organization reputation (Reuber &
Fischer, 2005) and legitimacy (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), and influence the
competitive advantage (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004) and survival of an organization
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(Freeman, 1984). Customers provide divergent thinking from internal product developers
(Kristensson, Gustafsson, & Archer, 2004), and knowledge of competitors and the
likelihood of retail channel acceptance (Luo, Kannan, & Ratchford, 2007). More involved
customers may even act as advocates for the business (Groth, Mertens, & Murphy, 2004),
or at times, act as partial employees (Ennew & Binks, 1999).
These early customer interactions also suggest a long-term influence of customers
in shaping the organization’s development. According to the path dependence literature,
early organizational features are thought to persist (Sydow, Scheyogg & Koch, 2009).
Initially, there are several potential outcomes and multiple paths that could be pursued.
When an early decision is made, it is often considered “insignificant” (Arthur, 1989) or a
“small event” (Van Driel, 2013), but it can serve as a reference point for later choices and
sets off a self-reinforcing process that narrows the set of choices for an organization, and
puts the organization down a particular path (Sydow et al., 2009).
The early customer interaction can be considered an example of a small event,
and can trigger a decision that leaves a lasting impression. This is particularly easy when
customers consistently share new information with startups (Blazevic & Lievens, 2008),
and when they are involved in co-creating (Vargo & Lusch, 2004). These interactions are
a two-way street - taking place through shared experiences (Burgoyne, 1995) and a
willingness of both sides to share creative ideas and experiment repeatedly to reinforce
learned knowledge and behaviours and impact decision-making (Lévesque, Minniti, &
Shepherd, 2009). Startups may also build a knowledge base in a certain industry, and
adapt to share common preferences between a startup and potential early customers
(Schreyogg and Sydow, 2011). Debate, negotiations, and exchanges with customers and
other stakeholders can influence startups’ decisions as to whether to solidify or discard
routines, culture, and goals. Through interaction that involves observations,
experimentation, and repetition, startups can build relationships, a shared identity, respect
and trust with their partners (Kelly, Schaan, & Joncas, 2002). The startup becomes
familiar with customer preferences and contexts (Lave & Wenger, 1991) and increasingly
tailors products to meet the needs of their “most important” customers.
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Customer interactions affect not just the product design itself, but also the
startup’s operations and relationships, including the development process of the
opportunity, how the startup is managed and operated, its environment and
entrepreneurial networks (Cope, 2005). These exchanges during the new product
development part of venture creation can create interpersonal cohesiveness among the
close-knit team members and prompt the undertaking of activities and formation of
routines, rather than just observing or learning about them secondhand. More specifically,
the co-design process creates a system of knowledge use and exchange (Brown &
Duguid, 2001), shared experiences, and shared attributes that are enacted to help increase
the likelihood that startups and its potential first customers share a common worldview.
These intense interactions suggest that the initial path that the startup is on is
increasingly reinforced as the startup develops. There are complementary effects built
into the organization’s processes over time, and increased coordination capabilities and
efficiency to use and exploit what has already been learned from customers (Schreyogg
and Sydow, 2011). An increased focus of time, attention, and resources on co-design with
certain customers may also create negative path mechanisms that restrict other options for
a resource-poor startup.
Furthermore, early customers may be selected for several reasons, including
because they are easily accessible, that they provide connections or opportunities to grow,
may be heavily pursued, or even may just be an opportunity for survival. While a startup
may aim to court a variety of potential first customers to gain unique information from
diverse sources of customers (Zogaj & Bretschneider, 2012), it can be challenging to
juggle ideas from multiple customers (Hoyer et al., 2010). Focusing on a small group of
early active, dominant customers that act as advocates for the business can be helpful for
young firms (Groth, Mertens, & Murphy, 2004), but there is also the risk that the
information they provide is subjective and sparse (York & Danes, 2014). There is
potential that early decisions, made to meet these customers’ needs, also subject the
startup to path dependence effects and restrict an organization’s ability to meet the needs
of the target market in the long term.
Concepts related to path dependence and the influence of network partners are not
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new in the entrepreneurship literature. For instance, early alliance partners have been
proposed as a predictor of the trajectory of startups (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Milanov &
Fernhaber, 2009), and the reputation of the first partners of venture capital firms has been
shown to affect a firm’s future development (Milanov & Shepherd, 2013). A firm’s early
customers may be involved in customizing a firm’s products, and subsequently, affect
their reputation (Blomqvist, 1997), business strategy and R&D (Herstatt & Von Hippel,
1992; Ruokolainen, 2008). Through these interactions, startups learn what characteristics
they possess, what characteristics they would like to possess, and what skills they still
must develop to subsequently build their business.
Looking at early customer interactions as triggers of these self-reinforcing
processes can create a deeper understanding of path dependence mechanisms at play and
the external stakeholder effect of early customers in the new venture creation process. It
can also help fill in the gaps in the path dependence literature that look at path formation
retrospectively and theoretically (e.g. Czaban, Hocevar & Whitley, 2003; Greve &
Seidel, 2015; Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011; Sydow, Schreyogg, & Koch, 2009; Vergne &
Durand, 2010), and solidify the importance of putting thought into selecting early
customers.
Despite the benefits

of understanding early customer interactions

in

entrepreneurial ventures, most of the studies on customers involve more established firms
and come from the new product development literature (e.g. Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001) or
various branches of marketing, including relationship marketing (Berry, 1983;
Gummesson, 1994; Payne & Frow, 2017) and service-dominant marketing literature (e.g.
Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 2008). In these fields, customers are seen as active co-creators
of value, involved in various stages of product development in established organizations
(Hoyer et al., 2010). Customers are not considered passive buyers that purchase and use
the products and services offered (e.g. Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 2008; Prahalad &
Ramaswamy, 2000; Yi & Gong, 2013), but are known for providing information about a
problem that needs to be solved (Lengnick-Hall, 1996). Interactions with customers can
occur long before a product is available to purchase, but also at any stage of the product
development - from initiation, innovation, and design of products, through to gathering
resources and processing them to produce a deliverable product for consumption (Chang
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& Taylor, 2016; Lilien, Morrison, Searls, Sonnack, & von Hippel, 2002; Payne et al.,
2008). Initial conditions can impact new venture success (Gao et al., 2010), and ideas
may even originate from customers, sparking more frequent interactions (Von Hippel,
2005). These interactions are meant to reduce uncertainty, improve novelty, and improve
fit between product offerings and the market (Payne et al., 2008; Prahalad &
Ramaswamy, 2000).
There is a growing, but fragmented, body of entrepreneurship literature that refers
to the role of early customers in new ventures. Topics include the impact of a first
customer sale (e.g. Rehme & Svensson, 2011; Ruokolainen, 2008), signaling of early
customers (e.g. Reuber & Fischer, 2005); customers in innovation (e.g. Coviello &
Joseph, 2012) the formation of relationships with external stakeholders (e.g. Engel,
Kaandorp, & Elfring, 2017), implications of these relationships (e.g. Yli-Renko, Autio, &
Sapienza, 2001; Yli-Renko, Sapienza, & Hay, 2001), and how they are the starting point
for customer feedback (Liao & Welsch, 2008).
When specifically investigating the early stages of the new venture creation
process, however, customer interactions are often addressed later or at the periphery in
the process (e.g. Gartner, 1985; Van de Ven, Venkataraman, Polley, & Garud, 1989;
Bhave, 1994; Corbett, 2005; Cunneen, Mankellow, & Gibson, 2007). In part, this
peripheral focus on customers can be attributed to entrepreneurship scholars’ decisions to
focus on explaining other parts of the new venture creation process, such as the creation
and discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g. Gartner, 1985; Dimov, 2011) and the
focus on entrepreneurial growth (e.g. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Gilbert,
McDougall, & Audretsch, 2006).
Second, it was once thought that entrepreneurs could rely on initial “hunches” or
entrepreneurial intuition to know what customers wanted (York & Danes, 2014). A
tension between trying to survive and developing a growing, sustainable business
originally envisioned by the founders can make it challenging to decide when is the right
time to reach out to different types of customers to get feedback.
Third, empirical studies on the entrepreneurial process itself have been slow in
appearing in the literature (exceptions exist such as e.g. Brixy, Sternberg & Stuber, 2012;
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Gruber, 2007; Liao & Welsch, 2008; Marion et al., 2015). This may be associated with
the challenges in conducting process research and the fluidity and uncertainty
encountered in the entrepreneurship process. Several theoretical articles and calls for
process research have been proposed (e.g. Bhave, 1994; Chell, 2013; Cunneen et al.,
2007; Downing, 2005; Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016; Hjorth, Holt, & Steyaert,
2015; Moroz & Hindle, 2011), but the literature on the entrepreneurial process remains
highly disparate (e.g. Moroz & Hindle, 2011; Zahra, 2007) and still does not necessarily
identify customers as playing a central role in the new venture creation process.
In contrast, recent practitioner-based approaches have emerged in the past decade
that advocate speaking with customers early and often in the startup development process
to test out ideas (e.g. Blank, 2007; Blank & Dorf, 2012; Cooper & Vlaskovits, 2013;
Maurya, 2012; Ries, 2011). Emerging around the same time as agile engineering, the lean
startup methodology and other customer-centric entrepreneurship methods require
entrepreneurs to develop hypotheses and iteratively build a minimum viable product or
service to meet early customers’ needs. Assumptions about customers’ values are then
continuously and rapidly tested with customers, allowing the startup to make corrections
– pivoting – as needed until the product and market are validated. Entrepreneurs continue
to adopt the lean startup methodology, learning about it through popular press books (e.g.
Blank, 2007; Cooper & Vlaskovits, 2013; Furr & Dyer, 2014; Maurya, 2012; Ries, 2011;
Blank & Dorf, 2012), blog posts (e.g. Blank, 2010; Ries, 2008), and in entrepreneurial
education curricula (York & Danes, 2014).
While the lean startup methodology was created using practitioner insights, it has
ties to agile software development, operations management and organization theory (Furr
& Dyer, 2014), as well as literatures such as learning from failures (McGrath, 1999), fast
product

innovation

(Eisenhardt

&

Tabrizi,

1995);

and

experimentation

in

entrepreneurship (Shah & Tripsas, 2007; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992). In academia,
references specific to the lean startup methodology have received limited attention but are
growing (e.g. Fisher, 2012; Whalen & Akaka, 2016; York & Danes, 2014). Lean startups
have even become a recurring topic of discussion at major academic management
conferences in the past couple of years (Clough & Wu, August 2016; Wu & Clough,
August 2017). However, while the implications of the lean startup methodology are
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substantial, both in terms of how entrepreneurs may interact with their early customers
and how these early customer interactions may shape organizations, further empirical
research is needed to understand it.
In sum, past literatures suggest that early in the new venture creation process,
customers have an effect on the future trajectory of the organization through path
dependence effects. While there are several studies on the role and impact of early
customers in established organizations and a slowly growing number of new ventures,
there are a range of domains – marketing, new product development, new venture
creation process, and lean startup methodology - that may help explain the role and longterm impact of early customers’ interactions during the startup development process.
Refreshing existing theories of new venture creation could account for and make a more
central argument for customers as an influential stakeholder. It could also clarify how
traditional models of new venture creation may be affected by or integrated with the
customer interactions proposed by the lean startup methodology.
1.2. Objective and Research Questions
The objective of this dissertation is, therefore, to develop a theory of customer
interactions during the new venture creation process and to add new insights that focus on
understanding what types of customer interactions take place throughout new venture
creation. Given the potential for the long-term influence of early customers, gaining a
better understanding of customer interactions at different stages of venture creation and
product development is important to assess the types of early customers that a startup
should seek out, how customers can influence different stages of the venture creation
process, and how these interactions can help create a customer-focused mission and
shared purpose among the entrepreneurial team (Zhang & Doll, 2001). To better
understand customers’ interactions with the startup during the venture creation process,
the overarching research question of this study is:
What is the role of early customers in an innovative startup’s development?
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More specifically, I am interested in developing an understanding of when and
how early customers are involved in the venture creation process and their long-term
impact on startup development and trajectory, and ask:
When and how do startups interact with early customers during the venture
creation process, and how do these interactions create path dependence for the type of
organization being created?
Before going further, I want to set boundaries on this research. First, the
entrepreneurial process is complex, non-linear, and uncertain (Bhave, 1994; Gartner,
1985; Liao & Welsch, 2008; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). I acknowledge that there are
several potential stakeholders that impact the venture creation process (Gartner & Carter,
2003), however, limit this dissertation to potential first customers that are courted by the
startup, the confirmed first customer that buys the product or service eventually offered,
and subsequent early customers. Secondly, I focus on innovative startups that are
developing their own novel products or services and business models, rather than looking
at startups focusing on franchised businesses or imitation products. This is because I am
considering customer involvement in the innovation process as a key influencer on
startup development. Third, I define types of early customers as follows. An early
customer is any type of customer that a startup may interact with during the venture
creation process. There are two types of early customers – potential and confirmed
customers. A potential first customer is a person or organization that a startup is
considering as a potential purchaser of the goods or services. Having a potential first
customer implies that no contracts for sale have been made yet, however, interactions
may have happened. A startup may have several potential first customers. A confirmed
first customer is the first person or organization with whom a contract for a sale of goods
or services has been agreed upon. This may be a verbal or physical contract. Fourth,
given the product, business model, customer segment, and operations of the organizations
in the study are not yet considered to be confirmed at the start of data collection, I
specifically refer to the organizations as startups – defined by Blank and Dorf (2012) as
“a temporary organization in search of a scalable, repeatable, profitable business model”
(xvii).
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To address this question, I identify key, defining stages of customer interaction
during the venture creation process that create path dependence effects. I explored how
encountering potential early customers could influence the business, creating path
dependence for the type of organization that the startup will become. In particular, the
study identified the validation, or affirmation, that potential early customers offer startups
and that could affect the decisions that entrepreneurs make, where relationships with
potential customers originated (in the founders’ personal, professional, and external target
market), the events of each phase of new venture creation, the purpose of interactions,
and the modes of communication used with customers. It is through understanding when
and how startups were interacting with potential early customers and when startups were
most impressionable that founders can gain a better understanding of how to select early
customers and learn when it is most beneficial to interact with customers.
To answer the research question posed, I undertook an inductive, qualitative
process study of startups in Ontario, Canada. Ontario-based entrepreneurs are comparable
in many ways to entrepreneurs in other major entrepreneurial ecosystems that have access
to mentorship, high quality education, early-stage government funding, and cutting-edge
research institutions. I took an iterative process approach to develop theory, following
methods for inductive research (Miles & Huberman, 1994) to study the entrepreneurial
process over time (Davidsson, 2005; Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016; Mintzberg,
1979; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990). Process studies are valuable to gain a rich
understanding of the complex and dynamic nature of startups’ early stakeholder
interactions (Gioia & Patvardhan, 2012; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven,
2013). I focused on customer interactions during the venture creation process and
collected longitudinal data on nine startups initially located in incubator settings over six
to seven months. While the startups were not necessarily at the same point in the venture
creation process when they joined the study, all startups at the start of the study were less
than two years old and still growing.
I relied primarily on interviews with entrepreneur participants as the main data
source. Interviews were designed to gather narrative data, with one retrospective initial
interview and up to fourteen interviews capturing data in real time. Questions asked in the
interviews included, “Tell me a story of the startup from the idea to today” and “What

11
types of interactions have you had with customers in the past couple of weeks?” Over
time, as necessary, I adjusted the protocol to reflect themes that emerged during data
collection (Spradley, 1979; Appendix A). Eighty-one formal interviews were recorded
and transcribed with founders, as well as several informal interviews during observation
periods. To gain other perspectives, additional interviews were conducted with mentors
and incubator directors. To better understand the general environment of the founder
participants during data collection, I spent several hours a week in the incubators where
participants predominantly operated their business during the study period. This allowed
me to be present for any informal interactions that occurred - to observe meetings, pitches
to customers and venture capitalists, hear phone calls with customers from the
participants’ perspectives, and attend industry events and markets, focus groups, and
retail stores where customer interactions occurred. At least one informal observation was
noted for each startup. I also collected archival data over time that represented customer
interactions and how the business was represented (e.g. archived websites over time,
press statements, news articles, radio shows, online community forums, blogs, social
media posts, business plans) to triangulate and help to explain events (Miles &
Huberman, 1994).
For the within-case analyses, I used narratives to analyze process and construct
detailed stories to explain what is happening in an organization from a focal actor’s
perspective. According to the cultural entrepreneurship process, the stories that
entrepreneurs tell about their business help define a new venture and affect its legitimacy
(Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Narratives take into consideration the main subject (the
entrepreneur or startup), time and context, and the sequence of events and plot, or the
objective, of the narrative are highlighted. The first stage of data analysis resulted in a set
of case narratives composed of ordered, raw data (including quotes from interviews,
archival documents, and field notes; Appendix B). Process maps were also created to
develop a better understanding of this process (Appendix D).
I then identified “venture creation stages,” or events, that arose in the startups and
documented during the study period. I reduced this list to a comprehensive set of
“typical” venture creation stages using a defined set of criteria. To minimize potential
issues with retrospective accounts of action (Golden, 1992), I checked accounts with
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archival data, participants, and multiple founder interviews (where there was not just a
sole entrepreneur) to help reduce biases. Second, as events are based on participants’
perspectives, events noted by founders were considered to be of real significance. Event
listing matrices (Appendix E) and summaries of the time ordered displays were then
created (Chapter 4). These stages were refined after discussions with key participants in
the startups.
Focused, shortened narratives identifying and chronicling the customer interaction
activities for each startup were then constructed and reported in the within-case analysis
(Chapter 4). This stage of data analysis involved identifying different characteristics of
customer interactions, such as customer types based on relationships with founders,
partners, and other stakeholders. The identification of relevant categories of customer
interactions that affected venture creation was only done after data collection, rather than
assuming a set of categories in advance or identifying them early in fieldwork. The
categories identified included: origin of customer relationships (personal network,
professional network, or the external target market), the communication channels used,
the purpose of interactions, and the validation received from these interactions. After
each individual case was well understood, a meta-matrix condensing the data from all the
cases was created to allow for systematic pattern comparisons and pattern clarification
across cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Appendix F).
Data were initially managed in NVivo 11.1.1 for Mac. The initial stages of
analysis involved coding transcribed interviews to generate a broad assortment of
categories that the data could be approached from (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The purpose
of coding the data was to identify concepts that are related to the phenomena of interest,
help in the identification, clarification, and specification of concepts or subcategories of
concepts, and in understanding the mechanisms by which early customer interactions are
influencing startups.
Over time, subsequent coding was done manually by hand to create a closeness
and familiarity with the data and to maintain the richness of the qualitative data (Welsh,
2002). While computer software was helpful in the initial organization of the raw data,
manual coding of the data allowed me to connect events and ideas that took place over
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several interviews during the new venture creation process, to not lose sight of the
context and overall picture of the process, and to compare themes that emerged over the
new venture creation process across cases (Roberts & Wilson, 2002; Welsh, 2002).
As coding was a dynamic and iterative process, as new themes emerged and
concepts and dimensions developed, they were adapted and re-classified over the process
of data collection and analysis. Note that coding was not done in isolation and that
existing literature was consulted during the analysis process (Suddaby, 2006). Data was
used to build and update theory, and while iterating between data and theory, concepts
were clarified with study participants to ensure that they were properly represented.
With this dissertation, I address calls for more process research in
entrepreneurship (e.g. Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016) and for “demand-side”
entrepreneurship research (Priem, Li & Carr, 2012) that is focused downstream on
product markets and consumers to explain manager decisions for value creation. I aim to
contribute to various literatures, including venture creation and entrepreneurial process
literature (Eckhart & Shane, 2003; Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016; Hjorth, Holt, &
Steyaert, 2015; Moroz & Hindle, 2011; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Van de Ven,
Venkataraman, Polley, & Garud, 1989; Wright & Marlow, 2011) and the growing lean
startup methodology literature (e.g. Blank & Dorf, 2012; Fisher, 2012; Maurya, 2012;
Ries, 2011; Wahlen & Akaka, 2016; York & Danes, 2014). I also frame the research and
the process of venture creation in a setting of potential customer co-creation/coproduction/co-design, and hence, draw from the venture creation (e.g. Bhave, 1994; Liao
& Welsch, 2008; Reynolds & Miller, 1992), new product development (e.g. Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1995; Fang, 2008; Joshi & Sharma, 2004; Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001; Zhang &
Doll, 2001), and the marketing literature in co-production (e.g. Etgar, 2008; Payne et al.,
2008). Finally, I refer to and contribute to path dependence literature (e.g. Arthur, 1989,
1994; David, 1985, 1986; Boeker, 1989; Sydow & Schreyögg, 2015; Sydow, Schreyögg,
& Koch, 2009; Vergne, 2013; Vergne & Durand, 2010) to understand the mechanisms of
narrowing the startup’s path of options.
Based on this inductive study, I develop a customer interaction model that takes
place during new venture creation and involves three stages of customer validation that
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affect entrepreneurs’ decision making. The new venture creation process and parallel
stages of validation benefit from following the same types of customers throughout the
new venture creation process. Despite phases appearing in a linear fashion, it is essential
to note the potential for additional micro stages of validation, back-tracking and repetition
of phases, and pivoting of paths. However, despite these adaptations, the new venture
creation phases and main stages of validation tend to occur generally in this order.
The model suggests that the first positive customer interaction, often taking place
during the Opportunity Discovery or Opportunity Refinement Phases, creates primary
validation for a business concept. This creates the first narrowing of the path of
opportunities that are pursued by the startup. The validation can be verbal, contractual or
monetary. Primary validation triggers self-reinforcing processes of the startup to seek out
additional confirmation on the business concept and to develop a product and business
around this validation.
The secondary validation takes place just before the end of the Opportunity
Refinement Phase. It also confirms the product and the business model, but requires
either monetary or contractual confirmation, or other forms of commitment (such as time,
feedback on the product or business, other resources or usage of the product) that
demonstrate interest in the product from a large diversity of customers in the target
market. Receiving this secondary validation further narrows the path of opportunities that
can be pursued by the startup. The secondary validation triggers another set of selfreinforcing processes of the startup to seek out additional confirmation of the business
concept.
Finally, in contrast to previous validations, tertiary validation, taking place after
the founders commit to the business, comes only from receiving monetary or contractual
confirmation from early customers in the external target market. The focus has moved to
more operational and tactical activities, such as whether the startup can undertake
activities to organize and deliver on the business concept to meet customer expectations.
Therefore, only if the product, business model, operations, and market are established,
can tertiary validation considered to be achieved.
Practically, the findings of my research are intended to help startups understand

15
the implications of early customer selection and interaction. This research will also be
applicable to entrepreneurs and incubators that offer and facilitate entrepreneurship
training programs and foster entrepreneurial development. Entrepreneurs need to better
understand the impact of early customers on the venture creation process and the issues
salient in their minds. Such an approach may then help entrepreneurs optimize early
customer selection to align with their growth strategy.
1.3. Organization of Thesis
In Chapter 1, I introduced the topic of customer interactions during the new
venture creation process, pose the research question, and propose theory to support the
question. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the topics that are relevant to my research
question. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the research methodology for this study.
Chapter 4 then provides within-case analyses for each of the nine startups in the sample.
Based on the results in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 summarizes cross-case findings. Chapter 6
explains how validation from early customers promotes self-reinforcing mechanisms
during a startup’s path formation and a resulting path dependence, and proposes a model
of customer interactions during the new venture creation process and supporting
propositions. The findings are discussed, implications are reviewed, and future research
directions are then proposed in Chapter 7. The appendices include the interview protocol,
the detailed case studies, event listing matrices and cross-case meta-matrix used for
analyses, and process diagrams for each startup in the sample.
1.4. Summary of Chapter 1
This chapter introduced the background and motivation for developing a better
understanding of early customer interactions during the new venture creation process. It
outlines the concept of path dependence that may be applied to explain the impact of
these interactions in shaping the organization, and the research question for this
dissertation: When and how do startups interact with early customers during the venture
creation process, and how do these interactions create path dependence for the type of
organization being created? I outline the methods for the inductive, qualitative process
study undertaken to follow a study sample of nine startups. I also provide a brief
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overview of the proposed customer interaction model developed from the findings of this
dissertation. The model includes three stages of validation from customer interactions
that occur over the new venture creation process, where customers offer different types of
validation to a startup at each stage, which helps them to justify continuing to develop the
organization. The chapter then concludes with an overview of how the thesis is organized
into seven chapters and appendices.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the following literature review, I provide an overview of literature relevant to
this research on when and how do startups interact with early customers during the
venture creation process, and how do these interactions create a path dependence for the
type of organization being created? I first define and review existing literature on
entrepreneurship and new venture creation (Section 2.1). As background to the impact of
interacting with and obtaining early customers during development, I review the path
dependence literature (Section 2.2) as context to better explain the role of early customers
during the venture creation process. Specifically, this literature helps explain how the
validation that the startup receives from early customer interactions puts a startup down a
certain path and shapes the type of startup that is created through sharing knowledge and
imparting legitimacy on the startup for who they are, why they are qualified, and
ultimately, the conditions under which they may succeed, including the type of customers
they have.
To better understand customer interactions in the literature, I then review
literatures that explain the role of customer interactions. First, I look to literatures outside
of entrepreneurship to borrow knowledge from, including the new product development
(NPD) literature and the customer-centric relationship marketing literature, which contain
studies on customers’ involvement in product development (Section 2.3). The NPD
literature typically focuses on more established organizations, often with dedicated
product development departments. The co-creation and relationship marketing literature
looks at customers as active co-creators of value during the co-production process and the
feedback they provide to firms.
Finally, I review literature on early customers in new ventures (Section 2.4), that
draws on diverse literature in marketing, organizations, and entrepreneurship. I then
review practitioner-based literature such as the lean startup methodology that has been
influencing entrepreneurs since it launched over a decade ago in blogs and popular press
books (Section 2.5). The literatures reviewed and related to the research question can be
seen in Table 1.
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One important point to note is that in conducting an inductive study, I looked at
the data to see what they reveal about this phenomenon to generate new theory
accordingly. That is not to say that I entered into this topic blindly, without consulting or
having an idea of potential literatures I may contribute to (Suddaby, 2006). My goal,
however, was to follow Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) philosophy where: “the researcher
begins with an area of study that allows theory to emerge from the data” (12). As a result,
what is represented in this literature review was developed based on potential themes that
emerged during early data collection for this dissertation. Also, note that while I
acknowledge stakeholders – individuals or groups who can affect or is affected by an
organization’s ability to achieve its objectives (Freeman, 1984; Lumpkin, Moss, Gras,
Kato, & Amezcua, 2013) - do have an influence as well, customer interactions are the
focus in this dissertation.
Table 1. Main Bodies of Literature in this Dissertation
Literature

Sample References

Venture Creation

e.g. Bhave, 1994; Liao & Welsch, 2008; Reynolds & Miller, 1992

Path Dependence

Arthur, 1989, 1994; David, 1985, 1986; Boeker, 1989; Sydow &
Schreyögg, 2015; Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009; Vergne, 2013;
Vergne & Durand, 2010

Product Development and
Related Relationship
Marketing in Established
Organizations

from disciplines of: e.g. Strategy and Organization Theory - Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1995; Innovation Management – Veryzer, 1998; Zhang &
Doll, 2001; Marketing - e.g. Chang & Taylor, 2016; Etgar, 2008;
Fang, 2008; Payne et al. 2008; Rochford & Rudelius, 1997;
Operations Management - Petersen, Handfield, & Ragatz, 2005;
Engineering - Ulrich & Eppinger, 2000; Management Science Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001

Early Customers in New
Ventures

Relationship Marketing: Payne & Frow, 2017; Rehme & Svensson,
2011; Yli-Renko, Sapienza, & Hay, 2001; Ruokolainen, 2005, 2008;
Ruokolainen & Igel, 2004

Lean Startup (Practitioner)
Methodology

Blank & Dorf, 2012; Andreessen, 2007; Ries, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c,
2011; Cooper & Vlaskovits, 2013; Maurya, 2012; Fisher, 2012;
Whalen & Akaka, 2016; York & Danes, 2014
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2.1 Entrepreneurial Process and Venture Creation
2.1.1. Understanding the Entrepreneurial Process
According to Shane and Venkataraman, the field of entrepreneurship involves
“the scholarly examination of “sources of opportunities [for future goods and services];
the processes of discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities; and the set of
individuals who discover, evaluate and exploit them” (2000: 218). In cases where
entrepreneurial activities take place outside of an existing organization, a new
organization is created concurrently to the development of new products or services.
This process is new venture creation - “the organizing (in the Weickian sense) of
new organizations [where] ‘to organize is to assemble ongoing interdependent actions
into sensible sequences that generate sensible outcomes’ (Weick, 1979: p.3)” (Gartner,
1985: 697). The organization may be an independent entity or a joint venture with new
products, processes, market, or technology acquired, a new market entrant and new
supply source to customers. The Strategic Planning Institute also included new profit
centres within an established firm under the term “new ventures,” however, for the
purpose of this dissertation, I exclude such forms of venture creation and consider them
to be intrapreneurship, corporate entrepreneurship, or corporate venturing (Burgelman,
1984). Being part of a more established organization may imply the existence of
bureaucracy, routines, and preconceived ideas, as well as access to knowledge, skills and
other resources, and legitimacy that new ventures do not have.
Themes for entrepreneurship research proposed by Gartner over 30 years ago
(1985) remain relevant in research today, including research on founders of the
organization, the startup itself, the environment that the startup is in, and the processes
and activities associated with the startup. In particular, interest in and calls for process
research that breaks the entrepreneurial effort into specific stages have continued to be
made since then (e.g. Eckhart & Shane, 2003; Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016; Hjorth,
Holt, & Steyaert, 2015; Moroz & Hindle, 2011; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Van de
Ven et al., 1989; Wright & Marlow, 2011), and it has been suggested that studying
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process could help create a unified research domain of entrepreneurship (Low &
MacMillan, 1988; Moroz & Hindle, 2011; Zahra, 2007).
There are several ways in which process has been studied in entrepreneurship –
including the process of discovery (Kirzner, 1973), opportunity (e.g. Alvarez & Barney,
2007), the use of social networks, cognitive processes of entrepreneurs (e.g. Sarasvathy,
2006), and the study of contextual or environmental factors (e.g. Gartner, 1985). Creating
a startup takes time, and process studies help us understand the reality of these events, or
“a continuous string of changing states of existence categorized into sets of ‘occasions of
experience’ that can then be classified into distinct processes (Whitehead, 1929)” (Moroz
& Hindle, 2011: 786). More generally, studying process allows us to see how events
unfold over time.
Despite the potential to learn from process studies, models for the entrepreneurial
process remain fragmented and limited in number (e.g. Moroz & Hindle, 2011). Up until
2011, Moroz and Hindle found thirty-two models of the entrepreneurial process, where
only twelve had empirical evidence. The predominant bulk of the studies focused on
individual entrepreneurs (not the venture organizational level), and only four papers
converged on conceptualizing the entrepreneurial process, including studies by Gartner
(1985), Bruyat and Julien (2000), Sarasvathy (2006), and Shane (2003). Furthermore, of
these four, Gartner was the only one that included the role of innovation in
entrepreneurship (1985). Bruyat and Julien (2000) and Shane (2003) did not specify
venture creation as essential to the entrepreneurial process, and Sarasvathy (2006) took a
different epistemological approach by proposing effectuation as part of the
entrepreneurial process.
Fragmentation in the new venture creation literature should not actually be all that
surprising, however. Entrepreneurship as a field and process is multidimensional
(Gartner, 1985) and disjointed (Bygrave, 1989), as it is particularly challenging to narrow
in on a single path that startups may follow (Bruyat & Julien, 2000). While venture
creation is often depicted as straightforward (e.g. Reynolds & Miller, 1992), in reality, it
is a complex, non-linear process with a diversity of stages.
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There is a lot of uncertainty involved (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), particularly
as emerging organizations tend to be small, fragile and volatile (Katz & Gartner, 1988).
Differences in gestation periods can mean variability and complexity in the venture
creation process (Davidsson & Gordon, 2012). Due to high failure rates, a startup that is
being researched over time may quickly cease to exist, making longitudinal studies risky
for researchers. Furthermore, longitudinal process research, particularly large-scale ones
such as the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED; Gartner, Shaver, Carter, &
Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds, 2007), are limited in number due to a lack of time and
resources available to conduct process studies (e.g. Langley, 1999; Moroz & Hindle,
2011).
Attempting to overcome some these challenges surrounding entrepreneurial
process research is worthwhile, however, as understanding the process has positive
practical implications for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial founders undergo a series of
events to create their new business (Liao & Welsh, 2008), and taking the time to study
the process of venture creation can help us understand these key events and improve the
decisions that startups make (Davidsson, 2005).
2.1.2. Venture Creation
In venture creation, a business opportunity must be identified, a product or service
created, a business model developed, information, finances, and other resources must be
assembled, and operations are undertaken to distinguish the startup from competition. A
new product or service needs to be marketed, and interactions with multiple stakeholders,
including customers, suppliers, and potential employees, need to be initiated.
Concurrently, the startup must develop an organizational business structure, and may be
dealing with a liability of newness and smallness as it battles to establish legitimacy with
society and the government (Gartner, 1985). While a startup begins with an idea, the
process of designing the product involves trial and error learning and actions over time
(Gartner & Carter, 2003). This process generally means that the final product can vary
substantially from the initial idea.
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To better understand the stages of venture creation, I conducted a literature review
of the venture creation process, including both theoretical and empirical papers (such as
venture creation - Ardichvilli, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003; general outputs - Sarasvathy, 2006;
creating a legal entity - Carter, Gartner & Reynolds, 1996; or commercialization –
Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007). Given the early focus in the new venture creation
process for this dissertation, studies that only focused late in the venture development
process (much later than the first customer), or papers that focused on seeking out
opportunities, but not necessarily the rest of the venture creation process, are not included
in this literature review.
In reviewing the literature, certain stages of venture creation are mentioned
recurrently across papers (Table 2). For this dissertation, I am applying five main phases
of venture creation: Opportunity Discovery, Opportunity Refinement, Transition,
Entrepreneurial, and Execute Phases. The process begins with opportunity discovery
(Phase I), which may be either externally stimulated or internally stimulated. Externally
stimulated opportunities start with the desire to start a business. Potential entrepreneurs
then scan the environment for opportunities (opportunistic surveillance; Thompson,
1967). After recognizing various potential opportunities, one is selected to evaluate and
potentially pursue (opportunity filtration and selection; Long & McMullan, 1984). In
contrast, internally stimulated opportunities start with recognizing that there is a problem
or a need that currently has no solution. This may spark what Cyert and March (1992)
call a problemistic search, where there is a search for a solution to a problem. Once a
solution is found, founders may recognize a business opportunity and decide to pursue it.
In both cases of externally and internally stimulated opportunity recognition, the
opportunity then needs to be refined to develop a clearer business concept (opportunity
refinement, Phase II) that takes into account customers’ needs before founders commit to
creating a product and business (Bhave, 1994; Corbett, 2005; Cunneen, Mankelow, &
Gibson, 2007; Gartner, 1985; Greenberger & Sexton, 1988). The opportunity discovery
and refinement phases can last a few weeks to several years prior to either exit or
initiation of activities to create a business (Brixy, Sternberg, & Stüber, 2012).
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While opportunity discovery and refinement are key phases of entrepreneurship
(e.g. Baron, 2006), up until this stage of venture creation, much of the investment by
founders is intangible, such as their personal time. The creation of an organization is
often considered more substantial, however, where a structure and organizational
processes need to be developed (Thompson, 1967) and there is an investment of capital.
Various authors have suggested there is some sort of transitional phase (Phase III) –
where commitment to organization creation takes place only when the business concept is
refined, when resources such as initial funding is obtained, when proprietary technology
is developed, or once an initial customer, or at least a highly likely potential customer,
has been secured (Bhave, 1994; Corbett, 2005; Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007;
Gartner, 1985; Greenberger & Sexton, 1988).

The first sale of a startup may be

considered particularly significant in that it validates the business concept (Block &
MacMillan, 1985), can help a startup expand their business (Ruokolainen, 2008), by
demonstrating credibility (Blomqvist, 1997) and reducing perceived risk of the purchase
for other future customers (Hutt & Speh, 2010). All these transitional activities, however,
are themselves signals of the potential of the organization and are the result of
“organizing” and hence, I include all these as part of the venture creation process.
Subsequently, in the entrepreneurial phase (Phase IV), the startup introduces the
product to external stakeholders in the wider market for feedback on the product and
operations (Bhave, 1994). These interactions have been shown to occur at any stage of
business development, and have varying degrees of outcome success (Bhave, 1994;
Corbett, 2005; Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007; Gartner, 1985; Greenberger &
Sexton, 1988).
Resources and competencies need to be acquired and organized to develop the
product and organization – including organizing to commercialize the product,
manufacture, arrange logistics and market it (Baron, 2007; Bhave, 1994; Carter, Gartner,
& Reynolds, 1996; Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007; Gartner, 1985; Ucbasaran,
Westhead, & Wright, 2001). This phase is entrepreneurial, in a sense, because there is
increased commitment, risk, and interest in exploiting the opportunity.
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While most models of new venture creation do not explain the final stage, an
execute phase (Phase V), once the exchange phase is over, the product, business model,
operations, and market have been established. The ‘temporary organization’ of a startup
ceases to exist and is replaced by a more established, but still new venture, with a
“scalable, repeatable business model” (Blank & Dorf, 2012).
2.1.3. Takeaways from Understanding the Entrepreneurial Process
In summary, we can see that new venture creation has been a topic of study in
entrepreneurship for several years now. There is, however, continued opportunity and
demand for refinement of new venture creation process research and to develop an
understanding of the process. In particular, studies that acknowledge, integrate and clarify
exchanges with early customers throughout the venture creation process are limited in the
new venture creation literature, despite practicing entrepreneurs continuing to consult
with customers, even if informally, to better understand the problems they encounter and
their preferences. In the next section, I review customer interactions in other disciplines
that offer insight into how customers may be involved the new venture creation process.
2.2. Path Dependence
From the beginning, startups are complex and uncertain, dealing with discovering,
assessing and exploiting opportunities during the venture creation process and affected by
whom is involved (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). According to Stinchcombe,
“organizational forms and types have a history, and this history determines some aspects
of the present structure of organizations of that type” (1965: 153). The founding
conditions of a startup are thought to influence its future direction, including competitive
intensity (Swaminathan, 1996), managerial values and philosophies, political and social
processes (Selznick, 1957), growth (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), and
organizational identity (Kroezen & Heugens, 2012).
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Table 2. Conceptualizations of Stages of Venture Creation and the Entrepreneurial Process in the
Literature
Authors

Stages

Webster, 1976

Pre-venture (Entrepreneurial search), Hard work (Evaluation, negotiation,
networks, inventor – prototyping, R&D, financial stress; manufacturer,
distributor, and venture organization, power play between inventors and
subordinates), Financial jeopardy (vulnerability); Product introduction
(critical moment), Rapacity (renegotiation, knothole); Payoff (Success or
failure)

Gibb & Ritchie,
1981

Acquiring motivation, Finding an idea, Validating the idea, Identifying the
resources, Negotiating to get into Business, Birth, and Survival

Galbraith, 1982

Four stage-of-development model – (1) Proof-of-principle stage involving
developing proprietary technology; (2) Prototype stage where proprietary
technology is made into a prototype; (3) Model shop stage – models are
produced and tested; (4) Startup stage where formal production begins and
firm makes their first sales

Gartner, 1985

Up to six stages, in no particular order: Locate a business opportunity,
Accumulate resources, Market products, Develop prototypes and final
product, Build an organization (including the organizational processes and
strategy), and Respond to the environmental context, including society and
the government. These activities do not necessarily include innovation, nor
are they unique to entrepreneurship.

Greenberger &
Sexton, 1988

(Limited to the decision to create a venture) – Identify an opportunity,
Believe that one can manage a firm, Possess expertise and control, Develop a
unique/niche product or process, Decision to initiate

Katz & Gartner,
1988

Gathering information, Creating boundaries that distinguish the organization
from the rest of the World, Acquiring financial resources, Exchanges with
external suppliers and customers

Van de Ven,
Venkataraman,
Polley, & Garud,
1989

The emergence of a business idea over time, The creation of competencies to
both innovate and market a product, and Using these competencies to develop
additional products in the business

Kazanjian
Drazin, 1990

&

Four stage model of new venture growth: Conception and Development,
Commercialization, Growth, and Stability

Reynolds & Miller,
1992

Four stages: Commitment, First hire, First sale, First financing

Bhave, 1994

Three-stage model: Definition of business concept (internal or external),
Commitment to venture; Creation of organization; Creation and set up of
production technology, and Exchange of product with customers and market
in a non-linear, feedback-driven process
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Table 2 continued (part 2 of 3)
Authors

Stages

Baucus &
Human, 1994

Five stages – Search for/generate business ideas, Selection of business
opportunity, Gathering of information, Formal specification of business, Get
support and arrange logistics before daily operations begin (seven case studies)

Carter,
Gartner, &
Reynolds,
1996

In no particular order – Activities to be completed in startup are: Organizing a
team, Preparing a plan, Buying/renting facilities/equipment, Looking for facilities,
Investing own money, Seeking out funding, Obtaining financial support,
Developing models and gaining fulltime staff, Applying for licenses or patents,
Creating a legal entity, Saving money for future investment

Bruyat &
Julien, 2000

Specific stages not defined, however, authors suggest that creative organizing
individuals are involved in the entrepreneurial process towards new value creation,
and places the entrepreneurial process within its environment and a specific time
period. Venture creation is not a given (Theoretical)

Ucbasaran,
Westhead, &
Wright, 2001

Opportunity recognition and information search and resource acquisition and
business strategies (more the entrepreneurial process)

Ardichvilli,
Cardozo, &
Ray, 2003

Perception, Discovery, Creation, lead to development and evaluation. From
evaluation, either idea is aborted, revised, or a venture is formed (Theoretical)

Shane, 2003

Entrepreneurial opportunities, Discovery, Exploitation, Execution (including
assembling resources, organizational design, and strategy)

Baker &
Nelson, 2005

A process model of bricolage for resource-constrained firms – Taking a
combination of resources available to handle new problems and opportunities and
continue to seek resources, counteract limitations and generate something from
nothing, actions are mutually reinforcing, results in outcome of either routinization
and broad rich markets and growth, or no growth

Corbett, 2005

(Only opportunity recognition) – Two stages: Discovery (Preparation – deliberate
and unintended); Incubation; Insight (Eureka!, Problem solved, Idea shared) and
Formation (Evaluation and Elaboration) (Theoretical, based on experiential
learning practice)

Sarasvathy,
2006

Inputs, effectual strategy, outputs

Baron, 2007

Three main stages: 1) Opportunity identification, evaluation; Intentions to
proceed; assembly of resources; 2) Selecting structural form; product/service
establishment; initial marketing plans; strategy; 3) Handling conflict; negotiations;
motivating others; attracting employees; management functions; plan exits
(Theoretical)
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Table 2 continued (part 3 of 3)
Cunneen, Mankelow,
& Gibson, 2007
(Theoretical)

Four broad stages: Opportunity recognition (Includes creative activity to
create a good idea, innovative activity to convert good idea into an
innovation, and additional activities for pursuing the innovation),
Opportunity evaluation (on both a commercial and personal level),
Opportunity development (Includes a detailed situational analysis,
formulation of mission and objectives, formation of entry strategy, creation
of a detailed business plan and analysis, and a search for funds), and
Commercialization (Includes formulating detailed operating plans,
ensuring initial funding is in place before implementing business and
operating plans

Liao & Welsch, 2008

Obtain resources, Develop new products, Seek funding, Do sales, Hire
employees

Blank & Dorf, 2012
(from a startup
perspective. Falls
under lean
methodology)

Concept/seed, product development – which includes Product
requirements, Design, Implementation by engineers, Verification (design
testing and validating), Maintenance, Alpha/beta testing, and Product
launch (commercialization, including production assumed to follow but not
explained)

Chell, 2013

Opportunity recognition/identification, Opportunity formation/
development, Opportunity exploitation, Outcome(s) (focus is not
specifically on venture creation, but the entrepreneurial process)

Founders possess knowledge and experiences prior to startup establishment
(Reuber & Fischer, 1999). A startup’s past experiences and those of its founding
members, bring a history and experientially acquired knowledge that allows
entrepreneurs to develop “insights, knowledge, and associations between past actions, the
effectiveness of those actions, and future actions” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985: 811), particularly
in an established industry or one in which they have experience. In contrast, if a startup is
operating in a new industry, particularly early in the startup’s development when they are
still figuring out and making decisions on its operations, founders may not be in a
position to build on existing knowledge and may not know what additional information
they need to collect (Clark & Fujimoto, 1987). This can greatly slow the interpretation of
new information. Founders are still learning what information is relevant and valuable to
their startup, and are undergoing a sensemaking process to integrate new knowledge with
their existing knowledge (Ravasi & Turati, 2005). At this stage, they may be less affected
by existing biases and routines.
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While entrepreneurs start with an array of options, over time, a startup’s path
narrows as they learn more through interactions with these founding conditions and the
decisions they make as they invest resources, including time and effort, to set up their
organization. In this section, I review the path dependence literature that can be used to
better understand the venture creation process and sets the foundation for the theoretical
context of this dissertation on early customers’ interactions impacting the venture
creation process.
2.2.1 Path Dependence – An Overview
“History matters” (Notteboom, 1997; Sewell, 1996), “the past affects the future”
(Sydow, Scheyögg, & Koch, 2009), and “bygones are rarely bygones” (Teece, Pisano &
Schuen, 1997: 522) are terms used to describe path dependence - how decisions are
historically conditioned and are often used to describe how organizational features
developed and persist. The concept of path dependence can be helpful in connecting the
past, present and future in a more abstract way and are explained in terms of the
technological, institutional and/or cognitive rigidities it creates (Vergne & Durand, 2011).
Research on path dependence builds on the seminal work by David (1985) and
Arthur (1994). David’s research used the QWERTY keyboard technology to explain how
an inefficient and inferior technological standard was established and persists (1985,
1986), and Arthur highlighted the role of self-reinforcing mechanisms in path-dependent
processes that are beyond the control of an agent (1989, 1994). Initial research focused
predominantly on technological innovations and how firms are constrained by their
technologies through path dependence that developed through interrelatedness of
technologies and gaining economies of scale and increased returns (e.g. Arthur, 1989,
1994; David, 1985, 1986; Dosi, 1982, 1997; Nelson & Winter, 1982).
Today, path dependence draws on the fields of institutional economics (e.g.
North, 1990), political science (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000), institutionalization
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1991), and organizational studies (Boeker, 1989; Johnson, 2007;
Stinchcombe, 1965). There are several studies emerging in this area (e.g. Czaban,
Hocevar, & Whitley, 2003; Garud & Karnøe, 2001; Greve & Seidel, 2015; Gruber, 2010;
Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen, & Volberda, 2007; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011; Sydow &
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Schreyögg, 2015; Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009; Vergne, 2013; Vergne & Durand,
2010).
I draw on research by Sydow, Scheyogg, and Koch (2009) and Vergne and
Durand (2010, 2011) and use Vergne and Durand’s (2011) definition of path dependence
as “a stochastic process triggered by contingent events and subject to self-reinforcement
over time, which tightens actors’ choice sets (Vergne & Durand, 2010)” (366). A
stochastic process has random components and is non-deterministic, in that different
paths could have been created (Vergne & Durand, 2010: 755).
The initial choice is considered a “small event,” and serves as a point of reference
for later choices (Van Driel, 2013). It is generally a chance, unpredictable, or historic
accident (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). According to Van Driel (2013), “events are not
necessarily a reaction to an earlier one, but still are influenced by it, in the sense that this
earlier event makes the later event more likely” (246).
There is a tapering process in which the choice sets become reduced when early
events are reinforced (Van Driel, 2013), and when actors becoming more sensitive to
their initial conditions. Changing to an alternative decision path can requiring a disruptive
event to reverse the initial choice or can mean encountering uncertain costs though. In
other words –the event itself is not significant. It is how the actors construct and interpret
the event that creates its significance (Munir, 2005). This self-reinforcement can result in
positive outcomes, such as increasing economic returns from positive feedback, but also
negative outcomes such as the adoption of inferior technologies or processes (Leblebici,
2013). Eventually, lock-in occurs - “a situation of relatively stable equilibrium, caused by
path dependence, from which it is difficult to escape without the intervention of shocks
exogenous to the system” (Vergne & Durand, 2010: 755) – and where a dominant
decision pattern becomes fixed.
The two main conditions of path dependence involve contingency and selfreinforcement. I adopt definitions from Vergne and Durand (2010), where contingency
“refers to unpredictable, non-purposive, and seemingly random events” and selfreinforcement is “a set of mechanisms endogenous to a given path that makes it more and
more dominant over time relative to alternative paths” (Vergne & Durand, 2010: 755).

30
2.2.2. Phases of Path Dependence
The phases of path dependence have received different labels in the literature.
Sydow, Scheyogg, and Koch (2009) have defined three distinct stages in the path
dependence process: the Preformation Phase, the Formation Phase, and the Lock-in
Phase, while Vergne and Durand (2011) defined the stages as Path Origin, Path
Development and Path Outcome. Given the similarities of each of the ordered phases, I
focus on Sydow et al.’s terminology (2009; Figure 1).
Figure 1. The Constitution of an Organizational Path (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009: 692).
Reprinted with permission from the Academy of Management.

In the first phase, the Preformation Phase (Sydow et al., 2009), several options
exist to choose from (Mahoney, 2000). While initially there are many potential outcomes,
allowing the possibility for multiple paths to be pursued, decisions are open to revision
and the consequences are not known ahead of time. Furthermore, the previous history of
the organization, decision makers, and context still matters at this stage, there is no
significant restriction on potential actions or decisions within an organization. When a
decision is made, it is initially considered random (David, 1985) and an ‘insignificant
event’ (Arthur, 1989). At this stage, there is still the possibility of adaptation, however,
the decision unintentionally sets off a self-reinforcing process. The time of this decision
is considered a critical juncture, where there is a narrowing of the path options and the
organization enters into the Formation Phase (Sydow et al., 2009).
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In the Formation Phase (Sydow et al., 2009), a path is contingently selected, and
development is nurtured by self-reinforcing processes or feedback loops that promote the
emergence of dominant actions (Arthur, 1994). Self-reinforcement can be defined as “a
set of mechanisms put into motion that sustains the contingently selected path” (Vergne
& Durand, 2011: 371). There are both positive mechanisms that support the path, such as
increased returns (e.g. Arthur, 1989; Bassani & Dosi, 2001), as well as negative
mechanisms that eliminate, or make alternative paths less attractive for decision makers
(Page, 2006).
While at this stage, the options are narrowing and altering or reversing the initial
decision may be a challenge, the path still has room to evolve. It is important to note that
this increased path narrowing is not aimed specifically at achieving increased utility or
increasing returns for the organization. A focus on utility ignores political processes,
cognitive biases, and emotional reactions that can affect feedback cycles, and selfreinforcing mechanisms can also cause alternative paths to be selected out. Furthermore,
decision makers are still making decisions in a broader context, culture, and institutional
norms that may influence decision making and reinforce a path (Sydow et al., 2009).
In the Lock-in Phase (Sydow et al., 2009), there is further constriction on the
available options. A dominant decision pattern becomes fixed, creating a certain way of
doing things (Sydow et al., 2009). When lock-in occurs – “an organizational situation that
can be altered only at a prohibitive cost and in response to strong exogenous pressures
(e.g. economic crisis, radical technological change, political turmoil” (Vergne & Durand,
2011: 372). Examples of what contributes to lock-in include an organization’s routines
being formed and inertia to change begins to take over (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), and
there is conformity to institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). It becomes
increasingly challenging to simultaneously have a fluid business model and project
legitimacy to the market, needed to survive.
Lock-in can be cognitive, normative, and/or resource based (Giddens, 1984). It
should be noted that lock-in should not be inherently viewed as resulting in inefficiency
or market failure (Vergne & Durand, 2011). A lock-in is only considered inefficient when
better alternatives arise (Sydow et al., 2009).
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The initial proposal of path dependence by Arthur (1994) included four
properties:

non-predictability,

non-ergodicity

(several

outcomes

are

possible),

inflexibility (challenging to change options), and inefficiency (when a path locks an
organization into an inferior solution). Today, the boundaries on path dependence and
lock-in have been slightly adapted. Non-predictability is restricted to the beginning of
path formation. There is the potential for a path to become increasingly predictable,
however more so towards the end. Total inflexibility of a path may not actually occur,
and inefficiency only arrives when more efficient options arise (Sydow et al., 2009).
2.2.3. Potential Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms
In their theoretical framework paper, Schreyögg and Sydow (2011) suggest four
mechanisms that act as propagating self-reinforcement of the path dependence process
and a diminishing scope of action during the Formation Phase: Coordination Effects,
Complementary Effects, Learning Effects, and Adaptive Expectation Effects.
Coordination Effects create self-reinforcement when there is an institution, organization
rule or routine that is adopted that promotes more efficient interactions among actors.
This decreases coordination costs and makes it easier to anticipate reactions and
behaviours. Complementary Effects are self-reinforcing when an organization’s practices
are interconnected in some way, creating synergy (Pierson, 2000). Learning Effects occur
when there is increased efficiency from an activity being performed frequently,
developing accumulated skills and allowing for exploitation of learning. This is also
affected by exposure to information. Finally, the more people that are expected to prefer a
product, the more attractive it becomes. Adaptive Expectation Effects assumes that
individual preferences are not fixed, however, will adapt in response to others’
preferences and propagate self-reinforcement of a certain path (Schreyögg and Sydow,
2011). This effect is often tied to the need to end up on a “winning side,” a bandwagon
effect, and a desire for social belonging, where these effects are seen when an option
becomes more attractive due to more individuals preferring it (Leibestein, 1950). For
instance, sometimes organizations see informal diffusion of

practices when

organizational members adopt these practices because they see others doing the same
(Szulanski, 1996).
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It is important to note that beyond these effects, there are other effects that could
influence self-reinforcing processes. For instance, network externalities are selfreinforcing processes that consider the effect of one user of a good or service on the value
of that product to other people. The network is generally more valuable as more people
join (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). Today, we see network effects in social media where
communities are being created (Belvaux, 2011).
In contrast, a downward spiral effect can take place when inappropriate concepts
are reinforced. For example, in escalating commitment, an organization does not change
its path or actions, despite facing an increasingly negative outcome related to a past
action, decision, or investment (Staw, 1984). This can be particularly dangerous for
entrepreneurs, as seen in the McMullen and Kier (2016) meta-theoretical process model
of escalation of commitment based on the 1996 Mount Everest disaster. Even in early
stages of new venture creation, entrepreneurs may be so persistent and focused on a goal
that they develop a psychological determinant of time investment, miss out on creating a
contingency plan, and set themselves up for additional risks and investment in resources,
time, and reputation. Furthermore, time invested can make it a challenge for individuals
to back away, should it reflect poorly on them. This reflects escalating commitment
through a psychological determinant of ego threat (Sleesman et al., 2012).
2.2.4. Agency and Reflexivity in the Organizational Path
According to Vergne and Durand (2010), in the absence of exogenous shock, a
path will persist. This is unsurprising, as path dependence has been described as sticky
and irreversible (David, 1994). However, such an approach suggests that actors have no
agency in the process, and it can be impossible to determine whether actors actually act in
a non-purposive way, given they have aspirations and previous knowledge that can guide
their decisions.
Increasingly, alternative studies suggest that actors exhibit agency that affects the
organizational path, such as context, cognitive frames, emotions, and politics (e.g. Kaplan
& Tripsas, 2008; Koch, 2011; Thrane, Blaabjerg, & Møller, 2010; Valorinta, Schildt, &
Lamberg, 2011). For example, Thrane, Blaabjerg, and Møller (2010) consider actors to be
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proactive and involved in reflexivity - “the ability of actors immersed in specific
trajectories to observe the results of their actions and deliberately try to alter the
conditions in which they find themselves” (Araujo & Harrison, 2002: 8).

Garud,

Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe (2010) suggest that actors have agency and are part of
emerging path creation. While Garud et al. (2010) see the processes of path dependence
and path creation as separate activities, Sydow et al. (2009) suggest that both path
creation and path dependence can occur in a process.
A proactive nature is prominent in entrepreneurs that are developing a startup.
Entrepreneurs are creating their own paths and have an “entrepreneurial mindset”
(McGrath & MacMillan, 2000). Actors are effectuating through complex processes
(Sarasvathy, 2001), and are able to manipulate self-reinforcing mechanisms and alter
lock-in situations with creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934). Not all businesses stay
entrepreneurial, however, as they grow. Gaining a better understanding of the balance and
transition between path creation and path dependence processes has the potential to help
us better understand the narrowing of the entrepreneurial path.
2.2.5. Related Concepts
Path dependence has been compared with several related concepts. In Table 3,
brief explanations of each of the related concepts are given. For more detailed reviews,
see Sydow et al. (2009) and Vergne and Durand (2010).
2.2.6. Takeaways from the Path Dependence Literature
The concept of path dependence has the potential to explain how the initial
conditions that a startup encounters can impact their future development trajectories. Path
dependence implies that an initial decision is often considered to be random (David,
1985) and an ‘insignificant event’ (Arthur, 1989). Researchers have debated in theorizing
about the path dependence process, and further process studies can help clarify the
mechanisms and conditions needed to create a narrowing path and trigger events such as
the critical juncture and lock-in stages (path dependence).
This focus on initial decisions is primed to be used to better understand the
entrepreneurial process. Entrepreneurs are constantly making initial decisions. While a
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decision such as an opportunity to pursue may be well thought through, less attention is
often paid as to what customer is best to first interact with, how to interact, and what
should the outcome of the interaction be. Interactions with early customers are often
those of convenience. However, it is in these moments of early customer interactions that
founders are receiving feedback, suggestions and validations, that trigger decisions that
may put them down a certain path and narrow their options. Finally, in path dependence,
there is a suggested lack of agency, however in reality, entrepreneurs and other
stakeholders, such as customers, play a substantial role in decision making and
interactions that affect both these processes.
Table 3. Related Concepts to Path Dependence
Concept

Explanation

Imprinting (Bryant, 2014; Burton
& Beckman, 2007; Gioia et al.,
2010; Johnson, 2007; Marquis &
Tilcsik, 2013; Schreyogg & Sydow,
2011; Simsek, Fox, & Heavey,
2015; Stinchcombe, 1965)

The process when environmental conditions are imprinted or
“stamped” on the organization in a brief, sensitive time period.
These conditions then continue to persist, even if there are
subsequent significant environmental changes.

Escalating Commitment (Ross &
Staw, 1993; Staw, 1976)

A social mechanism that prevents decision makers from changing
a course of action, due to fear of losing face or self-justification,
even if the outcome will be negative.

Commitment (Staw, 1984) / Sunk
Cost (Ghemawat, 1991)

Individuals are committed to the decision made or a resource
commitment creates an exit barrier from a certain scenario and
may affect future decisions.

Structural Inertia (Hannan &
Freeman, 1977, 1984; Levinthal,
1997)

Exists in population ecology - During startup creation, the
establishment of routines can be helpful to suggest accountability
and reliability of an organization. However, over time, this can
result in hyper stability, where the organization is unable to adapt,
even when there is a change in the environment.

Reactive Sequences (Mahoney,
2000)

A chain of modular events where there are singular cause and
effect relationships – Where event A affects event B, and event B
affects event C. The pattern of events is not created in advance,
however, and just seem to propagate.

Institutionalization (Powell &
DiMaggio, 1991; Tolbert & Zocker,
1996)

The focus is on the symbolic-normative environment of
organizations and how it can influence formal/informal
organization structure over time. Inertia and instability can be
created.
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2.3. Learning from Early Customer Interactions in Established Firms
Firms may involve customers and other stakeholders in their various activities
(Zhang & Doll, 2001). While sales are an assumed interaction that will hopefully occur,
customer interactions can take place well before with the intention of incorporating
customer preferences. Furthermore, customer interactions are well researched in
disciplines involving established firms, including the fields of engineering, new product
development (NPD), marketing, and innovation. For instance, in the NPD literature, most
customer involvement is proposed to occur during product optimization (Nijssen &
Lieshout, 1995), involving the specification, concept design and prototyping stages of
product development (Kaulio, 1998). In recent marketing literature, customers are
considered empowered stakeholders that interact with organizations in varying degrees
(e.g. Hoyer et al., 2010; Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 2008). In the lead-user design
methodology, customers are heavily involved in the R&D process (Herstatt & von
Hippel, 1992; Urban & von Hippel, 1988). Given that tasks of product development,
manufacturing, and commercialization occur in established firms and in startups, there is
potential to learn from existing literature on customer interactions.
Both innovative established firms and startups share similarities in the product
development process - studied in-depth in the new product development (NPD) literature
(e.g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Kaulio, 1998; Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001; Zhang & Doll,
2001). NPD is defined as, “the transformation of a market opportunity and a set of
assumptions about product technology into a product available for sale” (Krishnan &
Ulrich, 2001: 1). For example, in a typical NPD process, after a product opportunity is
identified (Opportunity spotting and selection), the concept is developed, a detailed
design created, and implementation by engineers typically takes place (Generation of
Concept and Critical Evaluation of Concept). There is often some sort of verification
process, including developing a prototype, testing, and validating it with customers
(Development of Product) before a product is then commercialized and launched
(Product launch; e.g. Crawford & Di Benedetto, 2000; see Table 4 for a sample of how
NPD stages are represented in the literature). These similarities allow us to see where
information from this literature could be applied to startups as well.
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Table 4. Stages in the New Product Development Process, including the Fuzzy Front End, Across
Disciplines
Reference

Stages

Royce, 1970 (Engineering)

Software Development – Waterfall of product development
(Conception, initiation, analysis), Collect system and software
requirements, Analysis, Program design, Verification (testing),
Maintenance (operations)

Booz, Allen, & Hamilton, 1982
(Booz, Allen, and Hamilton’s
New Product Process)

New product strategy, Idea generation, Screening and evaluation,
Business analysis, Development, Testing and Commercialization

Rochford &
(Marketing)

Idea generation, Screening, Preliminary market analysis,
Preliminary technical analysis, Preliminary financial analysis,
Preliminary financial analysis, Market study, Product
development, In-house product testing, Customer product testing,
Market testing, Pre-commercialization financial analysis,
Commercialization

Rudelius,

1997

Kaulio, 1998 (with a focus on
interactions between customers
and
the
design
process)
(Operations Management)

Specification, Concept development,
Prototyping, and Final product

Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998
(focus is on fuzzy front end, but
two main stages of entire NPD
process)
(Innovation
Management)

Front end [Pre-Phase Zero (Opportunity identification, idea
generation, market and technology analysis; product strategy
formulation and developing an understanding of the link between
the business strategy and NPD – how the product fits into the
firm’s portfolio of products), Phase Zero (Product concept
development, identify customer needs, market segments, and
competitive situations, evaluate technology capabilities and
requirements, identify core product requirements, test the
concept, specify resources needed, and identify key risks and
challenges), Phase One (Feasibility and project planning,
including identifying key project participants and additional
functional support needed)], New Product Development
Execution [Specification and design, prototype test and
validation, volume manufacturing, market launch]

Veryzer,
1998
Management)

Strategic planning and concept generation, Pre-technical
evaluation with market and customer needs; Concept revision,
Technical feasibility examined, Preliminary design and technical
development, Formative prototype, Lead user testing, Design
modification, Commercialization

(Innovation

Detailed

design,

Crawford & Di Benedetto, 2000

Opportunity spotting and selection, Generation of a concept,
Critical evaluation of concept, Development of product, Product
launch

Koen et al., 2001 (focus on fuzzy
front end, but three main stages
of NPD process) (Innovation and
Technology Management)

Fuzzy front end (Opportunity identification, opportunity analysis,
idea genesis, idea selection, concept, and technology
development), Structured new product and process development,
Commercialization
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Table 4 (continued)
Reference

Stages

Cooper, 2008
Stage-Gate®:
a
structured
process, designed to improve
efficiency and effectiveness of
NPD.
Stages
involve
information gathering and
“gates” where deliverables
must be met and a checklist of
criteria are checked against
(Innovation Management and
Commercial Tool)
Krishnan & Ulrich,
(Management Science)

Discovery and creative idea screening, Stage-Gate (Five stages Initial and Comparative Analysis including Scoping, Building a
business case, development, testing and validation, launch),
Commercialization and Post-launch review

2001

Concept development, Supply-chain design, Product design, and
Production ramp-up and Launch

Petersen, Handfield, & Ragatz,
2005 (Operations Management)

1) Idea generation (Voice of the customer); 2) Business/technical
assessment (Preliminary); 3) Product/process/service concept
development; 4) Product/process/service engineering and design;
5) Prototype build, test and pilot/ramp-up for operations; ending
with Full Scale production/operations. Note that supplier can
integrate during any of these stages

Roper, Micheli,
Vahter,
2016
innovation, etc.)

Identify new products, Prototype development, Final product
design, Product testing, Production engineering, Market research,
Developing a marketing strategy

Love, &
(Design,

Before proceeding, however, it is important to acknowledge that there are key
differences between an established firm and a startup, as these differences may affect the
customer interaction process during product development and beyond. First, in the
entrepreneurship process, while entrepreneurs are developing and exploiting an idea, a
new firm – its structure and processes - is concurrently being created (e.g. Gartner, 1985;
Katz & Gartner, 1988). A startup’s routines are in development at this time, including
those for customer involvement in the product development process (Lagrosen, 2005;
Ulrich & Eppinger, 2000), as entrepreneurs are still trying to both recognize and adapt
their startup to fit within an external environment (Liao & Welsh, 2008). In contrast,
having existing customers and product lines can often affect product development for an
established firm’s products. More established firms tend to focus on how a potential new
product would fit into their existing product portfolio and their existing business
(Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998). This helps these established businesses to continue to
serve the needs of existing customers while obtaining new ones, while a startup has a
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blank slate in terms of defining who they want their customers to be and the type of
customers that they can attract.
Finally, startups face several new challenges that involve accessing and
mobilizing resources, creating a market, establishing a reputation, and organizing the firm
with the intention to exploit a discovered idea (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). These are
different struggles than those encountered by more established organizations that often
have better-funded R&D budgets. Startups also face substantial uncertainty in
opportunities, affecting not just the product line but also the survival of the business. In
contrast, new product development in more established firms tends to be associated with
a goal of increased firm performance and increased efficiency.
2.3.1. Terminology of Customer Involvement in Established Firms Across Disciplines
The terminology for customer involvement has evolved across disciplines and
industries. To create a discussion around customer involvement in product development,
the NPD, marketing, engineering, and other disciplines have developed terminology such
as customer participation, defined as “the extent to which the customer is involved in the
manufacturer’s NPD process” (Fang, 2008), and customer knowledge development,
defined as “a process of developing an understanding of customer new product
preferences that unfolds through the iteration of probing and learning activities (Lynn,
Morone, & Paulson, 1996) across stages of the prelaunch phase of new product
development” (Joshi & Sharma, 2004: 48).
Much can be learned about customer interactions from the field of marketing,
which is defined as - “the activity, set of institutions, and processes for creating,
communicating, delivering and exchanging offerings that have value for customers,
clients, partners and society at large” (American Marketing Association, 2013). Within
marketing, the field of relationship marketing is particularly relevant to understanding
customer interactions (e.g. Berry, 1983; Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Morgan & Hunt,
1994; Payne & Frow, 2017; Sheth & Parvatiyar, 2002).
Berry (1983) defined relationship marketing as “attracting, maintaining and – in
multi-service organizations – enhancing customer relationships” (25). The marketing
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advantage of small firms has been linked to the close relationships between customers
and the entrepreneurs (Zontanos & Anderson, 2004). Over 30 years later, relationship
marketing continues to grow as a field, expanding to include dyadic relationships,
networks, and the interactions between them (Gummesson, 1994). Customer
management, part of relationship marketing, refers specifically to the management of
these customer interactions (Payne & Frow, 2017).
In engineering, quality function deployment involves engineers specifying and
developing a product concept, designing the product, and producing a prototype and final
product with the customers’ needs in mind, but does not necessarily consider regular
customer interaction (Ullman, 1992). In contrast, user-oriented product development
focuses on user requirements and involves regular interaction and feedback with
customers throughout the product development process (Rosenblad-Wallin, 1985).
Concept testing, a term used in the consumer packaged goods industry and industrial
products, involves the customer even before there was a working prototype. This may
involve sketches of the product and regular communication (Page & Rosenbaum, 1992).
Later in the product design process, the term beta testing is used in the consumer goods
and computer and software industries for customers to test a working prototype (Dolan &
Matthews, 1993). Methods where customers are more involved and involved early,
include consumer-idealized design in early stages of product development (Cincianntelli
& Magdison, 1993), and the lead user method where customers are deeply involved in the
entire product development process (Herstatt & Von Hippel, 1992).
2.3.2. Categorizing Customer Interactions in Literature on Established Firms
I outline four ways customer interactions have been studied in established firms
that may be helpful in our understanding of customer interactions during the new venture
creation process. These include: A) when customers are involved; B) what is the purpose
of these customer interactions; C) how firms are interdependent with customers, and D)
categorizing customers involved in these interactions.
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A. When are Customers Involved?
While customers are generally involved in the marketing and sales stages in
organizations, they may also be involved in different stages of the product development
and manufacturing process of established firms (Table 4; e.g. Gerwin, 2004; Hoyer et al.,
2010; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). Looking to the new product development
literature, this can be as early as idea generation during the fuzzy front end, and through
the stages of specification, concept development, detailed design, prototyping, and
development of the final product (Kaulio, 1998). In the fuzzy front end, at the beginning
of NPD (Koen et al., 2001), an established firm is still forming a vision about the product
that they may offer and how it fits into their business and the market (Bowen, Clark,
Holloway, & Wheelwright, 1994). There is uncertainty about technology used, how is it
changing, and what customers’ wants and needs are under various circumstances (Clark
& Fujimoto, 1991; Witell, Gustafsson, & Johnson, 2014; Zhang & Doll, 2001).
Interacting with customers at this uncertain time is challenging but also essential
for product success. The NPD process involves testing several new ideas, having failed
attempts, working with customers on product iterations, and often having initial ideas
differ substantially from final products. Early customer interactions during the ideation or
prototype and market testing stages can help increase the effectiveness of products and
financial return (Chang & Taylor, 2016), however, it can be challenging to juggle
multiple ideas encountered (Hoyer et al., 2010). Furthermore, interaction during the
development stage can slow speed to market (Chang & Taylor, 2016). Finally, if
customer interaction only begins during the commercialization stage when the venture is
established, subsequent changes to the product and business can be expensive. This can
result in negative perceptions when products need to be adopted after time and money
have already been invested.
B. Purpose of Customer Interactions
Customers are involved in the sharing of information and developing new
processes and routines that may require increased coordination (Prahalad & Ramaswamy,
2000). One of the main reasons why customer interactions take place before sales and
marketing efforts is that customer knowledge is a valuable input into innovation
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processes (Gassmann, Kausch, & Enkel, 2005). While learning of and integrating various
stakeholders’ needs during NPD can be challenging (Driessen & Hillebrand, 2013),
expensive (Sawhney, Verona, & Prandelli, 2005) and may affect management’s
objectives (Bendapudi & Leone, 2003; Blazevic & Lievens, 2008), getting customers
involved in the product development process can reduce uncertainty and help to achieve a
fit between product offerings and the market without requiring substantial changes later.
Furthermore, understanding customer wants and needs has been shown to
positively impact the success of new products, particularly early in the product
development process, improve customer awareness about product development (Joshi &
Sharma, 2004), and ultimately, the success of the firm (Lagrosen, 2001; Von Hippel,
2001). This includes increasing efficiency - including potential for faster speed to market
(Fang, 2008; Joshi & Sharma, 2004); reduced risk of product failure (Cook, 2008); the
potential to explore new uses for existing products and services (Xie, Bagozzi, & Troye,
2008); and greater effectiveness of products and services in terms of having greater
novelty and differentiation and likelihood to fit customer needs (Payne et al., 2008;
Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2000).
Firms also devote substantial time and effort into collecting customer feedback
after a product has been created, with the goal of making their company more profitable
(McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012). This should include both negative and positive feedback
that is representative of the market’s needs (Nasr, Burton, & Gruber, 2017), and should
be properly reported to allow companies to learn both about what customers dislike and
like (Wirtz, Tambyah, & Mattila, 2010). Only then can customer feedback be interpreted
and converted into practice in an organization (Caemmerer & Wilson, 2010; Markey,
Reichheld, & Dullweber, 2009).
Part of collecting customer feedback requires obtaining information on customer
satisfaction - the post-consumption evaluation of a product or service by a customer (e.g.
Farris et al., 2010; Kotler, 1991; Mano & Oliver, 1993; Szymanski & Henard, 2001).
Pillai and Goldsmith (2006) theorized that while there are measures of customer
satisfaction in more established firms, that managers’ perceptions of these measures are
not necessarily accurate. They suggest that calibration is needed between a manager’s
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knowledge and objective knowledge to ensure that customer feedback information is
properly understood and used in the firm. Such calibration includes pursing activities that
improve interpretation of customer feedback, such as having contact with customers,
feedback from sales people, and high job involvement.
C. Firm Interdependence with Customers and Co-creation of Value
Beyond understanding the basic needs of customers, customer involvement with
firms creates interdependence (e.g. Hoyer et al., 2010; Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 2008).
This interdependence - “the extent to which the completion of development tasks
depends on interactions and learning between a firm and customer during the
development stages (Sobrero & Roberts, 2001; Thompson, 1967) - democratizes the
product innovation process, empowers customers, and integrates them in the creation and
selection of new product designs (Von Hippel, 2005). The empowerment of customers
even increases product integrity – a “clear vision of the product’s intended image,
performance and fit with corporate competencies and customers” (Brown & Eisenhardt,
1995: 363). This can directly and indirectly influence the outcomes of a firm (LegnickHall, 1996), such as reducing costs and improving product effectiveness, but also
potentially reducing firm control (Hoyer et al., 2010).
Another way of looking at interdependence with customers is to consider cocreation between customers and a firm, highlighted in the relationship marketing
literature (Payne & Frow, 2017). Adopting O’Hern and Rindfleisch’s definition of cocreation: “a collaborative new product development (NPD) activity in which consumers
actively contribute and select various elements of a new product offering” (2009: 4),
there has been a shift towards having customers as “active players” in value creation in
the past twenty years (Payne & Frow, 2017). There are several potential stages of
customization involving customers, including iterative interactions during the
development process, joint-problem solving, and after purchase support (Fang, 2008).
The process involves testing several new ideas, having failed attempts, and often having
initial ideas differ substantially from final products. There can also be different levels of
co-creation that demonstrate whether startups are passively or actively integrated into the
product development process (Zogaj & Bretschneider, 2012).
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In co-creation, customers are partners that share creative ideas about their needs
and values that may influence the specifications of a product (Payne, Storbacka, & Frow,
2008; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2003). This forces early customers to be a close part of
organizational processes (Skaggs & Youndt, 2004; Zien & Buckler, 1997). It should be
noted that co-creation and the innovation process require trust and transparency (Prahalad
& Ramaswamy, 2004). In a worst case scenario, customers end up using ideas that were
co-created to compete with a focal firm (Cook, 2008). To reduce this risk, relationships
can be built to help foster this trust. For instance, both firms and customers often share
intellectual property and need to be on the same page in terms of protecting and using it
(Hoyer, Chandy, Dorotic, Krafft, & Singh, 2010), and startups and customers must be
willing and able to share their preferences and needs (Etgar, 2008).
D. Categorizing Customers Involved in New Product Development
Finally, customers that are highly involved with a firm are categorized in different
ways (Hoffman, Kopalle, & Novak, 2010) and have different interests and abilities to
influence an organization (Etgar, 2008; Legnick-Hall, 1996; O’Hern & Rindfleisch,
2009). This customer heterogeneity should be accounted for during interactions with a
firm (Hoyer et al., 2010). Customers involved in co-creation have been labeled in several
ways, including innovators (Moore, 2002), lead users (Von Hippel, 1986), emergent
consumers (Hoffman, Kopalle, & Novak, 2010), and market mavens (Feick & Price,
1987; Table 5). Note that despite a focus on specific types of customers, no single lead
user typically provides a complete idea for a breakthrough product (Lilien et al., 2002).
Instead, it is usually the accumulation of ideas from inside and outside the company that
results in a final product.
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Table 5. Examples of Terms Used in the Academic Literature for Customers Involved in the New
Product Development Process
Customer Typology

Definition

Innovator

Those who are first to adopt new products (Moore, 2002)

Lead users

Those customers that share both their needs and potential solutions that
may benefit the wider public will have in the future (Lilien et al., 2002;
Urban & Von Hippel, 1988; Von Hippel, 1986)

Emergent consumers

Customers that offer their opinions early in product development that
benefit mainstream consumers (Hoffman, Kopalle, & Novak, 2010)

Market mavens

Customers that know a variety of products and where they are available and
are willing to share market information with others (Feick & Price, 1987)

2.3.3. Takeaways from Customer Interactions with Established Firms
There are several ways in which customer interactions can influence established
firms, outside of traditional sales and marketing. Interactions throughout the NPD process
can be beneficial, allowing organizations to better understand the problems and needs of
potential customers, decrease uncertainty, and increase success of the firm. For example,
customer interactions can be undertaken to simply understand the problems customers
encounter and desired features in a product solution, or may involve more frequent and
intense interactions, involving the co-design of products and becoming user advocates.
We can learn from customer interactions and the focus on co-creation with
customers in established firms, and bring a more customer-centric focus that is lacking in
the new venture creation literature. Improving understanding of how customer
interactions influence startups has the potential to be particularly important for startups as
they establish their market, their reputation, and their business with limited resources and
no room for error in the product development process.
2.4. Early Customers and New Ventures
While there is much research that references customer interactions in established
organizations – both young and old – there is a growing, but fragmented, body of
literature that addresses activities of early customers in new ventures. Note that most of
this literature focuses on a specific type of customer activity (with the exception of

46
Rehme & Svensson, 2011, that looks at several activities). In this section of the
dissertation, I briefly introduce these literatures and categorized the topics into: building
initial relationships with customers (Section 2.4.1); the activities of new venture creation
that facilitate building these activities (Section 2.4.2); and the implications of the first sale
by a new venture (Section 2.4.3).
2.4.1. Building Initial Relationships with Potential Customers
Relationship marketing as a discipline is also applicable in new ventures. As
mentioned in the previous section on established firms, a branch of relationship
marketing has a specialized focus on customer management, defined by Payne and Frow
(2017) as the “implementation and tactical management of customer interactions” (12).
This literature provides context for customer interactions taking place during the initial
stages of new venture creation, and helps explain relationships between startups and their
customers that are “constructed around bonds established between networks’ actors
through personal interactions in which they influence and build opinions of each other”
(Rehme & Svensson, 2011: 6).
Building relationships with potential customers can take several forms – including
activities such as creating a database of potential customers and targeting them with
customized one-to-one marketing (Winer, 2001). Several startups today use e-commerce
websites to navigate the online retail environment and to reduce costs while building
customer relationships online (e.g. Yoon, Choi, & Sohn, 2008), as well as social media
(e.g. Sashi, 2012) and online community forums (e.g. Pitta & Fowler, 2005). While there
are multiple ways to connect with potential customers, it can be more challenging to earn
their trust and interest in engaging with the unknown startup. To build a network from
scratch, according to Engel, Kaandorp, and Elfring (2017), there is a need to act
altruistically and remain open in early networking to attract new customers. This
approach allows startups to receive potential ideas from customers that they had not
originally considered, and for them to have a higher chance of learning what problem
actually needs to be solved. This approach during customer interactions ultimately can
help develop the trust needed in long-term relationships to build commitment from
customers (e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Scarbrough et al., 2013).
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At their founding, startups are often thought of as not having pre-existing
relationships (Stinchcombe, 1965; Ostgaard & Birley, 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
However, networks and pre-existing relationships of entrepreneurs have been shown to
play a role in selling to first customers (Rehme & Svensson, 2011), where the scarce
resources of startups often lead them to use their relationships and network selling
(Bjerke & Hultman, 2002; Hills et al., 2008).
Furthermore, because startups often lack resources and knowhow to develop new
relationships, they may rely even more on their own networks to understand the market
(Ostgaard & Birley, 1994). These networks become their most significant knowledge
source (Johannison, 1990), particularly in the pre-startup phases (Aldrich & Fiol, 1986;
Davidson & Honig, 2003; Hienerth & Lettl, 2011), as more social ties and interactions
with customers increase knowledge acquisition (Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001).
With market activities embedded in social relationships (Granovetter, 1985), when
startups receive information from their network, firm performance (Brudel &
Preisendorfer, 1998) and survival (Ingram & Baum, 1997) may be influenced.
Social capital can also help an organization to find customers (Birley, 1995;
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). The first customer is often acquired through social
capital – “the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group
by possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual
acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 119). Furthermore,
organizations and customers do not just exist in dyads, but are embedded in a social
context that gives them access to pre-existing social ties, information, resources, and
support (Jack & Anderson, 2002).
On one hand, being embedded in a local ecosystem, with a personal network of
family and friends and a professional network, creates opportunities for founders. Having
these networks in entrepreneurial firms may be beneficial, even when the startup lacks
early credibility (Ruokolainen, 2005, 2008). Family and friends are often easily the first
accessible test for founders to get feedback on their business model due to their relational
proximity. Furthermore, if those in the network are representative of, or influential,
entrepreneurs may already have social capital with their potential target market (Burt,
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2000). This can allow them to gain even greater access to this market and gain a better
understanding of the problems faced by this market. This embeddedness also enables
entrepreneurs to more easily share potential solutions that meet customer needs and to
build relationships of trust and commitment.
This phenomenon of connecting with existing, knowledgeable networks can be
seen particularly well in peer communities involving lead user innovations. The
embeddedness of the lead user and lead innovator allows them to obtain evaluations of
the idea, assess the community for similarities to target market, and get them involved in
providing feedback. Hienerth and Lettl (2011) suggest that this involvement of the peer
community in the innovation increases the chance of success in the wider market – in not
only providing input on the product and social support, but also may provide funds and
other resources.
Because embeddedness shapes the way an event or action is interpreted and acted
upon (Jack & Anderson, 2002), embeddedness may also become a liability for
entrepreneurs who are over embedded (Uzzi, 1997). For example, a small firm may have
a liability of newness and can only maintain a limited number of customer relationships,
becoming highly dependent on a few customers (Yli-Renko, Sapienza, & Hay, 2001).
When attention and resources are scarce, the ease of relying on social links can restrict a
startup’s intent to search outside of their personal and professional networks for their
actual target market. This is particularly an issue when their network may not be an
accurate representation of the type of customers they wish to obtain in their market.
2.4.2. Activities of New Venture Creation
Throughout the new venture creation process, customer interactions during key
venture creation activities help founders learn not only about the technology and product,
but also how to create and operate a business and to develop deeper relationships with
their customers. This continuous involvement of customers or users in venture creationrelated activities increases the chance of startup success (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt,
1998; von Hippel, 2005). Rehme and Svensson (2011) identified five main types of
activities, four derived from network theory, that need to be managed during different
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phases of new venture creation between buyers and sellers, and propose that these
activities between a startup and their first customers take place in a certain order in new
venture creation (Figure 2):
•

Social activities – These include “developing relationships on different levels
and for different functions in the dyad, social bonds, and promotions” (Rehme
& Svensson, 2011: 7). These activities are pinpointed by Rehme and Svensson
(2011) to take place at the beginning of venture creation.
Connecting with customers early in the new venture creation process and
building a relationship with potential customers, through proactively learning
about their problems and regularly getting feedback during the development
process, can build the relationship through developing trust (Moorman,
Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992). It also helps ensure that founders are working
towards solving a real problem. Building a relationship can take time and
requires a quality product, but also builds commitment that can help ensure a
relationship is maintained (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh,
1987). While the eventual goal may be to establish visceral relationships
where the customers identify with the firm and vice versa (Morris,
Schindehutte, & LaForge, 2002), for most startups, the more pressing goal is
usually to learn more about customer needs, build, test, and then sell the
product.

•

Credibility activities – These include activities that build trust in the startup,
where early and consistent interactions over time facilitate the creation of
relationships and credibility (Gummesson, 2006; Rehme & Svensson, 2011).
Credibility activities are related to initial social activities, where relationships
are being built through showing interest in customers’ needs. Activities such
as meeting customers face-to-face or building a reputation on online
community forums are included in these types of activities.

•

Technical activities – These include activities needed to fulfil or surpass
customer technical requirements and involve the design of the product and
related business concepts. These exchanges with customers over time also
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allow relationships and credibility to develop (Teece, 1986).
•

Commercial activities – These activities help get a product to market,
including managing contracts and payments, pricing the product, negotiations
with suppliers and customers, and facilitate the gain of sales and contracts that
offer validation. These activities typically start later in the venture creation
process.

•

Distribution activities – These activities involve managing the supply chain
and logistics associated with the delivery of goods to customers and are
essential for subsequent fulfilment processes (Rehme & Svensson, 2011).

To this list of activities, I also add production activities and human resource
activities. Production activities involve the building of a physical or digital product, and
may be considered related to technical activities. Production activities, however, involve
additional challenges around manufacturing, sourcing of materials, and production
equipment, that are separate from the initial design. Human resource activities involve the
hiring and management of employees and workers on contract.
Figure 2. Activities Between Startup and their First Customers Over Time (t). (Rehme and Svensson,
2011: 8).

2.4.3. External Stamp of Approval - Implications of a First Customer Reference
While references involving first customers are limited in the literature, there is
one particularly relevant term, first customer reference - a formal recommendation by an
existing customer, or supplier, describing a business, its products and services, its
qualifications, and dependability (Ruokolainen, 2005; Salminen, 1997). The term

51
customer reference is used predominantly in the industrial marketing literature, involving
business-to-business transactions, and is meant to act as a strong marketing tool (Rehme
& Svensson, 2011), using past events to predict the success of future events. More
specifically, this first customer reference helps the startup expand their business
(Ruokolainen, 2008), demonstrating that it is a viable alternative to other solutions in the
market (Ruokolainen & Igel, 2004).
There are three outcomes to a customer reference. First, it demonstrates the
startup’s credibility – “the actor’s perceived ability to perform something he claims to be
able to do on request” (Blomqvist, 1997: 279), or “how likely customers believe the
claims that the startup tech companies express” (Ruokolainen, 2005: 6). This leads to a
reduction in the perceived risk of the purchase – the extent to which a customer or client
is uncertain about the consequences of an action, like a purchasing decision (Hutt &
Speh, 1992), and improves the reputation of the startup – “an entity’s willingness and
ability to repeatedly perform an activity in a similar fashion” (Herbig & Milevicz, 1993:
18).
These components of customer reference suggest that first customer reference is
viewed predominantly from an external stakeholder perspective. In this case, external
parties judge the credibility, risk and reputation of the business (and the experiences,
skills and ability of those in the business), and product functionality and can play a role in
realizing market potential in certain business sectors.
2.4.4. Takeaways from Early Customers and New Venture Literature
From this brief overview of literature reviewing early customer interactions with
new ventures, we see that building relationships can be challenging for startups, and due
to time, attention, and other resource constraints, startups tend to rely on their existing
networks that the founders are embedded in. While Rehme and Svensson (2011) propose
the types of activities that customers are involved in, the new venture creation process is
not always streamlined and these activities to socialize, develop credibility, sell the
product, commercialize and distribute may overlap, repeat, and may involve several
informal and formal interactions at different times over new venture creation process.
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For example, social activities occur throughout venture creation and from the first
interaction with a potential customer, there is the potential to establish credibility in the
market, to show that the proposed product is commercially viable (Ruokolainen & Igel,
2004). This allows the founders to test ideas and can be a make-or-break event for the
startup (Rehme & Svensson, 2011). Social, credibility, and technical activities often
begin before this sale, suggesting that building the relationship and input into the product
and business model design may take place long before this first sale. Commercial and
logistics activities may mostly occur once sales have started, however customers input
may influence how they are carried out.
Finally, the current literature on the first customer reference offers credibility and
validation from the external market’s perspective. However, during early stages of the
development, the startup also needs to internally assess their first customer references to
see if this is an accurate and ideal direction that they believe that the business should
pursue. Further clarification is still needed to understand what each customer interaction
means from a startup’s perspective, and how the startup can decide which customer
interactions impact a startup’s validation to move forward in the venture creation process.
Ultimately, further insight into the impact of the first sale on startups’
perspectives is needed. In the next section, I give an overview of the practitioner-based
literature on lean startup methodology that explains a practitioner-proposed process by
which customer interactions, including sales, can be used to validate a startup’s product,
as well as its business model.
2.5. Practitioner-Based Literature on Customers and Startups
2.5.1. Influential Entrepreneur Practitioners
Today’s entrepreneurs are flooded with available popular press literature that
explains the entrepreneurial process. The biggest contrasts between these models
proposed by practitioners and the traditional new venture creation process models in the
literature are the centrality of interactions with customers in the practitioner models, and
the testing and required validation from these interactions over time.
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One methodology, in particular, has been popularized over the past decade - the
lean startup methodology - credited to have developed out of entrepreneur-turnedlecturer, Steve Blank’s first book, Four Steps to the Epiphany (2007). Subsequently,
entrepreneur, Eric Ries mentioned the term ‘lean startup’ in his blog (2008), which was
later popularized in his best-selling book, The Lean Startup (2011). Blank’s follow-up
book co-authored with Bob Dorf, The Startup Owner’s Manual (2012), strongly
emphasizes what they term the Customer Development process – involving the gathering
of customer feedback on the product, but also the markets, potential distribution channels,
the price, and the customer acquisition strategies. The process proposed provided a
structured way to organize the testing, iterating, modifying and optimizing of these
factors, with the intention of finding the right business model. Blank and Dorf suggest
that this is what moves the startup from a more temporary organization into a “repeatable
and scalable business model” (2012: xxix).
In this section, I explain these practitioner concepts. Note that while practitioner
entrepreneurs continue to adopt these practices, there still is a lack of a consensus on how
academics reference these terms. Furthermore, testing and reporting the outcome of these
methods in an academic setting has been slow, despite the methodology being around for
nearly a decade (with the exception of, for example, Fisher, 2012; Whalen & Akaka,
2016; York & Danes, 2014).
2.5.2. The Lean Startup
The lean startup and its principles are commonly referenced by today’s
entrepreneurs and are becoming a growing topic in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g.
Fisher, 2012; Whalen & Akaka, 2016; York & Danes, 2014). The lean startup
methodology was created to speed up the process of getting products to customers,
shortening development cycles and encouraging entrepreneurs to adopt hypothesis-driven
experimentation, requiring them to “get out of the office,” testing and getting feedback
from customers instead of relying solely on intuition.
The methodology emerged around the same time as agile engineering and became
popular in product development as “an incremental and interactive approach to
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engineering that enables product or service development to iterate and pivot to customer
and market feedback” (Blank & Dorf, 2012: xv). It requires entrepreneurs to iteratively
build products or services to meet early customer needs. The ideas are then tested on
customers to validate it – to make sure they meet the needs of the customer. This in part
was to reduce waste of resources but also to incorporate planning into the entrepreneurial
process (Blank, 2013a).
2.5.3. Practitioner Terminology
Given the increasing use of the lean startup approach by practicing entrepreneurs,
I define related terminology here. This is particularly relevant, as current academic
literature referencing this methodology has some discrepancies, and academics would
benefit to be on the same page before studying the topic further. Note that the terms being
defined are proposed to be measurable by the popular press authors, however, startups
themselves establish and confirm the metrics desired, as they are involved in interpreting
the reactions and comments from customers.
The terms that are defined are components of the Customer Development Model
(Blank & Dorf, 2012), which is developed on principles of Bayesian decision making
(Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983) and requires substantial data to test hypotheses. The
challenge, however, is in obtaining necessary information in an entrepreneurial
environment (York & Danes, 2014). Access to customers can be challenging. Due to a
lack of attention and resources, major decisions may be made based on interactions with a
limited number of close customers (Yli-Renko, Sapienza, & Hay, 2001).
Furthermore, biased interpretations of these interactions can be dangerous,
particularly if the decisions are challenging to reverse. York and Danes (2014) identified
several biases that can exist when interacting with customers in an entrepreneurial setting.
These include selection bias, in terms of cherry picking who is talked to (Holcomb et al.,
2009); representativeness bias, when founders try to generalize from a small, nonrandom sample; acquiescence bias, when customers tell founders what they think that
founders want to hear; confirmation bias, where the founder interprets information that
confirms their prior beliefs; and overconfidence (Koellinger, Minniti, & Schade, 2007), or
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over-optimism (Kahneman, 2011) that can increase the chance that key information is
ignored or the dismissal of potential failure (York & Danes, 2014).
A. Customer Development Model
Developed by Blank (2007) and refined by Blank and Dorf (2012), Cooper and
Vlaskovits (2013) and Maurya (2012), the Customer Development Model outlines the
process of hypothesis development and testing of assumptions with customers on the
minimum features of the product, business model, market, value of product, pricing and
channel strategy.
The Customer Development Model has four interlocking, circular stages (Figure 3):
1) Customer Discovery – Involves understanding the needs and problems of customers
and identifying who these customers are. The vision is usually tested with a very narrow
customer segment, hypotheses are created, and the solution (problem) is tested in the
market.
2) Customer Validation – Involves identifying a scalable and repeatable model by
creating a map of the steps needed to reach a market and grow the venture. The problem
and product are a priority to validate at this stage, but assumptions about payment and
channels may also be validated. Note that it is the Customer Discovery and Customer
Validation Stages that are studied in more depth in this dissertation.
3) Customer Creation – Involves creating and driving the demand of the end user by
increasing marketing effort and creating a marketing strategy.
4) Company Building – Involves executing what has been learned in the previous stages
to create an organization (York & Danes, 2014). The venture is formalized and marketing
efforts are increased. Essentially, once all stages have been completed and
product/market fit has been established, the startup is developed.
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Figure 3. Customer Development Model. (Blank and Dorf, 2012: 23). The model is non-linear and
encourages failing early.

B. Product/Market Fit
The term product/market fit was popularized in the popular press by Marc
Andreessen (2007), Sean Ellis (2007), and Steve Blank (2013b). Product/market fit is
achieved when a product can satisfy a strong market demand – where the demand
initially comes from early adopters. According to Blank and Dorf (2012), there are three
factors that need to be confirmed to have achieved product/market fit. First, is there a
problem or need that is urgent and essential to address? Second, does the proposed
product solve the problem, or meet customers’ needs at a price that customers are willing
to pay? Finally, are there enough customers, or a sizable business opportunity?
C. Minimum Viable Product (MVP)
To test product/market fit, there is an expectation that a minimum viable product
(MVP) exists that can be shown to potential customers. Several definitions of MVP exist
in the literature and in practice. In their review of the term, Lenarduzzi & Taibi (2016)
proposed the MVP as an early prototype, physical or digital in nature, having a minimum
set of technical features that satisfy customers and allows startups to obtain feedback
from them. Developing it should involve minimal resources and allows for pivots and
new interactions of the product to be reintroduced and tested on customers (Lenarduzzi &
Taibi, 2016; Ries, 2009a, 2009b).
In contrast, practitioners and educators today see the initial MVP not as a working
prototype, but merely a description of a problem that they want to solve and a description
of how they will solve it (Blank & Dorf, 2012; Winkel & Wilcox, 2017). Given I am
working with a sample of practitioner entrepreneurs, in this dissertation, I adopt a
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practitioner definition of an MVP as the most basic, understood explanation of a problem
and solution and specify when a prototype (physical or digital) is available. This
explanation can be through a word description, or a physical or digital object, and can be
tested and will receive feedback from potential early adopter customers.
D. Viability
The term viability has several interpretations in the literature. It has been referred
to as what allows a product to be deployed (Pretorius & Budgen, 2008; Bjork, Ljungblad,
& Bosch, 2013), and suggests that the MVP is enough to gain feedback (Ries, 2009c;
Kniberg & Ivarsson, 2012; Mejia & Gopal, 2012; Read, Derrick & Ligon, 2014; Rao,
2014; Edison, Wang, & Abrahamsson, 2015). Viability may also imply that the MVP
meets the needs of a core group of early adopters (York & Danes, 2014), that the MVP
involves profit (Moogk, 2012; Bailetti & Bot, 2013), that it offers both feedback and
profit (Poole, 2002; Agostinho et al., 2015), or that it delivers customers with value
(Maurya, 2017).
E. Pivot
According to Blank and Dorf (2012), a pivot is a substantive change in the
business. This can involve changes to any part of the business, including the product, the
market, the business model, revenue streams, channels, and other operations.
F. Validation
Validation is perceived as the affirmation that there is customer interest in a
product. While it is related to customer satisfaction and customer feedback (Section
2.3.2), validation refers to the startup’s interpretation of customers’ comments. In the
Customer Development Model (Blank & Dorf, 2012), validation is interpreted differently
at each stage. In the Customer Discovery Stage, customer interest is confirmed for
startups with verbal or written affirmations. However, in the Customer Validation stage,
validation involves testing whether customers would buy a product and “whether there is
enough of a product/market fit to justify scaling sales and marketing spending” (Blank &
Dorf, 2012: 280). This includes validating different parts of the business model, but
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predominantly, the customer market, the product, the channels, and revenue model.
Based on the metrics set up by the startup, a startup may interpret these insights to decide
to pivot or proceed during this stage.
Despite validation being a commonly used term by practitioner entrepreneurs, the
term validation, with relation to customers, is still quite new and has been minimally
referenced in the academic literature to-date. Exceptions exist, such as Olsson and
Bosch’s conceptual model on developing a better understanding of product features in
established global software companies (2015). In their paper, the authors advocate for ongoing, continuous and frequent customer validation cycles. These cycles involve
collecting and interpreting customer feedback measures throughout the product
development process so that the needs and wants of the larger customer base is
represented and decisions to move forward are not made based on “gut feelings” alone.
Subsequent research referencing this model has also involved established software
product development contexts (e.g. Fabijan, Olsson, & Bosch, 2016; Schön,
Thomaschewski, & Escalona, 2017), and not entrepreneurial ventures. This suggests that
there is ample opportunity to explore the concept of customer validation in the startup
environment in the academic literature.
Finally, it should be noted that despite obtaining customer feedback and putting
effort into gaining a deeper understanding of customer satisfaction, startups may still lack
complete information (Simon, 1958). Due to time and resource pressures, they may need
to make decisions under pressure, and have the potential to satisfice, or settle for making
decisions using “good enough” information (Cyert & March, 1992). As a result, their
objectivity towards interpreting the situation and validation process may be affected.
2.5.4. Takeaways from Practitioner-based Literature on Customers and Startups
Practitioner methods such as the Lean Startup Methodology and the Customer
Development Model continue to be adopted by entrepreneurs and introduce the process
of creating a product in what seems to be a different way than previously explored in the
academic literatures of new venture creation (e.g. Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007),
new product development, and relationship marketing (e.g Rehme & Svensson, 2011).
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However, these practitioner methods remain under tested in an academic setting, and the
lack of consensus on related terminology in existing academic studies makes it
challenging to compare and learn from them. Furthermore, the relationship marketing
literature suggests that customers also influence those activities (Rehme & Svensson,
2011). While these practitioner models of startup formation focus on achieving
product/market fit and validating distribution channels and product positioning, they fail
to explain how customers may play a role in executing later activities of new venture
creation, including the latter stages of commercialization and exploitation.
These practitioner-based models of customer involvement in startups reflect and
promote the need to better understand customers’ role and influence in startups. Different
customer activities occur throughout venture creation (Rehme & Svensson, 2011), and
according to the new product development literature, there is a co-creation process that is
occurring as organizations attempt to understand customers’ needs and wants (O’Hern
and Rindfleisch, 2009). Customers have a productive lead role in the innovation process
and beyond (Lilien et al., 2002; Urban & Von Hippel, 1988; Von Hippel, 1986). This
leaves an opportunity to learn from these models and the practitioner-based methods and
explore the potential for a customer-integrated new venture creation process.
2.6 Takeaways from the Literature Review
Chapter 2 reviews the multi-disciplinary literature provideing background to the
research questions posed in Chapter 1 on the role of early customer interactions during
the new venture creation process. To start, the entrepreneurial process and new venture
creation literature are reviewed (Section 2.1). New venture creation involves the
interdependent actions that are undertaken to organize for a new organization (Gartner,
1985). Over the past 30 years of literature on the topic, the process has been studied
several times, however, there is still much opportunity and demand for refinement of
entrepreneurial process research and the chance to create a uniform understanding of the
process. There is also the need for studies that acknowledge, integrate and clarify the role
of exchanges with early customers that occur throughout the venture creation process.
Next, the path dependence literature was reviewed to understand the foundation of
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how initial conditions and decisions based on these customer interactions and the first
sale may play a role in influencing startups’ future development trajectories (Section 2.2).
In early interactions often being considered insignificant, entrepreneurs are receiving
feedback, suggestions, and validation that trigger decisions that narrow their options and
may put them down a certain path. Understanding the mechanisms around what triggers
this path narrowing can help ensure that startups land on an appropriate course.
Other disciplines, however, have researched different aspects of customer
interactions in both established firms and new ventures and offer insight into how
customers may be involved in product development or organization formation. Early
customer interactions are well documented in established firms in the new product
development and innovation, marketing, and engineering literature (Section 2.3). For
example, in the product development literature, customers are shown to be consulted
during the specification, concept design, and prototyping stages of the product
development process (Kaulio, 1998), and are particularly involved in concept testing
(Dolan & Matthews, 1993). Regular probing and learning activities have been developed
that facilitate the development of knowledge about customers (e.g. Lynn, Morone, &
Paulson, 1996). Customers may even be involved in the manufacturing process (Fang,
2008). However, interactions that suggest changes to the business concept during the later
development and commercialization stages can be more challenging to manage (Chang &
Taylor, 2016). At this time, the firm is busier and may be locked into certain processes
that are more challenging to adapt and rework. Nevertheless, even after a product has
been sold, firms continue to collect customer feedback to estimate customer satisfaction.
Furthermore, the relationship marketing literature suggests that activities and
processes with customers are necessary to understand customers’ problems, their needs,
and what customers value (Berry, 1983; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Payne & Frow, 2017).
These activities reduce uncertainty (Blazevic & Lievens, 2008), improve customer
awareness about product development and speed to market (Joshi & Sharma, 2004), and
reduce chance of failure (Cook, 2008). Certain firms may even have high
interdependence with customers to democratize the product innovation process (Von
Hippel, 2005). In these cases, customers may be involved in co-creating a product
(Blazevic & Lievens, 2008), and in becoming user advocates.
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If we transfer findings from more established firms’ interactions with customers
to the venture creation literature, where startups undergo product creation concurrent to
an organization formation process, we could surmise that frequent customer interactions
early in venture creation are beneficial to expose founders to divergent ideas and
preferences of the customers, essential for product development, and development of
other parts of the organization.
The question remains, however, as to whether the differences between established
firms and startups create different effects of customer interactions. For example,
established organizations often have existing standardized product development
processes. In contrast, unless founders have previous experience where they owned a
business before or worked together before, startups still need to create internal processes,
such as product development, from scratch. Furthermore, established businesses are
likely to have different constraints than startups – where they already have a certain
market that they need to continue to meet the needs of and where pursuing an alternative
market may affect their legitimacy within an existing market. Startups, on the other hand,
have a clean slate with no defined market or reputation, so to speak, and can use this
opportunity to test the market while interacting with a breadth of potential customers.
While startups are known for being agile and being able to test their product early
and quick, time crunches and lack of resources can make experimentation and survival
challenging for startups. While additional investigation is needed into the differences
between customer interactions in established organizations and startups, the NPD and
marketing literatures demonstrate the general importance of customer interactions during
product development.
Looking to the fragmented literature in relationship marketing in new ventures
(Section 2.4), we see that founders use their existing social networks (e.g. Granovetter,
1985; Ostgaard & Birley, 1994; Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001) and rely in part on
existing social capital (Birley, 1995) to obtain early customers. Furthermore, initial
relationships with potential customers can be built by using different communication
channels (e.g. Winer, 2001; Sashi, 2012; Pitta & Fowler, 2005; Yoon, Choi, & Sohn,
2008), and using a diversity of activities that involve customer interactions during venture
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creation. These activities are not only to learn about the technology and product, but also
to develop deeper relationships and learn how to create and operate a business to meet the
needs and values of customers (Rehme & Svensson, 2011). Finally, the first customer
reference is an external stamp of approval for startups – a formal recommendation from
the first customer that is meant to convey credibility, perceived risk and reputation to
other customers (Ruokolainen, 2008).
Finally, what this survey of this literature on customer interactions in new
ventures lacks is an understanding of how startups internalize these interactions and
decide to proceed to subsequent steps in the venture creation process. New practitionerbased methodologies were proposed in the past decade – the lean startup methodology
and the customer development process - that advocate frequent and early customer
interactions during the venture creation process (Section 2.5; e.g. Blank & Dorf, 2012;
Maurya, 2012; Ries, 2008). While academics are beginning to test these methods in an
academic setting, reporting of outcomes has been slow (except for e.g. Fisher, 2012;
Whalen & Akaka, 2016; York & Danes, 2014) and there is not always a consensus on the
definitions of the terminology (e.g. Lenarduzzi & Taibi, 2016).
What is particularly unique about these practitioner methodologies are that they
advocate a validation process with early customers, interpreting their reactions and
comments and incorporating their feedback into the startup. The challenge is, however,
that startups are not always able to obtain unbiased information (selection,
representativeness, or confirmation biases) and may interpret the information with
overconfidence or over optimism in a false validation (York & Danes, 2014). There is the
potential for academia to learn from these practitioner models and for a customerintegrated new venture creation process model that accounts for the importance of these
interactions for startup development.
The proposed validation process with customers is particularly interesting because
startups are making decisions based on this feedback that affects the product and the
business, and that require investments in resources and the building of relationships,
infrastructure, and processes. In the meantime, a startup is becoming more and more
established.
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The literature review presented in this chapter sets the foundation for why
studying the customer interaction process during new venture creation is important. In the
subsequent sections, the study used to answer the research question of this dissertation is
presented (Chapter 3). Within-case analyses for each of the nine cases in the study
(Chapter 4 and Appendices) and a cross-case analysis are presented (Chapter 5). From the
data, a path analysis was conducted and a customer interaction model during the new
venture creation process was created that incorporates the self-reinforcing validation
processes that are triggered from early customer interactions (Chapter 6).
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3. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
To investigate the research question posed in this dissertation, I undertook an
inductive, qualitative process methods study of startups. Denzin and Lincoln say that
qualitative researchers attempt “to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the
meanings people bring to them” (2008: 4). Given that this research question requires a
process approach to address the effect of early customers on startups over time,
qualitative research can be helpful in going beyond surface descriptions to use process
and narrative to explain relationships between events (Van de Ven & Poole, 2002).
Qualitative research is sensitive to context (Pettigrew, 1992) and how participants
interpret and describe how events take place in real time. I rely primarily on interviews
with entrepreneur participants for the main source of data. Additional interviews with
mentors; observations of meetings, pitches to customers and venture capitalists, and
industry events; and archival data serve to triangulate and help to explain events (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). A pilot study helped scope this research question and develop the
methods to investigate it (3.1), and the research context and sample (3.2), data collection
(3.3), and data analysis (3.4) of the main study for this dissertation are described below.
3.1. Pilot Study
A pilot study of four startups was conducted to test the approach to investigate the
phenomenon of early customer interactions during new venture creation. These startups
were followed from May to September 2015 (see Table 6 for basic information on pilot
study startups), and were comprised of young founder entrepreneurs, recent university
graduates with minimal entrepreneurial experience. This was a convenience sample of
entrepreneurs that were partaking in a competitive nationwide venture development
incubator program based in Toronto over seven months (three offsite and four onsite, colocated). During data collection, I lived in the same dormitory as startups while they were
in their residency period in the incubator. The founders were mentored by a select group
of experienced entrepreneurs, academics and business leaders, and had the potential to
earn funding from venture capitalists. Unique to this program year, the founders did not
know each other prior to the start of the program. In other words, the entrepreneurial
teams were formed only once the participants were selected into the program and ideas
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for a potential startup were decided upon over a two-day time-period. This created a
controlled environment, where all startups started at the same time, in the same incubator
setting. Team formation was considered the inception of the startups in the pilot study
(early February 2015). Data collected started in the post-idea generation stage - where the
founders already had identified an opportunity and had a vision that solved a customer’s
problems or needs.
Table 6. Startups and Entrepreneur Participants for Pilot Study.
Startup Name and Description1

Main Contact Description

Patient Pharma – A patient-centric prescription
management software application.

Masters student in Social
Sciences
(non-business),
Female, 23-24 years old

9

Experience Fast – A business that connected
businesses with part-time help from accounting,
human resources and law.

A recent graduate from a
Bachelors in Business degree,
Female, 22 years old

12

Citizen Engagement – An online platform that
allowed citizens and government to engage in twoway conversations on key issues affecting
communities.

A recent graduate from a
Bachelors in Political Science
degree, Male, 22 years old

13

Friends n’ Activities – An online platform to find
new friends based on similarities in interests in
activities, values and personalities.

A recent graduate from a
Bachelors
in
Engineering
degree, Male, 22 years old

12

# of
Interviews

Note: Interviews with mentors not accounted for in this table.

The findings of this pilot study are not reported in this dissertation because the
unique conditions of how startups in this sample were created are less representative of
startups, even those in incubator programs. Largely due to issues in team dynamics, all
four of these startups ceased to continue after the entrepreneurial incubator program
finished. Because of the unique nature of the incubator that the startups were in, there was
a lack of history between founding team members and a lack of entrepreneurial
experience in all founders. Founders were attempting to establish routines and procedures
of the organization from scratch (Stinchcombe, 1965), but also needed to develop a clear
internal structure, histories of exchange, trust and mutual obligation, interdependence,

1

The actual names of the startups and participants have been changed to maintain their anonymity.
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shared interests and expectations with co-founders (Blatt, 2009; Kelley et al., 2003), and
set transparent and clear expectations for each other (Blatt, 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002)
to build strong enough relationships to survive.
Despite issues with the pilot sample startups, there were five main preliminary
findings in the pilot study which helped refine the main research question in this
dissertation and develop the methods to investigate it. First, each of the four startups
chose to interact with potential first customers at different stages of the venture creation
process. Three of the pilot startups – Patient Pharma, Citizen Engagement, and
Experience Fast – chose to engage with customers early into venture creation, while the
startup Friends n’ Activities waited until a working prototype was developed before
reaching out to customers. This suggests that customer interactions can start as early as
idea generation, when a business does not actually exist yet. This early in the venture
creation process, the interaction may have substantial influence on the idea and the
product development process.
Second, the pilot startups interacted with customers in varying intensities and
reached out to their personal and professional networks and external target markets in
different capacities. They also chose different forms of media for customer interaction
such as online advertisements, surveys, e-mails, networking events, in-person meetings,
and focus groups. These choices resulted in the pilot startups being able to collect
different types of information from different customers. These initial findings suggest
that there may be an optimal time in venture creation for certain types of customer
interactions.
Third, only having an MVP in a description format (nothing physical or digital
available) was fine during initial stages of venture creation (Ries, 2011). However, as
time progressed, later interactions with customers increasingly require startups to have a
prototype to gain more concrete feedback and to demonstrate the startup’s technical
capabilities in product development. This prototype could then be adapted with customer
feedback. Furthermore, early interactions that were prompted by a prototype allowed
startups the opportunity to learn how to deal with external information and improve their
learning capabilities as they were developing and growing. Waiting too long to produce a
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prototype meant that the startup developed very insularly without the ability to gain
adequate customer feedback on the product, and this could restrict its ability to adapt.
However, three of the four startups struggled with showing or obtaining technical
expertise and in producing a prototype, making it a challenge for them to get feedback to
gain commitment from potential customers. This also emphasized, once again, the lack of
consideration put into creating these founding teams.
Fourth, early in the new venture creation process, if no customer had been
secured, there was a willingness to adapt the organization, based on the promise of
having a paying customer:
“But in terms of customers changing the direction - it's possible. Like this is a
way for us to go to market. We might pivot because that's where the money is,
if they're willing to hire us now, and our product might look different. And
who we go after in the future may be different. We may no longer want to
work with EMRs. It might be closed-door pharmacies. It's just who is willing
to pay. It's that this is the first person willing to pay, so it might be easier.”
-

Founder, Patient Pharma

As securing a potential first customer was linked to imminent survival of the
startup (due to factors such as access to resources or legitimacy), there may have been a
substantial increase in a founder’s drive to adapt a startup’s business concept to meet the
needs of potential first customers they are pursuing. This may result in the startup being
less selective, and willing to accept a less ideal first customer, including ones that are
substantially different from the mass market.
However, fifth, as the startups received verbal or text-based validation from their
customer interactions (none of these startups had a sale involving money exchange), the
founders’ interpretation of this validation pushed them to develop the business concept to
meet the needs of these early customers offering this non-monetary validation. In the case
where an initial prototype was available, as well as when the MVP had been refined
without a prototype, the startups became more resistant to adapting the business.
These preliminary analyses suggest that earlier interactions of potential first
customers that provide validations may create a path dependence for the type of
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organization being created. A startup is constantly bombarded with new information, and
it is easier to build subsequent knowledge on an existing type of customer or existing
feedback, rather than learn new information on a new customer market. This then can
result in the same type of subsequent customer being pursued, even if it is not
representative of the target market, and a narrowing influence of customers as new
venture creation progresses.
Based on these observations from the pilot study, I created a preliminary process
model on customer interactions (Figure 4) that suggests that customers have less
influence on both new product development and new venture creation over time.
3.2. Research Context and Sample of Dissertation
Based on initial findings from the pilot study, I selected the current sample to
better explain the interactions with customers at various stages of new venture creation. I
used theoretical sampling to identify Canadian startups from Ontario to develop a deeper
understanding of the phenomenon. Ontario-based entrepreneurs are comparable in many
ways to entrepreneurs in other major entrepreneurial ecosystems in that they have access
to high quality education, early stage government funding, and cutting-edge research
institutions, as well as mentorship and expertise in creative, information technology, life
and medical sciences, and finance industries. Startups included in this sample came from
a range of industries, had a unique product or business model (i.e. not a franchise), and
interacted with customers in person, the phone, and/or through various Internet-related
methods (e.g. e-mail, websites, video conferencing, blogs, forums, and social media).
Note that the term product is used broadly here to refer to physical and digital articles
and/or services that are manufactured/created/designed for sale purposes. The startups
were initially located in an incubator setting, suggesting that some type of screening took
place to validate the business idea and the founders, and that access to mentorship and
potential funding were available. Such a sample is beneficial to understand as
increasingly, startups enter incubators, seeking advice. However, despite being told to
interact with customers as part of their training program, not all startups sought out
customer interactions in the same way.
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Figure 4. Initial Proposed Model of Venture Creation Process, New Product Development, and Customer Interactions based on Pilot Study (Adapted
from Bhave, 1994; Brixy, Sternberg, & Stüber, 2012; Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998). New product development takes place concurrent to
venture creation. There are three phases of venture creation – Discovery, Opportunity Exploitation, and Entrepreneurial. Early customer
interaction can take place during any stage of venture creation, however, the influence of early potential customers on startup learning,
identity formation (not shown), venture creation, and on the parallel process of new product development decreases over time, as depicted
by narrowing funnel and lighter weight arrows over the venture creation process.
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To counter some of the issues encountered during the pilot study, the participants
in the sample were in sales-focused incubator programs (see Table 5 for basic
information on startups). Having a slightly older, advanced sample (between six to
twenty-four months old from study initiation) allowed for assessment of startups that
managed to survive through initial uncertain conditions in their first months, and offered
the opportunity to follow them into the sales generation phase of their business. Note that
having a first customer by the end of data collection was not guaranteed. The sample also
had self-selected founder teams to reduce issues of founder team conflict.
The number of participant startups was selected based on the longitudinal nature
of the study (Morse, 2000). Sample size in process studies is based on the number of
temporal observations, not number of cases (Langley et al., 2013). Therefore, repeated
interviews of a smaller number of organizations can result in a fairly large number of
observations. Furthermore, performing longitudinal research on startups at an early stage
of development can be challenging with high startup failure rates (Patel, 2015).
As this is a phenomenological study where each participant was interviewed
several times and there was a large amount of data for each participant, I expected that
the final study would have data from eight to ten startups to reach theoretical saturation
(Morse, 2000). To account for dropouts that may occur in a longitudinal study, I pursued
a sample size of ten to thirteen startups to capture data from participants over time.
Ultimately, a total of nine startups were included in this study. Having this sample size
allowed me to capture data of startups that did secure a first customer (considered a
success case in this dissertation), those that had longer venture creation processes, and
those that did not find customers, and allowed for reaching theoretical saturation - when
fresh data “no longer spark[ed] new theoretical insights, nor reveal[ed] new properties of
these core theoretical categories” (Charmaz, 2006: 113).
The descriptive profile of the cases and business models of the startups can be
found in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively. Note that additional insights were gained
informally from additional startups during the study period, however are not included in
this dissertation.
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Startups were not at all the same venture creation stage when they joined the
study to ensure different stages of venture creation and different types of customers were
captured in the study. Note that all startups followed were in a growth stage, where some
were followed from the initial developmental stages where the product was just an idea
and the startup had no customers, some had a product in the beta-testing stage, and others
already had a fully developed product or service and had secured their confirmed first
customer that was willing to purchase their product at a given price. The sample included
participants that varied in experience as an entrepreneur, educational background, and
size of team. All participants were under the age of 40. The startups come from a
diversity of industries. Case study design looking at validity and richness (e.g., Miles and
Huberman, 1994; Jensen and Rogers, 2001; Yin, 2009) suggests that different industries
should be compared when central industry characteristics differ and the analysis of only
one industry can influence (bias) the outcome of the study.
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Table 7. Descriptive Profile of Cases. Note: Interviews with mentors are not accounted for in this table.
Startup

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

# Founding Members
Age of Founders

2
Late 20s

2
Late 20s

1
Mid 20s

3
Early 20s to late 20s

2
Early 20s

1
Early 30s

1
Mid 20s

1
Mid-20s

2
Early 20s

Founder Experience

Yes - Similar

Yes – Similar/
Different

Yes – Different

Yes – Different

Yes - Different

Yes - Different

No

Yes - Similar

Yes – Similar/Different

Founder Entrepreneurial
Experience (Yes/No)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Bachelors in Business
Administration;
Bachelors in Civil
Engineering and
Computer Systems
Technology

Masters in
Communication and
Management and
International
Relations

Masters in Engineering,
specializing in
thermodynamics

Apr-14

Oct-15

Apr-16

Founder Education
(Degree)

Bachelors in Software
Masters in
Masters in Health
Engineering and
Entrepreneurship (x2);
Promotion; Bachelors in
Computer Science,
Bachelors in
Bachelors in
Health Promotion and a
Bachelors in Chemistry
Chemistry; Bachelors Software engineering
Certificate in Food
and Philosophy,
in Industrial
Security
Bachelors in Political
Engineering
Science

Date of Startup
Establishment
(Entrepreneur-defined)

May-15

Industry

Food and Beverage
(Organic beverage)

Business Model (Hennart,
Manufacturer /
2014 or Rappa, 2010)
(Merchant Model)

Sep-15

Aug-15

Nov-15

Bachelors in Media
Masters in
information technology,
Entrepreneurship;
interactive media
Bachelors in Business
design; graphic design
and Psychology
and automation

Sep-15

Creative market place / Affiliate marketing Shared economy (Event App-based video game Fin-tech search engine Consumer goods (Coffee Institutional-based
Makerspace
and website creation
space rentals)
community
/ aggregator
press)
mental health platform

May-15
Marketing analytics
design

Community
Marketplace
(Brokerage Model)

Affiliate Model

Online Marketplace /
(Brokerage Model)

Online Community
Model

Online Marketplace /
(Matching Platform)
(BrokerageModel)

Online product
(Merchant and
manufacturer model)

Community Model

Service (merchant and
Service manufacturer
model)

Tech/Non-tech

Non-tech

Non-tech

Tech

Tech

Tech

Tech

Non-tech

Tech

Tech

Type of Process (Van de
Ven & Poole, 2002)

Teleology

Dialectic

Dialectic

Teleology

Teleology

Teleology

Teleology

Teleology

Teleology

8

6

14

11

7

8

10

6

11

7 (+ ongoing)

6 months (to failure)

7(+ ongoing)

7 (+ ongoing)

7 (+ ongoing)

7 (+ ongoing)

7 (+ ongoing)

7 (+ ongoing)

7 (+ ongoing)

122

215

85

182

108

159

145

81

231

313

525

901

504

502

369

363

291

787

News articles (3);
Website, social media

News articles (14);
Website; Mobile
application software;
Community forum;
Crowdfunding
campaign; Social media

News articles (2);
Press release;
Website; Social
media; Website;
Focus group

Blogs (18); News articles
(4); Press release; Online
community forum;
Crowdfunding campaigns
(2); Social media,
Website; Radio shows (2)

Website

News article (1);
Television show (1);
Website; Social media

Number of Interviews
Number of Months
Followed
Pages of Founder
Interviews
Minutes of Interview
(Total 4555)

Other sources

Farmers’ market, event,
Social media, website,
social media, website,
event
news articles (11)

Websites; Notes
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Table 8. Business Model Families of Startup Sample.
Communities
E – Software
application of online
gaming community
(Digital)
B – Community
makerspace (Physical)

Markets/Platforms

Software Service

F – Online loan
aggregator (Digital)

H – Mental health
information platform

D – Web platform for
renting short term event
spaces (Digital/Physical)

C – Affiliate marketing
I – Web design

Physical Product
G – Coffee press
A – Organic,
probiotics-based
beverage

3.3. Data Collection
Data collection extended over seven months and involved interviews,
observations of activities where customers were discussed or involved, such as meetings,
documenting changes in websites and media presence over time, collecting archival
documents from participants, attending industry events where participants were
partaking, visiting manufacturing facilities and retail stores, and attending focus groups.
This intense engagement in the field (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Suddaby, 2006) and the
use of three primary data collection mechanisms helped create a rich understanding of the
phenomenon of interest. More details on these methods are below.
3.3.1. Interviews
My primary method of data collection used semi-structured interviews that were
designed to gather narrative data (See Appendix A for sample questions). From these
interviews, 1328 pages of interview transcripts were documented. According to
Reissman, in a narrative interview, “a speaker connects events into a sequence that is
consequential for later action and for the meanings that the speaker wants listeners to take
away from the story. Events perceived by the speaker as important are selected,
organized, connected, and evaluated as meaningful for a particular audience” (2008: 3).
In essence, such interviews capture stories created for a recipient and require them and
listeners to make sense of past experiences. In this study, interviews were conducted at
various development phases of the startup, including opportunity discovery, opportunity
refinement, a transition phase including committing to the business, an entrepreneurial
phase involving testing, developing and marketing, and an execute phase where there is a
product and a market identified that is willing to purchase that product.
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The methodology and questions were based on consulting relevant prior literature
and through observation of the phenomenon during the pilot study. I took an iterative
process of collecting and analyzing data, and sought out new participants and follow-up
based on current participant information and constant comparison of data (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967). Over time, I adjusted the interview protocol to reflect themes that
emerged during data collection (Spradley, 1979).
No startups in the sample were followed during their initial months in real time.
The first interview with each startup reviewed the events of the previous months. Each of
the initial interviews lasted 30 to 90 minutes. The interviews were semi-structured and
became increasingly focused over the course of the study. Questions asked during this
initial interview included, “Can you tell us something about how this idea for this startup
came about? Tell me a story of the startup from the idea to today.” Extensive field notes
were taken as time and context permitted. I also created memos after most interviews and
asked myself, “What did I learn?” and “How does this interview compare to prior
interviews?” (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2001). To minimize recall bias in these accounts,
I also collected archival data (explained below; e.g. blog posts, news articles, company
business plans) to compare with narratives and better understand startup processes.
Interviews with other informants, such as cofounders and mentors, also reduced potential
informant bias and added complementary perspectives (Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997)
that triangulated the stories.
Subsequent interviews were typically shorter, between 15 to 45 minutes, but were
longer if participants desired to speak longer (up to two hours). The subsequent
interviews also used semi-structured interview questions, asked to encourage participants
to share extended accounts of their entrepreneurial experiences. These questions
included, “When did interactions with early customers occur? Why did you decide to
interact with early customers at that time? What did you learn from that customer and
how did what you learned affect your venture creation process? What other activities
have been occupying your time since we last chatted?” Also, questions around the
confirmed first customer will be asked when applicable, including, “How did you select
your first customer? What activities did you do with your first customer, and how did
committing to this customer change your business?” Questions have also been included
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in the interview protocol to gain insight into mechanisms for the creation of the
organization’s path. More detail on this analysis is addressed in Section 3.4 on Data
Analysis.
I also asked the participants their plans for customer interactions and in general
for the coming weeks, and to describe where they think the startup would be in the next
few years. No precise future timeline is being specified to gain an understanding of how
founders interpret time in their business. During subsequent interviews, I followed up to
see what activities and changes in thought took place and questions were adapted as
necessary.
A total of 81 formal interviews were conducted with the founders of nine startups
over the study period. All formal interviews were recorded and transcribed. These
interviews allowed me to follow up on emerging themes. Informal interviews also were
conducted when spontaneous opportunities arose for learning more about the
phenomenon. Interviews were also conducted with mentors when possible.
3.3.2. Observations
A lived research experience – a first-hand account and impression of what
participants go through – can help a researcher with context immersion (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008). Throughout my data collection there were several opportunities available
to better understand the startups and the context that they are involved in through
observation. Real-time data collection was of particular interest as there was potential for
distortion of what happens in a startup’s venture creation process during narrative
interviews. Memory is constructive in nature (Anderson, 1990), and when opinions and
perspectives are shared, there is the potential for hindsight bias and selection when
retrospective data is included in a study.
To better understand the general environment of the founder participants during
data collection, I spent several hours (three to five days) a week in the incubator where
participants predominantly operate their businesses. This proximity allowed me to
become closer with the participants, establish a relationship, and collect near real-time
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longitudinal data. It also allowed me to develop a certain level of trust to engage
participants.
There were also several one-time opportunities that arose to better understand
how founders talk about their startups and interact with customers. These included:
attending customer focus groups, attending incubator-organized pitches to venture
capitalists and a public audience (presentation decks were collected), participating as a
potential customer in a social media startup, visiting startups’ manufacturing facilities
and retail outlets, listening in on sales calls, and attending of industry events where
customer interactions occur (such as a video game testing event). At least one observation
was conducted for each startup in the sample (noted in Other Sources, Table 7).
3.3.3. Archival Physical and Digital Documentation
Additional startup-owned archival documentation was collected, including
participant presentations, strategic planning documents, product design iterations, and
any other relevant internal documents that I was granted access to. These documents
helped to triangulate what was learned in interviews and observations, and verified
retrospective accounts from startups. Documentation provided important contextual
understanding to both the content and pace of the business development process in the
startup.
Additional data collected were for visual analysis of startups’ outward-facing
visual design. Communications and branding included snapshots of the startups’ websites
and social media (Twitter) feeds over time. These visual data are representative of
corporate identity, the public image communicated about what is the organization
(Cornelissen, Haslam, & Balmer, 2007), and corporate identity created by founders, and
provides information on the startup over time and the shared meaning of what the
organization represents to potential customers (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003). When
available, news articles and blogs written about the startups were collected. Data were
also gathered from online community forums such as Reddit.com, where startups sought
out feedback on their business idea. These forums provided readily accessible, public and
date-stamped data on interactions with potential customers.
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3.4. Data Analysis
Data for this study contain stories collected over several months from nine
startups. I will focus on answering the research questions posed through using an iterative
process, following methods described for inductive research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967;
Miles & Huberman, 1994). This involves within-case analyses, as well as a cross-case
analysis.
Data analysis was carried out in five main stages. First, I developed a set of
narratives and process maps that describe the venture creation process, and identified
venture creation domains where the startups and their customers and potential customers
interact. Second, data were coded and used to build and update theory, while iterating
between data and theory to reveal new insights into how customer interaction takes place
during venture creation. I also used archival data and field notes, in addition to the
transcribed interviews. The interview protocol was also adjusted as needed and when
possible, I checked back with study participants to gain their perspective on the findings.
Third, these methods were complemented by use of comparative matrices (Miles
& Huberman, 1994), data structuring techniques also suggested by Gioia, Corey, and
Hamilton (2013), that provided a visual aid while constructing raw data into themes.
These included event-listing matrices, summaries of time-ordered displays, focused
narratives, and other data displays for within-case analyses, and a meta-matrix for the
cross-case analysis. These data displays were used to answer the first part of the research
question: When and how are early customers involved in the venture creation process?
Fourth, based on the cross-case analysis, I answered the second part of the research
question: “How do these customer interactions create path dependence for the
organization being created?” Fifth, I conducted a path analysis to understand the
startups’ paths and used a causal loop diagram to display the process of customer
interactions during early stages of new venture creation over time.
3.4.1. Reason for Chosen Analysis Method
Before describing these analysis stages, I will explain why this methodology is
being adopted. Process data is concerned with why and how things are evolving over time
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(Langley, 1999; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013). It deals with
sequences of events where it can be challenging to identify what are the boundaries of the
event. As a result, such data are messy and challenging to deal with, as they involve
multiple levels and different units of analysis, however are often distilled into simple
linear processes.
Path dependence has been studied both over time and cross-sectionally.
According to Vergne and Durand (2011), rather than studying an isolated path,
interactions between paths and their broader environment should be considered. This
allows capturing key moments in the founding process, such as decision making and
interactions with stakeholders, and allows for an agency-based approach (Van de Ven,
1993; Ruef, 2005).
To capture decisions made and their implications, an organizational process
theory needs to take into consideration events and any other actions undertaken. The
events are recorded in a particular sequence, and the parts that have the most influence
are likely to become embedded into the organization’s characteristics, actions, and
processes (Schreyogg, & Sydow, 2011). Garud et al. (2010) suggest longitudinal research
design should be used to collect ‘real time’ observations as events that create and shape
paths unfold.
There are various strategies that can be used to analyze processes. Narratives, in
particular, can be helpful in constructing detailed stories that help explain what is
happening in an organization. According to Shaw, Brown, and Bromiley, “when people
can locate themselves in the story, their sense of commitment and involvement is
enhanced” (1998: 50). We tend to store and recall information in more of a narrative
form, rather than a more generic description of events (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), making it
an easy way for startups and other organizations to reflect on their past, present and
future efforts together (Bartel & Garud, 2009). Particularly for the concepts in this
dissertation, collecting and analyzing narrative accounts of the actors involved in decision
making and iterating between the past, present, and future are a relevant methodology
(Garud et al., 2010).
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3.4.2. Explaining Narratives
A narrative is a sequence of events, connecting cause and effect, as well as stories
that describe relationships in a process (Bartel & Garud, 2009; Pentland, 1999). In
addition to a sequence of events over time, narratives have focal actors that narrate the
stories and experiences of the startups, an identifiable voice that reflects a point of view,
attitudes, assumptions, and cultural values, and other indicators that help contextualize
the plot of the narrative (Pentland, 1999).
Weick (1995) suggests that the sensemaking process involves being both
retrospective and prospective to develop an understanding of events and idea. Given this,
I looked at customer interaction narratives of past interactions (termed structured
narratives), as well as in near real-time to understand how look at how participants define
problems and may lack a clear plot (termed provisional narratives; Boje 2001; Bartel &
Garud, 2009).
Time and context are particularly important, where the sequence of events, plot,
and generative mechanisms at work portray the different depths of narratives (Langley et
al., 2013). There is the surface level storytelling of a sequence of events by a narrator; the
description and translation of a sequence of events, relationships, and actors from a
particular point of view; a plot – or “conventional theme with which people in a given
social context can readily identify, enabling them to see actions, events, and
circumstances as related to parts of a larger whole (Bruner, 1986)” (Bartel & Garud,
2009: 111); and the deeper generating mechanisms – the underlying structures and
processes that drive and create patterns in the process (Bartel & Garud, 2009; Pentland,
1999).
A challenge in narrative studies is that it is easiest to conduct a shallow analysis of
the surface level details of participants – answering who (relational information), where
(contextual information), and when (temporal information describing a sequence of
events that they see as taking place in a certain way; Bartel & Garud, 2009). Theory
development however relies on gaining explanations of the generating mechanisms that
drive the process – i.e. how and why these events unfolded in a certain way. It is the
understanding of these deep structures that help in developing new theory and practically,
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help us take action on the customer interaction process (Pentland, 1999).
Using a narrative method requires acknowledgement that what we are told by
others is interpretive - a rich story that provides meaning for the events taking place and
potentially legitimacy to those hearing the story. However, it is also important to
acknowledge that this story may not actually be a true pattern of events. Hearing a
narrative, the researcher may become an active co-producer as they translate accounts and
stories through their own frame of reference (including their belief systems, goals, scripts,
identities and schemas) and experiences and re-state it from their own perspective (Boje,
2001).
Langley (1999) suggests that multiple strategies are important to develop a deeper
understanding of process and its mechanisms. For this study, I see narrative strategy
combining well with visual mapping to organize process data in a systematic way and
identify phases, events and constructs. Using multiple data sources also help with this
(Pentland, 1999). Visual mapping provides a way to look at processes over time in a
visual chronology. Mapping out the process is helpful as an intermediary step to
developing more abstract theorization on the interactions between the startups and the
customers. While the process is interpretive (Suddaby, 2006), the methods developed are
very specific and highly structured, involving comparison of small units of data and
creating categories and codes for comparison of processes. Using constant comparison,
data were collected and analyzed at the same time, and theory was built up from a base of
original data.
3.4.3. Within-Case Analyses
Given the bulk of the data, to be able to properly analyze them, they needed to be
organized in visual formats that presented the information systematically. The textual and
visual data displays that have been selected for the analysis made the data easier to digest
by reducing them to component parts (description) and showing how different
components fit together (explanation) to be able to draw conclusions. These different data
displays are explained below, both in the within-case analyses and the cross-case
analysis. Data displays used are noted in bold and underlined.
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Part 1. Creating Startups’ Narratives and Process Maps
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that it is important to first become familiar with each
case to understand case-specific patterns before cross-case comparisons can be made. To
bring focus on the data, the first stage of data analysis involved the creation of a set of
case narratives in a standardized format to explain idea generation, founders, startup
events, founder goals, and customer interaction activities during the study period. These
cases can be found in Appendix B. The narratives are composed of ordered, raw data
(including quotes from interviews, archival documents, and field notes) and commentary
to clarify the case. The goal was to see what founders said about the venture creation
process, what they did, and when they did it.
This stage of data analysis involved identifying who are customers, partners and
other stakeholders. Through data collection, there were diverse responses in terms of how
founders referred to who their customers were. Several startups have multiple types of
customers, varying by factors such as demographics, size, and repeat business.
Identifying relevant categories of customers could only be done after data collection
(Table 8, for example), rather than assuming a set of customers in advance or identifying
them early in the fieldwork.
All nine cases have been structured in a similar manner. While the semi-structured
interview questions were asked in each interview in a similar manner, the level of detail
available and format of how participants answered the questions differed dramatically
from participant to participant. Given these are narratives of the founders of startups, one
of the assumptions I made was that the interactions mentioned are those that the founders
believed were most important for their startup. Sample terminology used by participants
are defined in Appendix C. The cases represent all the customer interactions mentioned
during interviews and in the public locations noted by the participants during the
interviews, including on online community forums, social media platforms, and websites.
The second part involved identifying customer interaction activities by analyzing
narratives. Process maps were created to help with this. Using Business Process Model
and Notation software (BMPN.io), detailed process maps of the new venture creation
process and customer interactions were made. These maps helped create a visual
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overview of the various stakeholders and interactions that the startup has. The process
maps can be found in Appendix D.
These two types of data displays, narrative cases and process maps, encompass
the bulk of customer interactions, and sensitized me to potential types of customer
interaction activities that occurred in the startups in the sample (e.g. interactions on the
phone, in online forums, through social media, at networking events, etc.).
Note that despite regular data collection, there was potential for several customer
interactions to not be documented (e.g. casual discussions, phone calls, e-mails, and
interactions deemed not important or forgotten by participants to mention). Therefore, in
this study, I focus on customer interactions that are exchanges of information between the
startup founders and potential or realized customers that are salient for the participant at a
given time point.
To try to collect information on the most important customer interactions and to
minimize issues with retrospective accounts of action (Golden, 1992), combining
accounts with archival data and multiple founder interviews were used to reduce biases.
Secondly, for an event to be considered as important, all founders must consider it to be
of real significance.
Part 2. Coding Data to Identify Categories
As one of the initial stages of analysis, micro-coding was used with the
transcribed interviews to generate a broad assortment of categories that the data could be
approached from (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
The purpose of coding the data was to identify concepts that are related to the
phenomena of interest (customer interactions), help in the identification, clarification and
specification of concepts or subcategories of concepts in understanding the mechanisms
by which early customer interactions are influencing startups. As coding is a dynamic and
iterative process, as new themes emerged and concepts and dimensions developed, they
were adapted and re-classified over the process of data collection and analysis, and
existing literature was consulted (Suddaby, 2006). Codes identified are noted in Table 9.
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Table 9. Customer and Customer Interaction Information Codes and Definitions. Used in matrices
for analyses.
CUSTOMER AND CUSTOMER INTERACTION INFORMATION (Column B in analysis)
1. Description of Stage for Startup: A shortened summary of the case and detailed process diagram
2. Type of Customer: A category of customer, based on relationship defined by the founder(s).
These may include the Founder, Friends and family, Professional network, Early adopters in
external target market, External target market, Everyone, etc.
3. Customer Interaction Initiated by: Who initiates the relationship – the Customer, Startup, Other
4. Information Collection / Marketing and Sales Communication Channel for Customer
Interaction: The medium through which a message is transmitted to or received from the customer.
Physical (Earned, In-person, Phone, Newspaper articles, Radio promotions & Paid Ads) versus
Web/Mobile (Email, Social media, Blogs, etc.)
5. Distribution Channel of Product: The chain of businesses or intermediaries through which a
good or service passes before it reaches the end consumer. These include: Direct to end-customer /
end-user, Direct via marketplace, Direct to customer via intermediary, Direct to retailer, or Indirect
- Agents, Intermediaries, Brokers, Distributors
6. Purpose of Early Customer Interaction: The reason for which the early customer interaction
took place. Tested hypotheses and assumptions on (1) Problem, (2) Product (MVP), (3) Business
model, or (4) Customer segment; Learned more about problem or customer, etc.
7. Description of Information Gathered: A representation of what information was collected
during the customer interaction. For example: Product features, customer interest, etc.
8. Customer Feedback Impact: The type of effect of the customer interaction and information
collected on the business. The two potential imacts are: Strategic feedback impact (affecting business
concept and overall scope and direction of corporation; Ansoff, 1988; Child, 1972; Maidique &
Zirger, 1984; 1985) or Operational/Tactical feedback impact (Affecting the plan of action to employ
resources, and every day moves to give the organization an advantage; Ansoff, 1988)
9. Level of Validation Received from Customer: Recognition or affirmation that an aspect of the
business (problem, product, business model, customer segment, etc.) is valid or worthwhile to
pursue. Displayed in Chapter 4 in concentric shell circle diagrams, from inside out - Selfjustification, Personal network: Family & friends validation, Professional network, Early adopters
Target market validation, External target market validation / Media validation, Commitment through
contract validation, Commitment through money exchange validation
12. Other Non-Customer Intel Collected During NVC Stage: Other ways in which information
was collected about the customer, besides a customer interaction. These include: Data analytics,
Interviews with mentors or investors, Secondary research, etc.

The data were initially managed in NVivo 11.1.1 for Mac, and later, hand-coded.
The use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CADQDAS) is a debated
topic amongst qualitative researchers (Welsh, 2002). While software can help in making
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analysis more systematic – facilitating the organizing, manipulating, storing and
retrieving of data - and is thought by some to add rigour (Richards & Richards, 1991),
using software for coding has the potential to affect the richness of qualitative data.
The reason for this is that one of the goals of qualitative research is to observe the
perspective of human actors (Roberts & Wilson, 2002). This requires interpreting the
context, how participants interact with the environment and with each other, and the
language that they use to express themselves. While categorization is an important part of
the analysis process, when using CADQDAS, there can be the temptation to create an
increasing diversity of codes and discrete categories into which data are forced. This can
over-segment the data, affecting the meaning that would cause the researcher to lose sight
of the context and the overall picture and may lead to “incorrect” analysis occurring.
Furthermore, while initial coding is important, it is also important to think about
connections between themes across data (Welsh, 2002), which can be challenging when
flipping through windows in CADQDAS programs.
CADQDAS programs have the potential to distance researchers from the data
(Morison & Moir, 1998; Weitzman & Miles, 1995), where researchers may handle a
fraction of the data set at a time, and where even just reading the data on the screen may
alienate researcher from the data – ultimately affecting the analysis part of qualitative
research. As Kelle (1995) says, "the central analytical task in qualitative research—
understanding the meaning of texts—cannot be computerized" (p.3).
In contrast, manual coding allows researchers to create a closeness to and
familiarity with the data. The categorizing and sorting then takes place in different
displays – matrices, tables and diagrams - are used to summarize data (Miles &
Huberman, 1994), It also allows the researcher to acknowledge different ways an idea or
concept are expressed by participants (Welsh, 2002), and to step back to standardize how
these concepts may be analyzed and reported across cases.
Roberts and Wilson (2002) and Welsh (2002) argue for the supporting use of both
CADQDAS and manual coding – as done in this dissertation. Software programs are
useful to systematically explore the data and to find descriptive codes and thematic ideas.
Memos were written that allowed for data to be connected. However, with process data,
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the goal was to connect events and ideas that took place over time. Manual handling the
data was particularly helpful with this. By re-reading the data manually, I was able to
address how ideas were expressed differently by different participants, think about the
process that they undertook, and compare themes that emerged over the new venture
creation process through customer interactions.
Part 3. Creation of Event Listing Matrices
Because this study is process-oriented, I generated a time-ordered event listing
matrix display for each case (nine total) that allowed for the transforming of data,
condensing, sorting, and linking it over time (Gheradi & Turner, 2002). For each case, a
crossing of two lists helped in understanding flow, location, and connection of events.
The matrices are event listings – a series of concrete events listed over a chronological
time-period (columns) and sorted into categories (rows; Miles & Huberman, 1994).
The Event Listing Matrices for each case can be found in Appendix E. Labels
from these events came from activities that occurred during that chronological timeperiod. From the interview transcripts and narratives, I identified venture creation phases
and stages that arose in the startups that were documented during the study period. I
defined a venture creation phase as a time-period in which particular activities are
undertaken to advance the startup and a clear goal is met. A phase is made up of stages.
The events were also associated with the new venture creation phases and stages noted in
the literature. Five phases are identified. New time periods (or phases) were defined by a
significant activity, or shift of activities – a “barometric event” that moves the process
into the subsequent time-period. I then reduced this list to a comprehensive set of
“typical” venture creation stages using a defined set of criteria (noted in Table 10).
The decision rules for data entry into the matrix were clearly defined as follows:
•

Data were described based on data from specific interview transcripts, unless the
participants said that this was the way it was always done.

•

Secondary data were used to fill in the gaps from the interviews, as well as
triangulate the information from the interviews.

•

Participants were followed up with to ensure that the events were correctly
interpreted.
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Table 10. Definitions of Phases and Stages in New Venture Creation
PHASE (I to V; Row 1 in analysis), (Based
on Bhave, 1994; Cunneen et al., 2007)

I. OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY PHASE First stage of venture formation during which
business opportunity is recognized (Bhave,
1994) (A, B, C). Stages G, H, and I (from the
Entrepreneurial Phase) may also occur in this
phase.

II. OPPORTUNITY REFINEMENT
PHASE - During this phase, the venture has
decided this is an interesting business
opportunity and plans to define the business
concept and whether it meets customers' needs
(Bhave, 1994) (D, E) Stages G, H, and I (from
the Entrepreneurial Phase) may also occur in
this phase.

NEW VENTURE CREATION STAGE (A to J; Row 4 in analysis)
(I) - Internally Stimulated Opportunity
Recognition

(E) - Externally Stimulated Opportunity Recognition

A(I) - INDIVIDUAL NEED RECOGNIZED Entrepreneur sees a need that to her/his
knowledge has no current solution.

A(E) - DECISION TO START A BUSINESS Entrepreneur's personal and environmental
circumstances led them to want to start a business,
before deciding what that business is (Bhave, 1994)

B(I) - OPPORTUNITY FILTRATION Filtration of opportunities among a group of
recognized ones (Long & McMullan, 1984) leads
to... INDIVIDUAL NEED being FULFILLED
when a solution is identified.

B(E) - OPPORTUNITIES RECOGNIZED Several opportunities are recognized, and entrepreneur
conducts a search into how their knowledge,
experience, skills, and other resources match the needs
of the market - and they filter opportunities (Bhave,
1994; Long & McMullan, 1984)

C(I) - OPPORTUNITY SELECTION (Bhave,
1994) leads to… BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
RECOGNIZED - When entrepreneur sees a need
is widespread and commit to it

C(E) - OPPORTUNITIES CHOSEN Entrepreneur(s) create a commitment to pursue an
opportunity (Bhave, 1994)

D - OPPORTUNITY REFINEMENT - Idea is adapted and elaborated until BUSINESS CONCEPT is
IDENTIFIED

E - BUSINESS CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT - During this stage, effort is put in to clarify business
concept to achieve fit between customer needs and entrepreneur's perceptions of these needs (Bhave, 1994)
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Table 10 (Continued)
PHASE (I to V; Row 1 in analysis), (Based on
Bhave, 1994; Cunneen et al., 2007)

III. TRANSITION PHASE - During this phase, the
venture has committed to starting the organization in
some significant way (Bhave, 1994) (F)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE - During this
phase, the venture is still being set up, the customer
segment is being tested, the business model is being
evaluated, and/or the product/technology
development is ongoing. While three stages take
place during this phase (G, H, I), in no particular
order, these three stages can also take place during
other phases of the new venture creation process

NEW VENTURE CREATION STAGE (A to J; Row 4 in analysis)
F - COMMITTED TO PHYSICAL CREATION, INCLUDING ORGANIZING
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY TO TRANSFORM BUSINESS CONCEPT INTO
MARKETABLE PRODUCT - At this stage, the entrepreneur has decided to build an organization
and product. While testing the market and a minimum viable product may have occurred earlier, at
this stage, there is an action on the part of the entrepreneur, such as dedicating their full-time to the
startup or renting a physical work space, that signifies a more dedicated commitment to the business.
Prior literature suggests that often, but not always, at this stage, that the founder has promises of a
potential customer/an actual customer (Block & MacMillan, 1985; Bhave, 1994)
G - PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT & RELATED RESOURCE
ASSEMBLY - Attention towards the development of the 'physical' or digital product takes place
during this phase, including gathering resources for production technology development, and defining
specifications, design, prototype or minimum viable product (MVP), manufacturing processes; related
services and required expertise and knowledge.
H - ORGANIZATION CREATION & RELATED RESOURCE ASSEMBLY - Attention
towards the development of the organization takes place during this phase, including gathering
resources for creating the physical and virtual organization, office facilities and equipment, physical
structure, organizational processes, organization related software, etc. (Thompson, 1967). Funding
from investors, grants, banks, also falls under this phase, as it is not necessarily funneled towards
product or customer development, but may be allocated from the organization.
I - RESOURCE ASSEMBLY TO DEVELOP CUSTOMERS - Attention towards developing
customers takes place during this phase, including gathering resources to carry out marketing, sales
and promotion activities.

V. EXECUTE PHASE - Once this phase is reached,
the founders are fairly certain they have established
their market/business model and focus on growing it
with sales and marketing efforts (J).

J - SUBSEQUENT SALES WITH INCREASED MARKETING EFFORTS TOWARDS GOAL
MARKET AND FORMALIZE BUSINESS. - At this stage, there is a good idea of who the
customers, business model, and product are and the goal is to increase sales through increased
marketing and sales efforts. There may or may not have been money exchanged by this stage, but
there is likely to be some sort of commitment to the business (e.g. through a contract).
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Part Four. Time-Ordered Display Summary Matrix and Within-Case Analyses
To summarize what happened in each main phase, or time-period of new venture
creation, a summary table, a time-ordered display summary matrix, was created for
each case. Summary tables were necessary, given the size of these matrices and the
volume of the data (each event listing matrix in Appendix E spanned several printed
pages).
There were nine time-ordered summary matrices created (one for each case) that
help interpret the larger, more comprehensive event listing matrix from Part Three. These
tables are noted in the main body of the dissertation (Chapter 4) and provide an overview
for how each variable changed over time within the case.
These summary tables used the tactics suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994)
to draw conclusions. Two codes included in the original event listing matrices (rows 10 Level of acceptance of customer feedback, and 11 - Subsequent action by startup) were
excluded from the summary table due to lack of comparable data and repetition.
Part Five. Written Within-Case Analyses
The within-case analyses in Chapter 4 used the topics in these time-ordered
display summary matrices to create a series of explanations and data displays to better
understand each case. Shortened, focused narratives were written based on data from the
time-ordered display matrices that assessed customer interactions in each phase.
3.4.4. Cross-Case Analysis
Textual and visual data displays continued to be important to conduct the crosscase analysis. A cross-case analysis, involving comparable cases in a meta-matrix (Part
1), was used to deepen understanding and explanation of a scenario (Miles & Huberman,
1994). Using the within-case analyses that have a standard set of variables, matrices and
other displays were used to understand each case in depth.
Part 1. Meta-Matrix
After each individual case is well understood, the case-level displays were stacked
into a partially ordered meta-matrix, where the data from several cases are brought into
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one big chart, condensing them further using a standardized format that allows for
systematic comparisons to be made and pattern clarification (Miles & Huberman, 1994;
Appendix F). Further analyses were conducted based on what patterns were seen in this
meta-matrix.
Part Two. Path Analysis
Finally, path analysis was undertaken to understand the startups’ paths and
develop a general model of customer interaction during startup formation. There have
been different methods proposed to analyze paths. Sydow et al. (2009) suggested that
there are three main mechanisms that can be identified to map out an organization’s path.
First, operational rigidity or persistence within an organization are identified. In more
established organizations, this can be done by looking for practices that are inefficient or
not as valuable, however this may be challenging in newer organizations. Secondly, selfreinforcing feedback mechanisms can be identified and reconstructed that may contribute
to organizational rigidity. Finally, a triggering event, or critical juncture, can be identified
that facilitates the path building process.
Similar steps to analyzing paths were also considered by Wenzel et al. (2015) who
developed four steps to their path biography methodology: 1) Focus on self-reinforcing
mechanisms; 2) focus on the technical level, organizational level, and level-spanning
interactions; 3) Consider the interaction between the local information system and global
environment, and 4) Focus on stabilization and lock-in.
Finally, Koch (2008) suggests that strategic paths can only be analyzed
retrospectively, and argues that the analysis of the strategic path needs the strategic
activities and the agents that reflect on these strategic activities. Narrative interviews are,
as a result, ideal for this type of analysis.
While analyzing paths retrospectively is important to gain a fuller picture of
events over time, collecting narrative data in near-real time, as done in this dissertation, is
also important to reduce hindsight bias on events recounted by actors. Events that
influence path dependence may appear as small, contingent, random, or historic accidents
(Arthur, 1989; Bennett & Elman, 2006; Djelic & Quack, 2007), but are associated with
initial choices (van Driel, 2013) that may or may not be identified retrospectively.
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To identify self-reinforcing mechanisms, Koch (2011) outlines four steps: a)
identify time-consistent strategic practices or strategic activities; b) identify positive,
negative, and neutral elements of feedback, and identify at least one positive feedback
loop that suggests path formation; c) look for changes in the environment that indicate a
rationality shift – a significant environmental change that creates inefficiencies in the
strategic pattern (this can be an indication of lock-in); and d) look at whether the
organization adapted its strategic activities after there was a change in the environment. If
no changes occurred (indicating a rigidity) or if changes are counterproductive, this
suggests that lock-in may exist and that it may be challenging to overcome lock-in.
Two points should be noted for all the path analysis methods on early stage
organizations. Path analysis is typically done on more established organizations that have
already experienced lock-in or operational rigidity (Sydow et al., 2009), and already have
a notable persistence of a trait, even if it is no longer relevant or appropriate to the
organization. Given the early life stage of the startups, it is unlikely startups reached
lock-in, so for this analysis, I focus on the paths that are strategically relevant to the
organization and aim to focus on identifying the narrowing of their options, rather than
lock-in.
As a result, the focus on the path in this dissertation is on:
1) detecting what initial activities and choices (trigger events) trigger the critical
juncture, leading from the Preformation Phase (Phase I) to the Formation Phase
(or the phase of positive feedback as termed by Koch, 2008; Phase II)
2) identifying potential positive feedback mechanisms (precursors to lock-in and
path dependence) that result from customer interactions that drive a startup
towards a narrowing path (Koch, 2008; Wenzel et al., 2015).
The dissertation analysis reconstructs these self-reinforcing mechanisms leading
towards the belief that the product, business model and market have been established and
can be pursued (in other words, leading the startup towards the Execute Phase of new
venture creation). While in a fine grain analysis, individual startups in the sample have
diverse outcomes in terms of the customer interactions and how they interpret them, I
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identify mechanisms in the new venture creation process that should generally apply to
startups.
Finally, to present the model, I used the style of causal loop diagramming
methods commonly used in system dynamics research to articulate process theories (e.g.
Perlow et al., 2002; Rudolph et al., 2009) and increasingly used in organizational theory
literature (e.g. Strike & Rerup, 2016). This overall model considers customer interactions
during the early stages of new venture creation unfolding over time, and the stage at
which there is a critical juncture in the organizational path.
3.5. Summary of the Sample Description and Research Design
Chapter 3 describes the sample and inductive qualitative methods used to develop
a better understanding of customer interactions during the new venture creation process.
A pilot study helped test the approach to investigate the main research question (3.1). The
research context and sample was described (nine startups in Ontario-based incubators;
3.2). Data collection took place through interviews, observations, and archival data (3.3).
Finally, five stages of data analysis (3.4) of the main study for this dissertation are
described and justified here. These include developing narratives and process maps,
coding the data, creating comparative matrices as visual aids when constructing raw data
into themes (event-listing matrices, summaries of time-ordered displays, focused
narratives, other data displays for within-case analyses, and a meta matrix for the crosscase analysis), conducting a path analysis and using a causal loop diagram to display the
process of customer interactions during early stages of the new venture creation process.
In the next chapter, Chapter 4, each of the nine cases is individually analyzed (withincase analyses).
.
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4. RESULTS: WITHIN-CASE FINDINGS
Overview of Analysis
Chapter 4 provides the summaries of the within-case analyses for each of the nine
cases. Note that both Chapters 4 and 5 are densely packed with data and findings. Rather
than including these chapters in the appendices, these two chapters were included in the
main body of the dissertation to take readers through the inductive analysis process and
show the characteristics of customer interactions that emerged from the data, to provide a
common structure for each case (Chapter 4) so that they can be compared (in Chapter 5),
and to demonstrate to readers the richness of the cases. In other words, these chapters are
included in the main body of the dissertation to demonstrate the patterns that emerged in
customer interactions during each phase of new venture creation (Opportunity Discovery,
Opportunity Refinement, Transition, Entrepreneurial, and Execute Phases). that triggered
the theory development presented in Chapters 6 and 7. The basis of analysis for each case
is described as follows.
In Sections 4.1 to 4.9, each of the nine case analyses are presented individually, in
a standardized format, using a series of text, figures, and tables. The characteristics noted
were not specifically pre-defined and emerged from the iterative process of going
between the data during the analysis process and the literature. The analysis of each case
began with a case study overview (1) of the startup at each phase of the new venture
creation process. This was followed by a summary of customer interactions (2), where
customer interactions involved in the startup process were outlined and characterized in
tables. The next section explains the startup focus (3), defining whether the startup is
product, organization, or customer-focused during each of the venture creation stages.
Then, in the customer commitment (4) section, the first customer interaction and first
customer commitment through contract and/or sale are noted, and the new venture
creation phase in which these interactions occurred. Next, who initiated customer
interaction (5) is mentioned, followed by a summary of the communication channels
(6) used over time. The type of feedback sought (7) by the startup at different phases
was also noted (strategic feedback, affecting the business concept, or operational or
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tactical feedback, affecting activities to carry out/create the business concept). Finally,
the level of validation (8) received was reported, defining when and from whom the
startup received validation for their idea, product, or business model. Finally, these eight
characteristics are presented in a summary for each case (9), noting the corresponding
number of the characteristic in parentheses in bold.
For more information on the sample, see Table 7 for a descriptive profile of the
startups. Also, see Table 9 for an explanation of the customer interaction characteristics
codes used (in the first column of the following tables), and Table 10 for the definitions
of phases and stages of the new venture creation process adopted for this analysis.
Finally, note that much of the “semi-raw” data are available in the Appendices. As noted
in the methodology section (Chapter 3), as part of these analyses for each of the nine
startups, I prepared an extensive case narrative with supporting quotes (Appendix B),
process maps detailing each stage of venture creation during the study period (Appendix
D), and a detailed event listing matrices of this process study (Appendix E) used to show
and transform time-ordered data. These three types of data displays allowed me to
condense, sort, and link data, and to draw conclusions on the process over time (Gheradi
& Turner, 2002), and allowed me to generate the assessments of customer interactions for
each startup over time and summary tables of the time-ordered displays in this chapter.
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4.1. Startup A
4.1.1. Case Overview
Startup A was a beverage company that described their business as: “[we] make
the best organic [specialty beverage], the only 100 percent certified organic [specialty
beverage] on the market. We are the only company doing seasonal craft flavours… and
like a craft brewery – we try to stay small batch” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June,
2016). Though the idea arose in 2012, the company was only founded in July 2014.
Startup A was founded by two entrepreneurs who were engaged to be married.
Both founders were very health focused – having met in a fitness facility and having a
shared interest in physical activity, health and nutrition. After a few years, one founder
developed health issues, and in researching how she could change her diet to make her
condition less severe, she discovered consuming fermented foods would be helpful. She
began creating different types of fermented foods, until finally, she created a delicious
fermented beverage. She let her family and friends try early versions of it (the Minimum
Viable Product), and upon receiving positive feedback, the founder and her fiancé saw
that there was a potential business opportunity to sell the beverage to others (I.
Opportunity Discovery Phase).
In their spare time, the founders continued to test out the beverage with their
personal and professional networks in the health industry and found that potential
customers were very supportive of the product. The founders believed that they could
expand the business further (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase), and decided to commit
to the business full time. One founder stopped pursuing his Ph.D. and the other decided to
dedicate more time and effort to improving the product. They had a business logo
designed for the startup and managed to get their first contract with a health food retailer,
also a professional contact (III. Transition Phase). Over time, they moved in to a larger,
22,000 square feet facility to expand production, and started testing distribution options,
including selling the product themselves at the local farmers’ market and exploring
distribution options with smaller health food retailers (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase). As
Startup A’s reputation grew, and knowledge about this fermented beverage grew, the
startup started seeking out and gaining contracts with specialty supermarket chains,
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national general supermarket chains, regional organic supermarkets, and distributors.
While they continued to find customer interest was there, the startup was unable to serve
all of their needs with their current production facilities. This resulted in them having to
refrain from taking on larger clients (a nation-wide warehouse retailer and a large
regional organic food distributor) until they received a loan to create a larger, new
production facility (V. Execute Phase).
4.1.2. Understanding Customer Interactions
Table 11 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase
of the new venture creation process for Startup A, and Table 12 is a summary of the
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. These tables are
referenced both in this chapter, as well as the cross-case analysis in the next chapter.
Note that the founders of Startup A believed that there were multiple types of
customers in this startup, including individual end-consumers, the retail stores that the
beverage is sold through, as well as distributors. The founders initially believed that
individual consumers were like the professional market that they themselves already were
a part of: “[the] health conscious yogi type, younger hipsters.” However, they also saw
the potential to target a wider external target market, including a larger demographic:
“Really, the big opportunity is middle aged women. And then craft cocktails… I think the
sky’s the limit there.” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
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Table 11. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup A
PHASE (#
Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (5)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT PHASE
(2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV.
ENTREPRENEURIAL
PHASE (4)

V. EXECUTE PHASE
(22)

Customer
Interaction
Characteristics

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

One founder developed
health
issues
and
experimented with making
fermented foods that were
supposed to help. She
created
a
delicious
fermented beverage, and let
her family and friends try it.
Upon receiving positive
feedback, the founder and
her fiancé (co-founder) saw
the
potential
business
opportunity.

The founders tested out the
beverage with their network
of individuals in the health
industry to see if they would
be interested in purchasing
it.

The
founders
committed
the
business by putting
other activities on
hold,
including
stopping the pursuit
of a PhD. The
founders
had
a
business
logo
designed, and worked
towards
and
succeeded in getting
a contract with a
health food retailer.

The founders expanded
production
of
the
product
and
tested
distribution options (in
retail stores and at the
farmers' market) to see if
a wider array of
customers in their niche
health
food market
would be interested to
access product.

Sales efforts increased sales
in both niche market as well
as
a
wider,
more
mainstream retail target
market through different
channels - direct to endconsumer, retailers, and
distributors.

Focus on product
organization
(1),
customer (1); N/A (1)

Focus on customer &
product (2) together (getting
customer
feedback
for
product improvement at the
same time)

Focus on product &
organization (1) at
the same time

Focus on organization
(1) and customers (3)
(specifically to increase
sales and test sales in
different markets)

4.1.1.
Description of
Phases for
Startup:

4.1.3. Product,
Organization,
and/or Customer
Focus
(underlined if >1
at a time):

(2),
and

Focus predominantly on
customers
(16),
but
occasionally, a focus on
product (1) and organization
(4); product & organization
(1)
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Table 11 continued
PHASE (# Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE
(5)

II.
OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV.
ENTREPRENEURIAL
PHASE (4)

V. EXECUTE PHASE (22)

Customer
Interaction
Characteristics

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

4.1.4. Demonstrated
Customer
Commitment
(Contract/Sale):

Had end-consumer sales
shortly
after
initial
product was developed

End-consumer
sales
continued
during this phase

Secured first contract
from retailer

Continued building of
contracts with retailers
and individual endconsumer sales

Continued building of contracts with
retailers and individual end-consumer
sales

Type of Customer:

Started with just founder,
then, expanded to family
and friends, and then
professional network (who
also was representative of
a sub-set of external target
market)

Professional
network (which
was
also
representative of a
subset of external
target market)

Professional network
(which was also
representative of a
subset of external
target market)

Professional
network
and
external
target
market

Professional network and external
target market (and beyond with
advertisements)

4.1.5.
Customer
Interaction Initiated
by:
(number
of
initiations):

Startup (2); N/A (3)

Startup (2)

Startup (1)

Startup (3), N/A (1)

Startup (10), Customer (4); Media (1);
Customer & Startup (1); Media &
Startup (1); N/A (5)

4.1.6. Information
Collection
and
Marketing and Sales
Communication
Channel
for
Interaction
(underlined if >1 at a
time):

Physical, In-person (2);
N/A (3)

Physical,
person (2)

Physical, In-person
and phone (1)

Physical, In-person (1);
Physical, In-person, TV,
Web – Website and
Social
media
(1);
Physical,
In-person,
meetings, phone, Web email (1); N/A (1)

Physical - Phone (1); In-person (3);
Social media (1); Physical, In-person
& phone (3); Physical, In-person &
Social Media (1); In-person, phone,
email, website (2); Social media,
email, phone (1); Event, phone, email
(1); Newspaper, social media, blog
(1); >3 channels (3); N/A (5)

Distribution
Channel of Product:

Direct to end-customer
(2); N/A (3)

Direct to endcustomer (2)

Direct to retailer (1)

Direct to end-customer
(1); Direct to retailer (1);
N/A (2)

Direct to end-customer (3); Direct to
retailer (6); Direct to distributor (1);
Direct to end customer & retailer (1);
Retailer & distributor (1); N/A (11)

In-
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Table 11 continued
PHASE (#
Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE
(5)

II.
OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (2)

III.
TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV.
ENTREPRENEURIAL
PHASE (4)

V. EXECUTE PHASE (22)

Customer
Interaction
Characteristics

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Purpose of
Early Customer
Interaction
(underlined if >1
at a time):

Testing problem (1) and
customer (1), problem &
product (1), and product
(2) (Developing and
testing)

Testing
product
and customer (2)
(Developing and
testing)

Testing business
model and tested
customer segment
(1)

Testing business model
& customer segment (2);
Testing
problem,
product, business model,
& customer segment
(and promoting) (1);
N/A (1)

Raised awareness (promoting; 5); Tested
retailer/distributor interest (4); Product &
customer (2); Tested problem & customer
(2); Product, business model, & customer
(1); Problem, product, business model &
customer (1); Thank repeat customers (2);
N/A (5)

Description of
Information
Gathered:

Learned about product
and generally whether
people would like it

Learned people in
their
networks
liked the way the
product tasted

Learned that their
personal
and
professional
network mattered
and people liked
the product

Learned that both their
professional network, a
sample of the external
target
market,
and
retailers
liked
the
product

Learned that individual customers and
retailers were interested, but that they also
had customer loyalty and repeat interest.
To maintain this however, they realized
they needed to attend to neglected existing
customers before growing further

4.1.7. Customer
Feedback
Impact:

Strategic - confirmatory
feedback when just
founders (3); Strategic
confirmatory
from
family and friends (1);
and Operational/Tactical
- confirmatory (1)

Strategic
confirmatory (2)

Strategic
confirmatory (1)

Strategic - confirmatory
(1);
Strategic
&
Operational/Tactical
confirmatory (2), N/A
(1)

Strategic
confirmatory
(9);
Operational/Tactical - confirmatory (3);
Operational/Tactical - not confirmatory
(1); Strategic & Operational/Tactical confirmatory (3); N/A (6)
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Table 11 continued
PHASE (#
Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (5)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV.
ENTREPRENEURIAL
PHASE (4)

V. EXECUTE PHASE (22)

Customer
Interaction
Characteristics

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

4.1.8. Level of
Validation
Received from
Customer:

Self-justification initially and
then expanded to personal
network
(and
money
exchange)
and
Professional/External target
market validation (and money
exchange)

Professional
network
validation,
also
representative of subset
of
external
target
market (and money
exchange)

Professional
network validation,
also representative
of subset of external
target market (and
commitment
through contract)

Professional
network
and wider external target
market validation (and
money exchange and
contract)

There
continued
to
be
professional network and wider
external target market validation,
however there was also some
media validation (4 times), where
an article, blog, radio feature, etc.
took place, and continued money
exchange and contracts with
retailers

Other NonCustomer Intel
Collected
During NVC
Stage:

Secondary research about
problem
and
marketing
company

None

None

None

Affected by media exposure as
well as bank offering funding for
expanding size of production
facility
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Table 12. Startup A: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time
CUSTOMER INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES OVER TIME

4.1.1. Description of Startup
Process:

Phase sequence was a “typical” venture creation process, involving exploring
an idea, checking for product-customer fit, and developing ways to
manufacture and expand the business.

4.1.3. Product, Organization,
and/or Customer Focus:

The founders focused on developing the product early, during the
Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). While there were informal interactions with
family and friends that eventually became first customers, the startup's focus
on obtaining customers predominantly took place later in the venture creation
process.

4.1.4. Demonstrated Customer
Commitment:

Initial sales took place during the in the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I),
providing initial validation to the founders. Sales continued during each phase
and sales to different types of customers (retailers and distributors) expanded
over time.

Type of Customer:

In each subsequent phase, founders reached further outside personal network
to the external target market. Media engagement helped reach the external
target market during later stages of venture creation.

4.1.5. Customer Interaction
Initiated by:

Until Startup A became more well known in the local community during the
Entrepreneurial Phase, the startup initiated most customer interactions.

4.1.6. Information Collection and
Marketing and Sales
Communication Channel for
Interaction:

Initial customer interactions were simple and done predominantly in-person.
However, by the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), additional communication
channels were adopted, including digital ones.

Distribution Channel of Product:

Over time, as the startup experienced success of sales with individual endcustomers, it first found its first retailer through professional connections
during the Transition Phase (III) and expanded by reaching out to a wider
market through retailers and distributors in the Entrepreneurial and Execute
Phases (IV and V). The retailers and distributors connected with were
increasingly larger over time.

Purpose of Early Customer
Interaction:

Testing the business model became more important to the founders over time.
The founders heavily focused on testing the product, problem, and customer
early in venture creation, but this also continued throughout the phases. The
purpose moved from developing and testing/learning to testing/learning and
promoting.

Description of Information
Gathered:

Founders initially relied on feedback from their personal and professional
networks as validation to start the business - rather than starting with
discussions with an external target market first. This may have been possible
because their professional networks and the external target market overlap.
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Table 12 continued
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES OVER TIME

4.1.7. Customer
Feedback Impact:

Founders predominantly received strategic confirmation that this was a good business
concept to pursue early in the process. Activities undertaken to gain Operational/Tactical
confirmation took place later in venture creation, predominantly in the Entrepreneurial
and Execute Phases (IV and V).

4.1.8. Level of
Validation Received
from Customer:

Founders received validation from personal and professional networks (related to
external target market) during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. In subsequent phases,
validation grew from money exchange and contracts with retailers, and interactions with
external market, and eventually, also the media. The founders only started reaching
outside their personal and professional networks in the Entrepreneurial Phase and
beyond.

Other Non-Customer
Intel Collected During
NVC Stage:

Funding played a large role in being able to expand production facilities. Without the
focus on the organization and ability to grow production, the founders held back on
interactions and potential contracts with customers. Continued reliance on one noncustomer that affected resource access negatively impacted the business - particularly
when there was no apparent search for a solution outside of that stakeholder.

4.1.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?
As Table 11 and Table 12 suggest, Startup A early in new venture creation was
predominantly focused on developing the product (product focus), but also took the time
to verify customer interest and the ability to manufacture the product (organization
focus). Over time, this focus switched to an organization/product focus and then, during
the Execute Phase (V), predominantly a customer focus with an increased focus on sales
(see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During each Phase of New
Venture Creation in Startup A. (C=Customer, O=Organization, and P=Product)
P
C

P
O

I. Opportunity
Discovery

C

P
O

II. Opportunity
Refinement

C

P
O

III. Transition

C

P
O

IV. Entrepreneurial

C

O

V. Execute
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4.1.4. Customer Commitment
First Customer Interaction and First Customer Commitment through Sale (endconsumer) for Startup A took place during Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). First
Customer Commitment Through Contract (retailer) took place during the Transition
Phase (III). Development and revisions to the organization, product and customer
interactions took place as mentioned in 4.1.3 (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup A. Process steps shown indicate the status
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C =
Customer)
A. Start:
PreCustomer
Interactions

1

2

B. First
Customer
Interaction

6
E. Develop or
Revise Organization
/ Product / Customer

C. Customer
Commitment
Through
Contract

7

3
8/
9
F. Subsequent
Customer
Interactions /
Sales

5

4

D. First
Customer
Commitment
Through Sale

H. Startup
Exit

4.1.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction
Startup A initiated customer interactions until the Execute Phase (V), when they
had become more well known by the local community.
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4.1.6. Communication Channel
Most early communications with customers were in person. It was only after the
founders had committed to the business (during the Entrepreneurial Phase, IV), when the
startup began using more communication channels, including phone, email, and social
media. This was also when the founders began receiving additional levels of validation
for the startup (see Section 4.1.8).
4.1.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback
Founders began seeking out more operational and tactical feedback after they had
committed to the business (first in the Entrepreneurial Phase, IV). They however
continued to seek out strategic confirmation through all phases.
4.1.8. Level of Validation
The founders’ personal and professional network provided enough validation,
verbally and with early sales in the Opportunity Discovery and Opportunity Refinement
Phases for them to decide to commit to starting Startup A by the Transition Phase (III).
Early sales were to family and friends and individuals in the founders’ professional
network, and continued to provide enough validation to the founders to continue to
explore the business (see Figure 7). It should be noted that the founders’ professional
network was part of a subset of their wider target market, the health industry. More effort
to reach out to the wider external target market took place during the Entrepreneurial
Phase (IV).
Once the founders confirmed they had a product that their target market was
interested in and had demonstrated the ability to scale sales with retailers and distributors,
the founders entered the Execute Phase (V). By this time, they had received validation
from outside of their personal and professional networks, including the external target
market, media validation, commitment through retailer and distributor contracts, and
continued commitment from the end-customer with purchases.
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Figure 7. Level of Validation Received by Startup A During New Venture Creation. (Where the
shaded circles represent validation from following categories: I. Founder – Selfjustification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV:
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII:
Commitment through Money).
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4.1.9. Summary of Startup A
Startup A was a beverage company founded in July 2014 (1). The first customer
interaction and sale itself took place early, during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I).
This sale was to family and friends, and the founders said that at this time that selling the
beverage was just a hobby, “to make some money on the side” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 7 June, 2016; 2). The startup believed their market was health conscious
individuals, as well as individuals who aspired to be health conscious with a great tasting
beverage.
Startup A was product focused early in new venture creation, eventually shifting
to be organization/customer focused (3). While the first customer and sale were during
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the Opportunity Discovery Phase, it was not until the Transitional Phase (III), where the
first retailer was secured through a contract, that the founders realized that the business
could grow in value over time (4). It was after this time (in the Entrepreneurial and
Execute Phases) that Startup A begun to reach outside of their personal and professional
networks to the wider target market, and started using a larger number of communication
channels, and explored a more diverse array of distribution channels for the product.
Startup A initiated customer interactions until the Execute Phase (5).
Initial customer communication was in-person, however after the Transition
Phase, the startup reached beyond their database of personal and professional networks to
a wider target market through diverse communication methods (6). They also begun
seeking out more operational and tactical feedback after the Transition Phase (7).
While Startup A received validation by having sales early, they expanded their
business in a step-wise manner, to explore just how large a market they could attract. The
sales early to family and friends provided good initial validation for interest in the
product, however later testing with the external target market was needed to see if they
could continue to grow their market and justify expanding their organization almost
concurrently (increasing production capacity only once there was a large enough market
interested in the product; 8).
It should be noted however that this step-wise approach to new venture creation
was possible because of the nature of manufacturing the physical product – i.e. that it
could be designed, adapted, and produced locally and in small batches. This may not have
been possible with physical products requiring large setup costs for manufacturing.
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4.2. Startup B
4.2.1. Case Overview
Startup B was a membership-based physical and digital makerspace, a physical
location where individuals could gather and share resources, tools and knowledge on
creative projects, network and build both physical and digital media. The founders called
it: “a venue for creative makers of all types” (Startup B’s Twitter page, Accessed 1
March, 2017). The cofounders lived in a mid-sized town, and felt that there needed to be
more community-based cultural opportunities associated with arts or technology,
available to local citizens to observe and participate in: “The people who [live here], they
are the ones who don’t have the benefit of cultural activities that are more long term or
interesting things that help you feel a sense of belonging in that community. That’s a very
typical problem in many towns and cities across North America” (Startup B Founder,
Interview, 6 June, 2016).
Startup B was started by two founders with backgrounds in Chemistry and
Industrial Engineering, and who, at the time of founding, September 2015, were both
pursuing a Masters in Entrepreneurship. They started the business slowly, conducting
secondary research on existing makerspaces and the community (I. Opportunity
Discovery Phase).
After learning more about the potential of the business concept, the founders
decided to test potential customer interest and raise awareness by setting up booths at an
education networking event, and two different entrepreneurship events. Having received
positive feedback on the business concept, the founders started to search for a permanent
business location for the makerspace through their personal network in government, and
begun planning their first pop-up event – meant to be representative of a minimum viable
product, for the permanent makerspace (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase).
When the founders finish off their Masters degrees in Entrepreneurship, they
committed full time to Startup B (III. Transition Phase). Not having located a more
permanent location to start setting up the makerspace, the founders proceeded with
organizing two sequential pop-up events. The ticket sales however were limited and
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mostly to their personal network. Despite receiving initial positive verbal feedback during
the Opportunity Refinement Phase, the founders found they were unable to attract enough
customers to the events to make them cost-effective. With continued challenges in
finding a permanent location for the makerspace, Startup B decided to shut down
operations after six months (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase).
4.2.2. Understanding Customer Interactions
Table 13 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase
of the new venture creation process for Startup B, and Table 14 is a summary of the
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. These tables are
referenced both in this chapter’s within case analysis, as well as the cross-case analyses in
the following chapter.
Note that the founders of Startup B categorized their customers broadly as
creative, curious individuals of any age or background: “makers [creating a piece of art
or technology] and people who are dabbling or starting off a new business” (Startup B
Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
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Table 13. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup B
PHASE (# Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY REFINEMENT
PHASE (5)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (5)

Customer Interaction
Characteristics

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

The idea to create a
permanent makerspace came
from a personal interest.
While the founders found an
opportunity, they did not
fulfill their need at the time

Founders attended events to gain customer
feedback about the makerspace. They
started to search for a location for the
permanent makerspace, however ran into
challenges getting commitment on it.
While waiting, they decided to test their
MVP – a pop-up event – to see if there was
interest.

Founders
finished
their
Masters
degrees and made a
verbal
declaration
that
they
were
committing full-time
to working on the
startup

Most the time in this phase was dedicated
to developing a pop-up event, meant to
simulate the makerspace and test customer
interest. Ticket sales were predominantly
to family and friends. There continued to
be challenges in finding a permanent
location for the makerspace. The founders
made the decision to shut down the
business.

Thought about the product
only (1); N/A (2)

Customers (3); Organization (1); Product
(1).

Organization (1).

Customer (2); Organization (2); Product &
Organization (1)

No contracts or sales

No contracts or sales

No contracts or sales

There were sales through the two events
that the startup held, however these events
were not representative of the envisioned
membership-based business model

Founders (3)

Family and friends & professional network
(1); Family and friends & External target
market (1); External target market (2); N/A
(1)

N/A (1)

Family and friends (1); Family and friends,
professional network, and external target
market (1); Family and friends,
professional network, external target
market, proximal individuals (2); N/A (1)

4.2.1. Description of
Phases for Startup:

4.2.3. Product,
Organization, and/or
Customer Focus
(underlined if >1 at a
time):
4.2.4. Demonstrated
Customer Commitment
(Contract/Sale):
Type of Customer:
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Table 13 continued
PHASE (# Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY REFINEMENT
PHASE (5)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (5)

Customer Interaction
Characteristics

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

4.2.5. Customer
Interaction Initiated by:

No customer interaction
mentioned (N/A; 3)

Startup (3); Startup and Customer (1); N/A
(1)

No
customer
interaction
mentioned (N/A; 1)

Startup (4); N/A (1)

4.2.6. Information
Collection and
Marketing and Sales
Communication
Channel for Interaction:

N/A (3)

Physical - In-person (3); Physical - Inperson & Web - Email (1); N/A (1)

N/A

Physical - In-person & posters (1); >3
channels (Physical and Web - In-person,
phone, posters, social media, website) (2);
N/A (2)

Distribution Channel of
Product:

N/A (3)

Direct to end-customer, promotion (1);
Direct to performer for pop-up event (1);
N/A (3)

N/A

Direct to end-customer (2); Direct to end
customer & Direct to performer (1); N/A
(2)

Purpose of Early
Customer Interaction:
(underlined if >1 at a
time):

N/A (Founders only
interacted with each other in
understanding problem and
developing the product; 3)

Tested business problem and product (1);
problem, product, business model, and
customer segment (2), tested interest of
performers in providing entertainment or
learning experience (1); N/A (1)
(Developing, testing, and promoting)

N/A (Developing)

Tested assumptions that tickets would sell
and performers would be easy to find (2);
Tested interest in product (1); Tested
interest in product, business model, and
customer segment (1) (Developing, testing
and promoting)

Description of
Information Gathered:

Founders gathered
information that justified
their own interest in
pursuing the idea

Founders found that there were different
groups that were interested in the business
concept (2); They received feedback on
type of activities in the makerspace and
(1); learned there was more than one type
of customer (performers and customers; 1);
It was also tough to find an affordable
permanent location to operate out of (1)

N/A

Learned what types of event activities were
of interest to event attendees (1); That a
full day of events was not of interest (1);
That tickets were not selling well.
Founders concluded this had to do with
marketing (2); That city residents
(customers) were not actually interested in
these events (1)
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Table 13 continued
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY REFINEMENT
PHASE (5)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (5)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

4.2.7. Customer
Feedback Impact:

Strategic confirmatory
feedback when just founders
(3)

Strategic
confirmatory
(2);
Operational/Tactical - Confirmatory (2);
Operational/Tactical - Not confirmatory
(from a non-customer; 1)

N/A

Operational/Tactical - Confirmatory (1);
Operational/Tactical - Not confirmatory
(1); Strategic - Not confirmatory (1);
Strategic, Operational/Tactical - Not
confirmatory (2)

4.2.8. Level of
Validation Received
from Customer:

Self-Justification (3)

Family and friends justification (1);
External target market validation (1);
Professional network and external target
market validation (1); Family and friends
& External target market validation (1);
N/A (1)

Self-Justification

Family and friends validation (2); Family
and friends and some external target
market validation (but limited number; 2);
N/A (1)

Other Non-Customer
Intel Collected During
NVC Stage:

Relied on secondary
research to make
conclusions about
opportunity (2); N/A (1)

Only met with city counsellor about
permanent location for business (1); N/A
(4)

N/A (1)

Unsuccessful in working with city
counsellor to secure a permanent location
(1); N/A (4)

PHASE (# Stages)
Customer Interaction
Characteristics
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Table 14. Startup B: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time
CUSTOMER INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES OVER TIME

4.2.1. Description of Startup
Process:

The original business concept - a physical makerspace - was discussed and
emphasized across the phases of venture creation. Due to challenges and
delays in finding a permanent location, the actions undertaken in the
Entrepreneurial Phase were directed towards a different business concept pop-up events - meant to represent the startup's minimum viable product
(MVP), and was used to test and raise interest in the makerspace. From the
limited interest (and sales) from the pop-up events, the founders concluded
there was no target market interest in the original business concept, and shut
down the business.

4.2.3. Product, Organization,
and/or Customer Focus:

The product was the initial focus during Opportunity Discovery (I). While
customers were a focus in Opportunity Refinement (II), the organization
being created in the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) did not match what was
discussed originally with customers.

4.2.4. Demonstrated Customer
Commitment:

The lack of early sales or contracts failed to demonstrate customer interest in
the business concept - a physical makerspace, early during venture creation
(Phases I to III). Sales that occurred during the Entrepreneurial Phase IV)
were not related to the original business concept that the founders had
inquired about during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II).

Type of Customer:

Over time, the founders interacted with potential customers outside of their
personal social circle and in the target market. There were also customers that
may have not necessarily been part of the external target market, but that
happened to be nearby were attracted to the startup's activities. The customers
interacted with in the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) may/may not have
been the ones interacted with in the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV).

4.2.5. Customer Interaction
Initiated by:

When customer interaction occurred, it was initiated by the startup.

4.2.6. Information Collection and
Marketing and Sales
Communication Channel for
Interaction:

Customer interactions started in-person, with some email during the
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). Eventually, in the Entrepreneurial Phase
(IV), they involved phone, posters, social media, and the website. The
additional channels were used to promote the pop-up events.

Distribution Channel of Product:

The distribution channels noted were more representative of the pop-up
events than of the original business concept, the makerspace. They did not
change across the phases.

Purpose of Early Customer
Interaction:

The Opportunity Discovery Phase involved developing the product. The
customer interactions during the Opportunity Refinement Phase informed the
founders about the interest and preferences in "product" characteristics of the
permanent makerspace. Commitment to the startup was developing the
product and business model, which during the Entrepreneurial Phase, were
developed, tested, and promoted.

Description of Information
Gathered:

Information learned from customers at each phase applied to two different
business concepts. The founders learned about the potential product/market
fit from family and friends only for the pop-up events.
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Table 14 continued
CUSTOMER INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES OVER TIME

4.2.7. Customer Feedback
Impact:

The founders obtained strategic confirmation of the makerspace concept
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (III). However, a different business
concept was tested and expanded on during the Entrepreneurial Phase - the
pop-up events. The limited number of ticket sales for the pop-up events and
the type of customer (mostly family and friends) were not interpreted by the
founders as strategic confirmation of the business concept.

4.2.8. Level of Validation
Received from Customer:

Family and friends, their professional network and the external target market
all provided validation during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (III) for the
permanent makerspace business concept. However, when it came to spending
money on a sale of tickets for the pop-up event in the Entrepreneurial Phase
(IV), family and friends were predominantly responsible for the limited
number of sales, and limited validation came from the external target market
(just a few ticket sales).

Other Non-Customer Intel
Collected During NVC Stage:

The founders relied on one specific non-customer stakeholder (a local
government counsellor) to obtain a permanent office location - an essential
part of establishing their permanent makerspace. Relying on this stakeholder
alone, rather than looking for other available locations, had an influence on
the founders’ inability to find a permanent location for the makerspace, and
ultimately, their ability to develop and test the original business concept.

4.2.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?
As Table 13 and Table 14 indicate, the focus of Startup B early in new venture
creation was on developing the product during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I).
While customers were consulted in the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) to gain
feedback about their interest in the makerspace, the pop-up events organized in the
Entrepreneurial Phase were not necessarily promoted to or attended by the same
customers consulted with earlier (IV; see Figure 8).
Figure 8. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During each Phase of New
Venture Creation in Startup B
P
C
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I. Opportunity
Discovery

C

P
O

II. Opportunity
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4.2.4. Customer Commitment
The First Customer Interaction took place during the Opportunity Refinement
Phase (II) when the founder obtained positive verbal feedback on the makerspace.
However the first Customer Commitment through a Sale that took place during the
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) was for a different product - tickets to a pop-up event that the
founders thought was representative of the makerspace. Though revisions of the product
took place for the second pop-up event, the founders received little interest from
customers and decided to shut down the business (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup B. Process steps shown indicate the status
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C =
Customer)
A. Start:
PreCustomer
Interaction
s

1
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Commitment
Through Contract

2
E. Develop or
Revise Organization
/ Product /
Customer

3

5/6

7

F. Subsequent
Customer
Interactions /
Sales

4

D. First Customer
Commitment
Through Sale

H. Startup
Exit

4.2.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction
The founders initiated all customer interactions, both for the makerspace and the
pop-up events.
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4.2.6. Communication Channel
Most early customer interaction took place in person, except when Startup B
promoted its pop-up events in the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). Only then did the startup
begin to use additional communication channels – both online (social media and their
website), as well as in person, physical posters and phone calls. These channels were
accessible to individuals in the founders’ online social network, around the university
where they put the posters, and individuals that passed by the posters. The channels used
did not reach far beyond the founders’ personal and professional networks into the wider
market of “creative individuals” that the founders had initially targeted.
4.2.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback
The founders received strategic confirmation of the makerspace business concept
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). However, the business concept for the
pop-up events did not receive strategic confirmation during the Entrepreneurial Phase
(IV). Operational/Tactical feedback was also limited during the Entrepreneurial Phase,
suggesting that the founders were not able to employ resources well to create an event
that was of interest to founders.
4.2.8. Level of Validation
The founders relied heavily on self-validation during the Opportunity Discovery
Phase (I) and the Transition Phase (III) meaning they did not consult with others. While
they reached out to their personal and professional networks, as well as the
entrepreneurial external target market at events during the Opportunity Refinement Phase
(II), the enthusiasm and validation displayed by customers during the Opportunity
Refinement Phase was not experienced during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). This may
be explained by: The founders only reached out to potential customers in their
communities and their families and friends in the Entrepreneurial Phase; a different
product was now being offered that had not been validated earlier; a higher level of
commitment through payment resulted in less validation during the Entrepreneurial Phase
(IV). This was demonstrated by the limited number of tickets sold for the pop-up events
(Figure 10).
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Figure 10. Level of Validation Received by Startup B During New Venture Creation. (Where the
circles represent validation from following categories: I. Founder – Self-justification; II.
Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV: External Target
Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII: Commitment
through Money).
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4.2.9. Summary of Startup B.
Startup B was a membership-based physical and digital makerspace established in
September 2015 (1). Initial customer interactions took place during the Opportunity
Refinement Phase (2), however, no sales or contracts occurred until the Entrepreneurial
Phase, on a non-representative MVP. The startup categorized customers broadly as
creative, curious individuals of any age or background. The startup was product focused
early in new venture creation, eventually shifting to be more organization and customer
focused (3). While the first customer interactions lead the startup to develop and revise
the product, subsequent sales were with the pop-up event business model in the
Entrepreneurial Phase (4). The founder initiated all customer interactions (5).
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Most customer communication took place in person, except when Startup B
promoted its pop-up events in the Entrepreneurial Phase (6). While they received
strategic confirmation of the makerspace concept during Opportunity Refinement, the
business concept for the pop-up events did not receive strategic confirmation, and limited
operational and tactical feedback was received at any stage of venture creation (7).
The founders relied heavily on self-validation, however, did receive verbal
validation from their external target market on the makerspace during the Opportunity
Refinement Phase (8). Information about customer interest in the makerspace was
initially collected during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). While no further
validation or sales were made with respect to the makerspace, a limited number of tickets
were sold for individual pop-up events during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). The
“products” that Startup B was promoting when they spoke with potential customers
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase and during the Entrepreneurial Phases were
different however. As a result, the initial verbal validation received for the makerspace
may not be relevant for the pop-up event and the tickets for the event may not have
provided validation that was transferrable to the originally envisioned business concept –
the permanent makerspace – that the founders were intent on developing. If this was the
case, there may be a limit as to how different a minimum viable product (MVP) can be.
However, another other issue may be to blame for the limited interest in pop-up
event ticket sales. The founders promoted the makerspace during the Opportunity
Refinement Phase at events where they were reached a wider audience. However, the
pop-up events were mostly promoted events in locations that reached their own network
communities, and they did not necessarily reach out to the wider external target market.
This may have caused them to reach different customers types in each phase.
What this also suggests is that validation from early customer interactions during
new venture creation is only relevant if a similar product and customer group is validated
that shares a minimum number of representative characteristics with the future product
during that phase, and in subsequent phases. Finally, sales late in the venture creation
process that are predominately to family and friends’ networks and not to an external
target provided little validation to continue the pop-up event business.
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4.3. Startup C
4.3.1. Case Overview
In August 2015, the founder of Startup C started a business that “designed
software to help realtors get leads [on people interested in buying and selling their
homes]” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016). This software was based on
software that he had previously developed for another business he had started three years
ago – an online tutoring marketplace platform that connected university tutors and high
school students. The premise of the software was that if a real estate agent was able to get
a lead, they would pay the startup a referral fee.
Through personal contacts, the founder learned that most real estate agents were
not making enough sales in a year. To help combat this issue, the founder thought that
this software could help them access new leads, but realized that it would only be useful
if trust was established between all stakeholders for free flow of information to occur:
“Eighty percent of agents in Canada made less than six sales this year. That means that
the majority of them cannot make a living based on selling houses. The question is, how
do I provide [realtors with] more leads of customers with strong intent to buy or sell a
house in the next few months?… That is the problem we’re solving. Real estate is a
relationship-driven business [though]. No matter what technology you use, the final thing
you want to do is to establish trust. So, how you establish trust fast is with that face-toface meeting. Technology helps to achieve that goal” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1
June, 2016).
This initial idea for real estate lead generation software received little interest (I.
Opportunity Discovery Phase #1 and II. Opportunity Refinement Phase #1). While real
estate-related software was the original idea for Startup C, over time, the business
concept went through several pivots, or adaptations, trialing the same technology in
different industries and new business models or customers. The initial business idea
involving obtaining sales leads from others was dismissed altogether based on a lack of
validation from potential customers of the websites (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase #2
and II. Opportunity Refinement Phase #2).
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Finally, the founder stopped building sites that required convincing others to pay
him a referral fee and began building websites that provided sales leads for other
businesses with existing affiliate marketing programs (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase #3
and II. Opportunity Refinement Phase #3). While the founder unsuccessfully attempted
one last business concept that created affiliate marketing programs for companies without
related affiliate marketing programs (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase #4), the success
received from the partnerships with existing affiliate marketing programs resulted in the
generation of referral fees from the websites that advertised other company’s products
and services (Opportunity #3). To expand the business, the founder continued to test and
develop the affiliate market business model by building websites with affiliate marketing
links in other industries (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase and V. Execute Phase for
Opportunity #3).
4.3.2. Understanding Customer Interactions
Table 15 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase
of the new venture creation process for Startup C, and Table 16 is a summary of the
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. These tables are
referenced in both this chapter’s within-case analysis, as well as the cross-case analyses
in the following chapter.
In the process of determining what was the best business concept to pursue,
Startup C changed customer segment, industry, and product several times, as well as the
ways in which they chose to interact with customers. The time between pivots was short,
at times a week or less. This was possible because the founder could quickly build a
website that acted as a minimum viable product, and tested it for responses.
With the first business idea, the founder of Startup C focused on real estate agents
as potential customers of the real estate software he was developing. The intention of the
software was that if it brought a lead to a real estate agent, they would pay the founder a
referral fee. Initially, the founder tried to find the leads on his own, however, as time
progressed, he decided to seek out different types of non-real estate partners that were in
contact with individuals who might also be potential home buyers or sellers. In this
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model, Startup C intended to act as a facilitator to refer the leads to real estate agents. As
a compensation for the referral, Startup C would offer these partners part of the referral
fee he believed that he would receive for brokering the relationship: “Funeral directors,
marriage directors, graduation – there are different service providers that we don’t think
about being connected to real estate. Which makes sense. They shouldn’t have any
connection with real estate agents. But those are the people I want to focus on [to
provide referrals]. I need to do research [on them], and I have to get conclusions”
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).
While the founder of Startup C did not specifically refer to the terms, ‘supply-side
and demand-side customers’, his initial business ideas involved trying to create a
marketplace for real estate sales leads. In this business, the supply-side customers were
those individuals or businesses that could provide leads about individuals looking to
purchase or sell a home. The founder himself also tried to provide these leads at one
stage, however in different pivots of his business decided to work with real estate
industry-related partners (e.g. mortgage agents) and non-real estate industry related
partners (e.g. retirement homes, funeral home directors) that might be aware of
individuals looking to sell or buy a home. The demand-side customers were the real
estate agents seeking out leads, and who were willing to pay a referral fee to the supplyside customers. Startup C planned to take part of that referral fee as their transaction cost.
In later business ideas considered during the study period, Startup C still tried to
get sales leads for real estate agents in different ways, as well as for contractors.
Afterwards, the founder decided that rather than providing leads for others that had not
originally sought out these leads, that would instead build a business to provide sales
leads to businesses that already sought out partners through affiliate marketing programs
- earning a commission by promoting other business’ products. These partners included
home owners looking to sell their property, charities, wedding industry companies,
lawyers, plastic surgeons, and dentists. The first businesses in which Startup C saw
success in his affiliate marketing websites was the engagement ring industry.
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Table 15. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup C (Note that the phases are denoted as follows: I.
Opportunity Discovery, II, Opportunity Refinement, III. Transition, IV. Entrepreneurial, V. Execute). There were several business concepts
explored by this startup.

PHASE (#
Stages)

4.3.1.
Description of
Phases for
Startup:

I. #1 (3)

II. #1 (4)

I. #2 (3)

II. #2 (2)

I. #3 (3)

II. #3 (2)

III. #3; 1

I. #4 (1)

IV #3; 1

V. #3; 1

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Founder was
contacted by
a real estate
agent to build
a website for
them.
The
founder was
also part of
the real estate
industry and
saw a need
for increasing
lead
generation
for realtors to
sell
more
homes.
He
had the skills
to
develop
software to
build
websites that
would help
with this.

Founder
continued to
reach out to
different
stakeholders in
the real estate
industry to see
if there would
be
interest
from
them
(e.g.
home
owners
and
partners that
might provide
referrals
for
sales/purchases
of
homes).
After
exhausting
several
potential
avenues,
he
realized there
was
limited
interest in this
opportunity
from various
stakeholders.

Founder tried
exploring
three
more
opportunities
for
the
startup. These
opportunities
were
associated
with the real
estate
industry
as
well.
He
developed
minimum
viable
products
(MVPs) and
tested them
with potential
customers. He
received little
interest from
customers to
pay for access
to websites.

The founder
tried further
developing
one of the
opportunities
in
real
estate,
by
reaching out
to potential
partners and
customers.
He
continued to
be
challenged
to
get
interest.

The founder
decided
to
find
businesses
with affiliate
marketing
programs, and
to
promote
their products
on websites
he built. In
exchange, he
would
earn
referral fees.
The
MVP
websites were
built quickly.

The MVP
websites
with
affiliate
marketing
ads
continued
to
be
tested. The
founder
began
receiving
referral
payments
from one
website.

Founder
committed
to
developing
an affiliate
marketing
business
building
websites in
different
industries to
promote
products for
other
businesses
and earning
referral fees.

Founder
built
website
technology
to
help
businesses
that were
not
currently
offering
affiliate
marketing
programs a
way
to
obtain
more sales
leads.
These
businesses
were not
interested
however
and
the
founder
dismissed
this
idea
after
a
week.

The
founder
continued
testing the
existing
websites
he
had
built with
affiliate
marketing
links for
different
industries
for several
online
retailers.

The
founder
expanded
his affiliate
marketing
business
model into
additional
industries
and built
websites
that
continued
to attract
site visitors
to click on
links that
would earn
him
referral
fees.

121

Table 15 continued
PHASE (#
Stages)
4.3.3.
Product,
Organization,
and/or
Customer
Focus:
4.3.4.
Demonstrate
Customer
Commitment:

Type of
Customer:

4.3.5.
Interaction
Initiated by:

I. #1 (3)

II. #1 (4)

I. #2 (3)

II. #2 (2)

I. #3 (3)

II. #3 (2)

III. #3; 1

I. #4 (1)

IV #3; 1

V. #3; 1

Customer
(1), Product
& Customer
(1), N/A (1)

Product
(1);
Customers
(1);
Product &
Customers
(2)

Product &
Customers
(3)

Product &
Customers
(2)

Product
&
Customers
(2); N/A (1)

Product
&
Customers (2)

Organization &
Customers (1)

Product &
Customers
(1)

Product,
Customers,
& Org. (1)

Product,
Customers,
& Org. (1)

None.
Founder
was
still
refining
idea

None.

None

None

Contract

Commitment
through
contract and
money
exchange

Commitment
through contract
and
money
exchange

None

Commitment
through
contract and
money
exchange

Commitment
through
contract and
money
exchange

Professional
network
(Realtors;
2); External
target
market
(non-realtor
stakeholders
in the real
estate
industry; 1)

None
(Spoke
with
partners
that
may
provide
information
or referrals
for
the
business; 4)

External
target
market
(Home
owners; 1);
External
target
market
(Contractors;
1); External
target
market
(Realtors; 1)

External
target
market
(Realtors;
1);
N/A
(Partner
for
referrals)

External target
market
(Online
businesses
offering
affiliate
marketing
referral fees;
2);
Professional
network
&
target market
(Realtors; 1)

External target
market (Online
businesses
offering
affiliate
marketing
referral fees;
2)

External target
market (Online
businesses
offering affiliate
marketing
referral fees; 2)

External
target
market
(Online
businesses
not
offering
affiliate
marketing
referral
fees; 1)

External
target
market
(Online
businesses
offering
affiliate
marketing
referral fees;
1)

External
target
market
(Online
businesses
offering
affiliate
marketing
referral fees;
1)

Customer
(1); Startup
(2)

N/A (noncustomers;
4)

Startup (3)

Startup (2)

Startup (3)

Startup
(1);
Startup/
Customer (1)

Startup/Customer
(1)

Startup
(1)

Startup and
Customer
(1)

Startup and
customer (1)
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Table 15 continued
PHASE (#
Stages)

4.3.6.
Information
Collection and
Marketing and
Sales
Communication
Channel for
Interaction
(underlined if >1
at a time):

Distribution
Channel of
Product:

Purpose of
Early Customer
Interaction:
(underlined if >1
at a time):

I. #1 (3)

II. #1 (4)

I. #2 (3)

II. #2 (2)

I. #3 (3)

II. #3 (2)

III. #3; 1

I. #4 (1)

IV #3; 1

V. #3; 1

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Phone
(1);
In-person &
phone
(1);
N/A (1)

Physical
In-person
(door-todoor;
1);
Physical
Phone; Web
social
media; 1);
Web - Email
(1)

Web - Social
media(1);
Email (1);
Email and
data
scrapping
(1)

Physical
Phone
(1);
Physical
Phone, Web Email, Social
media (1)

Web
messaging,
data scrapping,
email,
web
forms
(2);
Website, Web
- messaging,
data scrapping,
email,
web
forms,
[Different idea
- Physical Phone (1)]

Web
Website,
data
analytics
(2)

-

Web
–
Website,
Email and
data
analytics (1)

Web
Website
and email
(1)

Web
Website,
data
analytics,
and email
(1)

Web
Website
and
data
analytics
(1)

Direct
to
end-customer
(1); N/A (2)

N/A
(Did
not
really
interact with
customers
during this
phase)

Direct
to
endcustomer
(2); Direct to
retailer (1)

Direct to endcustomer (1);
N/A (1)

Direct to endcustomer (3)

Direct
to
endcustomer
(2))

Direct
to
endcustomer
(1)

Direct to
endcustomer
(1)

Direct to
endcustomer
(1)

Direct
to
endcustomer
(1)

Problem (1);
Tested
developed,
promoted
problem,
product, &
customer (1);
Problem,
model
&
product (1)

Tested and
promoted
business
model (2);
Tested
hypothesis
on problem
& product
(2)

Developed,
tested and
promoted
problem,
product, and
customer
segment (3)

Tested
and
promoted
business
model (2)

Developed and
tested problem,
product,
business
model,
and
customer
segment (3)

Tested and
developed
problem,
product,
business
model, and
customer
segment (2)

Tested and
developed
problem,
product,
business
model, and
customer
segment (1)

Tested and
developed
problem,
product,
business
model, and
customer
segment (1)

Tested
and
developed
product,
business
model,
and
customer
segment
(1)

Tested and
developed
product,
business
model, and
customer
segment (1)
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Table 15 continued
PHASE (#
Stages)

Description of
Information
Gathered:

4.3.7. Customer
Feedback
Impact:

I. #1 (3)

II. #1 (4)

I. #2 (3)

II. #2 (2)

I. #3 (3)

II. #3 (2)

III. #3; 1

I. #4 (1)

IV #3; 1

V. #3; 1

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Learned that
while realtors
were
not
interested
in
his
original
business idea,
that he could
develop
a
referral
feebased business
model
to
provide leads
to
other
stakeholders in
the real estate
industry.

Learned that
partners that
could provide
leads
were
uninterested
and skeptical
of the business
idea.

Learned that
potential
customers of
these
business
ideas were
not
interested.

Continued to
see
that
potential
customers of
these
business
ideas were
not
interested.

Potential
customers
were
not
interested in a
service
that
helped them to
sell their own
homes
(one
business idea).
The founder
was
still
waiting
for
feedback on
the websites
he had created
with affiliate
marketing
links.

Found that
links on his
websites
for affiliate
marketing
were
successful
in earning
referral fees
People
were
purchasing
products of
affiliate
partners
through the
links.

Earning
referral fees
increased,
particularly
through
links on the
founder's
engagement
jewelry
education
website.

Learned
that
businesses
with
no
affiliate
program
had
no
interest in
being sold
leads
by
the
founder.

Data
analytics
removed
the need
to
communicate
directly
with
online
business
customers
and
visitors to
website.

Expanding
affiliate
marketing
model
to
other
industries
resulted in
the startup
earning
more
referral fees.

Strategic confirmatory
(1); Strategic
unconfirmatory
(1); Strategic,
Operational/
Tactical Confirmatory
(1)

Strategic - Not
confirmatory
(1);
Operational/
Tactical - Not
confirmatory
(1); Strategic,
Operational/
Tactical - Not
confirmatory
(2)

Strategic Not
confirmatory
(3)

Strategic Not
confirmatory
(2)

Strategic - Not
confirmatory
(former idea;
1); Strategic lack
of
information
(2)

Strategic –
Confirmatory (2)

Strategic,
Operational/
Tactical –
Confirmatory (1)

Strategic Not
confirmatory (1)

Strategic
–
Confirmatory (1)

Strategic –
Confirmatory (1)
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Table 15 continued
PHASE
Stages)

(#

4.3.8. Level of
Validation
Received from
Customer:

Other
NonCustomer Intel
Collected
During
NVC
Stage:

I. #1 (3)

II. #1 (4)

I. #2 (3)

II. #2 (2)

I. #3 (3)

II. #3 (2)

III. #3; 1

I. #4 (1)

IV #3; 1

V. #3; 1

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Personal
network
nonvalidation
(1); Personal
network and
External
target market
#1 network
validation
(1); N/A (1)

N/A
(Noncustomers
interacted with
did
not
validate
the
business
concept;
3);
N/A (1)

External
target
market #2 nonvalidation
(3)

Noncustomer nonvalidation
(1); External
target
market #2 nonvalidation
(1)

External target
market #3 nonvalidation/still
waiting
(1);
External target
market
and
non-customer non-validation
(1); N/A (1)

External
target
market #3
validation
(accepted
startup as
affiliate
partner)

External
target
market #3
validation
(received
referral fees
from
affiliate)

External
target
market #4
nonvalidation

External
target
market #3
validation

External
target
market #3
validation
(Online
costume
companies
as
affiliates)

Feedback
from mentors
(3)

Individual
home owners
and non-real
estate partners
that
are
affected
by
real
estate
industry (3);
N/A (1)

Feedback
from
mentors (3)

Feedback
from
mentors (2)

Feedback from
mentors (3)

Feedback
from
mentors (2)

Feedback
from
mentors (1)

Feedback
from
mentors (1)

Feedback
from
mentors
(1)

Feedback
from
mentors (1)
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Table 16. Startup C: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time
CUSTOMER INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

4.3.1. Description of Startup
Process:

Founder kept building MVPs (simple websites) and exposing potential
customers to them until one resulted in a "sale" (or payment of referral fees,
noted by funds being exchanged). Only after a payment occurred did the
founder commit to further developing the business.

4.3.3. Product, Organization,
and/or Customer Focus:

Founder focused on getting customer feedback and product development
before the Transition Phase. When there was no product/market fit, he
dismissed the idea and attempted another idea. He only started developing the
organization (processes for the virtual organization and how to duplicate the
business in other industries) after he received validation through referral fees.

4.3.4. Demonstrated Customer
Commitment:

Founder kept trying new business ideas until he received a "sale" using
minimum viable products – simple websites to test the business concept with
customers (Opportunity Discovery 1, 2, 3, 4 and Opportunity Refinement 1, 2,
3). Only once a sale occurred did he continue to develop the business further in
the Entrepreneurial (IV) and Execute (V) Phases. Founder was unwilling to
commit to starting a business (Transition Phase, III) without knowing there
was a product/market fit. This was confirmed for them by receiving payment
of the referral fee.

Type of Customer:

For the first business idea, the founder initially interacted with his professional
network, however quickly progressed with going straight to speaking directly
with the external target market.

4.3.5. Customer Interaction
Initiated by:

Though initial customer interest triggered the idea for the business, the startup
founder initiated subsequent interactions.

4.3.6. Information Collection
and Marketing and Sales
Communication Channel for
Interaction:

While the founder started with physical (in-person meetings and phone calls),
over time, he gradually sought out more digital/virtual communications with
customers.

Distribution Channel of
Product:

Throughout all phases, the founder preferred to a website business model that
delivered a product directly to end-customers and involved interaction with the
end-customers’ own customers.

Purpose of Early Customer
Interaction:

The founder tested the problem, product, business model and customer
segment throughout phases of new venture creation. Even when there was
money exchanged (III. Transition Phase), the founder continued to refine tests
on the same business model, but experimenting with different problems,
products and customer segments, depending on the industry of the company
with the affiliate marketing program.

Description of Information
Gathered:

Rather than dismissing an idea upon the first negative reaction from a potential
customer, the founder tested the idea on related, non-customer stakeholders.
He was quick to dismiss an idea after this if no validation was received. Once
there was a sale (in this case, the startup started earning referral fees), the
founder interpreted this as validation of the business idea.
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Table 16 continued
CUSTOMER INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

4.3.7 Customer Feedback
Impact:

In the first attempt to start a business, the founder wanted to test strategic and
operational / tactical feedback. With subsequent business ideas, the founder
first checked for strategic feedback and interest from customers, and then, once
confirmed, began experimenting to get operational/ tactical feedback.

4.3.8. Level of Validation
Received from Customer:

Without external target market validation, the founder did not move past the
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) with an idea. Money being exchanged was
a trigger that incentivized the founder to continue to develop the startup.

Other Non-Customer Intel
Collected During NVC Stage:

The founder relied heavily on feedback from mentors, constantly referencing
discussions with them in our interviews.

4.3.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?
Startup C preferred to develop a minimum viable product and test it quickly with
customers before committing to it (Table 15 and Table 16). Only once a payment was
made (a “sale” of sorts, with referral fees from the company offering affiliate marketing
referral programs), did the founder begin to develop processes for his organization
(Figure 11). This suggests that the founder only saw payment as validation.

Figure 11. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During each Phase of New
Venture Creation in Startup C
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4.3.4. Customer Commitment
The First Customer Interaction (B) with real estate agents took place during the
First Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). From there, during the Opportunity Refinement
Phase (II), the product, customer or organization was developed or revised (E), and
followed by subsequent customer interactions (F). The idea, product, and/or customer
may have been revised (E) or dismissed quickly (H). The first Customer Commitment
through a Sale took place during the Transition Phase (III), when the founder received his
first referral fee payment from an affiliate marketing partnership (see Figure 12).
4.3.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction
Though initial customer interest in having the founder build a website for them
triggered the idea for a business to generate real estate leads, Startup C’s founder initiated
subsequent interactions with customers.
4.3.6. Communication Channel
While the founder started with using physical communication channels (in-person
meetings and phone calls), over time, he gradually sought out more virtual
communications with customers. Once the first affiliate marketing-related website
showed to be effective in earning referral fees, he limited direct communication with
customers, relying only on data analytics clicks on his webpages and concrete sales for
indication of how successful the product was.
4.3.7. Strategic or Operational/ Tactical Feedback
In the first attempt to start a business with real estate referrals, Startup C tested
whether both the business concept and the day-to-day operations of the business were
feasible (testing strategic and operational / tactical feedback). With subsequent business
ideas, the founder first checked if the business concept made sense and was of interest to
customers, then checked to see if it would be feasible to develop the business further.
Only once the business concept was confirmed did the founder start to refine the websites
to obtain more operational feedback during the Entrepreneurial Phase.
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Figure 12. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup C. Process steps shown indicate the status
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C =
Customer). Note: Additional ‘sales’ related to the affiliate marketing business concept
took place after the First Customer Commitment through Sale, however, they were not
included in the diagram to be able to showcase the multiple business concepts explored
during the study period.
A. Start:
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4.3.8. Level of Validation
For the first business idea on real estate referral leads, Startup C received some
verbal validation from his professional network and the target market. However, with
subsequent ideas, Startup C strictly sought out external target market validation. Without
external target market validation, the startup did not move past the Opportunity
Refinement Phase (II) with an idea. Money being exchanged provided incentive to
continue to develop the startup (see Figure 13). Once the founder realized that there was
a successful business concept (III. Transition Phase), he continued to test the ability to
scale his affiliate marketing business by building new websites that promoted affiliate
partner links and promoted them to the external target markets (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase
and V. Execute Phase).
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4.3.9. Summary of Startup C
Startup C was initially launched as a lead generation software for real estate (1).
This initial idea received little interest, and over time, the business concept went through
several pivots, or adaptations, trialing the same technology in different industries, and
new business models or customers. Initial customer interactions took place during the
Opportunity Discovery Phase, however, ideas were dismissed if there was no sale by the
Opportunity Refinement Phase. Only the affiliate marketing business resulted in sales (2).
The startup focused on having a product (in MVP format) to test out on customers
early. Only once there was confirmed interest did an increase focus on developing the
organization occur (3). The first customer commitment through a sale took place during
the Transition Phase for the affiliate marketing business (4). While the initial idea was
triggered by a customer interaction, all subsequent customer interactions were initiated by
Startup C (5).
Startup C’s communications initially took place in person and over the phone,
however, as new business opportunities were explored, the startup’s founder sought out
more virtual communications with customer (6). Strategic feedback was sought out on the
business concepts, and when not obtained, the founder of Startup C was willing to
dismiss the idea quickly (7).
Startup C sought quick validation (8). The founder of Startup C initially spoke
with potential customers in his professional network in the real estate industry, however
with subsequent business models, started reaching out to the external target market
directly to test ideas. He wanted to test ideas early, and did not see verbal confirmation of
interest as enough validation. Instead, he saw referral fees from the external target market
as validation to confirm that this was a valid business concept to pursue (validation from
external target market and money exchange validation). Furthermore, over time, the
founder moved increasingly from speaking to people in-person or on the phone, to online
interactions such as web and email, to seeing interactions as visits to the website, detected
by data analytics. This was because he found it more effective to obtain feedback with
these channels.
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Figure 13. Level of Validation Received by Startup C During New Venture Creation. (Where the
shaded circles represent validation from following categories: I. Founder – Selfjustification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV:
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII:
Commitment through Money).
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4.4. Startup D
4.4.1. Case Overview
First launched in November 2015 under a different name, Startup D was a
marketplace that facilitated the connection of property owners of available downtown
rental spaces, or venues (supply-side customers), to consumers needing a short-term
rental for event purposes (demand-side customers). The founders considered Startup D to
be part of the sharing economy – a peer-to-peer sharing of access to good and services –
creating a marketplace akin to the ride sharing service, Uber, and AirBnB, the online
marketplace and hospitality service.
The idea for Startup D arose while the CEO and COO were working in the notfor-profit sector and were unable to find affordable, interesting venues for events they
were planning in the mid-sized cities they worked in (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase):
“Why can’t you rent a vacant space or an underutilized space for a lot cheaper, saving a
lot of money, and be more interesting, more unique?” (Startup D Founders A, D, M,
Interview, 2 June, 2016). The founders also had the goal to improve the economic and
cultural development in mid-sized cities – such as the city from where they originated:
“What our platform does is, it actually enables cities to increase their cultural and
economic activity because it allows entrepreneurs to get access to the spaces to bring
their ideas to life, and allows for those that are looking to put together cultural events to
actually make it happen instead of going through all sorts of bureaucratic processes. It’s
sort of like, an engine for community, with the economic development, and that’s the way
I really see this as making an impact” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June,
2016).
They reached out to some event planners in their network, potential demand-side
customers, for their thoughts and found: “During the first months, we reached out to
some event planners, just hearing feedback from people, [and found they were
interested]” (Startup D, Interview, 2 June, 2016), and they were then able to work with a
large local real estate and development company to access over 40 commercial properties
for rent (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase).
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Despite having manual matching of supply-side and demand-side customers, in
their first weeks of operation, Startup D had 44 commercial properties available to rent,
and approximately 30 individual space owners who successfully leased an underutilized
space for events that they were holding. A month into operation, Startup D was served a
cease and desist by the not-for profit organization that regulated the trade of real estate in
the region – accused of violating the Real Estate and Business Brokers’ Act (III.
Transition Phase).
The founders decided to shut down the website, re-brand, and re-organize how
they approached the business. Though manual in nature, the initial website, had provided
validation for them that their business concept had value. The manual process took much
time however, and they needed to develop an autonomous marketplace platform.
Concurrent to building the technology, the founders sought out new supply-side
customers with more unique spaces and partnerships with government agencies that were
developing regulations for the new sharing economy industry. Because they were known
in the community, and from media coverage that raised awareness about the startup, they
continued to be approached by individuals seeking rental spaces for events or individuals
wanting to rent out a space. This lead to a continuation of manual matching (IV.
Entrepreneurial Phase). After several delays, the web marketplace platform launched.
Though there were a few technical issues that had to be worked out, ultimately, it ran
smoothly. From here, the founders started to see how they could expand the number of
rental transactions on their site (V. Execute Phase).
4.4.2. Understanding Customer Interactions
Table 17 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase
of the new venture creation process for Startup D, and Table 18 is a summary of changes
in changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. There are two types
of customers for Startup D – supply-side customers renting out unused spaces, and
demand-side customers, seeking to rent spaces for events that they are holding. The
supply-side customers provide the highest level of validation and commitment to the
startup through a contract, while the demand-side customers commit through money
exchange, or a sale.
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Table 17. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup D
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE
(3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (2)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14)

V. EXECUTE
PHASE (1)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Founders could not find
an easy way to find an
interesting venues for
events and wanted to
help mid-sized cities
grow

Checked with demandside and supply-side
customers
in
their
network to see if an
event space marketplace
would be of interest

Launch
of
initial
website with manual
matching of demand
and
supply
side
customers.
Founders
served a cease and
desist by real estate
board

The founders continued to build the web
platform technology, on-boarding supplyside customers, developing regulations for
the new industry with government agencies,
and continued manual matching of demandside and supply-side customers through their
online form. Media coverage also raised
awareness about startup

Once
the
web
platform
was
launched,
the
founders
started
exploring
larger,
repeat
demand-side
customer contracts.

4.4.3. Product,
Organization,
and/or Customer
Focus (underlined if
>1 at a time):

Product (1); N/A (2)

Customers (1); Product
& Customers (1)

Product & Customers
(1); (Organization; 1)

Product (2); Customer (4); Organization (1);
Product & Customer (7)

4.4.4.
Demonstrated
Customer
Commitment
(Contract/Sale):

None

Supply side customer
commitment
through
contract (1)

Sales to demand-side
customers with money
exchange (2)

Supply side customer commitment through
contract (1); Sales to demand-side
customers with money exchange (2);
Contract with supply side customer and
sales to demand side customer (2)

Supply side customer
commitment through
contract (1)

Type of Customer:

Founders (2); Unknown
(1)

Demand-side - Family
and
friends
and
Professional network;
Supply-side
Professional
network
(part of external target
market)

Family and friends,
Professional network,
External target market
(1); N/A (1)

External target market (supply and demand;
3); External target market (supply - 2);
External target market (demand - 1);
Professional network (1); Family & friends
and professional network (2); Professional
network & external target market (3); N/A
(2)

Family & friends .
Professional, External
target market (1)

PHASE (# Stages)

4.4.1. Description
of Phases for
Startup:

Customer (1)
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Table 17 continued
PHASE (# Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE
(3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (2)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14)

V. EXECUTE
PHASE (1)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

4.4.5.
Customer
Interaction
Initiated by:

N/A (2); Unknown (1)

Startup (2)

Startup (1); Customer
(via media; 1);

Customer - Supply-side (3); Customer Demand-side (1); Customers (Supply and
demand; 2); Startup (5); Media (1); N/A (2)

Customer - Demandside (1)

4.4.6. Information
Collection and
Marketing and
Sales
Communication
Channel for
Interaction
(underlined if >1 at a
time):

N/A (2); Unknown (1)

Physical - In-person (1);
Physical - In-person,
phone; Web-email (1)

Physical - In-person
event, word-of-mouth,
phone,
newspaper;
Web - Social media
messaging,
website,
blog (1); Web - Email
(1)

Physical, In-person (1); Physical, In-person
& website (2); Physical - In-person, phone,
Web - email (3); Physical - Word-of-mouth,
newspapers, website (1); Physical newspaper (1); Web - Website (2); Web Advertisements (1); Web - Supplementary
website (1); N/A (2)

In-person and website

Distribution
Channel of
Product:

N/A (3)

Direct to end-customers
with manual matching
for venues (2)

Direct
to
endcustomers with manual
matching for venues
(1); N/A (1)

Direct to end-customer, supply (5); Direct to
end-customer, demand (1); Direct to endcustomers with manual matching for venues
(3); N/A (3); Direct via web platform
marketplace (2)

Direct
via
web
platform marketplace
(1)

Purpose of Early
Customer
Interaction:
(underlined if >1 at a
time):

Learning about problem
(1); N/A (1); Unknown
(1)

Tested hypothesis on
problem (1); Tested
hypothesis on problem,
product,
business
model,
customer
segment (1)

Tested hypothesis on
problem,
product,
customers segment (1);
Unintentionally
testing/learning about
customer segment and
business model (with
customers approaching
them; (1)

Unintentionally
testing/learning
about
customer segment and business model (with
customers approaching them; 1); Learned
more about product (3); Learned more about
customer segment (3); Promotion of
business (2); Customers reaching out to
startup (2); Launch of web platform
marketplace (1); N/A (2)

Tested
hypothesis
about adaptation to
business
model,
promoting and testing
product,
testing
customer segment (1)
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Table 17 continued
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE
(3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (2)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14)

V. EXECUTE
PHASE (1)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Description of
Information
Gathered:

Looked for short term
rental spaces online and
found mid-sized cities
would benefit from an
event
rental
space
business

Learned there is interest
from
demand
side
customers
(event
planners), and that they
could gather a lot of
information from large
supply-side customers

Gathered information
about strong customer
interest in MVP and
potential
website
features to include in
the future. Also learned
that they were seen as a
threat by real estate
board.

Learned that there is interest in the platform
from both supply and demand side
customers, even if manual matching needed
to take place. Learned how customers
interacted with web platform (3); Learned
that coordinating with and bringing in
features desired by regulatory agency would
make business operations easier (2);
Learned that they had an advocate customer
willing to support the business (2); Learned
that media could raise awareness and
interest in startup (1)

Learned
about
different types of
demand-side
customers

4.4.7. Customer
Feedback Impact:

Strategic - Confirmatory
(2); Unknown (1)

Strategic
Confirmatory (3)

Strategic,
Operational/Tactical Confirmatory
(1);
Strategic
Confirmatory;
Operational/Tactical Non-confirmatory (1)

Strategic
Confirmatory
(5);
Operational/Tactical
Listened
to
suggestions (2); Operational/Tactical Ignored
suggestions
(2);
Strategic,
Operational/Tactical - Confirmatory (2);
N/A (3)

Strategic
Exploratory (1)

PHASE (# Stages)

-

-
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Table 17 continued
PHASE (# Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE
(3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (2)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14)

V. EXECUTE
PHASE (1)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Self-justification
(1);
Professional
network
validation
(1);
Professional network &
External target market
validation (1)

Self-justification,
Personal
network:
Family and friends;
Professional network;
Target
market
validation;
Commitment through
money
exchange
(demand-side
customers);
Commitment through
contract (supply-side
customers);
Media
validation (2)

Self-justification (5); Self-justification &
Single customer (1); Personal network,
professional network, external target
market, commitment through money
exchange (2); Self-justification, personal
network, professional network, external
target market, commitment through contract
(supply-side
customers),
commitment
through money exchange (demand-side
customers) validation (3); + Media (1);
Personal network & professional network
validation
(1);
Self-justification,
professional network justification, external
target market (supply-side) non-validation
(1)

Self-justification and
single family and
friend
customer
validation (1)

Own
research (1)

Influenced by real
estate board's cease and
desist and media (1)

Media with newspaper (1); Regulatory body
on sharing economy (2)

N/A

4.4.8. Level of
Validation
Received from
Customer:

Self-justification
Unknown (1)

(2);

Other
NonCustomer
Intel
Collected During
NVC Stage:

Own secondary research
(2)

secondary
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Table 18. Startup D: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

4.4.1. Description of
Startup Process:

When they could not find an interesting venue to hold events, the founders came up
with the idea to build an online marketplace for short-term rentals. After checking
with potential supply-side and demand-side customers, they launched their MVP
website and had immediate success. When they were shut down with a cease and
desist, they took the opportunity to re-build the web platform technology, slowly find
the ideal supply-side customers, and participated in the co-development of
regulations on the new industry. Despite a few delays, the web marketplace platform
eventually launched and Startup D continued to attract new customers.

4.4.3. Product,
Organization, and/or
Customer Focus:

The product was a focus of the business - being developed and built through the
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), after which it went live. Working with customers, either
getting supply-side customers’ profiles on the web platform, ongoing manual rentals,
or getting feedback, was a focus in every stage after Opportunity Discovery (I).
Developing the organization and its processes was of limited focus for Startup D,
however did take place to improve government regulations that would affect
operations.

4.4.4. Demonstrated
Customer Commitment:

The founders secured supply-side customers with contracts to be on the web platform
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), and saw commitment with sales to
demand-side customers during the Transition Phase (III). Though the web platform
was not live during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), contracts to have supply-side
customers on the web platform, and rentals from demand-side customers continued in
a manual matching process, initiated by the startup’s simple web form.

Type of Customer:

The founders were well connected in the community. Initial supply-side customers
were found through their professional network, and initial demand-side customers
were found through their personal and professional networks (Opportunity
Refinement Phase, II). A news article also boosted publicity about the startup, raising
awareness with the external target market (Transition Phase, III). Even during the
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), additional publicity and word of mouth increased sales
transactions on the website.

4.4.5. Customer
Interaction Initiated by:

While the startup initiated customer interactions in the Opportunity Refinement Phase
(II), customers began to reach out to them in the Transition Phase (III) and beyond.

4.4.6. Information
Collection and Marketing
and Sales Communication
Channel for Interaction:

Initial communication channels used were in person, or over the phone or email.
However, by the time the startup entered into the Transition Phase (III), there was an
increased focus of promoting the startup through social media, online messaging and
blogs. Media articles also promoted the business. Even when the integrated web
platform was not live in the Entrepreneurial Phase, Startup D had a simple website
that was live with a web form. Ads were used to continue demand-side customer
interest to the website at the time.

Distribution Channel of
Product:

Until the integrated web marketplace platform was live, customers, both demand-side
and supply-side would interact with the website form, and there would be manual
matching of venues. Afterwards,

Purpose of Early
Customer Interaction:

Testing out the problem was concentrated in the Transition Phase and previous
phases. Testing the product and customer were a focus throughout venture creation
until the Entrepreneurial Phase. There were also customers promoting Startup D and
the startup also starting to promote themselves by the Transition Phase.

Description of
Information Gathered:

Information collected reinforces that customers remain interested during each phase
and the features that they are interested in.

138
Table 18 continued
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

4.4.7 Customer Feedback
Impact:

In the Opportunity Discovery, Opportunity Refinement and Transition Phase,
obtaining strategic confirmation takes place. Obtaining operational / tactical
confirmation takes place from the Transition Phase onward.

4.4.8. Level of Validation
Received from Customer:

The level of validation the founders receive for the startup grew over time. As early
as the Opportunity Refinement Phase (IV), they already had positive feedback from
their professional network and some external target market stakeholders. When the
initial website launched during the Transition Phase (III), there was immediate
validation from both supply-side and demand-side customers – creating justification
to continue to build and develop the web platform beyond the MVP.

Other Non-Customer
Intel Collected During
NVC Stage:

Startup D was heavily influenced by the real estate board’s cease and desist. This also
motivated their involvement to work with the government on creating regulations for
the sharing economy. Articles by the media also created promotion for the startup,
affecting customer interest, and the motivation to have a simple web form online as a
minimum viable product while the full web marketplace platform was being built.
The founders also did their own secondary research.

4.4.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?
As Table 17 and Table 18 indicate, the focus of Startup D early in new venture
creation was on developing the product - developed and built through the Entrepreneurial
Phase (IV). Working with customers, either getting supply-side customers’ profiles on the
web platform, ongoing manual rentals, or getting feedback, was a focus in every stage
following Opportunity Discovery (I). Developing the organization and its processes was
of limited focus for Startup D, however did take place to improve government regulations
that would affect operations (Figure 14).
Figure 14. Product, Organization and/or Customer focus (P, O, or C) of Organization During each
Phase of New Venture Creation in Startup D
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4.4.4. Customer Commitment
Demand-side and supply-side customer interactions with the founders’
professional network took place during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, leading to the
First Customer Interaction. Onboarding of supply-side customers through website
‘contracts’ (Customer Commitment through Contract) during the Opportunity
Refinement Phase lead to the first sale when the website went live the first time. This
demonstrating Customer Commitment through a Sale during the Transition Phase.
Though that version of the website did not stay live for long, revisions to the web
platform and subsequent customer interactions continued after the initial sales (see
Figure 15).
Figure 15. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup D. Process steps shown indicate the status
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C =
Customer).
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4.4.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction
While the startup initiated customer interactions in the Opportunity Refinement
Phase (II), even in the cease and desist, customers began to reach out to them in the
Transition Phase (III) and beyond. This may have been affected by both increased
customer awareness about the web platform through word of mouth and being featured in
different media articles, as well as the founders’ own network in the local community
spreading the news. While the founders continued to reach out and on-board supply-side
customers, they did not pro-actively reach out to demand-side customers again until the
web platform was relaunched (in the Execute Phase, V).
4.4.6. Communication Channel
Initial communication channels used with customers during the Opportunity
Refinement Phase were in person, or over the phone or email. However, by the time the
startup entered the Transition Phase (III), there was an increased focus of promoting the
startup through social media, online messaging and blogs. Furthermore, media articles in
the newspaper also played a role in promoting the business. Even when the integrated
web platform was not live in the Entrepreneurial Phase, Startup D had created a simple
website with a web form to continue to capture business. Finally, once the site launched,
the founders posted advertisements.
4.4.7. Strategic or Operational/ Tactical Feedback
In the Opportunity Discovery, Opportunity Refinement and Transition Phases,
Startup D obtained strategic confirmation, meaning the business concept was confirmed
by customers before moving forward in the venture creation process. Over time, the
startup received operational / tactical confirmation, from the Transition Phase onward, as
they built the web platform, brought on more supply side customers, and negotiated with
government counsel. The founders did not always accept later suggestions from
customers, particularly when they were not in line with the original business concept
promoted by the founder.
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4.4.8. Level of Validation
The level of validation received for Startup D grew over time. As early as the
Opportunity Refinement Phase (IV), they already had positive feedback from their
professional network - who also represented a part of the external demand-side target
market. It should be noted that the founders’ professional network involved individuals
involved in event planning, and who often struggled to find interesting rental spaces for
their events.
When the initial website launched (the MVP) during the Transition Phase (III),
there was immediate validation involving contracts and money exchange, from both
supply-side and demand-side customers respectively – creating validation for the
founders that the business concept had customers, that if they chose to rebuild the web
platform, there would likely be demand (see Figure 16).
Figure 16. Level of Validation Received by Startup D During New Venture Creation. (Where the
shaded circles represent validation from following categories: I. Founder – Selfjustification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV:
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract - for
supply-side customer; VII: Commitment through Money – for demand-side customer).
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4.4.9. Summary of Startup D
Startup D is an event space marketplace first launched in November 2015, and
then re-launched at the end of 2016 (1). The first customer interactions, both demand-side
and supply-side, took place during the Opportunity Refinement Phase and included both
their personal and professional networks (both part of the external target market; 2).
Startup D was initially focused on developing the product, and then interacting
with potential customers. When they were handed a cease and desist, they continued to
focus on developing the product and building their customer market. There was no real
focus on the organization during the study period (3). Customer commitment was
demonstrated by supply side customers (Customer Commitment through Contract) during
the Opportunity Refinement Phase, with the first demand-side commitment shown
through a sale during the Transition Phase (4). These commitments were ongoing
throughout the venture creation process. The startup initiated customer interactions in the
Opportunity Refinement Phase, however, afterwards, customers started to reach out to
them (5).
Initial communication took place in person, over the phone, or email during the
Opportunity Refinement Phase. However, additional forms of communication, including
media (traditional and online), were adopted in later stages of new venture creation (6).
Strategic confirmation on the business concept was received before the Transition Phase,
and Operational and Tactical Confirmation took place afterwards (7).
The level of validation for Startup D grew over time. While they received initial
verbal validation from their professional network and external target market, once the
website was launched the first time, they received both commitment through contracts
and through sales (8). Startup D learned from their simple website – their MVP – that
they had customers’ commitment beyond verbal validation. They could generate both
contracts from supply-side customers and money exchanges (sales) from demand-side
customers in their professional network. Getting this validation early was particularly
important, given the time it would take to create the actual web marketplace platform that
they hoped Startup D would become.
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It should be noted that initial supply-side customers were found from the
founders’ professional network. Due to their extensive involvement in the community,
Startup D was also able to indirectly raise awareness about the startup with their initial
demand-side customers, after which word-of-mouth and advertising broadened the
audience in both sides of the external target market.
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4.5. Startup E
4.5.1. Case Overview
Startup E was founded in April 2014 to develop a mobile phone application (from
here on noted as “app”) to connect online video game players (also known as “gamers”),
playing team-based video games. The purpose of the app was to create a friendly
community and to promote better and repeat interactions between online gamers: “[We
want to be] creating better online gaming experiences for the end user and for
connecting them. We want our users to meet new people – our motto is discover, connect
and engage. It’s not about that one-time connection” (Startup E Marketing Manager,
Interview, 9 June, 2016).
Startup E was founded by two cofounders in their early 20s who met at college as
roommates. They shared a common interest of playing videogames. When they were both
planning to move out of their residence, they shared a common issue: “We started to
realize, I was going to go back home, and we weren’t going to have those places to sync
up our play time as often to knock on the door and say, ‘hey, are you free to play right
now?’ There are a lot of people in this world that are around the same age, and are
going to connect the same way we connect. So, how do we find them?” (Startup E
Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
Previously, solutions to finding a gaming partner outside of an online gamer’s
local social circle involved posting on computer desktop-based website forums. However,
finding a gaming partner this way was considered time-consuming and did not always
yield a solution: “People would post on a forum – ‘I’m in EST, I live in Canada, I’m 20, I
play these games, and like to play them in this way.’ You’d have to search through [the
posted messages]. It may have taken you weeks before you found someone you were
interested in playing with. This just didn’t work.” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June,
2016). Furthermore, in contrast to these computer desktop-based website forums, Startup
E intended to be a mobile phone app (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase). Individuals often
had their mobile phones with them, and the founders felt that having a mobile-based app
would increase interactions and messaging: “people playing Xbox on their couch can
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have their phone – and they don’t need to go to the computer to post something online.
Or they don’t have to try to figure out a forum. And then you can also get notifications…
The whole system made sense.” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
The founders developed and promoted their first version of the mobile app on
gaming blog websites and online community forums associated with playing video
games. The Alpha version of the app received 300 downloads before it stopped working.
However, even with this setback of the app not working, the initial downloads offered
validation to the co-founders that there was a community of gamers interested in their
app. They decided to develop the second version of the app, Alpha version 2.0 within a
few months, and it was promoted both by the startup and media in a couple of online
community gaming forums, in social media, private messaging and blogs. This version of
the app had 1500 downloads (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase). The founders took this
as confirmation of the business concept and one founder decided to commit full-time to
working on Startup E (III. Transition Phase).
In the following months, Startup E released three subsequent versions of the
mobile application, including more stable Beta versions. The app was promoted in news
articles, the startup’s website, social media, and online community forums. While the
startup organized an unsuccessful online crowd funding campaign, they received funding
elsewhere, from a family investor, a local startup accelerator, a university pitch
competition, and other grants and loans. Because the mobile app had no revenue at the
time, this funding allowed the founders to continue to improve development of the
application and engage with potential users (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase).
With a stable mobile app, the focus of Startup E turned towards attracting more
users. To do so, they increased engagement of social media, direct messaging (in-app,
with email, and social media), held in-person gaming events, and engaged affiliate
partners that regularly interacted with online video game players. These included
individuals who recorded videos about video game playing and posted them on video
sharing websites such as YouTube, or streamers - individuals who streamed the playing
of video games live on the Internet. By Early 2017, they had over 100,000 downloads of
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the mobile app and had started to look into ways to monetize the business (V. Execute
Phase).
4.5.2. Understanding Customer Interactions
Table 19 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase
of the new venture creation process for Startup E, and Table 20 is a summary of the
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. These tables are
referenced both in this chapter’s within-case analysis, as well as the cross-case analysis in
the following chapter.
It should be noted that the mobile application could be downloaded for free at the
time of writing, and there was no revenue that was being generated from it. Given that the
revenue stream for the company had not been determined at the time of writing, for the
purposes of this dissertation, it is assumed that the users of the application are also
customers that may, in the future, pay for a product or service. The terminology of
demonstrating customer commitment by contract is considered relevant to these users
because they are downloading software that requires agreeing to certain terms and
conditions set forth by the software company.
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Table 19. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup E
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY
PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (4)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE
(10)

V. EXECUTE PHASE (9)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Two friends wanted a
good way to find
other online gamers.
Upon not finding an
existing
solution,
they built a mobile
phone
app
that
served this function.

Developed
and
promoted first and
second versions of the
app and saw customers
continue to download
and use app

Upon
seeing
the
success of the app,
one co-founder quit
his job and committed
full-time to the startup

Despite an unsuccessful crowdfunding
campaign, the startup received funding
additional times (from angel investor,
local startup accelerator, university pitch
competition, grants and loans). This
allowed them to continue to develop and
release the next three versions of the app,
including the beta version

An increased focus on attracting
users, using social media, direct
messaging (in-app, email, social
media),
affiliate
partners
(YouTube gamers, Streamers),
and in-person gaming event.
Users also began promoting
startup

4.5.3. Product,
Organization,
and/or Customer
Focus (underlined
if >1 at a time):

Product (1)

Product (2); Customer
(2)

Organization
(1);
(Product, ongoing)

Organization (5); Product & customer (5)

4.5.4.
Demonstrated
Customer
Commitment
(Contract/Sale):

None

Customer commitment
through contract (2)

None

Customer commitment through contract
(4); Funding from external source (5)

Customer commitment through
contract (5)

Type of
Customer:

Founders
(2);
Founders and family
and friends (1)

Founders (1); External
target market (3)

Founder (1)

Founder, family and friends (1);
Founder, family and friends, Kickstarter
funders (1); Founder, family and friends,
professional network (3); Founder,
family and friends, professional network,
early adopters in external target market
(1); Founder, family and friends,
professional network, early adopters in
external target market, external target
market (3); N/A (1)

Founder, family and friends,
professional
network,
early
adopters in external target
market, external target market
(9)

PHASE (#
Stages)

4.5.1. Description
of Phases for
Startup:

Customer (7);
customer (2)

Product

&
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Table 19 continued
PHASE (#
Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY
PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (4)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL
PHASE (10)

V. EXECUTE PHASE (9)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

4.5.5. Customer
Interaction
Initiated
by
(number
of
initiations;
underlined if >1
at a time):

N/A (3)

Startup
(1);
Startup/Customer (2);
N/A (1)

N/A

Startup (6); Startup/Customer
(4)

Startup (including affiliate partners; 7);
Customers (Users; 2)

4.5.6.
Information
Collection and
Marketing and
Sales
Communication
Channel
for
Interaction
(underlined if >1
at a time):

Word-of-mouth (1);
N/A (2)

Web
Private
messaging,
startup
website, blogs, online
community forums and
promotion,
social
media, mobile app (3);
N/A (1)

N/A

Physical - In-person, news
articles (3); Web - website,
mobile phone app (1); Web Website, social media, online
community
forum,
mobile
phone app (3); Web Kickstarter campaign (1); N/A
(2)

Web - Social media posts & Direct
messaging (1); Web - YouTube videos
and streaming services (2); Web - Emails
and survey (1); Physical - In-person
events & Web - social media (1); Web Email, in-app messaging and social
media messaging (1); Web - In-app
private messaging and public posts,
Social media (1); In-app push
notifications (one-to-many), personalized
direct messaging, & email (1); Data
analytics (1)

Distribution
Channel
of
Product:

N/A (3)

Direct to end-user (3);
N/A (1)

N/A

Direct to end user (5); N/A (5)

Direct to end user (8); N/A (1)

Purpose
of
Early Customer
Interaction:
(underlined if >1
at a time):

Problem (2); Product
development (1)

Tested assumptions on
problem,
developed
product, online gaming
community model, and
customer segment (2);
Promoted product (1)

N/A (Product
customer
development)

Tested ability to crowdfund (1);
Tested customer interest and
developed and promoted product
(4); N/A (5)

Tested ability to get new users through
various interaction channels (3); Tested
and promoting interest in product and
customer segment (2); Learned customer
preferences (2); Collected ideas about
user interactions through data analytics
(1); N/A (1)

and
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Table 19 continued
PHASE (#
Stages)

Description
Information
Gathered:

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY
PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (4)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL
PHASE (10)

V. EXECUTE PHASE (9)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

of

N/A (3)

300 downloads of first
version of app and
1500 downloads of
second version of the
app

N/A

Learned there was interest in
funding business by external
non-customer
sources
(4);
Learned that marketing was
important (1); Learned user
interest and feedback (4); N/A
(1)

Learned how to promote business to
users, including one-to-many social
media posts and direct messaging,
incentivizing affiliate partners, events, inapp push notifications, and advocate users

4.5.7. Customer
Feedback
Impact:

N/A (3)

Strategic
confirmatory (3); N/A
(1)

N/A

Strategic - confirmatory (5);
Operational/Tactical
confirmatory
(3);
Operational/Tactical
Not
confirmatory (1); N/A (1)

Strategic
confirmatory
(2);
Operational/Tactical - confirmatory (6);
Operational/Tactical - Not confirmatory
(1)

4.5.8. Level of
Validation
Received
from
Customer:

Self-justification
(and family and
friends
validation)
(3)

Self-justification (1);
Self-Justification,
External target market
validation,
media
validation (1); Selfjustification, External
target
market
validation,
Commitment through
contract validation (1);
Self-justification,
External target market
validation,
media
validation,
commitment through
contract validation (1)

Self-justification (and
ongoing
personal
network,
external
target market, media,
and
commitment
through
contract
validation) (1)

Early-adopters target market
validation (1); Self-Justification,
Personal Network validation (2);
Self-justification,
personal
network, early adopters target
market validation, external
target market validation (3);
Self-justification,
personal
network validation, professional
network validation, commitment
through receiving funding (4);
Commitment through contract
validation (4)

Self-justification,
personal
network
validation,
professional
network
validation; early adopters target market
validation, external target market
validation (8); Commitment through
contract validation (5); N/A (1)
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Table 19 continued
PHASE (#
Stages)

Other NonCustomer Intel
Collected During
NVC Stage:

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY
PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (4)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL
PHASE (10)

V. EXECUTE PHASE (9)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Angel investor funding (3),
acceptance
into
startup
accelerator (1), acceptance into
entrepreneurship program (1);
winning
university
pitch
competition; and receiving
grants and loans from various
organizations suggested investor
confidence in the startup and
industry and offered validation
to startup

Video bloggers and gaming streamers
helped boost users

N/A (3)

Media (1); N/A (3)

N/A (1)
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Table 20. Startup E: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

4.5.1. Description of Startup
Process:

The MVP, a mobile phone application that created a gaming community was
developed early, during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), allowing the startup
to quickly gauge whether there was interest from online video game players, their
external target market. They promoted the application through several online
avenues, as well as gained media attention, that increased awareness about the
app. With ongoing funding and user downloads of the app, the founders were
able to concentrate on developing increasingly better versions of the application,
gain a better understanding of user preferences and issues, and increasing their
user base.

4.5.3. Product, Organization,
and/or Customer Focus:

Developing the product was important and ongoing throughout new venture
creation. The core of customer interactions began once the first version of the
mobile application was released (in the Opportunity Refinement Phase), and
continued through to the Execute Phase as the founders wanted to increase users.
A focus on developing the organization did not take place until the Transition
Phase, when one founder committed to the startup full time.

4.5.4.
Demonstrated
Customer Commitment:

Some informal first customer interactions took place during the Opportunity
Discovery Phase (I), however the first customer interaction with the mobile
software application and first customer commitment through contract occurred
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). There was no money exchanged,
and hence no sale, by the end of the study period.

Type of Customer:

Initial interactions were with family and friends during the Opportunity
Discovery Phase (I), however, by the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II),
founders had started reaching outward to the external target market. By the
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), exposure to the external target market had grown
more, fueled by media promotions and user advocates by the Execute Phase (V).

4.5.5. Customer Interaction
Initiated by:

Customer interactions were predominantly initiated by the startup up until the
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). While customers did reach out with feedback for the
startup, the founders were very proactive in encouraging connections with
customers. In the Execute Phase, affiliate partners reached out to customers, and
customers became even more proactive in their interactions with the startup and
in acting as user advocates to other customers in the online community.

4.5.6. Information Collection
and Marketing and Sales
Communication Channel for
Interaction:

Starting with communication in-person, Startup E quickly moved to other
communication channels including private messaging, social media, online
community forums and promotion through blogs. Additional media coverage, as
well as partnering with affiliate partners (streamers and video bloggers) in the
gaming industry raised awareness about the mobile application. Startup E also
started using data analytics to gain a better understanding of the target market
and its interactions with the website.

Distribution Channel of
Product:

Startup E’s mobile application was always distributed direct to end-user, where
individuals would need to independently download it onto their phone.

Purpose of Early Customer
Interaction:

Early customer interactions during the Opportunity Refinement Phase involved
developing and testing assumptions on the problem, product and customer
segment. Later interactions continued to test customer interest, preferences, and
ways in which to attract customers. The product was promoted from the
Opportunity Refinement Phase onward.
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Table 20 continued
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

Description of
Information Gathered:

Information gathered demonstrated that there was strong interest in the application.
This was initially shown with the number of downloads, and subsequently followed up
by learning about how to attract new users, and re-engaging with existing users – using
in-app push notifications, affiliate partners and events.

4.5.7 Customer
Feedback Impact:

Strategic confirmation was important throughout the venture creation process for
Startup E. Operational and tactical confirmation became important in the
Entrepreneurial and Execute phases.

4.5.8. Level of
Validation Received
from Customer:

By the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), the founder had received verbal interest
from their external target market, which was confirmed by downloads of the application
(equal to Commitment through Contract validation). They also attracted dearly media
attention. Over time, in later phases, this level of validation continued, and grew as the
founders developed a professional network in this industry.

Other Non-Customer
Intel Collected During
NVC Stage:

Non-customer intel included angel investors, the various entrepreneurial programs, and
grants and loan organizations that offered funding to Startup E and suggested investor
confidence in the startup. Furthermore, insight from affiliate partners (video bloggers
and gaming streamers) provided more information about potential customers.

5.5.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?
As Table 19 and Table 20 indicate, throughout new venture creation, developing
the product was important and ongoing. Furthermore, once the founders had determined
that they were ready to start development and had created a minimum viable product (a
simple mobile app) to test on the external target market, interactions with customers were
ongoing – either to get their feedback on features that they were looking for and issues
with the software, to increase the number of users, and to move towards the Execute
Phase, to improve repeat visits to the app. Developing the organization was not a focus
for Startup E until the Transition Phase, when one of the founders committed to the
startup full time. Even then, customers were the primary focus for Startup E (see Figure
17).
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Figure 17. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During New Venture
Creation in Startup E
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4.5.4. Customer Commitment
The founders saw themselves and some of their personal network as potential
customers. While developing the mobile phone application in the Opportunity Discovery
Phase (I), they likely received some anecdotal insight from family and friends, however
had noted First Customer Interaction and user downloads, or Customer Commitment
through a Contract, from their external target market during the Opportunity Refinement
Phase (II; see Figure 18).
4.5.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction
Customer interactions were predominantly initiated by Startup E up until the
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). While customers did reach out with feedback for the startup
and downloaded the app, the founders were very proactive in encouraging connections
with customers through various channels – including in-app chats, social media, and
email. In the Execute Phase, while the startup continued to reach out to engage
customers, they also had affiliate partners raising awareness about Startup E. After this
engagement, customers became more proactive in their interactions with the startup, such
as by acting as user advocates to other customers in the online community.
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Figure 18. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup E. Process steps shown indicate the status
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C =
Customer).
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Startup
Exit

4.5.6. Communication Channel
Starting with communication in-person during the Opportunity Discovery Phase
(I), Startup E quickly moved to using communication channels including private
messaging, social media, online community forums and promotion, and promotion
through blogs during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). As the startup became more
well known, additional media coverage, as well as partnering with affiliate partners
(streamers and video bloggers) in the gaming industry also raised awareness about the
mobile application (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase and V. Execute Phase). Finally, Startup E
also started using data analytics to gain a better understanding of the target market and its
interactions with the website.
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4.5.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback
Gaining strategic confirmation in the business concept took place during the
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) when they were receiving downloads for the app.
While strategic confirmation continued into the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) and in the
Execute Phase (V), operational and tactical confirmation for how resources are used
became more important only later in venture creation. For example, Startup E started
hiring new employees and needed to start engaging and attracting new users.
4.5.8. Level of Validation
During the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), the founders had created their own
validation, but by the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), Startup E had received
validation from the external target market. This included verbal and text-based interest
from customers, as well as users’ actions of downloading the application – considered a
commitment through contract. Startup E had also received validation from the media in
terms of featuring the startup in articles. This level of validation continued through the
Entrepreneurial (IV) and Execute Phases (V). Note that as the founders were not initially
embedded in the industry, their professional network did not provide validation until later
in venture creation. Also, during the Transition Phase, although there were no explicit
validations noted during this phase by Startup E, there were ongoing downloads of the
app that are considered validations (see Figure 19).
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Figure 19. Level of Validation Received by Startup E During New Venture Creation. (Where the
shaded circles represent validation from following categories: I. Founder – Selfjustification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV:
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII:
Commitment through Money).
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4.5.9. Summary of Startup E
Startup E was a mobile phone application to connect online video game players to
form a community. They were established in April 2014 (1). Early customer interactions,
outside the founders’ immediate family and friends’ circle, took place during Opportunity
Refinement, when the first version of the app was released. This was considered customer
commitment by contract (2). The startup saw their customers as hard-core gamers
initially, but eventually diversified this to video game players, in general.
The initial focus of Startup E was on developing the product, and then interacting
with and promoting the app to potential customers. Only when the founders committed to
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the business did they start considering aspects of the organization (3). While the first
customer interaction and commitment through contract (or download) took place during
the Opportunity Refinement Phase, there were ongoing revisions to the product and the
customers, with subsequent interactions with customers (4). Customer interactions were
predominantly initiated by Startup E until the Entrepreneurial Phase, when users
themselves began being more proactive in downloading and advocating for the app. The
startup also hired affiliate partners that promoted the app (5).
Initial customer interactions took place in person, however quickly moved to an
array of online communication channels including private messaging, social media,
online community forums, and promotions. The startup also started using data analytics
to gain a better understanding of the target market (6). Once they received strategic
confirmation of the business concept during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, they
began seeking out operational and tactical confirmation during the Entrepreneurial Phase
(7).
The mobile app industry differs from other industries in that the success of an app
depends on the number of people using it, as well as the amount of time they spend on it.
The value of the startup comes not just from the individual use of the application, but the
community created through interactions through the software, and data about the users on
the software.
As a result, app development companies, such as Startup E, with a freemium
business model (offering limited features and then accessing premium content or features
through in-app purchases) or free apps with advertising are often encouraged to first build
a user base and then start monetizing. The main focus of Startup E was on building a
community of video game players on their website. The creation of this community is
ideal to build loyalty and a feeling of connectedness to the startup – key features that
affect the decision to make an in-app purchase (Hsiao & Chen, 2016). Given Startup E
had not yet started to monetize at the time of writing, it was not yet possible to make
conclusions as to whether they were able to successfully have customer commitment
through money exchanges.
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Furthermore, the creation of a community, attending to the experiences of both
the potential newcomers and of existing community members are important. Newcomers
may evaluate whether to join a community based on assessment of the current user base,
wanting to join communities where they are a good fit. For existing community members,
they may seek out new members that are like them, and diversity may be considered offputting (Kraut & Resnick, 2012). Startup E was particularly concerned that they were
attracting the right type of customer from the beginning. As they changed their way of
attracting users (bringing on their affiliate partners), their user based started to change.
This was initially challenging because the existing community created path dependence,
where earlier community member users affected the attraction of users that join the
community later. However, Startup E could create their own path to overcome this issue
by adapting the app to include ways to identify different types of users, and users could
seek out other users they were keen to play with.
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4.6. Startup F
4.6.1. Case Overview
Startup F was started with the intention of being “a search engine for loans from private
lending organizations… for loans that are unsecured under $50 grand... in other words,
a loan marketing agency” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016). “Our job is to
connect borrowers with lenders and basically create value for the borrower through
getting them connected with cheap, quick, and efficient loans that best match their
personal needs and financial situation” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016).
The idea for Startup F arose in March 2015, when the founder was in the waiting
room of a doctor’s office and he saw another patient with an emergency medical bill that
he was unable to pay. Curious about the availability of emergency funding options, when
the founder got home, he attempted a few web-based searches for personal loans, and
found no easy way to:
•

search through and aggregate available loans for a particular set of
circumstances, and to get a quick answer to the loan request from loan providers.
This planted the seed of opportunity in the founder’s mind to develop an online

loan aggregator - a loan search web platform where a loan seeker could perform an online
search for a loan, and gain access to an array of lenders with competing interest rates and
terms (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase). The idea was: “Why search [for] one [loan]
when you can search many? That’s kind of our slogan” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19
May, 2016).
The founder envisioned that building an online loan aggregator platform would
require Startup F to sign contracts with several fintech loan providers (supply-side
customers). These loan providers would be integrated into an online platform to
streamline the application process for loan seekers (demand-side customers). This would
mean that when a loan seeker visited the startup’s website, they would complete one short
loan application with their personal details and the loan amount that they were seeking.
Their credentials and credit rating would be verified and could be assessed for loan
eligibility based on the lending criteria provided to the startup by the loan providers.
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A high level of integration between the startup and the fintech loan providers
would allow Startup F to immediately report whether the loan seeker was eligible for a
loan, as well as the loan options and associated terms and conditions available to them.
Once a loan was selected, the information could be transferred directly to the integrated
fintech loan providers’ online loan platform – rather than having the loan seeker re-enter
information on each loan provider’s website. A partnership with Startup F as a loan
aggregator site would also help fintech loan providers, in a relatively new industry, to
gain visibility among loan seekers that were not familiar with fintech, and would ideally
help provide credibility and security to the transaction.
To check his assumptions, the founder of Startup F followed up with local
businesses (intermediaries) who might be interested to offer their customers consumer
finance loan options in-store, and potential fintech loan providers that he had contacted
through social media (supply-side customers). Several local businesses were interested in
the consumer finance options, and eleven fintech loan providers were interested in
signing onto the platform. Without even consulting a group of demand-side customers
seeking loans, the founders decided that this validation was enough for him to proceed
with the business (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase). He started web platform
development, however encountered several delays in launching due to technical
differences during the web platform development process and integration with loan
providers’ online systems (III. Transition Phase). Before launching the web platform, the
founder continued to test it, both with the lenders and also with family and friends.
Despite technical and security issues arising, the web platform eventually went live and
the loan seekers (demand-side customers) attempted the first loans.
Advertisements leading up to launch day had managed to attract the attention of
several loan seekers. However, the founders quickly learned that they had lost several
customers due to drop off during the application process that resulted in incomplete and
rejected applications due to loan provider integration issues. Despite this initial setback,
demand for loans kept growing with news spreading about Startup F with more
advertising, word-of-mouth, and search engine optimization. Once the site was up and
running smoothly, the founder was then able to change his focus and start implementing
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the consumer finance partnerships with local businesses that he had originally envisioned
as a key part of the business (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase).
4.6.2. Understanding Customer Interactions
Table 21 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase
of the new venture creation process for Startup F, and Table 22 is a summary of the
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. These tables are
referenced in both this chapter, as well as the cross-case analysis in the following chapter.
Note that there were three types of customers in Startup F. There were supply-side
customers - financial institutions offering loans (specifically, emerging fintech loan
providers that were using technology and innovation to disrupt personal finance), and
demand-side customers - individuals seeking loans. The third type of customers were
intermediaries – local businesses through which a loan could be offered in a consumer
finance transaction. These businesses would include industries such as home renovations,
veterinarian clinics, dentist offices, and wedding planners – industries where their
customers might need a short-term loan.
Startup F was not worried about the potential to attract loan seekers: “People who
want money will do anything for it. That’s what we’ve been learning through our market
research. People want money and they’re going to search, ‘I want money.’ That’s why
you see the line up at cash money – 550%. And that’s just insane. And people go for it”
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016). However, once the web platform went live
in July 2016, Startup F saw that the typical demand-side customer was in a lower income
bracket than originally anticipated: “[They have] poor credit, which is something I kind of
expected, but not as much as I’ve seen. I’d say probably about 85 percent of applicants
are coming from poor credit. Typical age is 30s, equally male and female…. A lot of them
are coming from Hamilton, Burlington, Brampton. Outside of Toronto” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016). By September 2016, the same tier of customer
approached the website: “Those with terribly abysmal credit scores – who’ve applied to
hundreds of places, and have been declined… They troll, and they’re looking for money,
anywhere they can get it” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016).
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Table 21. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup F
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (3)

III.
TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (18)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Founder saw another patient
in a doctor's office was
unable to pay his bill. He
searched for online loans, and
not finding one, he saw a
business opportunity to create
a loan marketplace to provide
loans directly to demand-side
customers,
and
via
intermediary local businesses

Founder followed up
with potential fintech
loan providers (supplyside customers) and set
up an office

Startup
began
web
platform
marketplace
development

Loan providers (supply-side customers) began to be integrated, the
platform was tested with family and friends, web platform is launched
and loan seekers (demand-side) start applying for loans, and news
about the startup spread with advertising, word of mouth, and search
engine optimization. Loan provider reconnected with intermediary
local businesses

4.6.3.
Product,
Organization,
and/or Customer
Focus (underlined if
>1 at a time):

Product (1), Customers Intermediaries (1); N/A (1)

Organization
(1);
Product & Customers Supply-side (2)

Product (1)

Customers - Demand-side (9); Customers - Supply-side (1);
Customers - Intermediaries (2); All customers (1); Product &
Customers (5)

4.6.4.
Demonstrated
Customer
Commitment
(Contract/Sale):

None

Supply-side customer
commitment through
contract (1)

None

Supply-side customer commitment through contract (3); Demand-side
customer commitment through sale (5); Supply-side customer contract
and demand side customer sale (1)

Type of Customer:

Founder (2); External target
market - Intermediaries (1)

External target market supply-side (2); N/A
(1)

N/A

Family and friends - demand-side (3); Early adopters in external target
market supply-side (1); External target market - Demand-side (4);
External target market - Supply-side (4); External target market Intermediaries (1); All external markets (3); Rejected external target
market - Demand-side (2)

PHASE (# Stages)

4.6.1. Description
of
Phases
for
Startup:
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Table 21 continued
PHASE (# Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (3)

III.
TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (18)

4.6.5. Customer
Interaction Initiated by
(number of initiations;
underlined if >1 at a
time):

Startup (1); N/A (2)

Startup (2); N/A (1)

N/A

Startup (14); Customers - Demand-side (1); Customers - Supplyside (1); Magazine (1); Startup (by having live web platform),
customer demand-side, customer supply-side (1)

4.6.6. Information
Collection and
Marketing and Sales
Communication
Channel for Interaction
(underlined if >1 at a
time):

Physical - In-person (1);
N/A (2)

Web - social media (1);
Physical - Phone, Web
- emails (1); N/A (1)

N/A

In-person (including word-of-mouth; 4); Phone (2); Magazine
(1); In-person, phone, Web - email (1); In-person meeting,
conference, Web email, social media (1); Phone, web platform,
email (2); Paid ads (3); Self-published article and press release
(1); Search engine optimization (1); Web platform and data
analytics (2)

Distribution Channel of
Product:

Direct to marketplace via
intermediary (1); N/A (2)

Direct via marketplace
(2); N/A (1)

N/A

Direct to end-demand-side customer via marketplace (15);
Direct to end-customer via intermediary (2); N/A (1)

Purpose of Early
Customer Interaction:
(underlined if >1 at a
time):

Observed
problem (1),
searched for solutions to
problem (1), and tested
assumptions on problem,
business
model
and
customer
segment
of
intermediaries (1)

Tested assumptions on
problem,
business
model,
customer
segment - supply-side
customers, developed
product (2)

N/A
(Developed
product)

(1)

Tested assumptions on web platform (2); Tested assumptions
about supply-side customers (2); Tested assumptions on product
and supply-side customer segment (2); Tested product and
business model (1); Tested demand-side interest in marketplace
(and ability to reach marketplace (4); Tested demand-side
interest in marketplace and how they interacted with web
platform (1); Tested ability to handle customer service issues
(2); Tested interest of intermediaries (2); Tested presence of
advocate users (1); N/A (1)
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Table 21 continued
PHASE (# Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY
PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT PHASE
(3)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (18)

Description of
Information
Gathered:

Learned there were no other online
loan search engine marketplaces
and small business intermediaries
were interested in a loan search
engine for their customers

Learned about interest from
loan provider (supply-side
customer) to be part of loan
search engine marketplace

N/A

Learned that software development and integrating
multiple business systems involves several unforeseen
challenges and delays, Learned that not all methods of
advertising were successful, Learned that there were
several demand-side customers with poor credit that
looked for loans, Learned that not all demand-side
customers completed their applications, found search
engine optimization was important for online business.
Learned that there were intermediaries that were willing
to commit as a customer

4.6.7. Customer
Feedback Impact:

Strategic - confirmatory (2); N/A
(1)

Strategic (2); N/A (1)

confirmatory

N/A

Strategic - confirmatory (4); Operational/Tactical confirmatory (6); Operational/Tactical - not confirmatory
(5); Operational/Tactical - confirmatory & Strategic - not
confirmatory (1); N/A (2)

4.6.8. Level of
Validation
Received from
Customer:

Self-justification
(2);
Selfjustification and early target market
- intermediaries (1)

Self-justification (1); Selfjustification, early target
market
supply-side,
Target market - supply-side
validation
(2);
Commitment
through
contract validation (1)

N/A

Family and friends validation (3); External target market
validation - Demand-side (6); External target market
validation - Intermediaries (2); Limited external supplyside target market validation (3); Lack of validation Demand-side (1); Media validation (1); Commitment
through contract validation (3); Commitment through
money exchange/sale (5); Commitment through contract
and money exchange (1); N/A (3)

Other NonCustomer Intel
Collected During
NVC Stage:

N/A

N/A

N/A

Marketing agent affected advertising (3) and search
engine optimization expert was hired (1)
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Table 22. Startup F: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

4.6.1. Description of Startup
Process:

From seeing a patient in a doctor’s office unable to pay his medical bill, the
founder searched for ways to access online loans. Not finding one, he decided
to create a loan marketplace, where loan seekers could find a variety of loans
and terms. He partnered with fin-tech loan providers, built a web marketplace
platform and integrated them the loan providers into the site. When he finally
launched, even with some issues, there was no shortage of loan seekers.

4.6.3. Product, Organization,
and/or Customer Focus:

The product was a focus throughout venture creation. In contrast, focus on the
organization was very minimal, only really emphasized during the Opportunity
Refinement Phase. Different customers are connected with (Intermediaries and
supply-side customers) early in venture creation, and all types of customers
during the Entrepreneurial Phase.

4.6.4. Demonstrated
Customer Commitment:

The supply-side customers commit through a contract to be integrated in the
website in the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). This continues in the
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). The founders have demand-side customers seeking
loans committing through sales – in this case, considered applying and
successfully obtaining an online loan.

Type of Customer:

The founder immediately went to the external target market for intermediaries
and supply-side customers, in the Opportunity Discovery and Opportunity
Refinement Phases respectively. In the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), he had
more testing of the interface of the website with his personal network (family
and friends), and also started interacting with the external target market in the
supply-side, demand-side, and intermediaries.

4.6.5. Customer Interaction
Initiated by:

The startup founder initiated interactions throughout the new venture creation
process. With awareness of the startup through advertisements, search engine
optimization, word-of-mouth, and media (a magazine article), customers
started to seek out and contact the startup during the Entrepreneurial Phase
(IV).

4.6.6. Information Collection
and Marketing and Sales
Communication Channel for
Interaction:

While loan providers were initially contacted over LinkedIn social media, early
interactions with customers predominantly took place in-person, over phone or
email. In the entrepreneurial phase however, several communication channels
were adopted, including: word-of-mouth, the web platform, paid ads, articles,
press releases, search engine optimization to appear in searches for loans, and
data analytics.

Distribution Channel of
Product:

Initially, during the Opportunity Discovery Phase, the founder envisioned the
product to be delivered to the demand-side customer through the marketplace,
via an intermediary (local business) that offered consumer financing.
Subsequently, the founder developed a way for supply-side and demand-side
customers to interact directly via the marketplace, and only re-visited the idea
of working via intermediaries once the marketplace model was working
successfully.

Purpose of Early Customer
Interaction:

Developing and testing the problem took place before the Transition Phase,
when the web platform development began. Afterwards, there continued to be
tests on assumptions about the customer segments, particularly when the
segment was not what was expected, and the product, into the Entrepreneurial
Phase. Promoting the product took place during the Entrepreneurial Phase.
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Table 22 continued
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

Description of Information
Gathered:

Throughout the new venture creation process, the founder realized that in such
a new industry, intermediary local businesses and fin-tech loan providers were
definitely looking for such a business concept. Furthermore, despite technical
difficulties with the web platform and integration with the loan providers, the
individuals seeking loans had particularly poor credit and were motivated to
find loans that they would not otherwise have access to.

4.6.7 Customer Feedback
Impact:

Before the Transition Phase, the founder of Startup F sought out and received
strategic confirmation of his business concept. Only once that happened and
the web platform was being built and launched, in the Entrepreneurial Phase,
was operational /tactical confirmation sought out as well.

4.6.8. Level of Validation
Received from Customer:

The founder sought out validation from two of the three early target markets –
intermediaries (during Opportunity Discovery Phase, I), and supply-side
customers (during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, II). Having received
several contracts of interested supply-side customers (loan providers;
Validation through Contracts), the founder assumed that there would also be
demand-side customers, however did not test their interest until the website
was launched during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). At that time, he also
received personal network (family and friend) validation, external market
validation from all three markets, media validation, and validation through
contracts and sales (applications form loans).

Other Non-Customer Intel
Collected During NVC
Stage:

No additional intel was noted except from working with marketing agents and
a search engine optimization expert that would affect publicity and raising
awareness about the business.

4.6.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?
The product – the online loan aggregator – was a focus throughout venture
creation. This was because it was being built from scratch and Startup F needed to reduce
supply-side customers’ integration issues and to ensure that the website was accessible to
demand-side customers.
Intermediary customers (local business owners) were connected with early in
venture creation during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). However were not followed
up with until later, when Startup F could revisit consumer finance models. Supply-side
customers were reached out to during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) and
integrated into the web platform. Demand-side customers were only contacted just before
the web platform launched. Only by the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) were all three
customer types connected with (see Figure 20).
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Figure 20. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During each Phase of New
Venture Creation in Startup F
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4.6.4. Customer Commitment
Eleven supply-side customers (loan providers) committed to be integrated in the
website through a contract during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). This prompted
the development of the web platform in the Transition Phase (III), integration of supplyside customers into the website, and advertising to demand-side customers in the
Entrepreneurial Phase. When the web platform went live, the founders had demand-side
customers seeking loans, equal to a commitment through sale (see Figure 21).
4.6.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction
Except for a single meeting initiated by a supply-side customer at their offices,
Startup F’s founder initiated all interactions with supply-side customers and
intermediaries throughout the new venture creation process. Awareness of Startup F was
raised through advertisements, search engine optimization, word-of-mouth, and media (a
magazine article). When the web platform went live, demand and supply-side customers
began to seek out and contact the startup during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV).
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Figure 21. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup F. Process steps shown indicate the status
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C =
Customer). Note: Additional demand-side ‘sales’ related to additional loans being sought
out took place after the First Customer Commitment through Sale, however, they were not
included in the diagram.
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4.6.6. Communication Channel
Loan providers (supply-side customers) were initially found and then contacted
over LinkedIn social media. However, subsequent early interactions with customers
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) took place predominantly in-person, over
phone or email. In the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) however, several communication
channels were adopted, including: word-of-mouth, the web platform, paid ads, articles,
and press releases. Other avenues used to learn about and raise awareness with customers
did not involve direct interaction. These included search engine optimizations to increase
the startup’s appearance in Internet searches for loans and data analytics.
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4.6.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback
Strategic feedback was sought out before the Transition Phase (III). This was
from intermediaries – who offered their own validation, and from loan providers – supply
side customers. Both these parties however also had demand-side customers as their own
current customers and were able to provide some insight about their preferences. Once
the founder committed to building the web platform, operational and tactical
confirmation was also sought out. This included integrating lenders and working out
contract details, learning how demand-side customers interact with the web platform, and
learning how to handle customer service issues.
4.6.8. Level of Validation
When he started this business, the founder of Startup F did not know anyone in
the industry except potential demand-side customers that he had received anecdotal
comments of interest. The founder sought out early validation from the other two of the
three external target markets before building the web platform. These were intermediaries
(during Opportunity Discovery Phase, I), and supply-side customers (during the
Opportunity Refinement Phase, II). Having received several contracts of interested
supply-side customers (loan providers; Validation through Contracts), and verbal interest
from intermediaries that deal with demand-side customers on a daily basis, Startup F
assumed that there would be demand-side customers. They did not test demand-side
customer interest until the website was launched during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV).
By then, the startup had also received personal network (family and friend) validation,
external market validation from all three markets, media validation, and validation
through contracts and sales (applications form loans; see Figure 22).
4.6.9. Summary of Startup F
Startup F was a search engine for online loans, established in March 2015 (1). The
founder interacted first with potential intermediary businesses (small businesses such as
home improvement stores, that customers may need financing options) in the Opportunity
Discovery Phase, then supply-side (loan providers) customers in the Opportunity
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Refinement Phase, followed by interactions with potential demand-side (loan seekers)
customers when the web platform launched in the Entrepreneurial Phase (2).
Startup F was equally customer and product focused during the Opportunity
Discovery and Opportunity Refinement Phases. There was minimal focus on the
organization, and the main focus was the customer when the web platform was eventually
launched in the Entrepreneurial Phase (3). Supply side customer commitment was
demonstrated during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, where loan providers signed a
contract to be integrated. Demand-side customer commitment came in the form of a sale
during the Entrepreneurial Phase (4). Customer interactions were initiated by Startup F,
until the web platform was launched, and customers begun to seek out the startup (5).
Initial intermediary customer interactions were in person when Startup F went to
speak with them, however connections with loan providers were initially over LinkedIn
social media. Subsequent interactions were undertaken with a diversity of communication
channels (6). Strategic feedback was sought out before the Transition Phase, and
operational and tactical confirmation was sought out afterwards (7).
Prior to starting this business, the founder of Startup F was not in this industry and
had no related network. As a result, he decided it was important to validate the external
target market’s interest in the web platform during Opportunity Refinement before
proceeding (8). He did not check with demand-side customers until the startup was built,
however assumed that he was familiar with this market and that receiving validation from
supply-side customers provided ample validation.
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Figure 22. Level of Validation Received by Startup F During New Venture Creation. (Where the
shaded circles represent validation from following categories: I. Founder – Selfjustification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV:
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII:
Commitment through Money).
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Furthermore, Startup F was racing to become first in the market as a loan
aggregator to gain recognition among lenders and individuals seeking loans. Hence,
rather than ensuring that all technical issues with the web platform were fixed before
launching, Startup F launched the web platform as soon as possible. Even with issues in
customers not completing the application, being live allowed Startup F to learn about
how customers interacted with the web platform, raised awareness with potential
customers, and began building customer relationships.
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4.7. Startup G
4.7.1. Case Overview
Startup G was founded to produce a product that could brew coffee on the go. The
product had been called several names: a portable travel brewer mug, pressure brewer,
and a coffee press, with the founder describing the product as: “an all in one pressure
brewer and travel mug that allows you to brew very high quality coffee and take it with
you on the go” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016). The idea for the product
arose from the founder’s love of coffee and his experiences operating canoe trips. He
found that he wanted great coffee on the go, but struggled to find a way to brew it while
camping.
In Summer 2015, as a coffee enthusiast with a Masters in Engineering degree and
specializing in thermodynamics, the founder realized that he could probably solve his
own problem: “I was making coffee one day in the lab [with a competing product], and I
thought, why can’t I just drink out of this? And that’s where it kind of came from. I drink
coffee every day. I’m in thermofluids. I know what [good coffee] is and how the actual
brewing works” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).

He developed a

prototype, and upon the urging of his business course professor, patented the design in
August 2015 (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase).
The founder started testing the prototype with his personal contacts. He wanted to
gain feedback from multiple sources, and started with the university campus and then
went to local cafes. He also went on the Internet, using various online platforms to learn
what types of features in a coffee press were important to customers. With frequent
interactions online, the founder realized how important it was to the community to have a
leak-proof lid. The last validation received before committing to the business was
winning an entrepreneurial pitch competition. This further validated the business concept
and gave Startup G some funding (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase).
The founder decided to commit to manufacturing the product, and decided to
crowdfund the manufacturing of the coffee press by using an online crowdfunding
platform to raise funds (III. Transition Phase). To ensure the success of the crowdfunding
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campaign, he started coming up with different ways to raise awareness about the product.
This included contacting blog writers to write about the product, using social media to
self-promote the business, connecting with radio stations, and continued interactions with
the online community forum. By the time the crowdfunding campaign started, despite
some pushback on shipping costs, sales started taking off. The founder also received
immediate feedback on whether the product would be purchased and continued
awareness through the online community forum.
Several more blog articles were written about the startup (almost 20), as well as
newspaper articles and another radio spot. The startup was proactive in generating social
media posts and also started using data analytics to better understand more about visitors
to his website. When the crowdfunding campaign was finished, they had raised 154
percent of their original goal.
Startup G continued to promote the travel brewer mug after the crowdfunding
campaign, with more newspaper articles and social media posts. Another crowdfunding
campaign was started to allow for continued sales while the founder turned his attention
towards getting the product manufactured. After a successful trip to the manufacturer’s
factory in China, the manufacturing process was started, and the founder was able to
focus his attention on discussing distribution opportunities with retailers and distributors
that had been contacting him from around the world.
4.7.2. Understanding Customer Interactions
Table 23 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase
of the new venture creation process for Startup G, and Table 24 is a summary of the
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. Note that the founder of
Startup G started with a target market segment as individual consumers who are like the
founder – outdoor enthusiasts that enjoy good coffee. While Startup G wanted to partner
with independent coffee shops, online stores that sold various gadgets and distributors of
coffee-related products, it did not consider these businesses as customers.
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Table 23. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup G
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT PHASE (4)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (12)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Founder wanted a coffee
brewer to take on the go. A
thermofluids engineer by
training, he designed a
prototype and talked with a
professor about patenting
the coffee press

Founder
started
testing
prototype with his own
network, getting feedback
from
online
community
forums,
won
an
entrepreneurial
pitch
competition, and met with
local cafes to test product

Made a decision to
crowdfund
manufacturing of
product (Commitment
to physically create
product on larger scale)

Connected with and featured by several bloggers, local
newspapers on social media, radio, and online community
forum to promote product. Visited the manufacturer's
factory in China and started using data analytics to track
Kickstarter and Indigogo sales. Co-adapted product with
feedback from customers and manufacturer

4.7.3.
Product,
Organization,
and/or Customer
Focus (underlined if
>1 at a time):

Product (1)

Customer
(1);
Product
Customer (2); Organization &
Customers (1)

Product (1)

Product (2); Customer (10); Product & Customer (1)

4.7.4.
Demonstrated
Customer
Commitment
(Contract/Sale):

None

None (Funding through
entrepreneurial pitch
competition; 1)

None

Sales through money exchange (5)

Type of Customer:

Founder (2); Founder &
Professional network (1)

Founder, Family and friends,
Professional network (1);
Early adopters in external
target market (1); Investors/
Entrepreneurial network (1);
N/A (café partners; 1)

External target market
(1)

Family and friends, Professional network, Early adopters in
external target market, External target market (3); External
target market (2); External target market & Everyone (5);
N/A (2 - Manufacturer and local cafes)

PHASE (# Stages)

4.7.1. Description
of
Stage
for
Startup:

175

Table 23 continued
PHASE (# Stages)

I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE
(3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT PHASE (4)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (12)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

4.7.5.
Customer
Interaction Initiated
by
(number
of
initiations; underlined
if >1 at a time):

N/A (3)

Startup (4)

Startup (1)

Startup (8); Startup & Customer (2); Media & Startup
(1); Media, Startup, & Customer (1)

4.7.6.
Information
Collection
and
Marketing and Sales
Communication
Channel
for
Interaction
(underlined if >1 at a
time):

In-person (1); N/A (2)

In-person (3 - At school, at
competition, in store); Web Online community forum (1)

Web
crowdfunding
platform (1)

In-person (1; Café); Web - blogs (1); Web - Social media
(1); Web - Online community forum (1); Traditional Radio & Web - Social media (1); Traditional Newspaper & Magazine and Web - Blog (1); Traditional
- Radio and newspaper & web - Cross-promotion of
crowdfunding campaigns, ads, emails (1); Tradtional Newspapers, posters, Web - social media, paid ads,
automatic direct messaging, regular messaging, crowd
funding website (1); Web - Crowdfunding campaign
website and online community forum (1); Web - Social
media posts and ads, blog articles, online community
forum (1); Web - Data analytics (1); N/A (1); Website
(All)

Distribution Channel
of Product:

N/A

N/A

N/A

Direct to end-customer (5); N/A (promotions or
otherwise; 7)

Purpose of Early
Customer
Interaction
(underlined if >1 at a
time):

Learned about problem
and
commercial
potential of invention
(developing product; 1)

Tested assumptions about
product (2); Tested problem,
product,
and
customer
segment (with online forum;
1); Tested problem, product,
and develop business model
(pitch competition; 1)

N/A (Founder plans to test
product
interest
by
willingness of customers
to
pay
during
crowdfunding campaign;
1)

Tested interest in product (3); Tested personal
promotions of product and segment (1); Tested interest
of media in product (1); Test model and Test interest of
partners in product (1); Tested promotions by media and
personal promotion (5); N/A (1)
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Table 23 continued
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY
PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT PHASE
(4)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (12)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Description of
Information
Gathered:

Founder learned what
features
such
an
invention would need,
how to develop it, and
that it had potential
for sales

Founder learned that there
was interest in the product
from customers and that it
needed to be leak proof,
that it was possible to
build a relationship with
potential
customers
virtually, and that it was a
quality product that was
valued by others in the
entrepreneurship
and
coffee communities

Learned that they could
be a way to both raise
funds
for
manufacturing
and
measure interest

Learned that it was possible to build strong engagement relationship with
customers in online community forum and in social media, that
customers were willing to purchase product through crowdfunding
campaigns without guarantee that it would be made, that it was possible
to engage media, cafes and other crowdfunding campaigns to promote
product, and that manufacturing in China could be a good collaboration.

4.7.7.
Customer
Feedback
Impact:

Strategic
confirmatory (3)

-

Strategic - confirmatory
(3);
Strategic,
Operational/Tactical
confirmatory (1)

N/A

Strategic - confirmatory (5); Strategic - information (1);
Operational/Tactical - confirmatory (2); Operational/Tactical - can be
adapted (1); Strategic - confirmatory, Operational/Tactical - can be
adapted (2); N/A (1)

4.7.8. Level of
Validation
Received from
Customer:

Self-justification (2);
Self-justification
&
professional network
validation (1)

Self-justification, family
and friends validation,
professional
network
validation
(1);
Selfjustification,
early
adopters target market
validation
(1);
N/A
(Investor/Entrepreneur
validation and partner
validation; 2)

Self-justification and
external target market
(1)

Family and friends validation & external target market validation (1);
Professional network, external target market validation, commitment
through money exchange (2); External target market validation (1);
External target market and commitment from money exchange validation
(1); Media validation (3); External target market & media validation &
commitment through money exchange (1); Self-justification, family and
friends, professional network, early adopters target market validation,
external target market validation, commitment through money exchange
(2); N/A (1)

Non-Customer
Intel:

N/A

Entrepreneurial
competition

N/A

Blog writers, radio station, newspapers, magazines, cafes, other media
and other crowdfunding campaigns, manufacturer

PHASE (#
Stages)

pitch
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Table 24. Startup G: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

4.7.1. Description
Startup Process:

of

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

The founder had his own need that he wanted to solve and had the expertise to design
and create a prototype for the product. Upon receiving a suggestion that other people
would be interested, he started testing the prototype with his own personal network,
getting feedback in an online community forum, and met with local cafes in person.
Receiving positive feedback and interest, he decided to crowdfund the manufacturing of
product, investing substantial time in raising awareness about the product. Successfully
raising money, the founder turns his attention towards manufacturing and exploring
potential partnerships with retailers and distributors in the future.

4.7.3.
Product,
Organization, and/or
Customer Focus:

The focus of Startup G in new venture creation was first the product (I. Opportunity
Discovery), then the customer and the organization (II. Opportunity Refinement), the
product (III. Transition), and then the product and the customer.

4.7.4.
Demonstrated
Customer
Commitment:

While the startup received some funding from an entrepreneurial pitch competition, the
first sale and continued sales through money exchange took place during the
Entrepreneurial Phase.

Type of Customer:

In the first phase, the founder spoke only to his own professional network, however
during Opportunity Refinement, he reached outside to three different related categories
of the external target market to learn more and test interest. It was only in the
Entrepreneurial Phase that the founder fully interacted with family and friends, his
professional network, and the external target market.

4.7.5.
Interaction
by:

Customer
Initiated

Customer interactions were predominantly initiated by Startup G across the new venture
creation process. Only in the Entrepreneurial Phase, did customers reach out to the
startup.

4.7.6.
Information
Collection
and
Marketing and Sales
Communication
Channel
for
Interaction:

In the Opportunity Discovery Phase, the founder only communicated in person. In the
Opportunity Refinement Phase, he reached out in-person, in cafes, and in online
community forums. In the Transition Phase, he reached out to a crowdfunding platform,
and in the Entrepreneurial Phase, he reached out in-person, through blogs, social media,
radio, newspapers and magazines, posters, email, advertisements, and direct messaging.
Data analytics were also used to collect data on visitors to the website.

Distribution
of Product:

The product was meant to be distributed direct to end-customer.

Channel

Purpose
of
Early
Customer Interaction:

Initial focus was on understanding the problem, then testing assumptions about the
problem, product and customer segment, and then finally, tested interest in the product
from customers and the advertising campaigns used to promote it.

Description
of
Information Gathered:

Founder first learned about essential features of the product, then learned about interest
in the product, and learned that there would be a way to build a strong engagement
relationship with online customers and crowdfund the product.

4.7.7
Customer
Feedback Impact:

Initial confirmations were predominantly strategic in the Opportunity Discovery and
Opportunity Refinement Phases. In the Entrepreneurial Phase, strategic confirmation
was still important, but more operational and tactical confirmations became important.
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Table 24 continued
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

4.7.8. Level of
Validation Received
from Customer:

Validation initially started with the founder himself and his professional network
(Opportunity Discovery Phase). In the Opportunity Refinement Phase, however he
reached out to a wider group, including an external target market, predominantly
online. In the Transition Phase, when he committed to the crowdfunding campaign, he
continued to receive validation from the online external target market. In the
Entrepreneurial Phase, he worked to gain media attention while building his
crowdfunding campaign. This eventually resulted in commitment through money
exchange.

Other Non-Customer
Intel Collected During
NVC Stage:

In the Entrepreneurial Phase, blog writers, a radio station, newspapers, magazines,
cafes, other media and crowdfunding campaigns provided validation to the startup. The
manufacturer provided insight into improving the product.

4.7.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?
Startup G followed a somewhat unique path where customers paid for a product
before it was manufactured. Crowdfunding made this possible. Startup G’s early focus in
new venture creation was on developing the product (I. Opportunity Discovery).
Subsequently, the startup tested customer interest and their ability to create an
organization (II. Opportunity Refinement), by deciding to raise funds for the product
manufacturing (III. Transition). Finally, Startup G continued raising funds for and
promoted the product to the customer and needed to learn how to get it manufactured (IV.
Entrepreneurial; see Figure 23).
Figure 23. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Startup During Each Phase of New
Venture Creation in Startup G
P
C

P
O

I. Opportunity
Discovery

C

P
O

II. Opportunity
Refinement

C

P
O

III. Transition

C

O

IV.
Entrepreneurial
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4.7.4. Customer Commitment
While first customer interactions took place during the Opportunity Refinement
Phase (II), the initial customer commitment through a sale (through the crowdfunding
campaign) did not take place until the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV; see Figure 25).
However, throughout venture creation, the founder built several public relationships with
potential customers, seeking out multiple communication channels, but relying
significantly on the use of the online community forum.
4.7.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction
Customer interactions were predominantly initiated by Startup G across the new
venture creation process. Only in the Entrepreneurial Phase, once the founder had raised
awareness about the startup and built relationships with a core group of the external target
market, did customers reach out to the startup (see Figure 24).
Figure 24. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup G. Process steps shown indicate the status
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C =
Customer). Note: Additional sales took place after the First Customer Commitment
through Sale, however, they were not included in the diagram.
A. Start: PreCustomer
Interactions

1
B. First Customer
Interaction

E. Develop or
Revise Organization
/ Product / Customer

C. Customer
Commitment
Through Contract

3/4

F. Subsequent
Customer
Interactions

H. Startup
Exit

5

D. First Customer
Commitment
Through Sale
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4.7.6. Communication Channel
In the Opportunity Discovery Phase, the founder only communicated in person to
potential customers about his product. In the Opportunity Refinement Phase however, he
started reaching out in-person, in cafes and in online community forums. These
relationships continued to develop over the new venture creation process. In the
Transition Phase, Startup G decided to start initial sales and fundraising through a
crowdfunding platform, and in the Entrepreneurial Phase, reached out to potential
customers in-person, through blogs, social media, radio, newspapers and magazines,
posters, email, advertisements, and direct messaging – to promote the campaign. Several
of the people reached were the same ones that were initially connected with during the
Opportunity Refinement Phase. The founder also used data analytics to collect basic data
on visitors to the website.
4.7.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback
The founder sought out strategic confirmation of the business concept during the
Opportunity Discovery and Opportunity Refinement Phases. While in the Entrepreneurial
Phase, strategic confirmation was still important, obtaining operational and tactical
confirmations became a larger focus for the startup. The focus changed to building
relationships with diverse customer segments and manufacturing the product.
4.7.8. Level of Validation
Verbal validation initially started with the founder himself and his professional
network (Opportunity Discovery Phase). In the Opportunity Refinement Phase, however
he reached out to a wider group, including an external target market, predominantly
online to receive text-based validation. In the Transition Phase, when he committed to the
crowdfunding campaign, he continued to receive verbal and text-based validation from
the online external target market. In the Entrepreneurial Phase, he worked to gain media
attention while building his crowdfunding campaign. This eventually resulted in
commitment through money exchange (see Figure 25).
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4.7.9. Summary of Startup G
Startup G was founded to produce a portable travel coffee press in April 2016 (1).
First interactions with potential customers were in the Opportunity Refinement Phase,
however only when their crowdfunding campaign was launched and completed did
Startup G have ‘customers.’ At this stage however, while the startup had funding, they
had still not manufactured the product (2). The startup saw their market as outdoor
enthusiasts that enjoy good coffee, however, this eventually evolved to include people
who enjoy good coffee.
Startup G initially focused on the product during the Opportunity Discovery
Phase, then on attracting customers during Opportunity Refinement and beyond. There
was never a major focus on the organization (3). The first customer interactions too place
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, but the initial customer commitment through
sale (crowdfunding campaign) took place only during the Entrepreneurial Phase (4).
Afterwards, there were still minor revisions to the product, but it still had not been
manufactured. Customer interactions were predominantly initiated by Startup G across
the new venture creation process (5).
Initial customer communication channels were in person, in cafes and in online
community forums. Over time, Startup G started to build sales and fundraising through
the online crowdfunding campaign, as well as through various channels such as blogs,
social media, radio, newspapers, posters and email to gain attention for the startup. The
startup even began using data analytics to learn more about their potential visitors to the
website (6). Strategic confirmation of the business was obtained before the Transition
Phase, and Operational and Tactical feedback became more important afterwards (7).
Startup G received a diverse array of verbal validation early during the
Opportunity Discovery and Refinement Phases (8). The founder of Startup G was
persistent in building relationships and gathering information about an array of his
external target customers’ needs and wants, much earlier before he started selling the
product during the Entrepreneurial Phase and before setting up his organization and
manufacturing process. The founder sought out validation from potential customers early
(during Opportunity Refinement) – connecting with multiple sources in the external
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target market – online community forums, professional in-person network, and cafes –
suggesting he was embedding himself in the community. Furthermore, the volume and
positive nature of the validation for the startup that came from online sources was
substantial – a market that the founder viewed to be essential for sales. He both built
relationships, received and shared information online – and matched this with the sales
channel by which he intended to sell the product. Crowdfunding to sell and raise funds
required relatively little initial personal capital however, suggesting that personal
investment in the product, beyond time and expertise, was minimal.
Figure 25. Level of Validation Received by Startup G During New Venture Creation. (Where the
shaded circles represent validation from following categories: I. Founder – Selfjustification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV:
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII:
Commitment through Money).

VII.

VII.

VI.

VI.

V.

V.

IV.

IV.

III.

III.

II.

II.

I.

I.

I. Opportunity Discovery Phase

II. Opportunity Refinement Phase

VII.

VII.

VI.

VI.

V.

V.

IV.

IV.

III.

III.

II.

II.

I.

I.

III. Transition Phase

IV. Entrepreneurial Phase

183
4.8. Startup H
4.8.1. Case Overview
Startup H was a web platform designed to provide comprehensive, personalized
resources for mental health - all online – allowing students to connect with online selfhealth resources, counsellors or online peers. The founder wanted the business to be:
“helping students discover and access the mental health resources that are best fitting for
their individual situation” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
The idea for Startup H arose in June 2015 when the founder realized that many
individuals, individuals who require it, do not seek out help for improving their own
mental health. Furthermore, he noticed that there was often a stigma and lack of
conversation on mental health issues with family and friends: “The idea came from
learning about my friend’s mental health situations and correlating it with my own. I
realized that we never really talked about it and [could have] helped each other. We only
discussed it after the fact” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
When Startup H was founded in September 2015, the initial business model that
the founder focused on comprised of platform users – university students, and the
demand side customer that would purchase the software – university counseling service
offices. While students were not customers of the web platform, their interaction with the
platform both justified its existence, as well as affected the content on the site.
Students would wait weeks before getting access to a counseling appointment.
The web platform was meant to improve on-campus mental health and alleviate some of
the backlog that the counseling services department had. It would provide articles on
mental health, an overview of the on-campus services available to students, and would
offer online e-counseling services to students (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase).
Having received verbal interest from the university, the founder decided to
explore what features the site could have. To gain an idea of what students would like to
have access to on the web platform, he spoke with informal faculty mentors that regularly
dealt with students on campus. (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase). While they suggested
creating customized websites for each individual university counseling services

184
department, after more reflection, the founder decided to develop a web platform that
could be used by all users (III. Transition Phase).
After building an initial demo website, the founder of Startup H went back to the
university counselling services to show them it. While he received positive verbal
feedback, the meeting did not result in a contract. Instead, the university encouraged the
founder to next pursue partnerships with their e-counseling staff for the website. The
founder of Startup H saw legal challenges creating confidential channels for e-counselors
however. This caused Startup H to adapt the web platform again so that instead of ecounseling, they would provide an online chat service to university students that
facilitated the search for customized access to resources on mental health. To this, the
university suggested that their auxiliary staff could offer this chat service, however
Startup H encountered substantial resistance from the staff, making the online chat
service challenging to implement.
By August 2016, Startup H had pivoted towards an advertising based revenue
model. Students remained the focal user of the web platform, but the demand side
customer became psychologists that purchased ad space on the web platform: “Before,
the school was the customer and students were the users. Psychologists would be
secondary customers that I would pursue after getting the school [as a customer]. But
now, the psychologists would be the primary customers. The schools would be a
marketing channel. And the students would [still] be the user” (Startup H Founder,
Interview, 16 August, 2016).
By January 2017, the founder had moved away from the sole focus of students as
users, to reach a more general population of users. To do so, he began contacting
insurance companies as potential customers for his web platform. Furthermore, he began
to develop a chat bot – a computer program that conducted conversation via text and
simulated a human conversational partner – that could be integrated into the insurance
companies’ websites and designed as a tool for their customers to better access
customized resources for mental health (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase).
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4.8.2. Understanding Customer Interactions
Table 25 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase
of the new venture creation process for Startup H, and Table 26 is a summary of the
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. Note that Startup H
initially pursued universities as customers of the web platform software, then changed to
have an advertising-based business model with psychologists as customers. Finally,
Startup H returned back to the original business model, but changed to seeking out
insurance companies as potential customers.
4.8.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?
The focus of Startup H early in new venture creation was on obtaining verbal
validation from the initial customer, a local university counselling services office. The
startup’s focus was then put on building the product during the Opportunity Refinement
and Transition Phases. Finally, during the Entrepreneurial Phase, the focus moved to
finding the right customer adapting the product accordingly. It took a few adaptations to
find a product (from a web platform with e-counselling, to having a chat function with
live humans supporting it, to having an automated chat bot) that suited the needs of
interested customers (from university counselling services to insurance companies; see
Figure 26).
Figure 26. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During each Phase of New
Venture Creation in Startup H
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I. Opportunity
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II. Opportunity
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Table 25. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup H
I. OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY
PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT PHASE
(2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (16)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Founder realized that there were
limited ways to help people talk and
learn about mental health on university
campuses and believed that a web
platform could be helpful to provide
customized mental health resources to
students. He spoke with university
counselling services as a potential
customer.

Considered
having
customized we pages for
different groups of users and
spoke with mentors and
informal counsellors of users
to learn of user interest

Founder
building
platform

4.8.3.
Product,
Organization,
and/or Customer
Focus (underlined
if >1 at a time):

Customers (1)

Product
(1);
representative; 1]

Product (1)

Customer (7); Product (3); Customer & Product
(2); Product & Organization (1); User (1); User &
Product (1); User representative (1)

4.8.4.
Demonstrated
Customer
Commitment
(Contract/Sale):

None

None

None

Customer commitment through verbal contract

PHASE (# Stages)

4.8.1. Description
of
Stage
for
Startup:

[User

a

began
web

Founder put prototype online and began to try to
get commitment from University Counselling
Services #1, as well as a few more universities.
Only University #1 offered to act as a pilot for the
web platform. Also, founder spoke with different
potential partners - psychologists and health
researchers, and tried to connect directly with
student users to get their feedback, but struggled.
The startup was pivoted twice, once towards an adbased business model, selling space to
psychologists, and secondly, selling software to
insurance companies. No sales resulted during
study period.
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Table 25 continued
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT PHASE (2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (16)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Type of Customer:

Founder (2); Early adopters in
external target market (1)

N/A (2 - Interacted with
representatives of users)

Founder (1)

Early adopters in external target market (university;
4); External target market (university; 2); External
target market (university and users; 1); External
target market (Psychologists advertising; 1);
External target market (Insurance companies; 1);
N/A (not customers but: user representatives, users,
competitors, and psychologists; 7)

4.8.5.
Customer
Interaction
Initiated by:

Startup (1); N/A (2)

N/A (2 interactions with noncustomers,
initiated
by
startup)

N/A (1 interaction with
non-customers, initiated
by startup)

Startup (12); N/A (4; Interactions not with
customers but initiated by startup)

4.8.6. Information
Collection
and
Marketing
and
Sales
Communication
Channel
for
Interaction
(underlined if >1 at
a time):

Physical - In-person meeting (1)

N/A (In-person for
customer interactions)

N/A

Physical - In-person (5); Web - email (2); Physical
- In-person and Web - email (1); Physical - Phone
and Web email (2); Web - Web platform (1); N/A
(5; Interactions with other stakeholders, used
business cards, posters, fliers, phone, email, and inperson meetings)

Distribution
Channel
Product:

Direct
to
end-customer
(university) who makes it
available to users

N/A

N/A

Direct to end-customer (university) who makes it
available to users (8); Direct to end-customer
(psychologist) who makes it available to users (1);
Direct to end-customer (insurance company) that
makes it available to users (1); N/A (5; showing
product to user representatives, users, health
researchers, psychologist before they became a
customer)

PHASE (# Stages)

of

non-
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Table 25 continued
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT
PHASE (2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (16)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Purpose of Early
Customer
Interaction
(underlined if >1 at
a time):

Tested assumption on
problem, business model,
and customer (1); N/A (2)

N/A (2) (Problem and
product)

N/A
(Develop
product)

Testing interest in product (4); Developed tested promoted new product
(1); Testing possibility to get more commitment from customer (1);
Seeking feedback from customer segment (2); developed and tested
new business models (2); N/A (Interactions with non-customers to test
product effectiveness, explore partnerships, seeking information on
market; 6)

Description
Information
Gathered:

of

Learned about customer
(university) interest and
concerns (1)

Received
suggestion
that
mental
health
resources should be
customized
for
different groups of
students (1)

N/A

Received positive verbal feedback from university customer (5);
Received positive verbal feedback from insurance customer (1);
Received feedback from data analytics on limited traffic (1); N/A (9;
non-customer interaction that showed user representatives believed
software was useful, but challenging to gauge user interest, online
counselling already existed, and potential partners were resistant to
working with them/unclear on partnership)

4.8.7.
Customer
Feedback Impact:

Strategic - confirmatory;
Operational/Tactical
some modifications (1)

N/A (Strategic - not
confirmatory
when
speaking with user
representatives)

N/A

Strategic - confirmatory (5); Strategic - Not confirmatory (2); Strategic,
Operational/Tactical - confirmatory (1); N/A (8; Interactions with other
stakeholders did not really change plans)

4.8.8. Level of
Validation
Received
from
Customer:

Self-justification (2); Selfjustification, Early adopter
target market validation (1)

Self-justification (2)

Self-justification
(1)

Self-justification (1); Early adopters target market validation (3);
External target market validation (2); N/A (10; Lack of validation from
customer and non-customers)

Other
NonCustomer
Intel
Collected During
NVC Stage:

None

Spoke
with
user
representatives
mentors to student
users (1)

None

Spoke with user representatives - mentors to student users, nonuniversity e-counsellors, peer support group, psychologist, and health
researchers interested to do research on success of product

PHASE (# Stages)
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Table 26. Startup H: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

4.8.1. Description of
Startup Process:

The founders realized that there was a gap in providing mental health support on
campus to university students. He approached university counselling services with the
idea that he would sell them a specially designed special web platform for this purpose.
Upon receiving verbal confirmation of interest, the founder built the platform. Despite
several visits to counselling services, they would not commit as a customer, but would
commit as a pilot location. Furthermore, Startup H faced some resistance from the
proposed partners that would make this web platform a success. The founder pivoted
towards an advertising based model and then towards having insurance companies as
potential customers before the end of the study period.

4.8.3. Product,
Organization, and/or
Customer Focus:

Customers were the initial focus during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. This was
followed by a focus on the product during the Opportunity Refinement and Transition
Phases. Finally, during the Entrepreneurial Phase, the founder concentrates on trying to
get customer commitment and changing to find the right customer, as well as adapting
the product to meet the needs of the new customers.

4.8.4. Demonstrated
Customer Commitment:

Only in the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) was there customer commitment through a
verbal contract with the university counseling services. However, this commitment
involved a pilot relationship, allowing Startup H to test out the software, and was not
intended to involve payment.

Type of Customer:

In the Opportunity Discovery Phase, Startup H interacted with a potential customer in
the external target market. In the Opportunity Refinement Phase, Startup H did not
interact with customers, nor the users (students) that the customers serviced, but
interacted with representatives of the users (their faculty mentors). Only once a
preliminary version of the software was built did Startup H approach potential
customers again in the external target market (universities, psychologists, and finally,
insurance companies).

4.8.5. Customer
Interaction Initiated by:

Customer interactions took place in the Opportunity Discovery (I) Phase and the
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) and was initiated by Startup H in all cases. During
Opportunity Refinement and the Transition Phases, no interactions with customers
took place, however there were interactions with non-customers (user representatives).

4.8.6. Information
Collection and Marketing
and Sales Communication
Channel for Interaction:

The founder initially approached customers for in-person meetings during the
Opportunity Discovery Phase. By the Entrepreneurial Phase, he was connecting with
customer in-person, using email, and through the web platform. He was also trying to
connect with the student users of the web platform using posters, business cards, and
flyers.

Distribution Channel of
Product:

Initially the web platform would be made available directly to the end-customer
(university) who would make it available to student users. The same distribution
occurred when the customer changed to psychologists and insurance companies.
Startup H however also played a role in promoting the web platform to users.

190
Table 26 continued
CUSTOMER INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

Purpose of Early Customer
Interaction:

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES
Early interactions during the Opportunity Discovery Phase with
university customer helped Startup H learn about the customer segment,
their problems, and interests. Subsequent interactions during the
Entrepreneurial Phase allowed founders to gain feedback to adapt the
product, see if it was possible to try to get commitment from customer,
try out different business models.

Description of Information
Gathered:

Startup H learned the interest of the university and their concerns,
received suggestions that the mental health resources should be
customized for different groups, and received positive verbal feedback
from different potential customers but no confirmation. They also learned
how to use data analytics to gauge interest by visitors to the website.

4.8.7 Customer Feedback Impact:

The founder initially got strategic confirmation that it was a good
business concept from the university during the Opportunity Discovery
Phase. Additional confirmation was not sought out until two phases later,
during the Entrepreneurial Phase, where some interactions confirmed the
strategy and others did not. Operational/tactical confirmation was also
obtained during this phase.

4.8.8. Level of Validation Received
from Customer:

Besides self-justification throughout the new venture creation process,
the founder received external target market validation during the
Opportunity Discovery Phase and the Entrepreneurial Phase. This
validation was verbal only.

Other Non-Customer Intel
Collected During NVC Stage:

During the Opportunity Refinement and Entrepreneurial Phase, the
founder also spoke with user representatives, mentors that were familiar
with student users’ mental health needs.

4.8.4. Customer Commitment
The first customer interaction took place during the Opportunity Discovery Phase.
While the web platform (product) underwent several adaptations, there was no contract or
sale by the end of the study period (see Figure 27).
4.8.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction
The startup initiated all interactions during the Opportunity Discovery Phase and
the Entrepreneurial Phase. No other interactions were noted.
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Figure 27. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup H. Process steps shown indicate the status
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C =
Customer). Note: Additional sales took place after the First Customer Commitment
through Sale, however, they were not included in the diagram.
A. Start:
PreCustomer
Interaction
s

1
B. First Customer
Interaction

2

E. Develop or
Revise O / P / C

C. Customer
Commitment
Through Contract

3/4

F.
Subsequent
Customer
Interaction
s / Sales

D. First Customer
Commitment
Through Sale

H.
Startup
Exit

4.8.6. Communication Channel
Initial interactions during the Opportunity Discovery Phase took place in-person,
however in the Entrepreneurial Phase, in addition to in-person interactions with
customers, Startup H also started reaching out using email and the web platform itself.
The founder also reached out to users of the platform – students, with business cards,
fliers, phone, email and in-person meetings.
4.8.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback
The founder received initial strategic confirmation from speaking with university
counselling services (the first customer) during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. No
feedback from customers was received during the Opportunity Refinement or Transition
Phases. The founder received some strategic confirmation during the Entrepreneurial
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Phase, as well as some non-confirmatory strategic feedback, and some operational /
tactical confirmatory feedback such as challenges getting help to implement the online
chat.
4.8.8. Level of Validation
Early validation came from initial interactions with the early external target
market during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). After this, the founder spent time
building the web platform. In the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), he continued to receive
validation from the early external target market, however no contracts or sales were made
(see Figure 28).
Figure 28. Level of Validation Received by Startup H During New Venture Creation. (Where the
shaded circles represent validation from following categories: I. Founder – Selfjustification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV:
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII:
Commitment through Money).
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4.8.9. Summary of Startup H
Startup H was a web platform designed to provide comprehensive, personalized
online resources for mental health, founded in September 2015 (1). The startup received
verbal interest from a potential customer – a university counseling services – during the
Opportunity Discovery Phase, and began developing the web platform to meet their needs
(2). They continued to develop the website for the university until they decided to pivot,
first, towards an advertising-based revenue model, and second, towards an insurance
company as a potential customer.
The initial focus of Startup H was on customers, seeing one customer’s interest
during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. Subsequently, the focus went towards
developing the product in the Opportunity Refinement and Transition Phases. Finally, the
focus returned to customers and products during the Entrepreneurial Phase. There was
limited attention put towards the organization during the study period (3). While the first
customer interaction took place during the Opportunity Discovery Phase, there was no
contract or sale by the end of the study period (4). The startup initiated all customer
interactions (5).
Initial interactions during the Opportunity Discovery Phase took place in-person,
however by the Entrepreneurial Phase, the startup began reaching out using email and the
web platform itself, as well as connecting with users of the platform on campus with
business cards, fliers, phone, email, and in-person meetings (6). The founder received
initial strategic confirmation from speaking with university counselling services during
the Opportunity Discovery Phase. Some strategic confirmation was received in later
staged, but there was limited operational and tactical feedback received from potential
customers (7).
Early verbal validation came from interactions with the one potential customer in
the external target market during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. However, limited
interaction took place again until the Entrepreneurial Phase, and validation received
continued to be verbal (8). The founder received no formal commitment from the
customer however was willing to continue to invest time in product development. While
one university counseling services office gave verbal confirmation that they would act as
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a pilot site for free, other potential university counseling services customers did not want
to have further discussions with Startup H until they saw the success of the first
university. This meant that there was only verbal external market validation from one
potential customer. There was no other type of ‘commitment’ to justify continuing to
develop a product for them. For instance, action that could have displayed interest and
commitment includes providing support for Startup H to become embedded in the
ecosystem of counsellors and facilitating connections with student users. For example,
the student counsellors’ Peer Support Group members were highly resistant to working
with Startup H, despite being connected to the startup by the university counselling
services. Furthermore, counselling services appeared to take a very passive approach
towards promoting the web platform to student users – suggesting a lack of investment of
time, money, or endorsement from the potential customers and that there was hesitation
of the market, a potential lack of trust in the product or founder, or a lack of interest,
despite the founder interpreting the verbal interest as validation. Furthermore, even with
changing customers (to psychologists and then insurance companies), the founder unable
to secure a contract or sale, by the end of the study period, and had not finished
development of the chat bot that was desired by the insurance companies.
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4.9. Startup I
4.9.1. Case Overview
Founder T, originally a freelance writer and competitive athlete, had returned to
school and learned he was good at website design (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase). He
met Founder A at a small business summer company program and the pair created a
partnership for a full suite marketing service company (II. Opportunity Refinement
Phase). The founders believed that they had a strong partnership from the beginning: “I
think what brought us together is that both of us work extremely hard and [co-founder A]
is very talented and I’m talented at what we do. We get along, and we’re friends, though
[when we met] we weren’t really friends at that point… It’s a great partnership and we
complement each other very well in that sense” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19
May, 2016).
They wanted to create “a full suite marketing service that offers tangible results
doing analytics integration. We connect our clients with the right people so they can
build the businesses that they want to” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May,
2016). One of the initial goals of the business was to have open communication and
collaboration with potential customers: “When you deal with your customer, that’s when
the changes happen. Because if you’re resenting your customer or they’re resenting
you… there’s a problem. And if there’s miscommunication – anything goes wrong, I’ll
make a note of it… Our whole business is collaborative and adaptive. Because if there’s
one thing that’s going on, I want to make sure it’s collaborative and adaptive to run
smoothly. Some of our worst projects were because we hit roadblocks and I wasn’t able
to adapt. But now, our goal is to be an integrated process where they give us money and
we get things done” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016).
For a year, the founders had been working on Startup I part-time. However, when
they were accepted into a university-based incubator, as of May 2016, they committed to
working on the startup full-time (III. Transition Phase). As they pushed to grow their
business, they relied heavily on personal networks for clients. Even though they wanted
to change their target customer type, they took a passive approach to finding customers –
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accepting projects from those that approached them rather than reaching out to customers.
This proved to be rather time consuming however, as it entailed lots of pre-contract
interactions that did not always result in a contract and eventual payment. Even once they
started to reach out to new customers that they were interested to work with, they found
challenges securing contracts with them. This lead to Startup I revamping their business
model – where they offered click-and-pay services on the website to minimize back and
forth communication (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase).
4.9.2. Understanding Customer Interactions
Table 27 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase
of the new venture creation process for Startup I, and Table 28 is a summary of the
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases.
4.9.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?
The initial focus of Startup I was on customers that were approaching the founder
and developing customized websites (product) for them (I. Opportunity Phase). A
partnership between the two founders refined the approach of the business towards a full
suite marketing service, requiring a shift in the organization focus (II. Opportunity
Refinement). Then, when the founders committed to the business full time when entering
an entrepreneurship program, they shifted towards thinking about developing business
processes and the types of customers they would like to work with (III. Transition
Phase). Finally, they focused predominantly on the customers that were approaching
them, as well as trying to change to higher-end customers by changing the company
website to promote more direct interaction, adapting processes for how they dealt with
customers, and offering higher end services such as in-bound marketing (see Figure 29).
Figure 29. Product (P), Organization (O) and/or Customer (C) Focus of Organization During Each
Phase of New Venture Creation in Startup I
P
C

P
O

I. Opportunity
Discovery

C

P
O

II. Opportunity
Refinement

C

P
O

III. Transition

C

O

IV.
Entrepreneurial

197

Table 27. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup I
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE
(3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT PHASE (2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Founder T went back to
school and learned he was
good at designing websites

Founder T applies to local city
small business centre and meets
Founder A. They create a
partnership for a full suite
marketing service company

Founders committed full
time to startup

Founders relied heavily on personal network for
clients. Even though they wanted to change target
customer, they took a passive approach to finding
customers. They eventually re-designed the
startup's website to require potential customers to
click-and-pay for services, minimizing client back
and forth communication.

4.9.3.
Product,
Organization, and/or
Customer
Focus
(underlined if >1 at a
time):

Customers (2); Product (1)

Organization (2)

Customer & Organization
(1)

Customers (6); Organization (3); Product (2);
Customers & Organization (1); Product &
Organization (1); Customers, Organization, &
Product (1)

4.9.4. Demonstrated
Customer
Commitment
(Contract/Sale):

Sale:
Commitment
through money exchange
(2)

None (But some sales may have
been ongoing)

Sale:
Commitment
through money exchange
(1) (Ongoing sales)

Sale: Commitment through money exchange (5)
(Ongoing sales)

Type of Customer:

Founder (1); Family &
friends (1); Founder &
Family and Friends (1)

Founders (1); N/A (1)

Family
and
friends,
Professional
network,
External target market (1)

Founders (1); Friends and family & professional
network (5); Family and friends, professional
network, external target market (4); N/A (4)

4.9.5.
Customer
Interaction Initiated
by
(number
of
initiations; underlined if
>1 at a time):

Friend (1); Unknown (1);
N/A (1)

N/A (2)

Customer (1)

Customers (4); Customers & Startup (1); Customer
and then Startup (1); Startup (3); N/A (5)

PHASE (# Stages)

4.9.1. Description of
Stage for Startup:

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14)
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Table 27 continued
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE
(3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT PHASE (2)

III. TRANSITION
PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

4.9.6. Information
Collection and
Marketing and Sales
Communication
Channel for
Interaction:

Physical - In-person?
(1); Unknown (1); N/A
(1)

In-person and email (1); N/A
(1)

Physical - In person
meetings, phone; Web
- email and ads(1)

Web - email (2); Physical - in-person, phone, Web - email
(2); Physical - phone, Web - email (2); Phone, paper
proposal, web - email (1); Web - Web content on website &
social media (2); Web - data analytics and email (1); N/A
(4)

Distribution
of Product:

Direct to end-customer
(1)

N/A (2)

Direct to end-customer
(1)

Direct to end-customer (7); Direct to end-customer via
website (1); Direct to end-customer via website and social
media (3); N/A (3)

Purpose of Early
Customer Interaction
(underlined if >1 at a
time):

Tested
interest
in
product (1); Learned
about problem and
customer segment (1)

Founders got to know each
other and see if they worked
well together (Tested product
and customer and developed
product and model; 2)

Tested business model
to see if product would
create a profitable
business and promoted
product

Observed how startup got clients (1); Developed and tested
business models, customer segment, and customer
commitment (3); Tested ways to connect with new clients
(2); Tested whether changing online presence would attract
customers (3); Tested how customers interact with their
website (1); N/A (4)

Description
of
Information Gathered:

Founder was able to
create websites that
satisfied customers (2)

Founders realized they would
work well together (2)

Founders found that
clients kept coming to
them.

Found that clients readily approached the startup, but did
not always accept their proposals and these were not
always clients that the founders wanted to work with. They
found waiting for customers to accept proposals was
important before starting work. The success of the changes
to the website and process of click-and-pay services were
not confirmed at end of study.

PHASE (# Stages)

Channel
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Table 27 continued
I. OPPORTUNITY
DISCOVERY PHASE (3)

II. OPPORTUNITY
REFINEMENT PHASE
(2)

III. TRANSITION PHASE (1)

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14)

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

4.9.7. Customer
Feedback Impact:

Strategic - confirmatory (2); N/A
(1)

Strategic - confirmatory
(3)

Strategic - confirmatory (1)

Operational/Tactical - Confirmatory (2);
Operational/Tactical - not confirmatory (4);
Strategic - not confirmed (4); N/A (4)

4.9.8. Level of
Validation
Received from
Customer:

Self-justification
(1);
Selfjustification, Family & Friends
validation
(2);
Commitment
through money exchange (2)

Self-justification
(2);
Commitment
through
money exchange (1)

Self-justification, Family and
friends’ validation, Professional
network
(1);
Commitment
through money exchange (1)

Self-justification (2); Self-justification, Family
and friends, professional network validation (1);
Self-justification,
Family
and
friends,
Professional network, External target market
validation (1); N/A (10); Commitment through
money exchange (5)

Other NonCustomer Intel
Collected During
NVC Stage:

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

PHASE (# Stages)
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Table 28. Startup I: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

4.9.1. Description of
Startup Process:

An entrepreneur went back to school for web design and later met another
entrepreneur at a small business centre where they decided to create a full suite
marketing service company. Working on it part-time while finishing school, a year
later, they entered an entrepreneurial program and committed full time to the startup.
Though they wanted to build the business and change the target customer segment
they were attracting, they had taken a passive approach to finding customers and were
spending a lot of time with customers before a contract was signed, and sometimes,
no contract was signed. The founders eventually re-designed the startup’s website so
that potential customers knew the prices and could just click-and-pay for services
before the founders needed to correspond with them.

4.9.3. Product,
Organization, and/or
Customer Focus:

The initial focus of Startup I was on customers and the product (Opportunity
Discovery), then on the organization alone (Opportunity Refinement), then on the
customer and the organization (Transition), followed by the customer, organization,
and product (Entrepreneurial).

4.9.4. Demonstrated
Customer Commitment:

The first sale as demonstrated through money exchange took place during the
Opportunity Discovery Phase. Regular sales of Startup H’s services continued
through the Entrepreneurial phase.

Type of Customer:

Initial customers in the Opportunity Discovery Phase were family and friends, then in
the Transition Phase and beyond, customers also came from the founders’
professional network and external target market.

4.9.5. Customer
Interaction Initiated by:

Customer interactions are predominantly initiated by customers (or friends of
customers/founders). Only in the Entrepreneurial Phase do the founders begin
initiating customer interactions.

4.9.6. Information
Collection and Marketing
and Sales
Communication Channel
for Interaction:

Initial communication takes place in person. By the Transition Phase, the founders
are using phone calls and email as well, and by the Entrepreneurial Phase, the
founders are also using social media and data analytics to interact with or better
understand customers.

Distribution Channel of
Product/Service:

The product is being delivered direct to end-customer throughout venture creation
until the end of the study period, when it is delivered to the end-customer via the
website.

Purpose of Early
Customer Interaction:

The initial purpose if customer interactions was to show the problem and test interest
in the product/service (Opportunity Discovery Phase), then to test the business model,
product and customer. There was a profitable business (Transition Phase), then
finally, to test the business model, new ways to connect with clients, and to test how
potential customers would interact with the website.

Description of
Information Gathered:

Startup H’s founders found that they could create websites that satisfied clients.
Initially they were proud that clients approached them, and then realized that there
were issues with that – where they would create proposals that clients would not
accept and that they were unhappy with the type of client that approached them.
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Table 28 continued
CUSTOMER
INTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES

4.9.7 Customer
Feedback Impact:

Most of the customer feedback received during the Opportunity Discovery, Opportunity
Refinement, and Transition Phases were strategic and confirmatory that the business
concept that Startup H had was working. However, during the Entrepreneurial Phase,
there was a lack of strategic confirmation as the founders were trying to change the
business concept and were changing how they worked with customers.

4.9.8. Level of
Validation Received
from Customer:

The founder received validation during the Opportunity Discovery Phase from family
and friends and through sales and money exchange. Money exchange continued to
provide validation, as family and friends and the personal network continued to
approach the startup. However, sales continued through the Entrepreneurial Phase, as
the business concept changed, the sales only provided validation of the past business
concept.

Other Non-Customer
Intel Collected During
NVC Stage:

No influential non-customers were noted during the study period.

4.9.4. Customer Commitment
The first customer interaction and the first customer commitment through sale
took place during the Opportunity Discovery phase. Subsequent customer interactions
continued, while the founders revised the type of organization they would be, the services
they offered, and the type of customers they served (Figure 30).
4.9.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction
While the initial customer interaction to Startup I was an introduction of a
potential customer via a friend, most customer interactions were initiated by the
customer. Only in the Entrepreneurial Phase did Startup I begin reaching out to potential
customers.
4.9.6. Communication Channels
Initial interactions with customers were predominantly in-person over the phone.
However, as time progressed, Startup I started communicating more using email, and
then eventually began using social media and their website when their business model
changed.
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Figure 30. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup I. Process steps shown indicate the status
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product/Service,
and C = Customer). Note: Additional sales took place after the First Customer
Commitment through Sale, however, they were not included in the diagram.
A. Start:
PreCustomer
Interaction
s

1
B. First Customer
Interaction

E. Develop or
Revise O / P / C

2

C. Customer
Commitment
Through Contract

4/5

F. Subsequent
Customer
Interactions

3

D. First Customer
Commitment
Through Sale

H.
Startup
Exit

4.9.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback
The feedback during the three first phases of new venture creation were strategic
and confirmatory, suggesting that the web design business concept of the startup was
established. However, as the founders tried to shift the types of customers they attracted
and their processes for how they operated, this reduced strategic confirmation. Also,
because they did not yet have the technology developed, they received mixed
confirmation on operational/tactical feedback.
4.9.8. Level of Validation
Startup I received their first monetary validation in the Opportunity Discovery
Phase without reaching beyond their family and friends. They continued to have
customers approach them through their personal and professional networks and continued

203
to receive sales validation. This learning about other customers in the external target
market non-existent and made it more challenging for founders to mentally change their
approach to interacting with customers.
In the Entrepreneurial Phase, the trigger to finally create the new website and
adapt towards a more online, technoculture business was triggered by the founders being
fed up after several months of dealing with the time-consuming processes for customer
Clients familiar with their old business model continued to pursue them however (Figure
31).
Figure 31. Level of Validation Received by Startup I During New Venture Creation. (Where the
shaded circles represent validation from following categories: I. Founder – Selfjustification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV:
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII:
Commitment through Money).
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4.9.9. Summary of Startup I
Startup I was a marketing and website design service established in May 2015 (1).
The idea for the startup began when a customer first approached the startup during the
Opportunity Discovery Phase (2).
Startup I was initially focused on developing products for customers in the
Opportunity Discovery Phase. While the organization became a brief focus in the
Opportunity Refinement Phase when a co-founder was added to the business, the focus
remained predominantly on customers and the product (3). The first customer interaction
and first customer commitment through a sale took place during the Opportunity
Discovery Phase (4). From then on, the startup relied on customers approaching them (5).
Initial interactions with customers were in person and over the phone, however, as
time progressed, the startup began using more email, and then, eventually social media
and their new website (6). Until the Transition Phase, all feedback was strategic.
Afterwards, they tried to shift the types of customers they attracted, however did not get
strategic confirmation, nor operational or tactical confirmation (7).
Validation was through sales, but predominantly from the founders’ personal and
professional networks approaching them (8). Despite being a different type of customer
from what Startup I desired, the ongoing supply of customers that were approaching
Startup I made it challenging for the founders to pro-actively change their business
model. This suggests it was possible to receive confirmation from customers too early in
the process if the founders were unwilling or unable to continue to test out different
customer segments. This lack of experimentation can make it a challenge to adapt the
business later not just because it is difficult to start seeking out new customers, but that it
first requires a shift in mindset that they would need to reach out to customers (founder
identity/mentally created path dependence). The founders only had so much bandwidth
and were bogged down with the work from existing customers approaching them, that
their business processes were only designed to handle these types of customers
approaching them (organization path dependence). Furthermore, their reputation as a
marketing firm offering basic services became established over time, based on their
existing client base, also making it a challenge to attract higher tier clients.
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4.10. Summary of Chapter 4
This chapter provided a within-case findings for each of the nine startups studied
during the study period. The analyses were presented individually, in a standardized
format, and provided a case study overview (1), a summary of customer interactions (2),
the startup focus at different phases of new venture creation (3), when customer
commitment first occurred and the first interaction (4), who initiated customer
interactions (5), a summary of the communication channels over time (6), whether
strategic or operational or tactical feedback was received and when (7), and the level of
validation received from the personal or professional networks of the startup, or the
external target market, and whether there were any contracts or sales that took place (8).
Rather than providing additional summaries for each individual case, please refer to the
ninth (final) section of each analysis for a summary of the each within-case analysis (9).
From looking at these characteristics for each of the cases, there were different
patterns noted for customer interactions in terms of who initiated them, what type of
customer existed, what type of communication channels were used, whether the feedback
from customers was strategic or operational or tactical, and at what stages, if at all,
contracts or sales occurred. In general, from these summaries we can see that an array of
industries was followed (1). Most startups had their first customer interaction before
committing to the business during the Transition Phase (III), but this interaction did not
necessarily result in a sale or a contract (2). They initially started with a product or a
product and customer focus, and over time, moved towards a customer and/or
organization focus (3). A first sale occurred in different phases during the study period
(4), and most startups initiated their own customer interactions throughout the venture
creation process, with the exception of Startup I (5).
Interestingly, even in digital-based startups, most initial customer interaction took
place in person (6). Strategic feedback was sought out and generally obtained before
committing to the business in the Transition Phase, affecting the decision to start the
business and commitment to the business concept. Only afterwards, in the
Entrepreneurial Phase, did the startup start to seek out operational or tactical feedback
(7). Finally, verbal validation came from different sources during the various stages of
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venture creation, as well as receiving validation through contracts or sales (8). To better
understand these cases similarities and differences, a more detailed cross-case analysis is
presented in Chapter 5.
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5. RESULTS: CROSS-CASE FINDINGS
Chapter 5 presents the findings of the cross-case analyses that compare the nine
startups in the sample. Ideally in a cross-case analysis, the similarities and differences
across cases in the sample are studied to better explain the specific conditions under
which a finding occurs (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Based on the general findings in
Chapter 4, this chapter explores the first part of my research question: when and how do
startups interact with early customers during the new venture creation process?
Two sections delve deeper into explaining where startups focus attention (towards
product, organization, or customer) (Section 5.1). Next, I explore the communication
channels used during new venture creation with different types of customers (family and
friends, professional network, and/or the external target market) and the validation
received from these customers at each phase of new venture creation (Section 5.2). The
characteristics explored here were highlighted in the findings of Chapter 4.
As mentioned in the methods section, the cross-case analysis builds on the withincase analyses (Chapter 4) - developed with a set of variables that emerged inductively
through coding and data analysis (Table 9), and analyzed using matrices and other
displays to analyze each case in depth (Appendix E). Then, the case-level displays were
‘stacked’ in a time-ordered meta-matrix (see Appendix F) that condensed and allowed
for even more systematic comparison of multiple cases into one big chart, and addressed
the chronology of each phase of new venture creation (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Refer
to Table 10 for a description of the five phases of new venture creation (the order is
noted with roman numerals).
Before delving into the findings, there are a few points to note about the
presentation of the findings in this chapter. Much like Chapter 4, Chapter 5 reports
detailed data and findings. The statements made about the startup events are supported by
data found in the extended cases (Appendix B). There are several figures (Figure 32 to
Figure 40) that show a comparison of different startup customer interaction
characteristics during the new venture creation process. Note that these figures are not
meant to be interpreted as quantitative measures. For example, looking at the figure of
stakeholders who initiated customer interaction (Figure 34), the mention of Startup A
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(organic beverage) and customers of Startup A initiating customer interactions during the
Entrepreneurial Phase does not mean that only one customer interaction was initiated by
Startup A, and one interaction was initiated by Startup A’s customers, but rather, that
during the participant interviews, founders mentioned or inferred that these types of
interactions occurred during this time period. Specifically, these charts should be used
merely to understand and compare relative occurrences of each characteristic or scenario
mentioned.
Another point to note is that founders themselves can be considered a category of
customer. Founders often start a business trying to solve a problem that they encounter
themselves, and then, they may reach out to others as potential customers that they
believe also have the same problem. Information about their personal insights from a
potential customer perspective have been considered in the following figures: Figure 32
(product, organization or customer focus) and Figure 33 (purpose of interactions), and
Figure 35 (level of validation received). Note that founders were not considered as
customers in Figure 34 (initiation of customer interaction), Figure 35 (validation),
Figure 36, Figure 37, Figure 38, Figure 39, and Figure 40 (communication channels
with customer during each phase of new venture creation).
Finally, a few last points to note. Not all cases are necessarily discussed in each
section of these findings chapters. If a startup was not discussed, the reader should be
assured that data in the sample did not provide relevant evidence for that point. Only four
of the startups made it to the Execute Phase during the study period. Also, for this crosscase analysis, the phases analyzed for Startup C were only for the affiliate marketing
business, that made it to the Transition Phase and beyond.
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5.1. Focus of Startup During Venture Creation
In this section, I aim to develop an understanding of where startups put their
efforts in each phase of new venture creation. An organization, and particularly a young
startup, has limited resources and attention (Yli-Renko, Sapienza, & Hay, 2001) and
where they choose to focus their efforts is informative of the priorities of the founders at
different phases of new venture creation.
As shown in Chapter 4, startups may focus on developing the product
(specifications, design, manufacturing processes, etc.) and gathering resources for it
(product focus), or may focus efforts on organization creation, including organizational
processes, infrastructure, obtaining funding, and human resource/staffing issues
(organization focus), or towards interactions with customers, including gaining
information about them, their preferences, and promoting the product to them (customer
focus). I organize the findings in this section based on the three places startups focus their
attention over each phase of new venture creation (Figure 32). An explanation of each
phase of new venture creation is also included. To understand the implications of this
focus, I then include comparative findings on the purpose of the customer interaction
(Figure 33) and who initiated the interaction during each phase over time (Figure 34).
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Figure 32. Focus of Startups on Developing a Product, Organization or Customer During New
Venture Creation. Note that the time the participants spent focused on a category during
a particular phase is presented proportionately. For example, during the Opportunity
Discovery Phase, Startup A spent approximately twice as much time focused on the
product than the customer.
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5.1.1. - I. Opportunity Discovery Phase
Products. During the Opportunity Discovery (I) Phase, eight of the nine startups
focused mostly on products (see Figure 32). Looking at the purpose of the interaction
(see Figure 33)– All startups were trying to learn about a problem that needed to be
solved or the product itself, or were starting to develop the product.
Customers. Testing the customer segment was the next most frequent activity
during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (Figure 32). These activities involved speaking
with customers to learn more about who they were, their preferences, whether they were
the target market, and obtaining feedback about the product and business. Two-thirds of
the startups in the sample initiated customer interactions during this phase, and only one
of the startups in the sample, Startup I (the marketing agency), was approached by
customers (Figure 34).
Founders as Customers: Internally Stimulated Opportunity Recognition. Some
startups in the sample decided to start a business from a need that they experienced
themselves (Bhave, 1994). Startups A (organic beverage), B (makerspace), D (online
event space marketplace), E (app-based gaming community), and G (coffee press) had
experienced a problem themselves, and thought about developing a product as a potential
solution. Prior to pursuing the idea, they spoke with no one or only spoke with family and
friends (Startups A and E), and saw themselves as a potential customer and part of a
larger customer segment. For example, Startup G, wanted to be able to make good coffee
while camping, and designed a portable coffee press. He believed that there were also
other, similar campers and coffee devotees that would also be interested, and the first
potential customers that he reached out to were in this category of market.
Startups that had Externally Stimulated Opportunity Recognition. In contrast,
Startups C, F and H did not experience the problem themselves. The idea instead came
from observing problems and opportunities in the environment.
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Figure 33. Purpose of Interactions for Startup Cases A to I at Each Stage of New Venture Creation.
Purpose of Interactions
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Organization. In general, gathering resources to build the organization was not
important to startups in the initial stages of new venture creation – particularly during the
Opportunity Discovery Phase. The organization was only a partial focus for Startup A
(Figure 32), relevant as the startup was creating a physical beverage product and needed
to have a physical space that allowed for product production.
Figure 34. Stakeholder that Initiated Customer Interactions During New Venture Creation.
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5.1.2. - II. Opportunity Refinement Phase
Customers and Product. By the Opportunity Refinement Phase, an idea has been
identified and the entrepreneurs test whether there is a market. Products and customers
were the focus for most startups in the sample during this phase (eight startups, all except
Startup I, and seven, all except Startups H and I, respectively; Figure 32).
The purpose of the interactions during Opportunity Refinement involved the
customer segment being tested, alongside learning about the problem, developing and
testing the product (Figure 33). Developing the business model had increased in
importance from the previous phase. By this phase, all startups had interacted with
customers, with eight of the nine startups having initiated customer interactions (Figure
34; all but Startup I).
The continued focus of startups on understanding the problem, and developing the
product during the second phase of new venture creation, suggests that the problem was
still being validated and that the startup was testing whether the potential product and
business concept met the potential external target market’s needs and interests.
By the Opportunity Refinement Phase, only five of the nine startups in the sample
had an actual prototype (digital or physical; Table 29; Startup A, Startup C, Startup E,
Startup G, Startup I, case narratives, Appendix B). Founders without a prototype still
spoke with customers to share their description of the problem that they wanted to solve
and the proposed product that they would use to test it. This is in line with a practitioner’s
view of MVP and is considered an appropriate tool to seek out feedback and requiring
minimal investment to create (Blank & Dorf, 2012; Winkel & Wilcox, 2017).
Organization. The Organization was still not the main focus or priority of any of
the startups during this phase (Figure 32). The business model was being developed in
this phase and only a couple of startups (C and E) had started to test theirs with a
prototype in hand.
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Table 29. New Venture Creation Phase in which Prototype was Created and Validation Received
Startup and MVP

Phase of Prototype Creation

Validation Received from Showing
Prototype

I. Opportunity Discovery

Verbal (in-person) and sales

B – Pop-up events

IV. Entrepreneurial

Verbal (in-person), limited sales (not
really an MVP because it was
different from goal business concept,
the makerspace)

C –Websites with
affiliate marketing
links

I. Opportunity Discovery

Sales

D – Web form for
event space
marketplace

III. Transition

Verbal (in-person) and sales

II. Opportunity Refinement

Verbal (in-person and online) and
download of app

F – Online loan
aggregator

IV. Entrepreneurial

Sales

G – Coffee press

I. Opportunity Discovery

Verbal (online community forum;
and sales in Entrepreneurial Phase)

IV. Entrepreneurial

Verbal (in-person)

I. Opportunity Discovery

Sales

A – Organic beverage

E – App-based online
gaming community

H – Online mental
health resources
I – Marketing agency
services

5.1.3. - III. Transition Phase
In the Transition Phase, founders demonstrated commitment to physical creation
of the startup – described by Bhave (1994) as the phase where founders move beyond
business concept identification. Commitment to creating the business was shown in a
variety of ways, including verbal statements demonstrating full-time commitment to the
business concept (Startup B, C, E, I); putting other career options aside (Startup A); or
more tangible events such as starting product development in-house (Startup D, F, H,); or
starting a public campaign to crowdfund the manufacturing of the product (Startup G).
Product. Five of the nine startups (Startups C, D, E, F, H, and I) put efforts into
developing the product during the Transition Phase (Figure 33). Startup B had no
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prototype at this phase (Table 29), however the narrative from this case suggests that the
startup’s founders were focused on establishing the organization (Figure 32; Appendix
B2). However, though Startup B was thinking about the product (Figure 32), they were
not developing it (Figure 33). By this phase, Startup A, Startup G, and Startup I already
had prototypes that they could use in demonstrations with customers to promote the
product. Finally, note that while Startup C had an initial MVP that was making money,
the founder continued to revise it.
Organization. All startups except for Startup C and Startup H had considered
some organizational aspect of their startup by the Transition Phase. One reason for this
may be that these two startups are somewhat self-sufficient in that: 1) both required no
additional external expertise to develop their online businesses; 2) besides their
computers, did not require special equipment or office space; and 3) are not marketspaces
that require supply-side customers on the website. Their commitment to physical creation
required time, more than any other resource.
Customer. While customer interactions continued to occur during the Transition
Phase, including some ongoing sales that are not detailed in most of the participant
narratives during the phase, the startups predominantly focused internally on their own
ability to develop the product and the organization in this phase (Figure 32 & Figure
33). This resulted in efforts to develop and test the business model and to test the
customer segment being reduced.
5.1.4. IV. Entrepreneurial Phase
The Entrepreneurial Phase involves ongoing testing of the customer segment,
setting up the organization, evaluating and continued development of the model and
product. From the previous phases, we saw that most founders had started developing the
product and technology and all began receiving customer feedback much early in the new
venture creation process. As a result, by the Entrepreneurial Phase, eight of the nine
startups were in full force to test and promote the product with customers.
Customers. By the Entrepreneurial Phase, relatively, more attention and focus of
the startup was directed towards customers (Figure 32). Looking at the purpose of the
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interactions, all nine startups in the sample were testing the customer segment in this
phase (Figure 33). Most of the startups’ business models were also being tested on these
customers. While all startups were initiating some type of customer interactions by the
Entrepreneurial Phase, seven of the nine startups now also had customers initiating
interactions (except Startup B and Startup H; Figure 34). This was also boosted by
solicited and unsolicited media influence for Startup D, Startup F, and Startup G.
Products. The next largest focus of the startup sample was on the product during
the Entrepreneurial Phase (Figure 32). While development of the product continued by
six startups, there were activities associated with products that required customer
feedback, including – testing and promoting the product to customers (predominantly
through advertising and other outreach). Startup B, Startup F, and Startup H had waited
until this phase to develop and begin testing their prototypes, and Startup C, Startup D,
and Startup E continued to refine their products (Table 29; Figure 33).
Organization. In the Entrepreneurial Phase, there was an increased focus on the
organization (six startups, A, B, C, D, E, and I), as they moved towards building a
physical structure for the organization and the processes of the organization that surround
production technology (Thompson, 1967). The organization however was still a less
important focus for the startups in the sample at this phase. This is in line with Bhave’s
suggestion that developing stabilizing organization structures and practices takes time,
and perhaps may indicate that the study period is too short to observe this at this time.
The focus on the organization however involved setting up production facilities or
permanent locations to work from or a new web platform, hiring new employees, and
developing organizational practices.
5.1.5. V. Execute Phase
By the end of the study period, only four startups had reached this last phase:
Startup A, Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E. Startups that had reached the Execute
Phase were meant to have understood their business model, had identified the product
that meets the needs of the target market. At this stage, there was more of an increased
marketing and sales effort focus.
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Customers and Product. A large proportion of the startups’ time was dedicated to
customers – testing the customer segment, but also testing out the product on them and
promoting the product. By this stage, there was less focus on testing the business model,
developing the product, or even learning about the problem (Figure 33). Any remaining
product developments for these startups’ existing products were minor revisions.
Organization. The organization was a focus for three of the startups (Figure 32),
however as mentioned during the Entrepreneurial Phase, this focus is likely to grow over
time. These startups were still relatively young (less than two years old) at the end of the
study period, suggesting that there was still ample time to develop these organizational
structures and processes later down the line.
5.1.6. Summary of Focus of Startups During New Venture Creation
This section delves into where startups focus their efforts during each phase of
new venture creation. The focus of startups towards customers, the product and the
organization varied in each phase, as well as the reason for customer interactions. In the
Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), the startups in the sample generally focused on the
problem and product. Startup A, Startup C, Startup F, Startup G, Startup H, and Startup I
were already interacting with customers during this phase, with Startup A, Startup C,
Startup F, Startup G, and Startup H initiating the interaction. Founders sought out
interactions with customers to clarify the problem and develop (and learn about potential
features of) the product as the earliest activities in new venture creation.
In the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), startups begun developing the product
and testing it with customers. By the Transition Phase (III), where startups committed to
a certain business concept, startups in the sample generally focused internally on
developing the product and their business model, unless they were still learning about
customer needs or had ongoing sales. By the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), however, all
startups changed the majority of their focus to customers - testing the customer segment
and business model, and testing and promoting the product to them.
Finally, only four of the startups (Startup A, Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E)
in the sample made it to the Execute Phase (V) by the end of the study. By this phase,
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startups were no longer focused on the problem. Instead, they remained predominantly
focused on interacting with customers, testing and promoting the product. This continued
customer testing suggests that the startups that had reached the Execute Phase had found
the right market, but were still testing interest in the product and ways to interact with
customers, and ways to test the business model.
Note that the flexibility of a startup to continue to adjust the business may be a
virtue of these startups being predominantly digital in nature and having less physical
infrastructure (Startup C, Startup D, Startup E, Startup F, and Startup H), a product that is
service-based (Startup I, where the product can be customized for each client), or a
physical product made in small batches, allowing for minor adjustments in each batch
(Startup A). Due to the length of the study period for this dissertation, it was not possible
to see if Startup G (coffee press) or Startup B (makerspace) would be able to take the
product into the Execute Phase. We can assume that costs associated with tooling the
manufacturing moulds for the coffee press (Startup G) and changing equipment in a
makerspace (Startup B) may provide some restriction in making later adaptations to these
products. Future studies could address this limitation.
Finally, note that by the final phase, customers were reaching out to startups as
much as startups were reaching out to them (Figure 34). This may be due to the efforts
put in by the founder to build relationships with potential customers and promote
themselves, but also suggests that this may be an indication of arriving at the Execute
Phase.
5.2. Communication Channels and Validation During New Venture Creation
Startups used different communication channels to connect with customers
throughout venture creation. Communication channels help in building relationships,
which can be tough to do from scratch (Engel, Kaandorp, & Elfring, 2017). These
channels are used to build trust and commitment (Scarbrough et al., 2013), and need to be
built for venture success.
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In part, the communication channels adopted were affected by startups’ business
models (see Table 8), the industry they operated in, and the type of customers they
interacted with. How entrepreneurs make decisions on what communication channels are
used is outside the scope of this dissertation however, validation received from customers
are referenced in Figure 35, and patterns of communication channels are noted below
and referenced in Figure 36, Figure 37, Figure 38, Figure 39, and Figure 40.
5.2.1. - I. Opportunity Discovery Phase
During the Opportunity Discovery Phase, Startups A (organic beverage), C
(affiliate marketer), E (app-based gaming community), F (online loan aggregator), G
(coffee press), H (psychology software for universities), and I (marketing company)
interacted with and received verbal validation from potential customers (Figure 35). All
of the startups had their initial customer interactions in-person except for Startup C, that
chose to connect with the external target market directly through online channels – email,
social media and the website (Figure 36). Startup C also used technology for data
scrapping to better understand customers and their interaction with the website and was
able to receive their first contracts with websites that offered affiliate programs this way.
Note that while Startup A, as an organic beverage startup, had its first interactions
in person with family and friends and their professional network, the initial customer
interactions of several digital startups were also in-person, including Internet-based
companies, Startup E (app-based gaming community), Startup F (online loan aggregator),
Startup H (psychology software for universities) and Startup I’s (marketing company)
and the physical product made by Startup G (coffee press) was going to be mostly
marketed and sold online. These startups spoke with family and friends (Startup E and
Startup I), their professional network (Startup G), and reached out to the external target
market (Startup F and Startup H; Figure 35). Only Startup I had been approached by
customers (Figure 34), and only Startup A and Startup I had sales during this phase –
both through their personal and/or professional networks.
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Figure 35. Validation Received from Customers and Media at Each Phase of Venture Creation. Note that the seven categories in roman numerals refer
to the type of customer: I – Founder, II – Family and friends (personal network); III – Professional network; IV – External target market;
V. – Media Validation; VI – Commitment through contract; VII – Commitment through payment (or a sale). All commitments besides VI
and VII are verbal or text-based.
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5.2.2. - II. Opportunity Refinement Phase
By the Opportunity Refinement Phase (Figure 37), all startups had interacted
customers in some capacity. Startup A (organic beverage) continued to interact with and
sell in-person to their personal and professional network. Startup B (makerspace) reached
out via email but also in-person. They had connected with their target market by setting
up booths at entrepreneurship events, and had received verbal confirmation from
attendees that they would be interested in a makerspace. These interactions provided
validation to the founders to continue the business. Startups G (coffee press) also
continued to connect with potential customers and to connect to a wider external market
through online community forums for coffee and hiking. Startup H spoke with mentors of
the student users of the software in-person. Startup D and Startup I started using email.
This facilitated obtaining contracts with supply-side customers (Startup D) and continued
sales with customers in their networks (Startup I; Figure 35).
Startup F (online loan aggregator) begun reaching out to lenders (supply-side
customers) in the external target market via phone, email and Linkedin (social media),
and was successful in getting contracts established (Figure 35). Startup E (app-based
gaming community) had built their first version of their application software and had
started connecting with new and existing users directly through social media, media
online, digital ads, their application, and online gaming forums. Their downloads of the
application are considered a contract. Finally, Startup C continued to interact with
customers and learn about their habits online through their website and data analytics.
They continued to partner with companies offering affiliate programs (contracts) and
started making their initial sales to the external target market during the Opportunity
Refinement Phase (Figure 35).
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Figure 36. Communication Channel: I. Opportunity Discovery Phase.
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Figure 37. Communication Channel: II. Opportunity Refinement Phase. Note that Startup H did not actually interact with a potential paying customer
(the university counseling services) during this phase. The in-person interaction was with the mentors of potential student users of the
website. The potential users themselves could not be reached.
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5.2.3. – III. Transition Phase
During the Transition Phase (Figure 38), only six of the nine startups (Startup A
– organic beverage; Startup C – affiliate marketer; Startup D – online event spaces
marketplace; Startup E – app-based gaming community; Startup G – coffee press; and
Startup I – marketing agency) chose to interact with customers. This phase however is
defined as displaying increased commitment to creating the startup and is quite short. The
customer interactions accounted for were specifically linked with tasks that would display
commitment to the business, including increased effort towards developing the product
and developing and testing the business model (Figure 33).
While Startup A’s interactions remained in-person, they expanded their
interactions outside of their personal and professional networks to the external target
market when they committed to the business. This allowed them to also connect with and
get contracts with retailers and distributors to sell their beverage.
Startup C continued to see success in their affiliate marketing websites, prompting
them to commit to the business. The founder decided to build and test different websites
and partnerships with affiliate marketing programs using email, various startup websites,
and data analytics.
Startup D moved away from more traditional email and begun connecting with its
personal and professional, networks and external target market through social media,
traditional media, media online and its own website. It secured both contracts with its
first supply-side customers, and sales with its first demand-side customers during the
Transition Phase, providing validation to the founders to continue the business.
During the Transition Phase, one of Startup E’s co-founders committed full-time
to the business. This allowed them to continue communication with customers using
social media, online media, the application software and its website, and an online
community forum. There were ongoing downloads (contracts) of the application software
by users, and at the time, there were over 1500 users.
.
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Figure 38. Communication Channel: III. Transition Phase.
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Startup G continued to reach out and gain validation from potential customers in
the external target market, committing to the business through deciding to crowdfund
manufacturing of the coffee press. By the Transition Phase, the founder did not have any
sales or contracts, however, had become one of the top seven most popular topics on the
world-wide accessed online community forums for coffee and camping, with potential
customers in the online forum providing textual feedback and voicing interest in the
product. Startup I continued to attract the customers from their personal and professional
networks, interacting with them in-person, on the phone and over email.
Startup B, Startup F and Startup H did not connect with customers during the
Transition Phase (Figure 35). Startup B was looking for a permanent location. Startup F
was building the software for the online loan aggregator and already had contracts with
supply-side customers to integrate into the web platform in the previous phase.
Finally, Startup H was focused on developing software for the one university
(potential customer) that they had spoken with. While, they had received no contract or
sales from the university (Figure 35), this verbal validation provided justification to them
to continue developing the business. The validation stemmed from their initial
conversation with the university during the Opportunity Discovery Phase, and the
discussions they had with the mentors of student users during the Opportunity
Refinement Phase. They had not spoken with student users by this phase, however.
5.2.4. - IV. Entrepreneurial Phase
During the Entrepreneurial Phase (Figure 39), there was a marked increase in the
variety of communication channels used by the startups. All startups in the sample were
interacting with potential customers at this stage. Not only did they continuing to test the
product, the startups had increased promoting and continued to test the business’ business
model and customer segment (Figure 33).
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Figure 39. Communication Channel: IV. Entrepreneurial Phase.
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Startup A (organic beverage) had expanded their communication channels to
include phone, email, social media and traditional media. This expansion of
communication channels helped them to promote their product and business during this
phase, while they expanded the business using retailers and distributors. Sales continued
to provide validation (Figure 35).
Startup B (makerspace) had decided to test out the business concept using a popup event as an MVP. They reached out to the external target market, as well as their
personal and professional markets in-person, on the phone, on social media, using posters
(physical ads) and their website. They were however not connecting with the same
market that had been interested in their makerspace the last time – advertising
predominantly on campus to only a subset of the external target market. They made
limited sales to their event, predominantly in their own network.
Startup C (affiliate marketer) continued reaching out to customers and learning
about them through email, their websites and data analytics. Sales continued to provide
validation. Startup D (online event location marketplace) also continued to grow their
business, reaching out using multiple communication channels (in-person, phone, email,
traditional media, digital ads and their website). Despite having issues with setting up
their technology (See cases, Appendix B), Startup D was still able to attract both supplyside and demand-side customers to their website, receiving contracts and sales to validate
their business. Startup E (app-based gaming community) continued to experiment with
ways to connect with potential and existing users. They started to hold in-person events,
connected on social media, were featured in traditional media, and had customer
interactions through the app and on the startup’s website. They also attempted an
unsuccessful crowdfunding campaign and continued interactions through the online
community forum with video game players. Ongoing downloads provided validation to
them on their business model.
Startup F’s (online loan aggregator) web platform went live during the
Entrepreneurial Phase, and the start of sales provided validation for the business. They
used several communication channels to reach out to their external target market,
including in-person meetings with lenders, phone calls, email, digital ads, through the
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website. To learn more about customer interactions with the website, the startup begun
using data analytics. To improve online searches for loans, Startup F brought in search
engine optimization of the website.
Startup G (coffee press) had launched their crowdfunding campaign during the
Entrepreneurial Phase. They adopted multiple communication channels with potential
customers – including in-person tastings, email, social media, traditional and online
media, physical and digital advertisements, the original crowdfunding website and crosspromoted products on the crowdfunding website, their own website, and ongoing
discussions on the online forum. Once the crowdfunding campaign launched, sales
provided validation to the startup. Furthermore, the online discussion forum that the
founder had built a relationship with the community (Opportunity Refinement Phase) was
the channel through which the startup was able to learn first about issues with the
crowdfunding campaign and quickly solve them. Furthermore, with the relationships he
had built with dedicated community members on the forum, the community members
defended Startup G and advocated for the product.
Media also played a role in raising awareness for Startup D, Startup F and Startup
G, where they were all featured by traditional media during the Entrepreneurial Phase,
and Startup G was featured by online media (blogs). Properly timing the media attention,
at a stage when the startup was also promoting sales, boosted the awareness of the startup
among the external target markets.
During the Entrepreneurial Phase, Startup H (psychology software for
universities) had designed and released the first version of the website software. The
founder begun reaching out again to both potential customers (universities and then later,
insurance companies) in the external target market by using in-person meetings, phone,
and email. He also promoted the website using business cards and posters around the
university campus to try to attract student users. Despite his efforts, pilot university
would not commit and the other university customers told the founder that they wanted to
first see demonstrated success of the software with the first pilot university, before they
would consider a sale. While the founder continued to receive verbal validation from the
first university, he began to think that universities were not a good customer to pursue.
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Finally, by the Entrepreneurial Phase, Startup I (marketing company), had decided
to start reaching out to their external target market, rather than waiting for customers to
approach them. They made steps to change their business model, revamping their website
to have a click-and-pay model to purchase marketing services. What they had hoped was
that instead of the frequent emails back and forth with clients before a sale took place
(though this continued to occur), the startup could now aim to connect with customers
through social media, digital ads and the website. The founders also begun using data
analytics to better understand how visitors interacted with the website. Meanwhile, sales
continued to old family and friends - clients in their network that approached Startup I.
5.2.5. - V. Execute Phase
The Execute Phase only had four startups (Figure 40). Though these startups
continued to promote and test the product and customer segment, their increased focus on
scaling sales, and not on product development, suggested that they had found the business
concept and market that worked for them Figure 33 and cases, Appendix B).
Startup A (organic beverage) continued to interact with customers in-person, on
the phone and with email. To reach a wider audience, they connected via social media,
traditional and online media. Startup C (affiliate marketer) continued the same tactics and
using the same communication channels of the website and using data analytics as before,
continuing sales and contracts with affiliate programs.

Startup

D

(event

spaces

marketplace) launched their full web platform and were interacting with customers
directly through the website now, as well as through email and in-person meetings (for
on-boarding supply-side customers). All three startups had sales (Figure 35).
Finally, Startup E continued to attract customer users to download their app using
the application software itself, their website, email, social media, and in-person events.
They also brought in affiliate advertisers - streamers (individuals who played video
games live online) and video bloggers (individuals who recorded videos about video
games and video game playing online) - to promote the startup, and started to use data
analytics to learn how users interacted with the app. By the end of the study period, they
had over 25,000 user downloads, quadrupling this just a few months later.
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Figure 40. Communication Channel: V. Execute Phase.
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5.2.6. Summary of Communication Channels and Validation Analysis
The startups in the sample had substantially different approaches to using
communication channels and what types of customers were interacted with. Six main
observations stood out from this analysis. Note that not all startups experienced the same
trends, and hence, are not mentioned in each section.
A. Startups that continued to use similar channels throughout new venture creation
built relationships with similar customers over time.
Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E used similar channels to communicate with
potential customers early and later in the new venture creation process. Right from the
beginning, they found channels that their potential customers were already using, and
used the same channels to learn about the problem, to develop the product and model, and
to test the model and the customer segment.
Startup C and Startup E had gone directly to their external target markets online
(through their website and online community forum, respectively) to receive feedback on
their businesses in the Opportunity Discovery (I) and Opportunity Refinement (II)
Phases, respectively, while Startup D, having connections in their external target market,
was able to speak directly with some potential customers in their personal and
professional networks, as well as use these channels to connect with the wider external
target market during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II).
These data suggest that using communication channels common to potential
customers allowed startups to reach their external market early and remain connected
throughout the new venture creation process. Connecting with the same group of
customers earlier and later in new venture creation allowed the startups to receive initial
input from customers and to later be able to follow up with them. These cases suggest
that reaching out to the external target market to get feedback early in the new venture
creation process allows startups to incorporate this feedback into the product and business
model development since they tend to focus on the problem and product development
early as well.
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Furthermore, connecting early allowed for the time to develop a relationship with
these customers that continued throughout the new venture creation process. Building this
relationship early could suggest that startups were developing trust with potential
customers and potentially, early commitment. These relationships may even have the
potential to grow so that customers act as advocates for the startup. For example, in

the

Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), Startup E built relationships with the community
members of the forums that they were part of. Having demonstrated their commitment to
these potential customers early, later, when the startups’ mobile app (product) had
become more publically visible and had run into some criticisms (for example, technical
glitches in the application software), the dedicated community members continued to
support and advocate for the startups.
In contrast to Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E, Startup B did not use the same
communication channels to connect with customers throughout new venture creation.
Startup B’s founders initially spoke with individuals attending in-person entrepreneurial
and community university events during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). The
potential customers that they connected with gave them verbal validation that their
business concept (a permanent makerspace) was of interest. During the Entrepreneurial
Phase (IV) however, the founders of Startup B used different channels (posters, their own
website and social media) to connect with potential customers while developing, testing
and promoting their product.
Using different channels at each of these phases resulted in the founders
interacting with different potential customers, and different types of customers, at each
phase of the new venture creation process. As a result, the feedback that was initially
received and incorporated into the product could not be tested later with the same
customers.
Though there were likely other factors at play that affected the lack of success of
Startup B, using the same initial communication channels, and expanding on these
channels, would have enabled them to connect and re-connect with similar customers
throughout the new venture creation process – much like Startup C, Startup D, and
Startup E. Even with a growing external target market, using the same communication

235
channels would allow the founders to receive feedback continually from the same core
group of customers, and to build the product and business to serve their needs. This
would also likely facilitate building the customer relationship.
B. One communication channel – an online community forum - can be used to build a
large community of potential customers.
While Startup E had aimed to build a community of users, they chose to use a
variety of communication channels to reach potential users from the beginning, including
an online community forum. In contrast, Startup G only initially used one communication
channel – the online community forum –to gain insight about the problem and product
from initial customers. Both startups were able to build large communities of potential
customers with an online community forum. This one channel allowed the founder to
receive feedback and public validation from many potential customers (see case
Appendix B).
When Startup G expanded its communication channels during the Entrepreneurial
Phase to include an array of promotional techniques of social media, traditional and
online media, advertisements and crowdfunding, they remained connected to their initial
group of potential customers by continuing interactions in the online community forum.
This allowed them to continue the relationships that initially gave them validation (the
early adopters or product enthusiasts) and build social capital (Lin, Cook, & Burt, 2001).
These initial customers also developed loyalty to the startup, and helped with innovation
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) begun acting as advocate users to defend and promote
the startup once sales began. Finally, the creation of community that founders are
involved in can improve chances of success (Hienerth & Lettl, 2011), suggesting that
communication channels that concurrently build community can be a useful tool for
startups to efficiently gain social support and interest.
C. Initially fewer communication channels can be used if startups are already
embedded in their industries.
Ideally, feedback from the external target market would be obtained before the
product or the organization is built and resources invested. Being embedded in the
industry and having some relationships built and knowledge of customer preferences can
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help access this insight (Jack & Anderson, 2002). While Startup D, Startup E, and Startup
G are somewhat connected with their industries, Startup A and Startup I, in particular,
received a large proportion of initial customers from their personal and professional
networks. Startup A’s founders were both part of the health industries, making the
production and sale of the organic beverage an appropriate fit with their network. With
the networks that they were part of, the founders of Startup I knew several small
businesses that were seeking marketing and website services, to the point where for
several months, they never had to seek out a client.
Because they were already embedded in their industries, both Startup A and
Startup I used a limited number of communication channels before the Transition Phase
(III), expanding their communication channels only afterwards, when they committed to
the business. They were also able to delay initial interactions with external target market,
and leverage existing relationships to get initial feedback and sales validation. Startup A
did not reach out beyond their personal and professional network before the Transition
Phase (Figure 35). The founders developed their product entirely on feedback from
within their network (see Case Appendix B). One co-founder was able to taste test and
sell the product to personal training clients, and the other was able to find space to make
and sell the beverage in an organic grocer that she worked with. When they started to
promote the product to a wider market, including expanding to retailers and distributors,
they fortunately found that there was wider interest in their product. Their embeddedness
in the health industry helped them get their initial contracts, and success there, prompted
them to seek out and helped them obtain subsequent contracts.
Startup I used the same communication channels (in-person, email and phone)
until the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). Early in the new venture creation process, they had
several customers in their network approaching them, needing websites and marketing
expertise. During the Entrepreneurial Phase, their increase in communication channels
was their way of reaching out to a wider target market of customers.
As both startups chose to not reach out to a wider audience initially, this delayed
them from getting feedback from the wider target market because they had pre-existing
knowledge about the market. In Startup A’s case, this was less of a problem because they
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continued to initiate interactions with several individuals in the industry – therefore
staying in-the-know. However, Startup I only relied on interactions with customers that
approached them, and hence, lacked the diversity of interactions that Startup A had from
reaching out. However, when interested to do so later in new venture creation, they were
still able to use multiple communication channels to reach the wider target market.
In contrast, if the startups’ founders are not embedded in their new startups’
industries, they could still find ways to embed (Startup G and Startup E seeking out niche
groups in online communities). For example, Startup G also sought out camping and
coffee enthusiasts specifically in an online community forum – a forum that he was
already actively part of and became further embedded in. When he wanted to reach a
wider market, he begun using social media and advertisements to promote the
crowdfunding campaigns.
Alternatively, a breadth of channels that would connect them with the external
target market from the beginning of new venture creation could be used. This was seen
with Startup C and Startup F, where the founders were not initially part of the industries.
Startup D and Startup E also chose to go beyond their personal and professional
networks, allowing them to find feedback from their wider external target market early.
D. Startups sought out validation from a varying closeness of potential customers.
During the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), only three startups interacted with
the external target market, and four had received validation from their personal or
professional networks. In the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), startups started to
validate with the external target market (all except Startup A, Startup H, and Startup I).
By the Transition Phase (III), all startups except Startup I had received validation from
the external target market.
However, by the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), all nine startups had interacted with
and received some type of verbal validation from the external target market. By the
Execute Phase (V), all four startups that reached this final phase had received validation
from the external target market during this phase.
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Furthermore, while there were only two startups that had sales in the Opportunity
Discovery Phase, seven had sales by the Entrepreneurial Phase. All startups that could
have contracts by the Entrepreneurial Phase (Startup A, Startup C, Startup D, Startup E,
and Startup F), had secured contracts.
These findings suggest that while startups may not initially seek out validation
from the external target market, these interactions grow over time. By the Entrepreneurial
Phase (IV), startups will be receiving feedback and validation from potential customers in
the external target market.
E. Validation in marketplaces can initially come from supply-side customers.
The two marketplaces in the sample are Startup D (event space marketplace) and
Startup F (online loan aggregator). While Startup D chose to connect with both the
supply-side and demand-side customers to validate the problem, before the Transition
Phase (III), Startup F chose to initially only use channels that allowed them to connect
with the external target market of lenders, supply-side customers.
Validation came from the interest in supply-side customers to be on the platform,
as well as Startup F’s supply-side customers already having tested the demand-side
customer market with their own current market (in contrast to Startup D’s supply-side
customers, that may have not rented out their event space before). The continued
existence and success of these lenders provided some validation for building Startup F.
When Startup F expanded to use a more diverse array of communication channels after
the Transition Phase, this allowed the startup to connect with demand-side customers.
This suggests that with a marketplace, it may be important to connect with the
external target market of supply-side customers first, beginning with using channels
appropriate to reach them. While validation from demand-side customers may be helpful,
it is more helpful to get feedback on the product and early validation from supply-side
customers that are already successfully operating in the industries. Receiving this initial
validation would reduce the risk that there was not a potential market.
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F. Lack of validation from not connecting with enough customers early with
communication channels
Startup H used the same communication channel to reach their first potential
customer (universities) during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I) and the
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV; in-person). Only one potential customer was interacted with
during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). This customer however had not offered any
concrete validation (e.g. a contract or a sale). When this initial validation was not
received, rather than seeking out other validation from other potential customers, the
startup decided to build the product for the unconfirmed customer. At the end of the study
period, there was still no sale and the founder decided to pursue other employment for the
time being.
Once Startup H had developed their prototype, the additional communication
channels noted during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV; through the website,
advertisements, email and phone) were used to connect with additional potential
university customers and to attract student users to the website. However, by this stage,
connecting with new customers was not fruitful. While found the product interesting,
they were unwilling to commit until they saw demonstrated success of the product with
the initial customer.
This suggests that by the Transition Phase (III), when a startup founder should
demonstrate a commitment to the business, the relationship with the early potential
customers and their interest in the product should already be somewhat established and
validated. What this validation is at this stage can vary somewhat, however. While a sale,
or money exchange is considered the ultimate validation, if that is not possible or
appropriate with the given business model, the growth of certain startups during the study
period suggests that contracts (as Startup F had with supply-side customers, before the
founder chose to build the web platform), a “critical” and “growing” number of
downloads of an application software (Startup E), or a large amount of publically
declared interest (Startup G) could suffice in offering validation.
While validation is individually defined by each startup, only having verbal or
textual interest from a “limited” number of potential customers (Startup B and Startup H)
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at this stage would suggest that the business concept still needs to be further refined and
tested with potential customers before further promoting the product or developing the
business more widely.
5.3. Summary of Chapter 5 – Cross-Case Findings
Chapter 5 presents the findings of the cross-case analyses that compare the nine
startups in the sample. One section delves deeper into explaining where startups focus
attention (towards to product, organization, or customer; Section 5.1). Next, I explored
the communication channels used during new venture creation with different types of
customers (family and friends, professional network, and/or the external target market)
and the validation received from these customers at each phase of new venture creation
(Section 5.2).
While Sections 5.1.6 and 5.2.6 provide an overview of the main findings in this
chapter, a few key takeaways can be mentioned from this analysis that play a role in
initiating the development of theory in Chapter 6. First, from Section 5.1, we see that
there are different stages of activities that the startups undertake – for example, assessing
the problem, developing a product to solve the problem, testing it on customers, internal
development of the organization and its operations, the development of the business
model, further testing and refinement of the product and the customers – at different
stages of new venture creation. Throughout the process, startups continued to interact
with customers, receiving their feedback on both the product, but also on these different
activities.
From Section 5.2, two key points arose from this analysis that move us forward in
the study. Validation received from customers provided justification to founders to move
forward with the business or to pivot. Verbal validation from customers early in the new
venture creation process was important, however, this validation could initially be from
personal and/or professional networks, and did not need to be in the form of sales or a
contract. The embeddedness of some startups in their industries suggests that this
approach is likely more effective if founders have pre-existing connections. However,
validation later in the new venture creation process typically came from the external
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target market, after the founders had committed to building the business, and were almost
all in the form of sales, or a contract, with the potential of future sales.
Looking at the findings of Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 together suggests that
startups are receiving validation from different types of customers on different activities
that they should perform throughout new venture creation. Potential customers that are
interacted with during Opportunity Discovery (I), verify the problem and the initial MVP.
The startup then starts undertaking activities to develop that product and to proceed with
the new venture creation process. This is fine, if the early customer is representative of
the target market, however, if they are not, then the startup ends up building in feedback
into the business from the initial interactions to meet the needs of the ‘wrong’ type of
customer.
Furthermore, there may be different types of validation needed at different phases
of new venture creation that put startups down a path to further develop the business –
impacting product design, to the market, business model, or even the operations
undertaken later. These concepts are explored in greater depth in the following path
analysis section that explains self-reinforcing mechanisms at play during early customer
interactions and the section explaining my proposed model of early customer interaction
during the new venture creation process (Chapter 6).
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6. TOWARDS A THEORY OF EARLY CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS
Chapters 4 and 5 (and cases in Appendix B) were intentionally exploratory in
nature to gain a better general understanding of how startups interact with early
customers during the new venture creation process, including the activities undertaken
and the stakeholders involved. From these chapters, there were two main interesting
observations. First, if startups were already starting to attract some customers or if they
were already more developed as an organization, they were more resistant to adapting
aspects of their business later in the new venture creation process. Second, startups were
not only interacting with customers throughout venture creation, they used feedback, or
validation, to understand the problem, develop and test the product and business model
with customers, and to develop the organization. The findings also imply that there are
different types of validation received from different types of customers on the product,
business concept, market, and operations at different phases of new venture creation.
Based on the patterns of validation received from customers, in this chapter, I set
the foundations towards developing a theory of early customer interactions and ask the
question, how do customer interactions create path dependence for the organization
being created? Drawing on concepts from the path dependence literature, I propose that
customer interactions are a key part of new venture creation in that they provide
validation, or feedback, as to whether to progress with the business concept being tested
or to pivot and change direction. If these interactions take place early in the new venture
creation process, early customers can influence the path formation that the startup is on.
However, as feedback is received, decisions and investments in resources made,
infrastructure established, and options are eliminated for the startup, there is a narrowing
set of options for the product, market, operations, or business model of the organization
as new venture creation progresses. It can be challenging or expensive to undo some of
these decisions, even if customers encountered later in the process suggest changes
(Appendix B). This narrowing of options suggests that early customers encountered have
the potential to influence startups long-term, making understanding the mechanisms and
implications of receiving validation at each of the phases of new venture creation more
salient.
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In the following sections, I develop two integrated models that help explain early
customer interactions during the new venture creation process. First, I present a model of
the self-reinforcing process that results from receiving validation during early customer
interactions (the customer interaction-validation-spiral; Section 6.1), and describe which
of the mechanisms proposed by Schreyogg and Sydow (2011) may be acting to propagate
the path dependence process (Section 6.2). I also mention other potential self-reinforcing
processes that explain the behaviour of some of the startups in the sample (Sections 6.3
and 6.4).
Second, I present a model of early customer interactions during the new venture
creation process that integrates the customer interaction-validation-spiral model into the
process of new venture creation (Section 6.5). I explain this model, offering a series of
propositions on three levels of validation throughout new venture creation (Sections 6.6
to 6.13). These validation levels have different requirements in terms of what is being
validated (which concepts and which activities; 1), what is “enough” validation (2), what
type of customer offers the validation (3), and the impact of the validation (4). With each
validation level, there is a critical juncture, or a narrowing of options.
6.1. Proposed Self-Reinforcing Process of Customer Interactions and Validation
As discussed in the literature review (Section 2.2), Schreyogg and Sydow (2011)
proposed four mechanisms that act as propagating self-reinforcement of the path
dependence process. These effects come into play during the Phase II of path dependence
(see Figure 1), the Positive Feedback Phase, that begins with a critical juncture – “an
event or decision that triggers a dynamic regime of self-reinforcement” (Koch, 2008; 55).
Gradually, a dominant solution emerges as more choices are made based on positive
feedback. Agents, consciously or unconsciously, act upon these mechanisms to reinforce
the path. In the process, it is possible that agents focus too much or inappropriately on a
particular pattern of strategic action and reflection. This positive feedback can still lead
them down a focused path, even if it is not the ‘ideal’ path for the entrepreneurial venture.
I present a model of the self-reinforcing process that occurs from receiving
validation during early customer interactions - the customer interaction-validation-spiral
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(Figure 41). In this model, the product, business model, operations, and/or market
concepts are presented to a customer and either is received positively or negatively:
•

In the case of being received negatively, there are two scenarios. First, the
concept(s) can be revised for improvement, and ultimately presented again to a
customer. Alternatively, the idea may be dismissed, the entrepreneur decides to
pivot, and develops resets to develop new business, product and/or market
concepts from scratch.

•

In the case the concept(s) are received positively by customers, the startup
receives some type of validation that solidifies these concepts.

Figure 41. Customer Interaction-Validation-Spiral.

This self-reinforcing effect exerts both direct and indirect forms of dependency.
Once the effect is established, it turns out to be quasi irreversible. In the beginning, it
only positively affects the product, business model, or market concept. However,
validation also triggers resources and attention to become allocated towards developing
processes and infrastructure focused on developing the product, business model,
organization, or market concept. These investments make it increasingly less possible to
have customer interactions influence changes to the product, business or market concept.
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6.2. Explaining Self-Reinforcing Process of Customer Interactions and Validation:
Applying Schreyögg and Sydow’s (2011) Mechanisms
The customer interaction-validation spiral model represents the self-reinforcing
mechanism of customer interactions resulting in validation of and solidification of the
product, business or market concept. While it is possible that any of the four selfreinforcing mechanisms proposed by Schreyögg and Sydow (2011; see Section 2.2.3 for
a review) are playing a role in promoting the propagation of the self-reinforcement of the
path dependence process, the Adaptive Expectation Effects and Learning Effects are
particularly relevant for considering the effects of other stakeholders, including
customers, outside of the startup and for considering the effects of repeatedly performing
an activity.
Adaptive Expectation Effects are a self-reinforcing effect where others’
expectations and preferences influence individual preferences. In this study, I view
Adaptive Expectation Effects not as an external effect of individual customers seeing a
product as increasingly attractive due to more individuals preferring it, but that the
entrepreneur sees a product as increasingly attractive due to more individuals preferring
it.
Applying the Adaptive Expectation Effects to the entrepreneur-customer
interaction setting - founders have their own beliefs and individual preferences about the
business, and Adaptive Expectation Effects consider how they adapt their individual
preferences in response to early customers’ preferences. In seeking an appropriate
customer and finding a product/market fit, entrepreneurs pursue feedback and validation
that brings them attention and acceptance. Ideas that are not being validated would be
revised or discarded. As validation is received, however, entrepreneurs are increasingly
likely to pursue a business concept, resulting in 1) the allocation of limited resources
towards developing this business concept, and 2) the discarding of alternative options,
narrowing the range of options and the path for the startup.
Learning Effects however are also at play – with an increased efficiency from an
activity being performed frequently, the startup develops and accumulates skills that they
can ultimately exploit (Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011). Different learning occurs from
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interacting with the same customer repeatedly versus several different customers in one
time period.
As the startup interacts repeatedly with the same customer, they can incorporate
their initial feedback and seek out additional feedback for revision or validation of the
product. Each subsequent interaction allows for a relationship to be reinforced with the
customer and learning more about their needs, getting to a product, business, or market
concept that is increasingly tailored towards that customer and improving the likelihood
of validation occurring.
In contrast, interacting with several different customers allows for comparison of
customer preferences. If several customers are interacted with during a certain period of
time, the startup can compare and contrast their feedback, taking into consideration the
importance and appropriateness of each customer within their product, business, and
market concept. Based on this feedback, startups can determine the degree to which the
concepts are validated or need revisions.
6.3. Other Self-Reinforcing Process During Early Customer Interactions
In addition to path dependence effects, there are other types of self-reinforcing
effects that are also at play with the customer interactions in this sample. Here, I review
negative effects (Section 6.3.1) and network effects (Section 6.3.2).
6.3.1. Negative Effects of Self-Reinforcing Processes
The effects of self-reinforcing processes are positive if the startup has found product,
business model, organization, and market concepts that allow the business to be able to
grow and be executed successfully. However, early validation that is received from a
customer and that solidifies the concepts are not always beneficial to the startup. If the
validation is inappropriate for the wider market, if revisions suggested by potential
customers take the customer away from creating an ‘optimal’ product, business, or
market concept, or if suggested revisions are not possible to carry out in the organization,
the startup can reinforce inappropriate concepts, resulting in a downward spiral effect
for the business, such as escalating commitment.
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Escalating commitment could be seen with both Startup H and Startup I with two
different mechanisms. Each time they met, Startup H was promised by the university
customer that they were interested in the software that they were developing. Having
committed so much time to this customer, Startup H developed - a psychological
determinant of time investment. The founder continued to work for months towards
developing the business model and product for the potential customer without more than
verbal validation. While the first potential customer was allowing Startup H to run a pilot
of the software on the students, they did not play further roles in supporting the startup,
such as promoting the platform to the students or brokering relationships with counsellors
and the peer support group that were meant to help facilitate the operations of Startup H
(see case, Appendix B). Furthermore, the startup was unable to gain validation from other
customers that were waiting to see how the software worked for the first customer. This
resulted in the startup continuing to invest time to create the product for the initial
potential university customer:
“The feedback that I’ve been getting is that everybody is just waiting to see
how [University Potential Customer #1] is going to do. Once I mention a
pilot, they’re like, ‘great, yeah.’ They want to know how the metrics are
before they take a look… So, I’m going to do the pilot. I’m going to focus on
this, and then, go back or not go back and open up the sales funnel so I’ll
have a more robust sales pitch that would speed things up on that side”
(Startup H Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
This continued for months:
“I can’t really just accelerate the process that we have [to get customers]
until [the software] is more refined” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 16
August, 2016).
In contrast, Startup I experienced escalating commitment through a psychological
determinant of ego threat (Sleesman et al., 2012). The founders were very proud that they
had customers approach them, rather than the other way around, however were unhappy
with the type of customers that they were interacting with. While they could have sought
out different types of customers, they persisted in not doing so:
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“The big thing for us is lead generation. I don’t want to be cold calling
people. It’s not what [Startup I] is about. I thrive more on connections,
meeting people, networking events. I know it’s a numbers game and you
have to keep calling and stuff, but it’s also a matter of reputation
management too” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
6.3.2. Network Effects - Self-Reinforcing Process of Customer Interactions with Other
Customers
While the effects of customer interactions with the startups are the focus of this
dissertation, it would be inappropriate to not acknowledge the effects of customers on
other potential customers and the influence they have on interactions between customers
and the startup. Note that the customer interaction-validation spiral (Figure 41) is also
affected by network externalities that may positively increase users or customers in a
network. Note that network externalities are a self-reinforcing process that consider the
effect of one user of a good or service on the value of that product to other people, where
the network is more valuable as more people join (Katz & Shapiro, 1985).
For example, for Startup E, each additional user who was seeking someone else to
play online video games with had the potential to create a bandwagon effect – where
individuals decide to do something because other people are doing it, even if this was not
their original intent (Leibenstein, 1950). These types of network effects only come into
play after a critical mass of users would have been accumulated, similar to what is
happening in social media platforms (Belvaux, 2011).
As a result, when Startup E was just starting off, network effects were not in
effect. Startup E had to grow to reach critical mass by motivating users to download their
software application. This was done by offering it free to users and spending time
developing relationships with them and incorporating their feedback into the application
software.
While it is challenging to identify when that critical mass would have been
reached, these effects were likely in effect when at the end of the study, the startup had
25,000 downloads and just a few months later, that number had quadrupled to over
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100,000 downloads – the fastest growth in downloads in just a few months since the
application was first launched (see Table 30). During these months, the founders had
managed to optimize the use of video bloggers and streamers as affiliate partners to
attract new downloads. The startup also began efforts to reconnect with users who had
downloaded the application, but had not been returning, by sending push notifications
through the application. This resulted in an increase in repeat visits using data analytics
software.
Table 30. Downloads of Startup E’s Application Software Over Time.
Date

Concurrent Events

Number of
Downloads/ Users

August 2014

First release of application

300

November
2014

Second release of application

1500

June 2016

Video blogging started

7500

September
2016

Full-time affiliate (video bloggers and streamers)
finder hired

14,500

November
2016

Experimenting with video bloggers and streamers

19,500

December 2016

Continued affiliations with video blogging and
streamers and started using in-app push
notifications and data analytics (end of study
period)

25,000

March 2017

(Unknown – Outside of study period)

100,000

The validation of using the affiliate partners to stimulate app downloads did not
happen immediately. Instead, after some experimentation and hiring an expert to search
for affiliates full-time, Startup E began to see the benefits of these partnerships through
an increase in downloads of the application:
“In these videos, [the video blogger] talks about the game. He teaches you
about new games and how to die and that kind of thing. This game is a 5x5
game. One team is planting a bomb [in the game] and another team is
learning how to diffuse a bomb. And you have to work in teams. So people
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are getting better at the game to be more tactical. He makes the whole
video himself. Every time he does a video, he does something new and a
different video. Then, he talks about a new feature of the app. He does a
really good job with what he's doing.
But it was really hard to convince [the video blogger who posted videos
about video game playing]. He didn't want to ruin his users’ experience. But
then he realized that this is something that his users would enjoy. And after
his first five hundred bucks he realized holy s***. This is really working [for
the video blogger to earn referral fees. Then] he continues to put all this
effort because he can see the reward. The more effort he puts in, the more
he gets people to convert. Now I look at the results again. Before this got
huge, it was 1 percent on average the video views were converting. So,
that's pretty insane” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
This increase in users was influenced in part by the affiliates’ endorsements
themselves, as well as the comments made in the comments section on the web platforms
by viewers (video game players watching these videos). In these comments, viewers
validated either the affiliate (indirectly validating companies that they support) or Startup
E. Understanding the causes of the bandwagon effect is, however, outside the scope of
this dissertation.
6.4. Summary of Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms and Early Customer Interactions in
Startups
In the previous sections, I presented a model of the self-reinforcing process that
occurs from receiving validation during early customer interactions – the customer
interaction-validation spiral (Figure 41). This model outlines what happens when a
startup tests out different concepts of the startup (the product, business model, operations,
or market concepts) on potential customers – and what happens if the concept(s) is
positively received, or negatively received by a customer, and how the startup responds to
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this feedback. The model shows that validation reinforces the concept(s), and a lack of
validation sends the startup to search for improvements or to pivot (Section 6.1).
Over time, self-reinforcing path mechanisms are at play. These include Adaptive
Expectation Effects (where customers’ expectations or preferences influence the startups’
preferences) and Learning Effects (where increased efficiency from performing an
activity frequently or from an accumulation of skills), as customers interact with a
startup, offering them information and validation that they are on the right path in
creating the startup (Section 6.2). Finally, I explain other self-reinforcing processes that
that are in effect for select startups in the sample, including network effects and
escalating commitment (Section 6.3).
In the next sections, I apply this customer interaction-validation spiral to the
overall new venture creation process to explain how validation from customers plays a
role during different times in the new venture creation process.
6.5. A Model of Early Customer Interaction During New Venture Creation Process
Overview
In most existing models of new venture creation, stakeholders, including
customers, are placed on the periphery of the process (see Table 2, Chapter 2, for
examples). This model assumes that (a) customers play a central role in new venture
creation; (b) startups do interact with customers (interacting defined here in broad terms,
including interactions of customers with the startup’s website or a monetary transaction);
(c) customer interactions are acknowledged by startups; and (d) that startups act on these
interactions with the goal to better improve their product, operations, business model, and
market concepts. Incorporating these assumptions led to developing a model of the
customer interaction process during new venture creation, summarized in Figure 42.
Note that the model does not assume that the startup interprets the interactions in a
correct or incorrect manner (for example, negative effects of self-reinforcing processes
occurred with two startups in the sample; see Section 6.3).
In Figure 42, the five phases of new venture creation – the Opportunity
Discovery Phase (I), the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), the Transition Phase (III),
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the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), the Execute Phase (V) are noted by the different boxes
with rounded corners. These phases have been referenced throughout this dissertation and
are analogous to the new venture creation phases mentioned previously by others (e.g.
Bhave, 1994; Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007; phases are defined in Table 10).
The early customer interaction model is presented as an integral part of the new
venture creation process, and includes a narrowing path and reduced options for the
product, market, operations, or business model as new venture creation progresses. The
model has three different levels of validation from customers that take place in the
process. These validation levels have different requirements in terms of what is being
validated (which concepts and which activities; 1), what is “enough” validation (2), what
type of customer offers the validation (3), and the impact of the validation (4).
There are also two customer interaction-validation-spirals included in the model
(noted by curved arrows are associated with the self-reinforcing processes of customer
interactions; Figure 41). These spirals represent self-reinforcing processes that promote
the search for additional validation or revision of their product, operations, business
model, and/or market concepts. These self-reinforcing processes are triggered by a
narrowing of options (noted by the three multi-point stars inside thick arrows). After the
final (third) narrowing of options, the startup enters the Execute Phase (V), where the
product, business model, operations, and market have been established from the
validation process, and signify the end of the new venture creation process and the startup
phase of the organization. While additional searches for validation may occur in the
Execute Phase and beyond, they are outside the scope of this dissertation.
Finally, note that the focus of the startups in the study is to ultimately gain sales
revenue or users, with several individuals purchasing or downloading their product.
However, the term ‘sale’ is used loosely to describe a way that a customer parts with
money, and where part of it ends up in the hands of the startup. This includes physical
product purchases, as well as affiliate marketing fees earned when a customer clicks on a
web-link on a website. The early customer interaction model is described in more detail
in the following sections of the chapter.
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Figure 42. Customer Interaction Process During New Venture Creation. Five phases of new venture creation are noted by the different boxes with
rounded corners. With the customer interaction process, note that the numbers 1 to 3 indicate different paths that can be taken to get to a
first customer interaction and opportunity recognition. There are three stages of validation as described in the text. Note that the curved
arrows are associated with the self-reinforcing processes of customer interactions. The multi-point stars inside thick arrows indicate periods
where there is a narrowing of options. O = Operations; P = Product; BM = Business Model; M = Customer Market Segment.
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6.6. Opportunity Discovery Phase and Opportunity Recognition
During the Opportunity Discovery Phase, a business opportunity is recognized
(Bhave, 1994) and activities are undertaken to convert an idea into an innovation
(Cunneen et al., 2007).
With the customer interaction process during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I,
Figure 42), note that the numbers 1 to 3 indicate different paths that can be taken to get
to a first customer interaction and opportunity recognition. In Paths 1 and 2 the
opportunity is internally recognized and in Path 3, the opportunity is externally
recognized (Bhave, 1994). Note that only startups that undergo Path 1 started developing
an initial product (not just the MVP) during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. For the
rest of the startups, this product development started in a later phase.
Also, note that product development takes time and rarely takes place in total
isolation. As a result, there may have been undocumented, casual customer interactions
occurring (typically family and friends), where founders talked about the idea before they
acknowledge a first officially noted customer interaction. The paths are distinguished
however by a clear declaration of the first customer interaction by the entrepreneur
participants. See Table 31 for which startups in the sample followed each path.
Table 31. The Path Taken by Startups in the Sample During the Opportunity Discovery Phase.
Startup

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Path

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

3

In the Opportunity Discovery Phase, the startups were predominantly testing out
the technical feasibility of the product (Technical Activities), trying to understand the
needs and wants of customers (Social Activities), and starting to build trusting
relationships and credibility (Credibility Activities). There were a few sales at this time
(Commercial Activities) by Startup A and Startup I, but obtaining sales was not the
predominant focus for the startups. Distribution, production, and human resource
activities were also not a focus at this time (see Table 32 for examples of activities from
the sample in each of the five new venture creation phases). Note that not all startups
performed the same types of activities in each phase.
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6.7. Opportunity Refinement Phase – Primary Validation
6.7.1. What is Being Validated in the Primary Validation?
Emerging from the first customer interaction during the Opportunity Discovery
Phase and at the start of the Opportunity Refinement Phase, startups in the sample
focused their attention on learning about the problem and developing the product (Figure
32 and Figure 33, Chapter 5). The startups received their primary validation from the
initial customer interaction if the product was of interest to potential customers. All
startups in this sample would have received this initial validation to justify continuing
with the new venture creation process (see Table 33 for examples of primary validation
from each startup). This observation lead to the following proposition:
P1: Startups seek out confirmation on the problem and product concepts
during the primary validation. These interactions test a startup’s ability to
undertake technical activities to develop the product, and to try to
understand needs and wants of customers with social and credibility
activities.
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Table 32. Examples of Types of Activities During New Venture Creation in Sample Startups. Type of activities from Rehme & Svensson (2011).
Phase
Activity
Technical
Activities

/

I:
Opportunity
Discovery

II:
Opportunity
Refinement

III: Transition

IV: Entrepreneurial

V: Execute

A – Experimented with
making
fermented
foods

A – Tested product on
clients

A – Continued testing
different flavours

B – Found pop-up event location

B – Received feedback on
makerspace
model
at
events

B – Committed to
startup by thinking
more about business

A – Developed
alcoholic
beer
beverage

C - Continued testing
interest of affiliate business

C – Committed to
affiliate
marketing
and improved website

D – Received suggestions from
customers
to
improve
technical
components and testing of web platform
with customers. Tested live transaction
with customers

D – Building basic
web platform

E – Continued developing updates to
software

E – Created first version of
gaming
application
software

E
–
Co-founder
committed full time
to
working
on
business

F – Continued to improve web platform,
performing search engine optimizations
for those searching for loans

F – Learned about desired
features of search engine
from loan providers

F – Started
platform
development

web

G
–
Received
and
incorporated feedback into
product

G
–
crowdfunding
platform

Built

H – Thought of
potential features for
mental health platform

H – Thought about design
of web platform and
received feedback from
mentors of student users

H – Begun building
web platform

I – Founder developed
technical capabilities

I – Ongoing improvement
of web building skills

B
–
Developed
makerspace business
model
CBuilt
affiliate
marketing
based
custom website
D
–
Discovered
features needed in an
event
space
marketplace
E – Developed first
ideas about gaming
application software
F – Thought of features
for loan search engine
G – Created design and
prototype for coffee
brewer

D – Tested interest of
event marketplace with
demand and supply side
customers

I
–
Increased
investment
in
technical equipment

C – Committed to affiliate marketing by
building more websites

G – Used data analytics to better
understand traffic on websites and to
improve it
H – Prototype was live and begun
seeking feedback and incorporating
updates into the website. Increased use of
data analytics to understand customer
interaction
with
web
platform.
Developed chat bot software upon
request from first university customer
I – Designed new website involving
click-and-pay for services. Changed
services offered. Started tracking visitors
using data analytics

D – With initial
business model
steady, founders
were testing a
new model of
repeat demandside customers
E – Incorporated
customer
feedback
into
app. Increased
use
of
data
analytics
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Table 32 continued (p. 2 of 4)

Social
Activities

I:
Opportunity
Discovery

II:
Opportunity
Refinement

III: Transition

IV: Entrepreneurial

V: Execute

A – Told family and
friends about beverage

A – Told personal training
clients about beverage

B – Raised awareness about pop-up
event for the first time

F – Spoke with
businesses
about
consumer
financing
interest

B – Received feedback at
events about makerspace

A – Reached out to
network for contract
with retailer

A – Promoted at
local events and
own
event.
Increased social
media usage

G – Spoke with
professor and decided
to patent coffee press
H – Met with first
university
customer
and gained feedback
I – Founder had
customers approaching
him to build websites

D – Spoke to event
planners
(demand-side
customers) and property
owner
(supply-side
customer)
E – Two versions of
application went live and
were promoted to hardcore
gamers
F – Started contacting loan
providers
G – Started testing
prototype with personal
network, local café and
online community forum
H – Sought out feedback
about what student users of
the website would want
(but did not talk to the
users themselves)

D – Seeking feedback
on social media
E
–
Continued
interactions on online
forums
I – Launched only
web campaign

D – Advertised startup to demand-side
customers
E – Continued interactions on online
forums
F – Brought loan providers on the web
platform. Started advertising and testing
the prototype on family and friends.
Followed up with businesses about
consumer finance interest
G – Used social media to self-promote
and gain feature on radio show. Ongoing
interactions with online community and
emails. Visited local cafes
H – Unable to access web platform user
feedback.
Spoke
with
potential
counsellor partners on the website
however gained no traction. Met five
times with first customer and attempted
meetings with additional university
customers. Promoted web platform to
student users. Attempted changing
customer to insurance companies
I – Relied on personal network for clients

D – Continued to
seek
out
customers
E – Increased
promotion of app
on social media
and
use
of
affiliate partners.
Users started to
promote app
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Table 32 continued (p. 3 of 4)

Credibility
Activities

I:
Opportunity
Discovery

II:
Opportunity
Refinement

III: Transition

IV: Entrepreneurial

V: Execute

H – First meeting
helped gain trust with
potential customer

B – Gained trust from
interacting with potential
customers early

A – Gained initial
contract
from
knowing retailer

D – Newspaper article written about startup.
Partnered with local government to develop
sharing economy regulations

A – Media
coverage

D – Initial conversations
with potential customers
to develop relationship

E
–
Continued
interactions
on
online forums

E – Won pitch competitions, grants, and angel
funding. Continued interactions on online
forums

E – Initial interactions
started early in online
gaming community forum

F – Featured in local magazine
G – Contacted blog writers to be featured on
several blogs. Received media coverage
before crowdfunding campaign

F – Early interactions
with
loan
providers
gained trust

H – Unable to gain credibility from
interactions with additional customer without
having sale and demonstrated success with an
existing customer

G – Gained trust from
social interactions by
establishing
early
interactions
Commercial
Activities

A - Informally sold
beverage to family and
friends and at local
grocer
C – Made affiliate
marketing website live
to test sales and made
sales
I – Had
website
services

sales of
building

A – Informally sold
beverage to personal
training clients
C – Found success in
earning referral fees from
online
retailers
with
affiliate
marketing
programs

E – Use of
affiliate
partners to
endorse
startup and
promoting at
events

A – Signed contract
with retailer
C – Continued to
earn referral fees
D – Sales and
contracts
with
demand and supply
side customers
G – Decided
crowdfund
manufacturing
product

to
of

A – Contracts with several retailers
B – Sold tickets for pop-up event
C – Continued to earn referral fees
D – Sales and contracts with demand and
supply side customers
E – Held unsuccessful crowdfunding
campaign
F- Web platform went live and initial
transactions took place
G – Received funding / sales through
crowdfunding campaigns
H – Attempted sales with other universities
counselling services

A – Contract
with several
retailers and
distributors
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Table 32 continued (p. 4 of 4)

Production
Activities

I:
Opportunity
Discovery

II:
Refinement

Opportunity

A Started
production
in
20'x20' space

B – Search for permanent
location
F – Set up office to work
from

III: Transition

IV: Entrepreneurial

V: Execute

G – Decided to
crowdfund
manufacturing of
product

A – Moved to 22,000 square
foot facility

A – Purchase walk-in cooler
and receive loan to create new
production facility

I – Part of small business
centre’s summer program

B – Challenges finding location
for pop-up event
C – Committed to affiliate
marketing by building more
websites

C – Standardized process of
building
and
screening
affiliate marketing websites

G – Visited manufacturer for
coffee press in China.
I
–
Started
developing
processes for interactions with
clients
Human
Resource
Activities

A – Hired employees for
production

Startup I - Meets co-founder

E – Hired
developers

marketing and

A – Hired employees for sales
E – Hired marketing and
developers

F – Hires sales employees
G – Hired employee for team
Distribution
Activities

A – Contract with
retailer

A – Selling at several retailers
I – Interest to improve company
website and designed new
website that required customers
to approach website

A – Selling at several
supermarkets, own retail store,
partnered with distributors
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6.7.2. What is ‘Enough’ Primary Validation?
Validation is defined as the first affirmation that there is customer interest in a
product. Primary validation is the first interest shown by customers. It is typically related
to seeking information about the potential product or business model (Figure 32 and
Figure 33, Chapter 5) – learning whether the product has features that are of interest to
customers or if they would consider purchasing it. This feedback on first customer
preferences would have been received, and often, incorporated into the initial revisions
(or development) of the business concept.
Primary interactions also generally take place in-person, even for technologybased startups, and are undertaken with potential customers in the founders’ network
(Figure 36, Chapter 5). The primary validation received was verbal or text-based for all
startups in the sample. There were also two startups that experienced sales (Startups A
and I) and one that received contracts (Startup E). However, startups would have needed
to receive primary validation to justify continuing with the new venture creation process
(see Table 33 for examples). This observation lead to the following proposition:
P2: During the primary validation, verbal or text-based validation is
considered acceptable confirmation to proceed with the new venture
creation process.
6.7.3. Who Offers Primary Validation?
Before proceeding to further steps in the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), note
that this first customer interaction in the sample was often by chance or convenience. The
customers that primary validation was predominantly received from were in founders’
personal and professional networks (Startup A, Startup E, Startup G and Startup I – that
reached out during the Opportunity Discovery Phase - I). Startup B and Startup D’s
professional network that was easy to access and that they sought primary validation from
was part of the external target market (Appendices B2 and B4). Even the founders of
Startup C, Startup F and Startup H that interacted with the external target market (Figure
35, Chapter 5) interpreted the first interactions with a small segment of the target market
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as adequate for primary validation (Appendices B3, B6, and B8). This observation lead
to the following proposition:
P3. Founders rely on chance or convenience to undertake their first customer
interaction and to obtain feedback for primary validation. This often means
relying on feedback from their nearby personal and professional networks.
6.7.4. What is the Impact of Primary Validation?
Despite first validations being by chance or convenience, primary validation from
customers plays a large role in whether startup development continues - validating the
problem and the potential solution. This primary validation stage also resembles the
critical juncture in path dependence, moving from the Pre-Formation Phase to the
Formation Phase (Figure 3, Chapter 2). The critical juncture is a seemingly insignificant
event (Arthur, 1989), such as casually getting feedback from a customer for the first time,
but the event can trigger a decision to be made that both narrows the paths or
opportunities that can be pursued and can trigger self-reinforcing processes that involve
seeking out future validations for the business concept. This observation lead to the
following proposition:
P4. An initial positive customer interaction creates primary validation for a
business concept. This primary validation is influential as it acts as a
critical juncture that can narrow the path of opportunities that may be
pursued by the startup, and triggers subsequent self-reinforcing processes
where the startup seeks out further validation and develops a product and
market around this validation.
6.8. Opportunity Refinement Phase - First Customer Interaction-Validation-Spiral
After the primary validation, a startup then attempts to better define the business
concept and determine whether it meets the needs of its target market. The process
undertaken is the first customer interaction-validation-spiral (Figure 41), described in
Sections 6.1 to 6.4.
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During the first customer interaction-validation-spiral, parts of the business
concept (the product, the business model, the operations, or the market) are developed,
revised, and presented to customers during subsequent interactions. Note that these
interactions may be with the same customers as in the first customer interaction, or
different customers that typically share similar characteristics to the first customer. Also
note that the communication channels for these interactions at this stage remain personal
– in-person, over the phone and using email (Figure 37, Chapter 5). Startup C, Startup E
and Startup G, however, did branch out to start using data analytics with their website
(Startup C), ads and online media articles (Startup E), and interacting publically with
potential customers in an online community forum (Startup E and Startup G).
If the interactions do not receive validation, or if the startup receives feedback to
change something about part of the business concept, it is revised or discarded. It is
during this first customer interaction-validation-spiral that without validation, an idea is
likely to be discarded and the startup will pivot. At this stage, the investment in activities
are predominantly associated with technical activities such as developing the product, and
not other aspects of the organization, making adaptations relatively easier than once the
startup is more invested, or routines have formed.
During the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), the focus is mostly on the
customer and the product still – developing and testing the product on the customer
segment (Figure 33, Chapter 5). The activities are around understanding the customer
requirements (social activities), still building trust (credibility activities), and developing
the product (technical activities). There are minimal commercial activities during this
phase, although sales were not the main focus. The startups’ focus was instead to learn
more about the problem and develop the relationship with potential customers.
6.9. Opportunity Refinement Phase – Secondary Validation
If the customer interactions during the latter part of the Opportunity Refinement
Phase receive validation, this is termed Secondary Validation. At this time, the startup
begins to gradually increase commitment of resources allocated and dedicates time, effort
and other resources towards developing processes and infrastructure (example quotes of
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secondary validation from each case can be found in Table 33, Chapter 5). With each
validation, the founders seek out additional customer interactions to clarify whether they
have the right market.
6.9.1. What is Being Validated in the Secondary Validation?
For the startups in the sample, by the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), it was
important that strategic feedback of the business concept was received before additional
investments were made into the business. In Figure 43, we see that all the startups
interpreted that they had received strategic confirmation of their business concept and the
overall scope and direction of the organization by the end of the Opportunity Refinement
Phase (II; Ansoff, 1988; Child, 1972). Customer interactions at this time validated the
product and the customer segments (Figure 32, Chapter 5), and the founders continued to
develop and test the product and develop the business model (Figure 33, Chapter 5).
There was also a slight increase in focus on the organization of the startup (Figure 32,
Chapter 5), but developing operations was still not a major focus for the startup
(Appendix B).
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Table 33. Quoted Examples of Different Levels of Validation Received for Startups in Sample.
Startup
Primary
Secondary
Striving for Tertiary Validation or Pivoting Activities
Validation
Validation
A

“Since she
had
no
job,
we
thought
this
was
the perfect
time
to
make some
money on
the side.
So,
we
took our
operations
from the
kitchen
counter
and
started
selling it to
a
few
clients –
friends
and
family…”
(7
June
2016,
speaking
about the
past)

“I liked it. She liked
it. It was us. And
then clients liked it.
These were clients
from my personal
training business at
the time. So we kept
being told that…
One guy, he bought
a litre and said this
is great! And then
he gave some to his
friend, who then
wanted a litre. Then,
within a few weeks,
it was like, okay,
we’ve hit so many
max capacities, it’s
already
mind
blowing.
People
keep saying it’s the
best. And it wasn’t
until we got out
there
and
had
people we didn’t
really know coming
up and saying this is
good
[that
we
realized we had a
good product]. This
is really awesome.”
(7
June
2016,
speaking to the past)

“I think our first customer was [organic stall at farmers’ market]. That’s where our target market was going, so let’s
create demand. I guess it was good. We were selling out. The market would go from 8 in the morning to 1 but we
would sell out by 10. Then we made a little more and we sold out at 11. Then more, and we sold out a t12.
Eventually, we made it through the whole day.” (7 June 2016).
“We have over 75 retailers now. And that’s always been the goal from day one. To distribute. We started at our
market. We have a passion form markets… Then we started selling at a few key retailers. We wanted to get it into the
hands of where our target market shops.” (7 June 2016).
“We’ve landed our biggest chain. It’s exciting…. They said, everything seems good. And then six weeks go by and we
didn’t hear back anything. I went and called once or twice a week…. I didn’t want to lose that sale, didn’t want to
lose that account…. It wasn’t until two weeks ago when I sent them a case with some feature flavours and just saying
thank you… She contacted us to say, “thanks so much. We’re having a [beverage] party here. Good news. We want
to let you know that we’re going to list the product” (21 June 2016)
“We’re throwing an event – it’s going to be an opportunity to say thank you and we’re back, and we have things on
sale and just to have fun.” (12 July 2016)
“Just opening the storefront and having that little action there. It’s just going to create a lot of buzz, and we’re
hoping that will ripple outward through our social media.” (12 July 2016).
“We partnered up with a brewery and did half our beverage, half beer. And it was delicious. We definitely want to
distribute it.” (26 July 2016)
“[Large warehouse store] contacted us. So, it’s pretty wild… They found us on Instagram… They love the samples
we sent so it’s on to the next phase of things. But the next phase of things involves us being audited from a third party
health and food safety organization. I want to wait until we’re in our new facility though, so I was able to stall them.
Obviously, we can’t supply them now. So, I made it sound like we already had the facility picked out. ‘We’re moving
in as we speak. So, you want to hold off until we’re up and running? No point in doing it here.’” (27 Oct 2016)
“We’re excited about our new website. It’s coming. I think we got five blogs written by the marketing firm. They write
the blogs and it’s just cool.” (27 Oct 2016)l
“We got the loan. It’s official. We’re good to go. It’s good because we got a lot of money going out to buy the tanks
and stuff because a lot of things take six weeks to get them in. So, we’re trying to get that place up and running to the
next phase of things as soon as possible because it’s crazy renting. Making things by hand doesn’t really cut it,
economy scale wise. This is because demand continues going up and we’ve been waiting to move for a solid year
now… It’s all kind of coming in a perfect time. We just found out we also got 23 locations of [local supermarket].
That’s huge, right?” (12 Jan 2017)
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Table 33 continued (part 2 of 8)
Startup

Primary Validation

Secondary Validation

Striving for Tertiary Validation or Pivoting Activities

B

“There was this event.
This was an example
where we were able to
talk to a lot of potential
customers…. It was to
raise money for, I think
it was nutrition or
learning. It was a
certain kind of clientele
we don’t necessarily get
to meet often… So, we
discovered that they
want live music.” (6
June 2016)

“We went and talked to
quite a few people that we
met at different meetings.
We basically find people at
these
conferences…
It
attracts certain people who
are interested in doing
social
activities…
The
discussion on that day was
women
in
entrepreneurship… So, the
people we met there, we
started to talk to them and
explained to them that
there’s a venue that we’re
making… and they were
interested.” (20 June 2016)

“The occupancy of the building [for our pop-up event] is supposed to be 100 people… We
haven’t yet printed any posters and flyers and stuck them anywhere. But we know enough
people through our Facebook and other channels so that they and their families can come.”
(21 July 2016)
“The one thing that we didn’t manage to do that we wanted to do again was go and talk to
people in the city about the permanent venue. And then we realized that, okay, we can invite
them for this temporary event, the pop-up event, and they can get a feel for it.” (21 July
2016).
“We did our marketing, it seems we were able to reach about 1,100 people of which
something like 100 commented, were engaged and shared. And then about 20 people showed
up… Our main learning part was, ‘okay, how do we price things? Do people appreciate
what we are doing?” (16 August 2016).
“We had again, a lot of challenge trying to speak to the councilor… We met this councilor
again at an event. It was very frustrating after four or five times, every time I see her, she
says, oh, just email me about it again. But then, you know, you email, you call, and she
doesn’t get back to you.” (28 Nov 2016)
“What we are doing now – it’s really on hold. I don’t feel disappointed about putting it on
hold at this point because I know we’re going to be in the community for quite a while.” (28
Nov 2016)

266

Table 33 continued (part 3 of 8)
Startup

Primary Validation

Secondary Validation

Striving for Tertiary Validation or Pivoting Activities

C

“So, the greatest thing. I
can
now
generate
revenue for myself. I
can see what I’m doing
is working!... In one
month, I made much
more than in the past
eleven months. So, I’m
quite excited about this
opportunity to have
more
affiliation
partnerships. Money is
a very good validation. I
think this idea is pretty
much validated. (24
October, 2016)

“This month, I’ve already
made $2000… I keep
finding more and more
partners [and building more
websites]… So, onboarding
new partners, optimizing the
process
and
making
money… How can I
[improve this]? I can use
heat maps to see where
people go on a website… I
can also promote on
Facebook… Anyhow, I can
experiment now because I’m
making
money…”
(21
November, 2016)

“I’m making data-driven decisions – all the great ideas by founders are guesses… What we
need to do is use data to prove what’s right and what’s wrong… Let’s look at my progress
right now from the past few weeks. I’ve been making much more value. Last time we chatted, I
was making $200 a day. Now, I’m making $250-$300 daily profit… And I continue to do
iterations [and build more sites].” (21 December, 2016)

D

“The first month, [we]
were reaching out to
some event planners,
just hearing feedback
from people. I was
asking everyone on
Facebook… ‘Here’s a
thing I’ve been working
on, give me some
feedback on it.’ And
some people gave some
awesome feedback.” (2
June, 2016)

“We had gone for a month.
We had amazing customer
feedback. We had 33
bookings in the first couple
of weeks and like a ton of
customer feedback from the
supply and demand side. So,
it’s like really good. We’re
getting really excited of
where we’re going to
build.” (22 June, 2016).

“We’ve done a fair amount of exposure from [the article], but the problem is that the timing of
this we weren’t like live so it didn’t like -- it was kind of like not an awesome timing, to be
honest [given we’re still building].” (22 June 2016).
“The ministry said we can work with the Sharing Economy Advisory Committee… so they can
create the legislation in the near future.” (8 Sept. 2016)
“We sat down with like nine customers and asked ‘what makes sense? What doesn’t make
sense? There’s been a lot of very good feedback… But we’re not marketing, we’re waiting to
make sure everything works transaction wise.” (8 Nov, 2016)
“Going live [again] was good. Some people were using it which is nice. We have lots of people
viewing profiles, some people trying to book… But it’s been good… The first day, there were
probably 400-600 people that came to the site.” (19 Dec. 2016)
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Table 33 continued (part 4 of 8)
Startup

Primary Validation

Secondary Validation

Striving for Tertiary Validation or Pivoting Activities

E

“We needed to start
from scratch. And the
nice thing was, we were
developing the idea. We
were reaching out to a
lot of different gamers
just on blogging sites,
[online
community
forum], and whatnot.
They
were
really
interested in what we
do, though we didn’t
have a product. We
ended up getting a
couple hundred users
before [the app] broke
completely. Our site had
over 300 views at one
point. I know there was
a thread that had really
good traction. At this
point we had a little bit
of validation, so we
said, let’s try again.” (8
June 2016, speaking
about the past)

“We went on [gaming
platform on computer], and
we created our own
[company] community and
connected
with
other
gamers. We started inviting
people to this group and
started talking about the
app with them. And a lot of
them were like – ‘Hey, I’ll
meet new friends. Cool.’ So
we kind of reached out to
people
in
different
communities. Our goal was
to bring them on, and it was
kind of spammy in a way.
But we were really personal
about it. We customized our
message. And because we
would get the random
person willing to try this, we
grew to 1500 people.” (8
June 2016, speaking about
the past)

“We launched our Kickstarter, spent a lot of time on it, building it up. And honestly, things
went well. But they also went terrible. Our challenge was that we spent so much time building
a great campaign, we forgot about marketing our campaign ahead of time. Lesson learned.” (9
June 2016)
“We had 7500 users, we’re still needing more. So we [started using] hashtags.” (9 June 2016)
“We don’t want to put all our eggs into one basket. If something ever does go wrong with
Instagram, then we want these other ways working. This one way is working, but we definitely
don’t want it to be the only way to do it.” (9 June 2016)
“It’s a daily task talking to people and doing community engagement. It’s quite exhausting in
terms of how much time it takes up.” (9 June 2016).
“I said, do you know how many user suggestions we have building up?... We always have
suggestions coming in. So, if these suggestions come up repeatedly, I just keep track of how
many repeats occur.” 9 June 2016).
“With this event, we had really good turnout. People said they’d definitely come out again if we
held an event. We learned a lot to plan our own event.” (22 June 2016).
“We have these Facebook groups that we’re trying to establish relationships… We want to get
in…. They play a large role in getting people interested. So it involves reaching out to local
gamers.” (7 July 2016)
“We’ve been partnering with Youtubers [affiliate partners]. We had this idea a year ago, and
just couldn’t execute. We tried reaching out to people but people would never get back to us.
Now we’ve created a budget to do it a bit differently…. At the end of the summer, we still had
14,000 to 15,000 users. And the basically we brought on this new guy who started looking at
how to approach them. And he scaled what we were currently doing, basically tenfold. It was
crazy!... But it wasn’t scaling…. We [realized] we had to pick the right person to be a brand
ambassador.” (13 Dec 2016)
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Table 33 continued (part 5 of 8)
Startup

Primary Validation

Secondary Validation

Striving for Tertiary Validation or Pivoting Activities

F

“I went around this summer and spoke
to 150 business owners. I chose the
home reno[vation] industry because
it’s generally easy to access the
decision people. And an industry in
which they would use these types of
loans. They used to work with banks
and the banks have jumped all ship…
So, what have they done? They’ve
moved over to a consumer finance
company like Cree Logics or Snap
Financial… We got a lot of good
feedback from business owners… And
speaking to our lenders. These guys –
they’ve no credibility and no history.
And the growth – they’ve had 920
million applications in two years.
People want money. They’re going to
search, ‘I want money. Where am I
going to get my money? That’s why
you see the line up at cash money. 550
percent. And it’s just insane. And
people go for it.” (19 May 2016 –
speaking about the past)

“I’m in a fintech cluster group
on LinkedIn, so I’m in there.
And I’m working that. I have
11 lenders. I’ve contracted
them. So that’s pretty cool.
Yeah! Awesome! They’re so
keen. For them, the cost is
developing
the
website
structure. But above and
beyond that, they pay us when
they get dispersed loans. So,
super keen… We’re right
there, man! We’re right on the
edge of the cliff! It’s super
exciting. It’s been a long trip
over the past year trying to
get it all put together… As far
as the lenders go, everyone
has been quite keen.” (19 May
2016)

“We launched, obviously. But the marketing agency that we’re working with to
do all of our advertising dropped the ball... We gave our lenders the power to
choose when to call back on information… [This resulted in] a huge drop off
actually. From those declines, we didn’t get a conversion at all… So, that’s an
issue, losing money there too. A lot of people are still in the pipeline [that
applied and were denied]. We’re going to follow up with them and hopefully be
able to convert a quarter of them. So, Mondays are exceptionally good for
loans. On Monday I think I had eight loans for 200 bucks invested.” (29 July
2016).
“I think it’s good [we are live]. We’re kind of one conversion for the cost.
We’re not making money but we’re breaking even… I don’t like it that all the
lenders aren’t integrated. [But] we can iron them out.” (22 Aug 2016)
“I did an interview with [magazine]…. It’s been good, a lot of positive
feedback… We’ve got a number of leads from the city who are interested…
We’re getting about 45 applications a day…. it’s a volume, right? We receive
good search volume, we sell out people looking for loans, and we’re an
alternative.” (22 Nov 2016)
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Table 33 continued (part 6 of 8)
Startup

Primary Validation

Secondary Validation

Striving for Tertiary Validation or Pivoting Activities

G

“Once I got my patent filed, it’s just a
provisional patent, it’s patent pending,
but once I got that file, I posted to the
Reddit forum – I didn’t think I was
going to get much. All I said was, “hey,
I came up with this coffee press. What
do you guys think of this brewing
technique?” And that kind of blew up.
That is the 7th most popular post of all
time on that forum right now (receiving
478 comments total). They gave me a
lot of great feedback on my initial
prototype. They’re the ones that really
encouraged me to say… no, this is a
thing you can actually do… At one
point, I got offered a job at a medical
device company that makes new
devices for surgery. And that would
have been a really great job. But after
that feedback from the Reddit post, I
thought, I might as well risk this. This
is what people want. And I kept going
for it.” (27 May, 2016)

“This past month [on the
forum], I was top 11. Once
again, 125 comments of this
post actually got me 200
email signups in two days….
So, you can actually start to
see a conversion rate… I’m
feeling pretty good about [it].
I have [online community
forum]. I’m starting to get
some social media attraction,
and I’m starting to get some
blogs and articles written
about me.” (9 June 2016)

“It’s pretty hard, especially in Ontario to find companies that are willing to get
outsourcing to China… When I brought that to Canadian manufacturers, they
right away said, ‘Oh, we can’t do that. It’s impossible. We can’t do that.’… So,
constant pushback from them, whereas the Chinese manufacturer…, they say,
‘Yes it will be hard, there’s going to be some [issues]… but we can work with
you to figure out some other options.’” (13 June 2016)
“Day one [of the Kickstarter campaign] was a little crazy. I think in the first
24 hours, from like 3pm until midnight, we raised over $16,000, which we’re
kind of expecting.” (28 June, 2016)
“I’m definitely not a marketing expert at all. I don’t even know basic online
marketing. It’s just saying, ‘hey, here’s a product. This is what I’ve invented.
I’m not really sure how to reach different demographics.” 14 July, 2016
“We ended up with $61,400 [from the crowdfunding campaign]… I’m not too
disappointed. We’ve started on [another crowdfunding site] now.” (3 Aug,
2016).
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Table 33 continued (part 7 of 8)
Startup

Primary Validation

Secondary Validation

Striving for Tertiary Validation or Pivoting Activities

H

“My first step was to look through a
bunch of literature…. That’s when I
decided, maybe a week or two in, I
decided to talk to a counselor that I
had a connection with… They liked it.
What stood out most from this
conversation was that we’re going to
move towards online counseling.” (6
June, 2016 – speaking about the past)

“I already had a bunch of
ideas floating around and it
wasn’t as distilled as now…. I
talked to the residence life
coordinator,
the
athletic
director, and different faculty
staff… They saw the problems
students were having. I went
back to the people who I
thought would be champions
and potential customers…. So,
getting the user perspective
from them and the customer
perspective…
from
the
Associate
Director
of
Counseling Services…. It was
like, ‘Yeah this is great.’ The
most common thing was, ‘This
looks really good. It looks
welcoming, relaxing and
inviting and it makes you feel
welcomed.” (6 June 2016)

“I found that she was very receptive and she liked the idea. She said, ‘I’ll
contact you at the end of July,’ because there’s so many other people she
has to go back and talk to… So that’s why it’s taking a long time.” (20 June
2016)
“Last time, it was back and forth, ‘Oh, we’re going to do part of it. We’re
not going to do part of it.’ So, I was waiting to hear back and I met with the
assistant director of counseling services. She’s saying, ‘Yeah, let’s go
ahead, and these are the things that we need to figure out. Follow up with
me by the end of the week and then we’ll talk.’ Initially I was thinking the
middle of July to pilot. But, she doesn’t really know if that’s possible
because she has to check with her legal side of things and her boss. There’s
no telling what their timelines are.” (4 July, 2016)
“Once I mention a pilot, they’re like, great, yeah. They don’t know how the
metrics go, so they want to wait to take a look. So, in one way, that’s been a
hindrance because before the pilot was set in place, it was like, ‘Oh, this
could be of value to us. I’m going to give it to my team, and then, they’ll take
a look and we’re going to see if they want to move ahead with this.’
Whereas now that the pilot is in place, people are waiting [to see what
happens].” (21 July 2016)
“We’re trying to push towards user adoption… We started posters at the end
of the term and there hasn’t been significant increase… So, [now we’re
talking to insurance companies]. I just called and emailed them… They
immediately were interested and contacted me back, and said, ‘Hey, we’re
looking to build something similar on our own. We want to know how you’re
tackling it from an AI side.’… So, that’s why they were interested, and that’s
probably why they said we were too early stage. I think they thought we had
an intelligent chat bot [developed].” (6 Jan 2017).
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Table 33 continued (part 8 of 8).
Startup

Primary
Validation

Secondary
Validation

Striving for Tertiary Validation or Pivoting Activities

I

“[Starting
off
with
designing
the [named
university]
site,
now
I’m doing
[company
name]
which has
100,000
page views
a
month
[and it’s]
something I
made. I’m
really
excited
about it.”
(10
Aug
2015
–
Article)

“When we were
in the Small
Business Centre
group last year,
we were in the
same group of
about
20
people…. I think
what brought us
together is that
both of us work
extremely hard
and are very
talented. We get
along and we
are friends. We
weren’t really
friends at that
point, but we
[co-founders]
were
stronger
together than we
were apart… I
think it’s a great
partnership.”
(19 May 2016)

“A good and diverse range [of customers contacted us]… I’ve never cold called a person in my entire life… [This
one client], I’ve known him for six years. That’s what I mean. The more I do – I’ve planted so many seeds with
people. They keep seeing what we’re doing and they’re eventually going to ask [for us to do a site for them]. I could
easily do six sites for $1000 right now.” (19 May 2016).
“Most of the time, we do [websites for] clients for $1000 and we have to scramble to get all of them done. And it
ends up with us staying for late nights, hurting ourselves, and putting ourselves into a state of duress. I still enjoy the
grind but it would have been nice to finally have a [bigger] client [to say], ‘Hey, we made it’.”
“[Founder]’s friend’s dad owns [big potential client’s business], and that fell through. I think they wanted someone
that would do a website for $500. Then… another proposal went to [big local beverage company] and one to [big
real estate agent]. The real estate agent would rather give it to us, as [a competing marketing agency] said that they
would do it for $5000, but he thought [we were going to charge him] $500-$1000. And unfortunately, [big local
beverage company], we heard from him yesterday. He took what we said back to the other guys we were competing
against and they undercut us even more.” (7 June, 2016).
“The big thing for us is lead generation. I don’t want to be cold calling people. It’s not what [Startup I] is about… I
know it’s a numbers game and you have to keep calling. But it’s also... reputation management.” (8 June, 2016).
“When it comes to the [existing] site, it’s good, but it’s not good enough. We’ve learned a lot of stuff since then. And
we’ve been talking about re-doing it since May… a long time, and last weekend, something just snapped and I started
working on [the new website]… This is going to be a really nice tool for us… Now every piece on the website has a
reason and it feels a lot more professional.. It’s going to be a lot easier to have people come to us… I’m waiting for
the new site to capture the leads.” (6 July, 2016).
“I think the problem is [that] those referrals are still not the projects that we want to take on. We want to get [into]
that bigger atmosphere… Poor people hang out with poor people, or successful business people hang out with other
successful business people. It’s just the way it works. So, we need to get out of that circle…” (7 September, 2016).
“[We] can see [visitors’] IP addresses and can see how long they spend on each page and look at every page. I can
see even where they left or why they were halfway through the checkout with all their information entered, but,
they’ve left. But I don’t know why, you know what I mean? It could have been that they didn’t want to buy, they had
second guesses or they didn’t have money, or their kid distracted them and they had to leave.” (Startup I Founders T
& A, Interview, 2 November, 2016).
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Figure 43. Customer Feedback - Strategic or Operational/Tactical Impact. S-C = Strategic
confirmation, confirming the business concept and overall scope and direction of the
business (Ansoff, 1988; Child, 1972; Maidique & Zirger, 1984, 1985); S-NC = Lack of
strategic confirmation; OT-C = Operational and tactical confirmation, confirming the
plan of action to employ resources and everyday activities (Ansoff, 1988); OT-NC = Lack
of operational and tactical confirmation; OT-Adapted = operational and tactical activities
were adapted; S-Exploratory = new strategic activities were being explored.
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When considering the business concept that needs to be validated, an MVP needs
to be presented to potential customers by this stage. Not all startups in the sample had a
developed prototype by the Opportunity Refinement Phase (Table 29, Chapter 5),
however. Only five of the nine startups in the sample had an actual prototype (digital or
physical; Table 29; Startup A, Startup C, Startup E, Startup G, Startup I, case narratives,
Appendix B). Founders without a prototype spoke with customers to share their
description of the problem that they wanted to solve with a description of the idea for the
product that they would use to test it.
This met the practitioner’s definition of MVP - the most basic, understood
explanation of a problem and solution; whether through a word description, physical, or
digital object (Blank & Dorf, 2012). The MVP was tested and could receive feedback
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from potential early adopters. Even with minimal features and it still being early in the
new venture creation process, the MVP needed to be a good representation of the final
product – ensuring that the business concept that was receiving validation was also the
business concept that would be developed further in the later stages of new venture
creation. This had been an issue for Startup B, that later in new venture creation had
changed their MVP and not retested it. This observation lead to the following
proposition:
P5. Startups seek out confirmation of the business concept (strategic
feedback) during the secondary validation (during the Opportunity
Refinement Phase) using an MVP. The MVP need not be a prototype,
however, it should be representative of the final product.
6.9.2. What is ‘Enough’ Secondary Validation?
There is however a point where “enough” secondary validation is reached from
potential customers, and the founders decide to commit to creating a business. This
signifies entrance into the Transition Phase (III). However, “enough” secondary
validation was interpreted differently by different startups in the sample. For Startup A
and Startup I, that validation came from receiving monetary compensation (sales).
Startups D, E, and F were already receiving contracts (Startup D and Startup F received
contracts from supply-side customers, while Startup E had users downloading their app,
requiring an approval to certain terms and conditions). Startup C received contracts from
companies offering affiliate programs and monetary compensation.
Note that Startup B, Startup G, and Startup H did not received contract or sales
validation in the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). Startup B and Startup G had
consulted with the external target market however (Figure 35, Chapter 5). Startup B
spoke with people in-person at a few events about their makerspace concept and Startup
G had interacted with individuals in an online community forum for coffee and for
camping. Also, Startup H, who also did not have a contract or a sale by this stage, did not
speak with customers during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, but had reached out to a
single customer in-person - a university counseling services department - during the
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Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), and considered validation from them to be enough to
proceed with the business. Startup H received verbal validation from this interaction. The
differences between these startups are that Startup G was able to reach a large, wider, and
diverse potential target market through the online community forum in comparison to
Startup B and Startup H that had reached a smaller group of potential target customers.
However, all three startups interpreted the validation they received as adequate to proceed
with committing to the business.
From these data, startups are still focused on validating the product and business
model, making secondary validation share similar characteristics to primary validation.
However, secondary validation requires a different amount of validation, and is still not
necessarily focused on the setup of the business. In the secondary validation, there is a
focus on developing, as well as testing the product and business model out on customers.
Furthermore, because there is more clarity on the MVPs and business models, secondary
validation offers more confirmation for startups that are able to produce a more accurate
version of the product.
Some practitioners would argue that by this stage, only Startup A, Startup C and
Startup I had achieved validation – as they consider a problem is not validated until a
customer pays to solve it (Winkel & Wilcox, 2017). However, the other six startups in the
sample had not received payment by the Opportunity Refinement Phase, of which four of
them did at a later phase (Startup B, Startup D, Startup F, and Startup G).
Other practitioners argue that validation can come from cash, but also other forms
of commitment, such as time, feedback, and usage of a product (Ries, 2009c) that offer
validation that the direction and goals of the startup match those of the customers.
Examples of validation that demonstrate commitment included contracts from supplyside customers (Startup C, Startup D and Startup F), startups starting to obtain users
through downloads of their application (Startup E), and startups that had received ‘large’
amounts of verbal/text-based (often public) validation of interest from a diversity of
potential customers in their target market and affiliated stakeholders (Startup G – spoke
with engineers on campus, cafes and coffee roasters, online forum for camping and
coffee, and entrepreneurial pitch competition). These startups that received this level of
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validation were on a growth trajectory at the end of the study period (further details on
this mentioned below).
The remaining two startups, Startup B and Startup H, only received verbal
validation from a limited number of customers (Startup B and Startup H) and/or from
channels not specifically used by the target market (Startup B). No other types of
validation were received that would suggest commitment and interest from customers.
Startup B received positive verbal validation from setting up booths at two events
that had a different purpose than creating a makerspace. Furthermore, the events held
only had a small segment of their potential market in attendance, as they took place on a
university campus, yet funders had also hoped to attract the non-university community.
Startup H, developing a mental health software that would be purchased by
universities and used by its students, spoke with only one potential customer, where he
received verbal validation. He also spoke with the mentors of the users, but was unable to
access the student users themselves. Both Startup B and Startup H decided to proceed by
investing more resources into the businesses at this stage to develop the product,
however.
We can compare these two startups, Startup B and Startup H, that later in the
study still had limited or no customers, with those that did not receive monetary
compensation but did receive other forms of validation, Startup D, Startup E, Startup F,
and Startup G. At later stages, Startup D, Startup E, Startup F and Startup G all received
customers or users. The combination of receiving verbal validation from such a limited
group of potential customers and not obtaining other types of commitment from
customers and their related stakeholders (such as contracts, downloads, sharing of
information, developing relationships), implies that this limited type of validation is
inadequate to proceed in the new venture creation process. By this phase, startups should
be receiving some indication that in the future, potential customers would take action to
support their verbal statements. In other words, the customers needed to be willing to
“put their money where their mouth is.” This is in line with Winkel and Wilcox’s (2017)
practitioner teaching suggestion that validation should be received from a variety of
different ways – from in-person interviews with both direct customers and related
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stakeholders, to using data analytics to collect information about how visitors interact
with the startups’ website. This observation lead to the following proposition:
P6. During the secondary validation, startups should receive either monetary
or contractual confirmation from early customers, or other forms of
commitment that demonstrate interest in the product from a ‘large’ diversity of
potential customers in their target market, as confirmation to proceed in the
new venture creation process. These forms of commitment may include time,
regular feedback on product and business, offering other resources, and usage
of a product that offered validation that the direction and goals of the startup
matched those of the customers.
Note that the term ‘large,’ describing the diversity of customers, is subjective and
will differ based on the type of industry and the market that the startup is in. Large can be
interpreted as obtaining views that are representative of the diversity of stakeholders,
customers and otherwise, that need to be appeased for the success of the business
concept. Having a ‘large’ number also suggests the possibility of having a market beyond
a single or small group of customers.
6.9.3. Who Offers Secondary Validation?
Note that secondary validation through sales was still possible if startups had not
reached out to their external target market. This included Startup A and Startup I, that in
later phases were able to also seek out validation from an external target market that they
had not obtained by the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). What this means is, that there
were still startups that were willing to increase commitment, resource allocation, and
undergo dedicated process and infrastructure development based on personal and
professional network contacts – without having engaged with the external target market.
Startup A, however, was already embedded in the industry, perhaps indicating that their
personal and professional networks could have been representative of the external target
market. Startup I continued to receive customers as validation of their ability to create a
product that has demand – even if this was not their ideal target market. This observation
lead to the following proposition:
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P7. In the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), it is still appropriate for a
startup to receive validation from its personal and professional market if the
network is representative of its external target market and if a basic level of
secondary validation reached, as specified in P6.
6.10. Transition Phase - What is the Impact of Secondary Validation?
When secondary validation is obtained, the startups’ founders decide to commit to
the business in some significant way (see Table 34 for examples of these commitments).
This signified entering the Transition Phase (III) of the new venture creation process.
Startups continued to develop the product, and shifted to promoting the product and
testing the business model on their target market (Figure 33, Chapter 5, and cases in
Appendix B). This shift in increased commitment resulted from receiving secondary
validation and ultimately, launched the process into the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV).
Note that while the entrepreneurs in the sample were more internally focused
during the Transition Phase (III), those that were communicating with customers also
started to experiment to gain more insight into customers’ needs and interests and start
promotion (social activities; e.g. Startup G), to build credibility (credibility activities;
e.g. Startup E), to continue to improve technical design (technical activities; e.g. Startup
H), to start to explore how they may sell the product to a more widespread target market
(commercial activities; e.g. Startup E), to startup displaying their commitment through
setting up a production facilities (production activities; e.g. Startup A), and to begin
considering the skills and team needed within the organization (human resource
activities; e.g. Startup I). This observation lead to the following proposition:
P8. Customer interactions during the secondary validation stage test whether
the startup can continue to undertake social and credibility activities to
develop trust and a relationship with potential customers, and start
experimenting with other activities (technical, commercial, production, and
human resources).
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6.11. Entrepreneurial Phase - Second Customer Interaction-Validation-Spiral
After the Transition Phase (III), the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) launches directly
into the second Customer Interaction-Validation-Spiral. Note that this process is similar
in stages to the first customer interaction-validation-spiral that occurred during the
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), in that there are revisions to certain business
concepts, subsequent customer interactions where the concepts are presented, further
revisions or validations (in this case, tertiary validation), and increased commitment to
resource allocation towards process or infrastructure development. If it is too challenging
to proceed, the concept is discarded. With each validation received, the startups seek out
additional customer interactions to clarify whether they have the appropriate market.
They also continue to commit resources to develop processes and infrastructure to
support the business. These activities eliminated alternative options and in confirming
these options, narrowed the path for the startups.
By the Entrepreneurial Phase, there is a certain amount of investment into the
startup that did not exist during the first customer interaction-validation-spiral. Founders
have committed to the business by this phase, by declaring commitment, laying out
funding, time, or other resources. Having been in operation for a short while already,
certain processes and routines are forming, or have been formed, to meet the needs of the
target market, and are geared towards producing a validated product from the primary
and secondary validations. This suggests that the decision to pivot or adapt away from the
validated path is likely taken more seriously at this stage, due to existing investments.
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Table 34. Quotes Demonstrating Founders’ Commitment to Startup in the Transition Phase.
Startup

Quote

A

“I had this gut feeling. I thought, I’ll drop out of school and make this happen. So, we had a
friend draw up a logo. He was a graphic designer… That was our only marketing tool. A
great looking bottle with a great product. At the time, we had zero Facebook friends. It
wouldn’t have happened if [co-founder] didn’t have the who’s who in the organic space and
my connections in the health industry and knowledge in the health space. It was the right time
right place. A lot going on. Hitting the ground hustling. Asking, ‘hey, do you want to carry
us?’ And they say, ‘yes, of course! If you’re behind this, of course we will carry this.’” ( 7
June 2016).

B

“We’re done with the coursework. So, now we have to focus on the business.” (4 July 2016)

C

“[My mentor] – I told him about this and he said drop everything and focus on this to make
money. And so, I think I’ll focus on this. I like this kind of project. I get so much revenue in
return.” (24 October 2016).

D

“The idea came out of working in a not-for-profit sector, wanting to do events and being
really frustrated with expensive venues and just thinking, ‘Why can’t you rent a vacant space
or an underutilized space for a lot cheaper, saving a lot of money, and be more interesting,
more unique?’ And then, yeah, the idea kind of sat for a while and then we all kind of got
together and started working on it.” (02 June 2016)

E

“I was basically doing this every day after work. And that’s when things were picking up. And
that’s when I decided to leave my job and pursue this full time. I was working for my uncle
anyway. So, he knew the situation. And he was like, ‘if you come back, you come back.’ I was
like, good. I’m going to do this [startup]. I have an opportunity here.” (8 June 2016).

F

“Come October, I got into [office space], I talked to the CEO and they gave me an office… I
threw together a profile on LinkedIn. It was the best $68 I’ve spent. It’s incredible. So
valuable… Every lending company I could find, I’d search in LinkedIn and on Google.. I’m in
a fintech cluster group on LinkedIn. So, I’m in there. And I’m kind of working on that. I have
11 lenders and I’ve contracted them. So that’s kind of where it’s at now. The website’s being
completed in India. I’ve hired a CTO to help monitor that… Basically, integrating
everybody.” (19 May 2016)

G

“Hopefully [now, I can start to] leverage Kickstarter. Not only does it give me the funding to
move forward [with manufacturing], it also gives me the traction to approach these
distributors to say – hey, I sold x amount in a 30 day campaign. What can you sell to your
customers? I’ve looked online for distributors. Found one that distributes [competing coffee
press], but I haven’t really reached out to them. I’m a bit tunnel-visioned towards Kickstarter
right now.” (27 May, 2016)

H

“Then [after I got that feedback,] I started building. I built a website.” (6 June 2016)

I

“We got accepted into [the full-time summer incubator] with the company I started… When it
started off, it was interactive because I wanted to build websites. You guys pay me money and
I’ll build you a better site than you can build yourself. And then it progressed. We can build
your site, market it, drive traffic to it… So, we’ve really evolved… This summer, it’s proving
the methods, getting clients on board by the end of summer and basically tracking everything
so that when I go to future clients and say, look at these numbers, why wouldn’t you want to
work with us? That’s really the goal for this summer.
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6.12. Entrepreneurial Phase – In Pursuit of Tertiary Validation
Note that only four of the nine startups achieved Tertiary Validation during the
study period (Startup A, Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E). Therefore, all startups in
this section are assessed for their attempts towards achieving Tertiary Validation, rather
than their achievement of Tertiary Validation.
6.12.1. What is Being Validated in the Tertiary Validation?
Like with secondary validation, if the customer interactions resulted in tertiary
validation, the startup increases commitment of resources and dedicates time, effort and
other resources towards developing processes and infrastructure to developing the
business (example quotes of attempts to reach Tertiary Validation from each case in
Table 33). The difference between the secondary and the tertiary validation however lies
in what is being validated and the concepts being revised. The startups were more
customer focused than product focused during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV; Figure 32,
Chapter 5). This meant there was testing of the customer segment, testing and promoting
the product, and testing the business model (Figure 33, Chapter 5). Startups continued to
seek out strategic confirmation, however were also starting to undertake operational and
tactical activities that needed confirmation from customers to ensure that founders were
using their resources appropriately (Figure 43).
By the Entrepreneurial Phase, the startups in the sample had all developed a first
(or subsequent) prototype or beta version of their product (Table 29). It should be noted
that all startups except one (Startup B) tested a similar (though adapted) MVP linked to a
particular business concept throughout the new venture creation process (Startup C had
multiple MVPs, but only one progressed to the Transitional Phase, III). Having the same
MVP throughout the new venture creation phases allowed it to be validated throughout
the new venture creation process with a particular target market - where primary and
secondary validation of the business concept would involve the same, increasingly
developed MVP, so that by the Entrepreneurial Phase, the product would be refined and
other activities related to the operations of the organization could commence. This also
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meant the business concept would be confirmed (strategic confirmation), and the startup
could begin testing more operational and tactical feedback on the business.
In contrast, the MVP that was ultimately developed and tested for Startup B
(individual pop-up events with entertainment and attendee participation) was different
than the originally envisioned business concept (a membership-based permanent
makerspace). As a result, the feedback received on the makerspace concept during the
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) was not necessarily applicable to the pop-up events
that were created in the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV).
Having received positive verbal validation on the business concept for the
membership-based makerspace, but struggling to develop the product (because the
founders were unable to find a location), the founders believed the individual pop-up
events would be able to act as MVPs to test the business concept with potential
customers. They had not, however, validated interest in the individual pop-up events.
This resulted in Startup B concurrently developing, testing and promoting the pop-up
events during the Entrepreneurial Phase (attempting to obtain all three levels of validation
at once). Not having received the initial validations, the founders had not realized that
there was limited interest in the popup events (as shown by limited ticket sales), and they
ended up overinvesting resources into a business that ultimately ceased to exist. This
suggests that if there is a change to the business model, the validation process should start
over from the primary validation stage (as seen with Startup C, until they settled on an
affiliate marketing business). Furthermore, based on the startups in the sample, this lead
to the following proposition:
P9. Startups seek out operational and tactical feedback during tertiary
validation. They already have a prototype and are transforming it into a
product and creating the organization during the Entrepreneurial Phase.
6.12.2. What is ‘Enough’ Tertiary Validation?
While the goal of validation is to offer “traction” (Ries, 2009c), there are
differences between levels of validation. Primary and secondary validation offer strategic
confirmation, allowing startups to determine the direction and goals of the business and if
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they match customer interest. It is during tertiary validation that startups should be testing
the viability of the startup’s business model, as well as its ability to deliver on this
business model.
Also, by this stage, while verbal confirmation is beneficial, startups need to start
to see some type of payment or commitment from customers to feel validated. As
validations of customer sales, downloads, contracts and public declarations continued or
were not received in the sample startups (see Table 33 for examples), obtaining
validation through growing sales (as well as contracts if a marketplace with supply-side
and demand-side customers) became much more important than verbal validation. Startup
A, Startup C, Startup D, Startup F, Startup G, and Startup I all had growing sales.
However, just having some sales were not enough to provide validation by this stage. For
example, Startup B had some sales, however, they did not seem to be sustainable.
For startups that were based around building a community that had not yet
monetized, such as Startup E, validation was based on gaining a critical number of users
that allow network effects to come into play (see Section 6.4 for more information on
network effects). This observation lead to the following proposition:
P10. During tertiary validation, startups should be receiving either monetary or
contractual confirmation (with suggested potential of monetary confirmation) from
early customers, as validation to proceed in the new venture creation process.
Other forms of commitment on their own are not sufficient by this phase.
6.12.3. Who Offers Tertiary Validation?
By the Entrepreneurial Phase, for the first time, all startups decided to interact
with the customers in the wider target market to test the customer segment, and the
business model (Figure 33 and Figure 35, Chapter 5). This is in stark contrast to
previous phases, where only some of the startups connected with customers outside their
own network.
Note that activities and communication with customers took place across a wider
number of communication channels than in previous phases (Figure 39, Chapter 5). All
startups had a website by this stage. While most startups continued to communicate with
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customers using more traditional methods – in-person, over the phone and email, there
was an increase in social media usage, traditional and online media articles (solicited and
unsolicited by founders), and physical and digital ads. The online forums were still
important to Startup E and Startup G, but they had also attempted both social and
commercial activities using crowdfunding (successful only for Startup G). Tech-savvy
startups also attempted to learn more about customers without actually talking to them by
employing data analytics (Startup C, Startup F, Startup G, and Startup I). Reaching out
via more direct channels allowed for testing with the intended target market, and to test
the potential for sales at this time. This observation lead to the following proposition:
P11. In the Entrepreneurial Phase, validation should be coming from the
external target market and have a basic level of tertiary validation reached
(monetary or contract with potential for future payment), as specified in
P10.
6.12.4. Impact of Tertiary Validation
Upon closer look at the activities undertaken during the Entrepreneurial Phase
(IV), the startups’ organizations were still being set up. Activities still involved the
customer segment being tested and developing relationships (social activities and
credibility activities; Rehme & Svensson, 2011); the product and technology
development was ongoing (technical activities); and the business model was still being
evaluated. With almost all startups (except Startup H), having received either sales or
contracts by this stage (commercial activities), we can see that the startups were
successful in developing a certain level of trust and credibility with customers.
However, in addition to these activities, the startups began seeking out validation
during customer interactions on whether, beyond a few initial sales, that they could
deliver on a product to a wider target market. This included testing whether their
promotional activities could reach a wider target market (social activities). They also
tested whether they could create operations that allowed them to deliver on the business
concept to more people. For instance, during the Entrepreneurial Phase, the startup was
testing both strategic and operational activities, including whether they could actually
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build the product that they promised (technical and production activities), testing whether
they could obtain contracts and conduct sales activities (commercial activities), testing if
they could increase operations-based activities such as managing hired employees that
carry out these activities (human resource activities), and seeing if they could increase
the startup’s focus on supply chain and logistics that would deliver goods to meet
customer expectations (distribution activities; Rehme & Svensson, 2011; Table 32).
Therefore, while the primary validation, and to a certain extent, secondary
validation, focused on ensuring the product is of interest to customers and meets the
preliminary market’s needs (but has not necessarily been created and manufactured yet),
tertiary validation validates whether startups could undertake activities to build an
organization to serve a wider, target market. These validations allow founders to test
whether they have the expertise in house to do these various activities and to answer the
questions – “Do we know how to design, do we know how to sell, do we know how to
make strategic decisions, and do we know how to obtain the resources to grow?” This
observation lead to the following proposition:
P12. Customer interactions during the tertiary validation stage test whether
the startup can undertake technical, production, human resource,
commercial, and distribution activities to organize to become an
organization.
6.13. Execute Phase
By the Execute Phase (V), the founders believed that they had a product that was
of interest to their target market, their business model was confirmed, and they had a
grasp on their operations. The focus at this stage was predominantly on the customer
(Figure 32, Chapter 5), and on increased sales and marketing efforts to promote the
startup (Figure 33, Chapter 5).
While I have categorized four startups as having reached the Execute Phase (V;
Startup A, Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E), these startups continued to test these
different concepts by undertaking activities that tested the product, tested the model and
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tested the customer segment and operations (Figure 33; Chapter 5), and also continued to
use a breadth of tested and confirmed communication channels (Figure 40; Chapter 5).
6.14. Summary of Model of Early Customer Interaction
In the second half of Chapter 6, I propose and explain a model of early customer
interactions that integrates the customer interaction-validation-spiral model into the
process of new venture creation, and offer a series of propositions on three levels of
validation throughout venture creation (Table 35).
Startups interact with customers throughout the new venture creation process,
however look for different types of validation from customers during the different phases
of new venture creation as they perform various activities related to building the business.
Founders use the feedback received to understand customers’ problems, develop and test
a product and business model, and to develop the organization.
There are three levels of validation that startups seek out during their early stages
of new venture creation. First, primary validation comes from the first interest that is
shown by early/potential customers. Typically, this takes place during the Opportunity
Discovery Phase (I) or the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). Primary validation can
take place just after the first customer interaction, and involves obtaining confirmation on
the problem that customers are having and target customer interest in product concept (or
MVP) (P1). This involves technical activities to develop the product, and social and
credibility activities to try to understand the needs and wants of customers.
Obtaining primary customer validation through verbal or text-based feedback is
often considered sufficient at this stage, as founders are learning whether the product has
features that are of interest to customers and if they would consider purchasing it (P2).
This interaction is often by chance or convenience, and involves people in the founders’
personal and professional networks, though sometimes, part of the external target markets
as well (P3). However, early customer interactions can act as a critical juncture that
triggers decisions to pursue certain paths, narrows options that can be pursued, and
triggers self-reinforcing processes to seek out future validations on business concepts
(P4).
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Table 35. Propositions from the Model of Early Customer Interactions During New Venture Creation.
Level
Validation

of

Proposition
P1: Startups seek out confirmation on the problem and product concepts during the primary validation. These
interactions test a startup’s ability to undertake technical activities to develop the product, and to try to
understand needs and wants of customers with social and credibility activities.
P2: During the primary validation, verbal or text-based validation is considered acceptable confirmation to
proceed with the new venture creation process.

Primary

P3. Founders rely on chance or convenience to undertake their first customer interaction and to obtain
feedback for primary validation. This often means relying on feedback from their nearby personal and
professional networks.
P4. An initial positive customer interaction creates primary validation for a business concept. This primary
validation is influential as it acts as a critical juncture that can narrow the path of opportunities that may be
pursued by the startup, and triggers subsequent self-reinforcing processes where the startup seeks out further
validation and develops a product and market around this validation.
P5. Startups seek out confirmation of the business concept (strategic feedback) during the secondary validation
(during the Opportunity Refinement Phase) using an MVP. The MVP need not be a prototype, however should
be representative of the final product.

Secondary

P6. During the secondary validation, startups should receive either monetary or contractual confirmation from
early customers, or other forms of commitment that demonstrate interest in the product from a ‘large’ diversity
of potential customers in their target market and their affiliated stakeholders, as confirmation to proceed in the
new venture creation process. These forms of commitment may include time, regular feedback on product and
business, offering other resources, and usage of a product that offered validation that the direction and goals of
the startup matched those of the customers.
P7. In the Opportunity Refinement Phase, it is still appropriate for a startup to receive validation from its
personal and professional market if the network is representative of its external target market and if a basic
level of secondary validation reached, as specified in P6.
P8. Customer interactions during the secondary validation stage test whether the startup can continue to
undertake social and credibility activities to develop trust and a relationship with potential customers, and
involve starting experimenting with other activities (technical, commercial, production, and human resources).
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Table 35 continued
Level of Validation

Proposition
P9. Startups seek out operational and tactical feedback during tertiary validation. They already have a
prototype and are transforming it into a product and creating the organization during the Entrepreneurial
Phase.

Tertiary

P10. During tertiary validation, startups should be receiving either monetary or contractual confirmation
(with suggested potential of monetary confirmation) from early customers, as validation to proceed in the
new venture creation process. Other forms of commitment on their own are not sufficient by this phase.
P11. In the Entrepreneurial Phase, validation should be coming from the external target market and have a
basic level of tertiary validation reached (monetary or contract with potential for future payment), as
specified in P10.
P12. Customer interactions during the tertiary validation stage test whether the startup can undertake
technical, production, human resource, commercial, and distribution activities to organize to become an
organization.
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After primary validation, the first customer interaction-validation-spiral takes
place, as parts of the business concept are developed, presented to customers in
subsequent interactions, revised and/or discarded. Adaptive Expectation Effects – selfreinforcing effects where others’ expectations and preferences are influencing individual
preferences – and Learning Effects – with an increased efficiency from an activity being
performed frequently (Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011) – are at play, as the startup develops
and accumulates skills that they can ultimately exploit.
In the secondary validation, startups seek out strategic feedback and confirmation
of their business concept using their MVP (P5). This typically takes place during the
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) and is to ensure that the business concept is validated
before additional investments are made into the business. Secondary customer validation
involves obtaining more concrete validation than just the verbal and text-based validation
received in primary customer validation. Startups should receive either monetary or
contractual confirmation from early customers, or other forms of commitment that
demonstrate interest in the product from a ‘large’ diversity of potential customers in the
target market and their affiliated stakeholders, as confirmation to proceed in the new
venture creation process (P6). ‘Large’ is self-defined by the startup. These forms of
commitment may include time, regular feedback on the product and business, offering
other resources, and using the product.
The criteria for who secondary validation is received from also increases, where
validation should come from individuals who are representative of the external target
market though may not be the wider target market (P7). The activities that are being
undertaken involve customers in social and credibility activities to develop trust and a
relationship, and involve them by experimenting with other activities (technical,
commercial, production, and human resources (P8).
If secondary validation is obtained, the startup enters the Transition Phase (III)
and commits to starting the business. This results in the additional investment of
resources to make the product and organization a reality.
From the Transition Phase, the startup enters into the second customer
interaction-validation-spiral during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) of new venture
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creation. This is a similar process to the first customer interaction-validation-spiral, where
concepts are presented to customers, subsequent revisions or validations are received, and
there is an increased commitment to resource allocation towards developing processes
and infrastructure for the business. The Adaptive Expectation Effects and Learning
Effects are still at play, however feedback from customers that deviates from the path that
the startup is currently on may be increasingly discarded, as the startup is increasingly
committed to the validated path.
Finally, in the Tertiary Validation, startups begin seeking operational and tactical
feedback when building the product and organization (P9). These include setting up
manufacturing facilities, developing processes for the way clients are handled, and
learning how to distribute the product. By this stage, all startups should be receiving
monetary or contractual confirmation (with suggested potential of monetary
confirmation) from early customers (P10). Other firms of commitment on their own are
not sufficient by this phase, and validation should be coming from the external target
market (P11).
Finally, customer interactions during tertiary validation are not just testing a
product, or an idea of a product. These interactions are testing a startups’ potential to
build an organization. Through the social and credibility activities that typically involved
testing and developing relationships and trust, founders were also engaging with
customers during technical and production activities – to ensure that the product had
desired features; during human resource activities – where customers continued to
interact with the small entrepreneurial team; in commercial activities – where startups
obtained contracts and conducted sales activities; and distribution activities – where
supply chain and logistics activities allowed goods to be delivered (P12).
In summary, these three levels of validation offer a startup regular reality checks
as to whether they should move forward and pivot. The first stage of validation is a check
for interest in an idea, so that an entrepreneur may decide whether to further explore and
develop the business concept, however, the secondary validation provides more
confirmation of a market, and achieving the tertiary validation stage suggests that the
startup is able to organize to deliver the product to a wider market.
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7. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1. Overview
Customers have a central role in clarifying or contributing to the ambiguity of the
venture creation process. From the literature, we know that customers have certain values
they are seeking and have a self-serving bias (Bendapudi & Leone, 2003) to share
feedback about their needs, preferences, and the context they live in (Etgar, 2008). From
the new product development and relationship marketing literatures on more established
organizations, we know that customers are not just passive buyers (e.g. Payne, Storbacka,
& Frow, 2008; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2000; Yi & Gong, 2013). They often share
information that affects new product development long before a product is available
(Chang & Taylor, 2016).
While entrepreneurship literature makes reference the role of early customers in
new ventures [e.g. topics such as the impact of a first sale (e.g. Rehme & Svensson, 2011;
Ruokolainen, 2008), their involvement in innovation (e.g. Coviello & Joseph, 2012), and
the implications of these relationships (e.g. Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001)], in
studying the new venture creation process, customer interactions have often been placed
at the periphery of the process or assumed to occur at later stages (e.g. Gartner, 1985;
Van de Ven, Venkataraman, Polley, & Garud, 1989; Bhave, 1994; Corbett, 2005;
Cunneen, Mankellow, & Gibson, 2007; Liao & Welsch, 2008; Chell, 2013).
In contrast, recent practitioner-based entrepreneurship approaches have emerged
in the past decade that advocate speaking with customers early and often in the startup
development process to test out ideas (e.g. Blank, 2007; Blank & Dorf, 2012; Cooper &
Vlaskovits, 2013; Maurya, 2012; Ries, 2011). The lean startup methodology and other
customer-centric entrepreneurship methods encourage entrepreneurs to develop
hypotheses and iteratively build a minimum viable product or service to meet early
customers’ needs. Assumptions about customers’ needs and values are rapidly tested,
allowing startups to pivot and change their idea as necessary. The focus with these
methods are on validating the product and the market (product/market fit), however, do
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not necessarily account for the role of customers in other aspects of creating an
organization and delivery of a product to the wider market, on a larger scale.
The limited integration of domains that address customer interactions –
marketing, new product development, new venture creation, and the lean startup
methodology – and the complexity of the entrepreneurial process, give rise to the need for
more process research (e.g. Cuunneen et al., 2007; Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016;
Hjorth, Holt, & Steyaert, 2015; Moroz & Hindle, 2011) to integrate and address the role
and long-term impact of early customers’ interactions during the startup development
process. Specifically, the literature on customer interactions in new ventures lacks an
explanation of how startups interpret what was gained from these customer interactions
over time, and how they use this feedback in decisions to proceed with the venture
creation process.
In this dissertation, I placed early customer interactions at the centre of the startup
process and asked: When and how do startups interact with early customers during the
venture creation process, and how do these interactions create path dependence for the
type of organization being created? To answer this question, I undertook an inductive,
qualitative process study of nine startups.
The within-case analyses provided an understanding of customer interactions for
each of the nine startups in the sample (Chapter 4 and Appendices B, D, and E). Various
concepts were identified in initial coding of the data (Table 9) that were used to identify
a summary of customer interactions, the startup’s focus at each phase of new venture
creation, when customer interactions first occurred, who initiated customer interactions,
what type of communication channels were used, whether the feedback from customers
was strategic or operational or tactical, the level of validation received from the personal
or professional networks of the startup or the external target market, and whether there
were contracts or sales that occurred.
From the within-case analyses, we learned that most startups had their first
customer interaction before committing to the business during the Transition Phase (III).
This interaction did not necessarily result in a sale or a contract. These first sales and
contracts, if they took place, occurred during various phases of new venture creation.
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Most of these early interactions were initiated by the startup and even in digital startups,
first interactions tended to occur in-person. Startups initially focused on a product and
customer, and eventually moved towards a customer and/or organization focus. They also
tended to seek out and obtain strategic feedback on the business concept before the
Transition Phase, and only afterwards, did startups begin to seek out operational or
tactical feedback.
Based on the results in Chapter 4, in Chapter 5 (also see Appendix F for the metamatrix), I delved into cross-case findings that address the first part of the research
question: When and how do startups interact with early customers during the new
venture creation process? The data suggests that startups undertake different types of
activities during different phases of the new venture creation process and concurrently,
undertake customer interactions that can influence these activities. In the Opportunity
Discovery Phase (I), startups focus on interacting with customers to clarify the problem
they were experiencing. Startups begin developing and testing the product in the
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), and by the Transition Phase (III), startups commit to
a business concept. This is when they also commit to the organization. By the
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), minimally, a prototype has been developed that can be tested
widely with customers in the target market. While the business concept, product and the
market, were validated earlier, at this phase, the startup needs to validate whether they
can develop an organization, business model, and operations that allow them to deliver
the product on a larger scale (the operational and tactical feedback; Section 5.1).
The analysis also suggests that the communication channels that startups use can
affect the relationships being built with customers. Startups that continued to use similar
channels throughout new venture creation were able to build deeper relationships with
similar customers over time. An online community forum could be used to test a business
concept on a wide group of dedicated potential customers and get their feedback, and
concurrently, can be used by startups to build a community of users – and increase
chances of success. Connecting with several customers early in the venture creation
process and using the communication channels that the target market uses, allows startups
to gain validation before they inappropriately invested resources into an organization
(Section 5.2).
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Finally, the cross-case finding suggested that founders interpreted feedback and
validation from customers as justification to move forward with the business or to pivot.
Verbal validation was considered adequate before the Transition Phase (III), could be
from a startup’s personal or professional networks, and did not need to be in the form of
sales or a contract. Later in new venture creation, however, validation was from the
external target market, and in the form of sales or a contract, with the potential of future
sales (Section 5.2).
While receiving and reacting to validation itself was not surprising, concurrently,
resources were being invested to build the startup, and processes and infrastructure were
being developed that would theoretically be challenging or expensive to undo – even if
customers encountered later in the process suggested changes (Appendix B). This made
understanding the mechanisms and implications of receiving validation at each of the
phases of new venture creation more salient.
With the parallels between the new venture creation process and path formation –
both showing a narrowing set of options for the product, target customer market,
operations, and business model, I then turned to the path dependence literature to better
understand these customer validations during a startup’s path formation.
In Chapter 6, I proposed a model of the self-reinforcing process that occurs when
validation is received during early customer interactions – the customer interactionvalidation-spiral. This model outlines what occurs when a startup tests out different
concepts (the product, business model, operations or market concepts) on potential
customers, what happens if the concept(s) is positively or negatively received by a
customer, and how the startup responds to this feedback. The model suggests that
validation reinforces the concept(s), and a lack of validation sends the startup to search
for improvements to the concept or to pivot (Section 6.1).
There are self-reinforcing path mechanisms at play when customers interact with
a startup, including Adaptive Expectation Effects (a self-reinforcing effect where early
customers’ expectations and preferences are influencing the startup’s direction) and
Learning Effects (where startups have an increased efficiency from performing an
activity frequently; Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011). Early customers providing suggestions
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may encourage startups to adapt their business and validation offer reinforcing
information and validation that the startup is on the right path. These self-reinforcing
mechanisms suggest that as a product is refined for a certain market, more validation is
received that supports a business concept, and as the startup learns more about how to
deliver that concept and invests more resources into the concept, alternative options
(adaptations to the business concept or pivoting) it may pursue or pivot to are reduced.
Finally, I present a model of customer interactions during the new venture
creation process with supporting propositions (Section 6.5). I apply the customer
interaction-validation spiral to explain how validation from customers plays a role during
different times in the new venture creation process. Note that one of the main goals of the
new venture creation process is to achieve clarity on and demonstrate ability to organize
to deliver on the concepts of the product, the market, the business model and their
operations.
There are three levels of validation and two customer interaction-validationspirals involved in propelling startups through the phases of new venture creation (Figure
42). The validation levels have different requirements in terms of what is being validated
(which concepts and which activities; 1), what is “enough” validation (2), what type of
customer offers the validation (3), and the impact of the validation (4).
Primary validation (predominantly verbal) from a limited number of initial
customers can be enough to initiate a potential path for the startup to pursue (at the
critical juncture, in path dependence terms). While there are still several opportunities
that could be pursued, the first narrowing of the path triggers self-reinforcing processes of
the first customer interaction-validation spiral. This then promotes the search for
additional validation or revision of the product and customer market concepts. With the
search for validation, there is also the push to undertake activities that meet the needs of
“what customers want,” akin to the adaptive expectation effects.
When validation is accumulated, a startup achieves the secondary validation level.
This level re-confirms the product and the business model but requires additional
commitment from customers - either monetary or contractual confirmation, or other
forms of commitment (such as feedback on the product or business, time, use of the
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product, or other resources) to demonstrate interest in the product from the wider target
market. Receiving this additional validation on the business concept, the founders
become even more committed to the business, further narrowing the path of opportunities
that the startup can pursue. This may lead to investment of additional resources, and the
beginning of establishing activities to manufacture, promote, and distribute the product to
a wider market.
As this investment into the startup continues, this can trigger another set of selfreinforcing processes, the second customer interaction-validation-spiral. In this second
self-reinforcing process, the startup seeks out additional validation, this time, not only on
the product and market, but also to test whether it can undertake activities to organize and
deliver on the business concept to meet customer expectations. In seeking out and
receiving additional validation, once again, other options are gradually eliminated as a
growing set of early customers’ expectations and preferences are met, the startup
becomes more efficient at performing tasks to meet those expectations and needs,
information is gathered to meet the needs of the current path the startup is on, decisions
are made to perform certain activities, resources are allocated to the path, and processes
that support the path are created within the organization.
Finally, if the product, business model, operations and market are validated and a
growing monetary or contractual confirmation is received from early customers in the
external target market, this demonstrates the existence of a market, and that the startup is
capable of organizing to be an organization. By this stage, tertiary validation considered
to be achieved. A summary of these points can be found in Table 36.
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Table 36. Characteristics of Three Levels of Validation During the New Venture Creation Process
Primary Validation

Secondary Validation

Tertiary Validation

What is being
confirmed

Business
concept,
problem,
product
(Business model)

Business concept and
product

Business concept and
ability to bring product to
market and operate a
business

Type of
Feedback

Strategic

Strategic

Operational and Tactical

Stage of product

General idea

MVP

Prototype
product

Acceptable
amount of
validation to
proceed in new
venture creation
process

Verbal
/
Text-based
(Monetary or contract
validation also acceptable
but rare)

Monetary, contract, or
other
form
of
commitment indicating a
‘large’ diversity of
potential
customers.
Commitment includes
time, feedback, and use
of product.

Monetary or contract
confirmation
(with
potential for monetary
confirmation)

Who validates

Individuals often found by
chance or convenience.
May be in the personal or
professional network (but
may also be in the
external target market,
particularly if founders
have no prior connections
to the market).

Personal, professional
market and the external
target market

External target market

The impact of
validation

Creates a critical juncture
and narrows the path of
opportunities
for
the
startup

Results
in
founder
committing
to
the
business (entering into
the Transition Phase of
new venture creation)

Demonstrates that the
product
meets
the
market’s needs, that the
business model works,
and that the organization
can undertake necessary
operations

The activities
undertaken and
tested (Rehme &
Svensson, 2011)

Technical,
credibility

Social and credibility
(and experimenting with
technical, commercial,
production, and human
resources)

Technical,
production,
human
resources,
commercial, distribution
(and social and credibility)

social

and

or

finished
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7.2. Additional Insights from Inductive Process
Several concepts emerged in the development of this model that have theoretical
implications for our understanding of customer interactions and validation during the new
venture creation process. Perhaps, most importantly, my analysis reveals not only are
there different validation levels from customers, they have different requirements to
achieve validation at progressive stages of new venture creation, including what is being
validated (which concepts and which activities), what is “enough” validation, the
closeness of the customer relationship that should offer the validation, and the impact of
the validation. My research builds on the notion that customers play a central role in
startup development (e.g. Blank & Dorf, 2012; Ries, 2011), but suggests that they play a
deeper role beyond product and market development, by contributing insights that affect
the creation of the organization as a whole.

7.2.1. The Central Role of Customers in New Venture Creation
My analysis suggests that customer interactions play an integral role in path
formation during the new venture process. What is surprising, however, is that even
though there is potential for early customers to be influential, in practice, relatively little
thought is put into the initial interactions with potential customers, that are often random
or by convenience. Primary validation, during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I),
checks for interest in an idea so that an entrepreneur may decide whether to further
explore and develop the business concept. The customers who decide to provide feedback
are also potential customers that self-select into the process of offering suggestions about
the product and business model (Sarasvathy, 2010). What this suggests is that while there
is a tendency to seek validation from customers throughout new venture creation, that it
matters who these initial interactions are with, and that they are representative of the
external target market. This is because their opinions have the potential to be
incorporated long-term into the product, the business model, and the overall organization.
If this cannot be achieved during primary validation, it should be aspired for during
secondary validation.
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While a startup has five main categories of activities it undertakes during the new
venture creation process, these activities occur during different phases (Rehme &
Svensson, 2011). The initial activities are social and credibility building – aimed to build
credibility and a relationship between the startup and the market – and technical activities
involved in developing the product. There are potential customer interactions at this stage
that will ideally offer feedback and suggestions on the product and business model
(strategic feedback), and whose suggestions would be incorporated into the startup.
Ideally, these customers would also commit to purchasing the product in the future –
making reconnecting with the same initial customers throughout the new venture creation
process important.
Meanwhile, the activities for establishing an organization continue to grow and to
be developed – including ongoing technical revisions to the product, commercial
activities to produce, market and sell the product, and the logistics needed to get the
product to customers. Validation is constantly being sought out from customers for these
operational and tactical activities. These different stages of validation with customers
reshape the startup from what the entrepreneur envisioned to an organization that both
parties care about. Ultimately, these customer interactions are validating the whole
entrepreneurial process of whether the startup has the expertise in house to make strategic
decisions, to design, sell, and obtain resources, and do what is necessary to grow and
organize to become a more permanent and stable organization.
This primary validation and secondary validation are both strategic, in that they
confirm interest in the business concept, the product and market, and the overall scope
and direction of the organization (Ansoff, 1988; Bhave, 1994; Child, 1972; Maidique &
Zirger, 1984, 1985). However, as strategic validation is received, and the founders
commit to the organization (Transition Phase), they begin organizing the infrastructure,
processes, and relationships needed to build the organization, to bring the product to
market, and to operate the business. This results in startups starting to collect operational
and tactical tertiary validation from potential customers that facilitates their assessment of
how they are organizing to bring the product to the market.
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Primary and secondary validation, obtained before committing to a business, are
often verbal or text based, or, through other forms of commitment besides sales or
contracts (for example, downloading a piece of software, providing feedback, or
becoming part of an online community), however. This implies that when founders
commit to an organization, this commitment is often based on the potential of sales,
rather than demonstrated actual sales. While this might initially be considered a risky, it
is unsurprising as this uncertainty is an expected aspect of entrepreneurship. Less than
half of the nine startups in the sample had sales by the time they committed to the
business in the Transition Phase (III). By the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), however, six
had growing sales, one startup had some sales, and one startup had a growing number of
contracts. Only one startup in the sample had no sales by this time. This suggests that
there may still need to be a leap of faith that interest will translate to sales or contracts in
the long run, but that this risk may be minimized by the demonstration of a range of
alternative forms of commitment.
7.2.2. Agency, Reflexivity, and the Formation of a Startup’s “Path”
As we saw, literature on path dependence can be helpful in explaining how
customers influence and shape the new venture creation process. The primary validation
occurs at the critical juncture of the path formation process and triggers the movement
from the Pre-Formation to the Formation Phase (Figure 3). This stage, and each
subsequent stage, of validation offers a reality check for the startup, encouraging
founders to move forward or pivot. The different stages of validation and self-reinforcing
mechanisms at play narrow the path of options for different concepts of the organization
in the first versus the second customer interaction-validation-spiral.
While the self-reinforcing processes are at play in both customer interactionvalidation-spirals, the ability and willingness of a startup to pivot in the first spiral is
likely greater than in the second spiral. In the first spiral, there is generally little invested
beyond the creation of an idea and some time. As seen from the study, confirmation from
potential customers by this stage are mostly verbal or text-based and there is likely
minimal infrastructure and resource investment into the operations of the organization.
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In the second spiral, in addition to resource investment and knowledge gained that
can facilitate the development of the business concept, there is an interest to carry on to
customer needs. This may be due to a variety of reasons, from feeling obligated or
committed to solving their problem, a feeling of sunk cost of investment, or that the
founders feel that after all this time, they have something to prove to themselves and/or to
others. The investment of resources in particular may be a restriction, as startups’
resource limitations may restrict their ability to make frequent adaptations. Regardless of
the reason, this suggests that the startup less likely to pivot in the second spiral.
Note that I am not claiming that startups reach the lock-in stage of path
dependence by the end of new venture creation. The young organizations created when
the Execute Phase has been reached are still much more adaptable than older, more
established organizations2, and startups are not likely to have experienced lock-in that
quickly.
However, these multiple stages of validation in early customer interactions
suggest that during the Formation Phase of path dependence (after the critical juncture
and before lock-in), startups are on a narrowing path (Sydow, Scheyogg, & Koch, 2009)
and there is the potential for more than one set of sequential self-reinforcing processes.
This is akin to the first and second spirals that are proposed to take place in sequence in
this new venture creation process model. The resulting stages of validation contribute to
the “wave” of options being contemplated and validated or discarded during the
Formation phase (refer to Figure 3).
Finally, this also suggests that while there is escalating reinforcement of the path
with each sequential self-reinforcing process (for example, from learning more, becoming
more efficient to serve a certain path, having already adapted to initial potential customer
needs, and including investments of resources), that as long as a startup is still able to
pivot, founders retain some agency and reflexivity to observe the results of their actions
and change their trajectory (Araujo & Harrison, 2002; Garud, Kumaraswamy, & Karnøe,

2

Even lock-in should not be considered totally rigid and should be able to have some variance, according

Sydow and Schreyogg (2015).
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2010). It is, however, the early emotional attachment to an idea (Burgelman & Grove,
1996) that can create inertia to pivot. Founders that have put on emotional blinders
(Sydow et al., 2009) to early, non-confirmatory validation may find themselves
developing a product or business model for which there is no market, or operations that
do not meet the needs of their customers. This tension between path creation and path
dependence is in line with what has previously been proposed by Sydow et al., (2009),
and supports the idea that despite self-reinforcing forces involved in a path being created,
that cognitive rigidity has not set in and entrepreneurs can play a substantial role in
creating their path.
7.3. Summary of Contributions
This research makes three main contributions. First, I contribute to the literature
on new venture creation process, by showing that customers play a central role
throughout new venture creation. Early customer interactions can influence various
activities undertaken by startups by providing validation for a business concept, or
incentive to adapt or discard the idea by pivoting. At each phase, the type of customer
interacted with can therefore be important to consider – in terms of whether they are
representative of the target market, as well as the type of validation received – whether it
is verbal, a contract, or sales. Furthermore, by conducting a process research study, we
gain a better understanding of the entrepreneurial process that is generally considered a
challenge to study.
Second, my research contributes to the growing research on the practitioner
concepts of lean startups and customer interactions to expand on the idea that customers
not only provide validation on the product and the market, but also provide validation on
how a startup develops into an organization and plans to operate in the future. This study
introduces the idea of different types of validation from customers at different stages of
new venture creation, what is validated, and the implications of the type of customer
involved. It also suggests that pivoting, advocated in this practitioner literature, can
become more challenging over time, as the startup becomes more developed. There is,
however, still the potential for agency and reflexivity in the path formation process that
occurs during new venture creation, where entrepreneurs can observe the results of their
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actions and still change their trajectory.
Finally, I contribute to the literature on the path formation process by showing
that validation can act as a trigger for narrowing the path during the Formation Phase of
path formation. My model of the customer interaction-validation-spiral – the selfreinforcing process - contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms of path
dependence. Finally, my model of early customer interaction implies that there is the
potential for multiple validation stages where the path is narrowing and evaluated, rather
than just at the critical juncture (at the end of Pre-formation) and lock-in (at the beginning
of the Lock-in stage; Sydow, Schreyogg, & Koch, 2009). This offers further insights into
the mechanisms of path dependence, further opening the black box of organizational
paths.
This study identifies that customer interactions are influential, however, have
generally been left implicit in the theorizing on the new venture creation process. More
specifically, my findings suggest the importance of startups putting more thought into
selecting these early customers for interactions, especially when there are finite resources
available to court “appropriate” customers. Finally, over time, despite agency and
reflexivity, the ease with which a startup can pivot becomes more challenging with
additional investments into the organization, sunk costs, efficiencies, and promises made
to the market that further commit the startup to continue down a given path.
7.4. Limitations
Despite attempts to capture data in as near-real time as possible, there is the
potential for retrospective bias when using interviews for data collection with participants
in a qualitative study. Having a first interview that recaps the story of the startup from
establishment is essential, and because it is nearly impossible to follow an entrepreneur
from when they first have an idea (unless you are immersed in an entrepreneurial
network), this interview will definitely be retrospective. The nature of entrepreneurship
makes it a challenge to locate startups for the sample even earlier in the new venture
creation process.

303
To mitigate this retrospective bias, I use several methods of data collection for
this study, including ‘real-time’ observations of the founders, including: daily work and
interactions of founders in the incubator, events with customer interactions, attending
customer focus groups or listening to sales calls, and watching entrepreneurial pitches. I
also collected blogs, news articles written about the startups, radio and television show
features on the startups, press releases written by the founders or their external marketing
team, social media data, images on the startups’ websites, interactions in third-party
online community forums, public interactions on startups’ websites, internal documents
(when available), and conducted mentor interviews (when available) to triangulate
interview data to minimize the potential for retrospective bias in the data. The
participants were also briefly consulted to ensure that I interpreted the general
understanding of their events correctly.
It should be noted, however, that the goal of this research was to collect narrative
data. As a result, while the other methods of data collection that confirm the stories of the
founders are beneficial, ultimately, the goal was to gain the founders’ perspective of the
startups on how their business progressed. Therefore, the bias that may exist in this
dissertation is in my interpretation of their narratives and supporting material.
Furthermore, as these are interpretive narratives, this study is unable to conclude
whether the startup’s interpretations of validation were appropriate or not to create a
successful business. While this was not specifically the goal of the study, the field of
business is generally performance focused (whether it is revenue, growth, or another
measure). This leaves room for other future studies, however, that look at organizations
over a longer period of time, from early startup stage, up until when they are more
established or when they fail. This would allow for looking at performance measures and
reducing survivor bias in future studies.
Generalizability of findings is always a question when a limited number of cases
are used. The tradeoff however allows for in-depth and accurate observations of the
phenomenon of interest. What this means, however, is that these findings are applicable
to startups in incubator settings, but not necessarily to startups in general. However,
startups in general may also learn from how customer interactions and validations occur
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during the new venture creation process, particularly, in that there may be multiple
validation stages that need to be evaluated over time and consideration should go into the
customer interactions pursued. This provides an opportunity for future research to
determine whether there is a difference between the customer interaction processes of
startups in incubators and outside of incubators.
The presence of these startups in an incubator setting also has implications for
generalizability. First, the startups in the incubator have been screened for the “potential”
of their business idea and the founders. Second, by being at this entrepreneurial stage,
accepted to an incubator, startups are no longer in the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I),
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), or the Transition Phase (III), as they have
demonstrated a commitment to starting a business. As mentioned previously, despite
attempts to follow startups early, in real-time, it was not possible to follow them from
conception. As a result, data collected on these earlier phases were retrospective, and may
have been as far as two years prior or as recent as four months prior to data collection.
Accessing startups in early stage incubators is still beneficial for this type of
research, because they identify startups that have a business concept of interest but may
not have tested it or may not have done much development of the organization yet.
However, much can still be learned from startups in incubators. They are all receiving
similar information in a given ecosystem and were screened by similar criteria, however,
still behave differently. Furthermore, as the presence of incubators are growing on
university campuses and in entrepreneurial communities, understanding startups in these
environments can be beneficial to improve the new venture creation process.
Another point to note is that the study groups physical and digital products and
services under the same category of “product.” There are also different business models,
including community based networks, creating the potential for differences in how
customers are interacted with. While this was done intentionally to obtain a diversity of
industries and to see if a general customer interaction process could be observed, this
diversity also limits the potential to draw conclusions about customer interactions in a
specific type of industry. It does, however, present an opportunity for future research on
early customer interactions in specific business models, product types, or industries.
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7.5. Statement of Reflexivity
Willig (2001) suggests that prior experiences and beliefs can shape qualitative
research. As a result, I present a statement of reflexivity to allow readers to “explore the
ways in which a researcher’s involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon,
and informs such research” (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999: 228).
While today I have a strong fascination with the entrepreneurial process, this was
not always the case. With the exceptions of childhood baked goods and vegetable stands,
I have not yet started my own business. My first influential exposure to entrepreneurship
was in my role as a co-operative education student in Biology at the University of
Waterloo, working for biotechnology startups in the early 2000s. There, I was exposed to
challenges of product development and resource constraints of a startup. However, during
a biotech boom when these types of ventures were well funded and as a student employee
who was relatively un-invested in the business, I was sheltered from the true implications
of what happens if a venture fails. The businesses I worked for were a few years old by
this stage, and already had demonstrated their potential to customers by virtue of being
medical-related products that aided in the detection of widely occurring chronic diseases,
such as heart disease, cancer, and HIV.
Fast forward to 2004, to my degree in Nutritional Biochemistry and Metabolism
at the Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy at Tufts University in Boston. I
was mostly embedded in learning about the natural sciences, but being in a school of
applied nutrition, I also learned about small subsistence farmers starting their own
businesses and the humble origins of large food and agriculture companies such as
McDonalds, Monsanto, and Nestlé. Later, my career and life took me to Hong Kong for
my MBA at City University of Hong Kong in 2006, and subsequently, Singapore in 2009
for work. During my time in Asia, I incidentally met entrepreneurs that had started their
own real estate businesses, software companies, fashion companies, and their own
restaurants. Once again, however, I thought little of these encounters from an
entrepreneurial perspective, but rather, from the innovation process of product
development that I had been exposed to, earlier in my education.
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Finally, even when I had started my PhD journey, I was still focused on the
innovation processes in organizations. It was not until a research trip to India, where I had
the opportunity to interview several entrepreneurs for another study, and in my
discussions with faculty, that I found that several of the concepts that piqued my interest
in innovation were not only relevant in startups, but also had additional challenges and
puzzles that needed to be considered.
In undertaking this current study over the past few years, I reflected on my
previous encounters with entrepreneurial settings, and my level of respect for
entrepreneurs has ballooned. In the process of this research, I spent several hours with
entrepreneurs in my sample in their work environments. I developed a relationship and
rapport with them that facilitated data collection. This extended time together also made
me feel as though I was going through the entrepreneurial process with them. These
relationships allowed me to develop an in-depth understanding of the creative nature of
their work, the uncertainty, frustrations, and unrelenting hours they endured, as well as
the passion, resourcefulness, and drive they had to persist in the new venture creation
process. At times, they considered me a “therapist,” of sorts, where they were cued to
reflect on their customer interactions. This reflection process itself may play a role in
biasing the data, as not all entrepreneurs take the time to do this without reminders or
incentives. Therefore, in collecting and analyzing the data in this study, I am certainly
biased towards the entrepreneurs I have followed. As the readers of this dissertation
assess my research and findings, they should be aware of these perspectives.
7.6. Future Research Directions
The richness of the cases triggered the potential for future research opportunities
to explain the long-term implications of early customer interactions in the new venture
creation process. These include:
•

To start, several propositions related to the customer interaction model were
proposed in Chapter 6 that could be further tested and their boundary conditions
could be explored.
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•

Furthermore, the study further opened the black box of the mechanisms of path
formation and proposed the potential for multiple levels of validation and selfreinforcing processes. The tension between the lack of agency often associated
with self-reinforcing effects, and the agency and reflexivity of entrepreneurs
makes startups an ideal setting to understand how reflexivity that we do not
necessarily see in more established organizations may decrease over time. To my
knowledge, minimal empirical studies exist in this area.

•

The startups in the sample came from several industries. Future studies could
address the effects of different industries on customer interactions – where for
example, customers may be more, or less, involved in new venture creation, there
may be restrictions in the co-creation process (Baqer, 2006; Blazevic & Lievens,
2008; Payne et al., 2008) due to factors such as knowledge gaps and regulations,
and where customers may be more challenging to engage.

•

The ongoing search for validation, and the uncertainty involved, makes the new
venture creation process a sensitive and vulnerable period for startups. Related
literature on imprinting addresses this sensitive period and suggests effects during
this period persist, regardless of changes to the external environment (Marquis &
Ticsik, 2013; Stinchcombe, 1965). It is possible that the entire new venture
creation process is a sensitive period, or even, just the first sale should be seen as
a sensitive period for an organization (Carroll & Hannan, 2004). This first sale
may imprint on a startup, that is optimistic to make a first sale, and making it
increasingly receptive to external influence (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). Given
these potential effects, confirmed first customers could be seen as having
substantial, long-term impacts, affecting customization of products or services and
firm reputation (e.g. Blomqvist, 1997), as well as startups’ emerging business
strategy, R&D, and technology development (Herstatt & von Hippel, 1992;
Ruokolainen, 2008). Given the potential persistent effects of a confirmed first
customer, a future study involving longer observation period is needed to
understand the long-term effects of imprinting and path dependence, and to
understand the impact of these early levels of validation on creating scenarios for
imprinting in startups.
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•

As the startups are not yet at lock-in, future studies may analyze organizations
that have made it to a later stage of development to understand the details of how
and when lock-in occurs. To do so, ongoing data collection of the same startups,
and other startups can help create a larger dataset with longer time periods. These
could be used to assess how changes in the global and/or business environment
may impact the advanced organization, and subsequently, due to lock-in, how
difficult it is for it to no longer act on these changes, resulting in inefficiencies or
market failures.

•

Literature suggests that founders’ past experiences bring history to a startup (Fiol
& Lyles, 1985). This implies a potential difference in path dependence and
imprinting processes between inexperienced and experienced founders. Future
studies may acknowledge and compare these concepts in the startups of serial and
portfolio founders, as well as first-time entrepreneurs (Parker, 2013; Rouse,
2015).

•

From the data, it appears that developing relationships with potential customers
from early in the venture creation process creates a community where all stages of
validation could be obtained. This is particularly salient with Startup G, that did
not receive a contract or sales until the Entrepreneurial Phase, however sought out
and received a large amount of textual validation from a diversity of customers.
The startup was able to build relationships with potential customers from early on
and received validation in a very public manner in an online community forum.
This suggests that there is the potential for data involving public declarations and
communities to increase sales to be further explored.

7.7. Implications for Practice
The process of seeking validation and its long-term implications suggests that
entrepreneurs should have a more methodical approach to customer interactions and
review of feedback, even in fluid, early stage environments such as startups. Establishing
customer relationships should be a main planning issue for startups. Because customer
may not initially trust startups, it is hard to develop these relationships. When possible,
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using personal networks can help establish initial trust with customers, and they may act
as referrals to the wider target market (Gruber, 2007).
This study also suggests that during new venture creation, it should still possible
to make strategic choices to change the situation of the startup. Even though the path is
narrowing, rather than having emotional blinders to undesirable issues (e.g. Sydow et al.,
2009), there is the possibility for entrepreneurs to be more mindful of the customers they
interact with, and how they interpret their feedback in the grand scheme of getting the
product, business model, organizational processes and market organized. This may
require additional reflection when at a critical decision point to determine if information
received from customers so far are representative of the target market. Mindfulness can
affect decisions to deviate from paths (Garud & Karnoe, 2001), and being mindful in
customer selection may remove “autopilot” features in entrepreneurs, where they rely on
preexisting notions and previous experiences (Gordon & Schaller, 2014).
Though the path will have narrowed, startups should be able to overcome the path
they are on and either exploit or transform emerging strategic opportunities related to the
product, business model, organizational processes or market with path-breaking changes.
However, even at such early stages, startups may still be unwilling or unable to do so
based on normative, resource-based, or cognitive reasons (Rothman et al., 2014). This
may be due to a developing tension between the path dependence effects that are
occurring and the agency we typically may see with entrepreneurs to create their
organizational path. Regular reflection and self-regulation – “a systematic process of
human behavior that involves setting personal goals and steering behavior towards the
achievement of established goals” (Zeidner et al., 2000: 751) – are important in
tempering this.
McMullen and Kier (2016) suggest that there are different mindsets that can affect
susceptibility to escalation of commitment when exploiting an entrepreneurial activity,
and that opportunities should be pursed with skepticism, or questioning and doubt.
However, entrepreneurs often face “Stockdale Paradox,” where they continue to hope that
they will succeed, even if the goal is not possible to achieve. The authors also propose
ways to reduce likelihood of escalation of commitment, that include having milestones
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set where goals are regularly re-evaluated (Allison, 1971) and contingency plans
developed to allow for the opportunity to discarded. This is in-line with the importance of
planning and mindfulness in approaching customer interactions.
Given the different levels of validation that push founders to move forward or to
pivot, the potential implications of these findings for practice are substantial. This
research helps clarify the impact of early customers on the venture creation process and
will help incubators and entrepreneurial training programs educate entrepreneurs on the
importance of regular reflection on customer interactions. Such an approach will ideally
help entrepreneurs optimize early customer selection to align with their growth strategy.
I suggest that mindfulness of entrepreneurs in each interaction with early
customers can help temper the proposed self-reinforcing effects – both positive and
negative. Mindful entrepreneurs can nonjudgmentally assess their own processes,
physical and mental. They can self-reflect on information received from customers and
other stakeholders, recognize where they may have made mistakes, and use evidence to
make decisions – making each piece of information received from customers better
understood and easier to act upon. In incubator settings, this may be triggered by regular
meetings with mentors, discussion groups with other entrepreneurs, and lessons in
reflection on customer interactions and other actions undertaken, and their implications.
In selecting customers, startups may be mindful in distinguishing how well
personal and professional networks represent the external target market. While having
these relationships and knowledge may bring an advantage to these startups to validate
the business concepts early, it is essential that these startups reach out to the wider
external target market to continue to test and expand the business. Without doing this,
there is the potential to have the path dependence based on a non-representative sample.
The business then may be tailored towards the wrong market. Furthermore, an early,
unique chance interaction can be risky, where you do not encounter that customer again
or they are unwilling to commit at a later time. In fact, startups unsure how embedded
they are in the external target market may consider seeking out external market validation
from the start – even if it is less convenient than reaching out to their personal and
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professional network. This would reduce the chance of investing in an idea that has not
received proper validation.
Challenges in assessing commitment and validation can also be minimized by
building and maintaining relationships with the same market segment consistently
throughout new venture creation. If validation and interest are received early from a
potential customer, it makes sense to try to encounter that customer later when it comes
time to make a sale.
Also, founders may interpret validation in different ways, but sales are still the
ultimate validation. If it is not possible to validate by obtaining sales early in the new
venture creation process, often a challenge with physical products (Startup G) or with
social networks (Startup E), building a relationship early with customers is beneficial to
receive multiple perspectives from potential customers. This validation can be accessed
through several channels – such as downloads of software (Startup E), attendance of
events, media coverage, and verbal/textual public validation through online messaging
forums and social media (Startups G and E), and private messaging. Also looking to the
previous history of the industry and partners (Startup F) can provide some initial
validation, create embeddedness, trust and commitment.
Finally, if a startup still has not received sales or a contract validation by the
Entrepreneurial Phase, it is likely to continue to face challenges. This suggests that there
may not be a market for this product, or that this startup is not able to organize to deliver
the product in a way that is satisfactory to potential customers.
7.8. Concluding Thoughts
It is surprising that customer interactions have predominantly had a peripheral
role in the new venture creation process literature (e.g. Bhave, 1994; Cunneen et al.,
2007). It was not until the recent emergence of practitioner-based lean startup methods
(e.g. Blank & Dorf, 2012; Maurya, 2012; Ries, 2011) that early customers became more
of a central focus in entrepreneurship research. I am also surprised how the mechanisms
of the early, entrepreneurial stages of forming the organizational path are also often taken
for granted. I hope that my dissertation will serve as a call to action for further study of
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the various roles that customers play in the new venture creation process and how they
inform the decisions and activities that founders make to design, sell and obtain resources
necessary to grow and organize into a more permanent and stable organization. Most
particularly, I hope that the early customer interaction model and proposed validation
levels will prompt a better understanding of how founders’ first envisioned ideas are
transformed into organizations that both startups and their customers care about. I also
hope that the reviews of the new venture creation literature and the lean startup
methodology will provide a bridge between these two literatures for future evaluations.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. SAMPLE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW
QUESTIONS
Note: not all questions will be repeated in subsequent interviews
1. General
•
•

Can you tell us something about how this idea for this startup came about?
When you were deciding on what your startup would be, was there any
discussion on, “who we are not”? Can you describe these discussions?

2. Agency: The role of founders and owners and image management
•

What do you see your contribution in the project to be/what is the nature of your
involvement? What are the important actions that you are undertaking during the
founding of the venture?
• Does one member of your team in particular impact the direction of the venture?
• To what organizational peers do you compare your venture/see as competitors?
• How would outsiders describe your venture?
3. Informal organization and identity: Central, enduring, distinctive, and dynamic
organizational elements
• What types of products/services will/do you offer?
• What is (are) the most central characteristic(s) of your venture? What do you
think makes your venture what it is? Which of these characteristics are the most
enduring and distinctive? What term or metaphor do you think currently best
describes your venture?
• Have there been any major shifts in the importance of these characteristics in the
past week(s)? If so, why?
4. Early Potential Customers
•
•
•

What are the venture’s target customer groups (in other words, who do you see
as your potential customers) and what value does your product offer them?
Do you have an ideal type of customer?
When did/will you interact with your first potential customer? What stage
was/will your business be in in its development? How did the connection
originate? Why did you decide to have this interaction at this time? What did
you/do you hope to learn from that customer? What did you do with the
information you learned from interactions with the customer? How did that
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•

•

•

•

interaction affect the type of business you are creating? Does this customer meet
your idea of an ideal customer? Why/why not did this interaction change your
business?
When did you interact with your next potential customer?/What potential
customers did you interact with since we last met? How did the connection
originate? Why did you wait until then/why did you interact at that time? Does
this customer meet your idea of an ideal customer? How is this customer similar
or different from the other customer(s) you have interacted with? What stage of
your business were you in? What did you learn from these customers? How did
their feedback affect the direction you took the business?
Did you speak with anyone else, seeking advice about any particular customer?
If yes, what were their comments? If not, why not? How did you use this
information?
In the case of 2 or more potential customers having been interacted with: Do
you feel that one of these potential customers is more important to your
business? Why or why not?
What activities have you undertaken with any past potential customers since we
last talked?

5. Confirmed First Customer
-

-

With your confirmed first customer, how did you select them/how did they select
you? What types of activities did/do you interact on? What did you learn from
these interactions? At what stage of your business were you when you had your
first interactions? What stage of your business is your business at now?
How did committing to this first customer affect your business?

6. Other Information
-

What other activities have you done/what else has affected the business since we
last met?
Have you changed any practices or activities in your startup since we last talked?
If so/if not, why?
What other stakeholders have you interacted with? How did this interaction affect
how you perceived the business? How did this interaction affect your next steps?
Have there been any changes in the environment that may affect/have affected
your business? If so, what are they and why do you thing they matter?

7. Near Future Focus
-

Do you have any upcoming discussions planned with customers (new and
ongoing discussions)? How did these connections arise? Do you feel this
customer important to you and your venture’s development, and why?

Startup A
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APPENDIX B. DETAILED CASE STUDIES WITH PARTICIPANT
QUOTATIONS
Appendix B1. Startup A
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS
1.1. Business Idea
Though the idea to produce their beverage arose in 2012, the beverage company,
Startup A, was officially founded in July 2014. The founders described their business as
follows: “[we] make the best organic [specialty beverage], the only 100 percent certified
organic [specialty beverage] on the market. We are the only company doing seasonal
craft flavours… and like a craft brewery – we try to stay small batch” (Startup A
Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
1.2. Founders
Startup A was started by a couple in their 20s, who at the time of company
foundation were engaged to be married (they subsequently married in late 2016). They
had met at a fitness facility where they both worked and bonded over shared interests in
physical activity, nutrition and health. One co-founder, Founder F, had a Bachelors’
Degree in Health Promotion and a certificate in food security. In 2012, Founder F was
diagnosed with an illness that motivated her to make lifestyle changes to her diet. This
included making the beverage at home for personal consumption. In the meantime, she
found that she was passionate about creating a beverage that tasted great, used local, inseason ingredients, and had some health benefits. The other co-founder, Founder M, had
a Masters’ of Science degree in Health Promotion. He had started his Ph.D. in Health
Promotion, and had a background in personal training, certified holistic nutrition and as a
lifestyle coach. Both co-founders had a strong interest in promoting the health benefits of
the beverage and in supporting the local organic food system and sustainable business
practices.
1.3. About the Customers
In Startup A, there were multiple types of customers. These included both
individual consumers and the retailer stores that the beverage would be sold through, as
well as distributors. In speaking about these businesses: “they are customers now,
supporters, but also retailers” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
The individual consumers that the founders were initially targeting were
individuals that shared similar backgrounds to them - health conscious individuals
interested in local and organic beverages: “The [customers] that are our backbone are
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our health conscious yogi type, younger hipsters… They really already know what [our
product] is. We come from that lifestyle ourselves.” However, they also wanted to target
a couple of growing demographics that either were looking to incorporate healthy
beverages into their diet, or individuals seeking to mix this beverage with alcohol: “But
really, the big opportunity is middle aged women... And then craft cocktails. So, brew
pubs, riding that craft beer, microbrewery culture. And, we’d have a few strategic
partners [that may help with that]. I think the sky’s the limit there… [Such as] your local
organic vegan cafes. So, any place that focuses on local food” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 7 June, 2016).
Furthermore, there were different types of retail stores that they had as customers.
Initially, their retail customers were “grassroots, local, specialty grocery store and
farmers’ market partnerships” and over time, potential customers grew to larger retail
supermarket chains where they could reach more people. Startup A also talked about
distributors of their beverage as customers – essentially any organization or individual
interested in exchanging funds for the product.
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2. STARTUP HISTORY
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016
Start of More
Retail
Partnerships

Taste Testing Began
First Sales to Family &
Friends

Apr/13

Jul/13

First Contract with Specialty
Supermarket #1

Production Moved
to 22,000 sq ft
Facility

Contract with Specialty
Supermarket #2

First Retailer Contract Signed
Oct/13

Jan/14

May/14

Received Loan for New
Production Facility

3 Distributors and 75 Retailers

Idea - Founder has Health
Issues
Dec/12

Focus on Existing Customers

Aug/14

Nov/14

Production Began in
20' x 20' Space
Developed Name and Bottle
Design

Mar/15

Jun/15

Sep/15

Jan/16

Apr/16

Jul/16

Oct/16

Feb/17

First Official Sale (Farmers'
Market)
Contract with Regional
Supermarket #1
Startup's Retail
Store Opened

Increase locations for Regional
Supermarket #1, Contacted by Warehouse
Retailer and Large Distributors
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes
2.2.1. Founder F experienced health issues.
In 2012, Founder F was diagnosed with health issues. To combat her illness, she
started research into ways she could change her diet to feel better, and learned that
consuming fermented foods would be helpful. The couple then began experimenting with
making various fermented products for personal consumption and found that they could
make a beverage that not only had a pleasant taste but also had health benefits, such as
being “a source of probiotics that is full of beneficial bacteria” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 7 June, 2016).
2.2.2. Sales of beverage to family and friends as a hobby.
Personal network. In 2013, the founders began selling small amounts of the beverage to
family and friends as a hobby while they were both in school. They received positive
feedback, including that their beverage was “the best” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7
June, 2016).
2.2.3. Developed name and bottle for product.
Early 2014 (approximately March 2014), the couple developed a name for Startup
A and a bottle for the beverage when they decided to explore the possibility of making
this a business.
2.2.4. Founder F began new job at organic grocer (Retailer #1) and new production
location (#1) established.
In April 2014, Founder F started a new job managing an organic grocer, based at a
farmers’ market. With some flexibility in their jobs, and access to a food production
facility, the couple set up operations for the business in a new 20’x20’ space. While they
were now making the beverage in a commercial facility, this was still a hobby: “to make
some money on the side” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). In the meantime,
Founder M was finishing up his Masters’ degree and was also a personal trainer on the
side.
2.2.5. Testing product with Founder M’s personal training clients.
Professional network and word-of-mouth.
In-person. By May 2014, Startup A started providing free samples of the beverage to
Founder M’s personal training clients in exchange for product feedback: “[My personal
training] clients liked it. They had tried other [specialty beverages] and said this was the
best. We kept being told that… One guy, he bought a litre and said, this is great! And
then, he gave some to a friend who said, he wanted a litre. And then, he gave some to his
friend, who then wanted a litre. And so, within a few weeks, it was like, okay, we’ve hit so
many max capacities, it’s already mind blowing. But people were saying it’s the best.
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And it wasn’t until we got out there and people that we didn’t really know were coming
up to us and saying, ‘this is good! This is really awesome!’ [did we realize we had
something that might sell].” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). At the time
however, the business remained a hobby: “We were testing out with clients in May 2014
or so. And into Fall 2014, and even before that in 2013, we were doing some sales, but it
was all just a hobby” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
2.2.6. Committed to growing the business – Logo designed and Ph.D. put on hold.
Founder M had started his Ph.D. earlier that year, however at the end of 2014, he
decided to put his studies on hold. With sales going well, he decided to focus on creating
Startup A with Founder F. They had the logo for the beverage created shortly thereafter:
“It was this gut feeling. I thought, I’ll drop out of school and make this happen. So, we
had a friend draw up the [Startup A’s] logo, who was a graphic designer… He drew that
up and from the start, that was our only marketing tool. A great looking bottle with a
great product” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
Personal network, in-person. Given their connection with the health industry, the
couple had a strong professional network in which they could promote the product. To
start testing interest in the specialty beverage, they decided to test whether it was possible
to sell the product through retailers and other local businesses that knew them personally:
“At the time, we had zero Facebook friends… [Starting the business] would not have
happened without [Founder F’s close network of] who’s who in the organic [food
industry] and my connections in the health industry and knowledge of the health space. It
was the right time and right place. We hit the ground hustling [in various local shops and
markets]. And they said, ‘yes of course! If you two are behind this, of course we’ll carry
it.’… I think we were ahead of the game with a network of people who knew what they
were talking about, saying this [beverage] was great. It truly made a difference that we
had the movers and shakers in the [organic and health food] space saying, ‘yeah, get
going on this!’ ” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
2.2.7. Moved to second, larger production space (Production Location #2).
By early 2015, Startup A realized that if they were serious about growing the
business, they would need to have their own, larger production facility. By March 2015,
Startup A had found a location and expanded production into a 22,000-square foot space.
2.2.8. Partnered with Retailer #1.
Professional network. By April 2015, Startup A had found and initiated their first
retailer partnership with the organic grocer (Retailer #1; Refer to 2.2.4) that Founder F
had originally worked at in the local farmers’ market. The partnership was considered a
great success as the beverage regularly sold out each week: “That’s where our target
market was going. I guess it was good we were selling out. The market would go from
eight in the morning to one, but we would sell out by ten [at Retailer #1]. Then we made
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a little more, and we sold out at 11. Then we made more and we sold out at 12.
Eventually, we made it through the whole day” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June,
2016).
2.2.9. First farmers’ market booth and first official sale to individual consumer.
In-person market retail. Startup A had their first official sale to individual consumers in
May 2015 at their booth in the local farmers’ market. The farmers’ market booth was
helpful to spread awareness about the specialized beverage, to explain what the product
was, and to dispel myths about it. The founders would explain the benefits to potential
customers as follows: “You can drink this as a source of probiotics that is full of
beneficial bacteria. I’ll give you the whole spiel…” (Startup A Founder, Farmers’ Market
Visit, 9 June, 2016).
Unsolicited media. Coincidently, a television talk show that promoted the health benefits
of the specialty beverage around the same time. This helped boost sales of the beverage:
“Dr. Oz did an episode on [specialty beverage], maybe two weeks after we started [in
May 2015]… Essentially, when he says it, they all walk to the health food store and say,
‘we need this!’ They came flocking. [They] found us on Facebook and said, ‘we want
[specialty beverage]!’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
Social media. As part of their drive to become more present on social media, Startup A
set up Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter accounts to post pictures of their product and of
people with their product at the farmers’ market booth and other places around town.
2.2.10. Building retailer partnerships.
Phone, emails in-person meetings, professional network. From June 2015 onward,
Startup A continued to search for new retailers to sell their product at. The initial goal
was to partner with grass root retailer places: “chiropractors, medical doctors, yogis,
holistic nutritionists, food bloggers, farmers’ markets” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7
June, 2016). Some of these were retailers in their network of health professionals that
both co-founders knew from their previous careers. They specifically chose retail
locations where they believed the health-conscious individual shopped, and retailers with
similar views on nutrition and health: “We try to partner up with likeminded people. I’d
say 80 percent are. 20 percent aren’t…” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
Startup A was however not limiting themselves to only working with the health
food market, but also wanted to expand into the mainstream food and beverage markets:
“Our goal is to get our product on the shelves of anywhere currently selling [specialty
beverage]. [With large retailers], at the end of the day, they would move a lot of our
product and they do have our target market. They say they are about what we are about,
so it only makes sense that they do it. So, I keep calling them… I guess the bigger they
are, [the tougher it is to get them interested]. Often, I have to talk to a guy who is 55
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years old, who doesn’t know what [specialty beverage] is. He’s at this company to help
them grow, but he wants me to bend over backwards like everyone else has done for him”
(Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
2.2.11. Media coverage.
Blog, radio, television. In June 2015, Startup A started receiving local media coverage.
They were featured in a blog, local daytime television, and an hour-long local radio show
(Startup A’s Website).
Blogs (4), event, newspapers (2), radio and television. The initial media exposure
sparked a series of media pieces and public exposure that raised awareness about Startup
A, including: a blog in September 2015, a local organic food event in October 2015, a
blog and newspaper article coverage in November 2015, a radio feature in December
2015, a blog in January 2016, a television feature in February 2016, a newspaper article
in the local paper in March 2016, and a blog article in June 2016 (Startup A’s Website).
2.2.12. First contract with Specialty Supermarket Chain #1.
Phone and email. In February 2016, the startup was contacted by their first potential
non-independent retailer – a specialty supermarket chain (#1) - that they would consider
working with as a retail customer. Although the supermarket chain had originally
contacted Startup A, the startup had a difficult time re-connecting with the supermarket
after this initial contact. The co-founders tried phone calls and emails to connect with the
product managers, however they were not getting any response: “It was a very long
process, starting in, maybe February or March. They had actually contacted us saying,
‘Hey, we want to hear from you guys.’ And then they said, ‘okay, everything seems good.’
Then there was six-weeks where we didn’t hear anything back and I [followed up with]
calls once or twice a week. At first, I was leaving messages, but I didn’t leave messages
at the end. I was [also] sending emails and I heard nothing back. It’s like we fell off the
face of the planet, right?” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016).
Care package and samples of beverage sent to specialty supermarket headquarters.
Startup A was persistent in trying different types of messages to reach the company over
the next couple of months. And then in May 2016, they sent a care package of the
beverage over to the specialty supermarket chain headquarters with a hand written thank
you card: “I just didn’t want to lose that sale, didn’t want to lose that account. I knew
[that if we] landed that sale, we’d start landing other sales. Maybe [competing specialty
grocery store] would jump onboard… I just kept doing things like calling, saying, ‘Hey.’
I remember even leaving one message, just trying to be funny. I said, ‘Hey, you’re in my
dreams. You’re in my thoughts. Thinking of you guys. We had a great conversation on the
phone and I’m really looking forward to getting together. I have a few more things I’d
like to share with you to help move things along if that needs be. But it wasn’t until two
weeks ago, when I sent a case of [the beverage] with some feature flavors with a thank
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you card saying, ‘Thanks very much for meeting with us. We’re really looking forward to
hearing from you.’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016).
In June 2016, the specialty supermarket chain #1 finally re-connected with Startup
A. Founders F and M were convinced that this personal touch won them over: “And then
last week… she contacted us and said, ‘hey, we got [your delivery]. Thanks so much!
Good news, we want to let you know that we’re going to list the product.’ We [think what
might have sold them was that we] did a really good phone tasting with them…. So, they
had our product… And we said, ‘As soon as it’s convenient, let’s get on the phone and
we’ll do a tasting.’ So, I’d talk about prices, company values, and where we would fit
with their current company values… We’d try to say, ‘Hey, we have similar values. Let’s
do this!’ [I thought we had] a really strong sales presentation. We just try to be really
professional, so that probably has a role… [but it would have been helpful if they’d
replied with] a few e-mails saying, ‘hey we’re busy. Sorry. We can’t get to you. We’ll get
to you soon.’ We even had our distributor call and he said there’s still no answer. So,
maybe it was the little thank you card and the personal touch [that made a difference]. I
don’t know” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016).
2.2.13. Built up volume of contracts with small, independent retailers.
By June 2016, Startup A had seventy-five retailers and three distribution companies
(Distributors #1, #2, and #3) that their beverage product was distributed through, and
continued to reach individual customers in person at their weekly local farmers’ market.
The selection of retailers that Startup A partnered with were smaller, grassroots, local,
independent specialty grocery stores or farmers’ market partnerships. At this stage, they
still had not landed a partnership with a larger grocery store chain.
The distribution companies that they worked with were also small and local. Startup
A specifically wanted to monitor who their product was distributed to: “All three of our
distribution companies know they can’t sell to just anybody without my approval….
They’re all growing with us. They’re not making much money and I appreciate their help.
And, I look forward to growing with them and working together on that” (Startup A
Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
Phone. Even with this success with independent retailers, Startup A wanted to increase
its smaller retailer network: “We have to create a really good master list of [potential
retailers to sell through] – who’s who – and maybe do some calls to ask people if they’d
like to get ready to carry [the beverage]” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
To facilitate sales with these businesses, they wanted to develop a sales script:
“I’m hoping to develop a solid sales script. I’m hoping to… get together the sales
training so we can educate people, hopefully, train them to sell [our product]” (Startup A
Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
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Emails and in-person meetings. Most of the time, these retailers were corresponded
with over the phone, email and in-person: “With that e-mail I sent out, we finally got a
contract from them.” And sometimes clarifying meetings are in person: “My meeting this
morning was supposed to be about just one of these contracts and they just wanted to go
over it together” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 July, 2016).
2.2.14. Attempted first meeting with National General Supermarket Chain #1.
Phone. Early June 2016, Founder M had a phone call scheduled with one of the largest
supermarket retailers in the country. By then however, the product manager had cancelled
their phone call a few times: “He’s postponed a couple of times. I guess he’s a busy guy”
(Startup A Founder, Farmers’ Market Visit, 9 June, 2016).
In-Person. With several cancelled meetings, Founder M ended up visiting the large
supermarket chain headquarters in person: [The meeting] didn’t happen because he was
just too busy. So, I called him on the phone, and he basically said, ‘Just got me another
busy day.’ So, I asked, ‘is it better for me to come in and see you, in person?’ And he
said, yes. That usually works if you just show up.’ So, tomorrow afternoon I’m just going
to show up at one and say, ‘let’s meet.’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016).
2.2.15. Search for new production space.
Despite having set up a meeting a national general supermarket chain #1 in June
2016 (see 2.2.14), Startup A realized that they would be unable the needs of such a large
retailer with their current level of production and current facilities: “So, this meeting will
happen tomorrow, but just to start this process. We’re not completely ready to produce
for them… I wouldn’t want to say, ‘Hey, this is [Startup A]. We would like you to carry
our product, but we can’t quite do it yet. If they’re ready to go, I’d be fearful that they’d
just reach out to a competitor” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016).
The co-founders believed that having a presence of their beverage at a larger
supermarket chain would gain them legitimacy with other retailers: “I feel like by getting
in with [a large retailer] in that corporate realm that [other large retailers will say],
okay, they’re kosher. They’re good. Now, we can take them on [as a supplier]…. I feel
like right now, we’ve got the best of both worlds. Now, we’ve got our corporate partners.
We’ve got our grass root partners, and then our values. I feel that it will open up new
doors” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016).
This triggered the goal to increase production by moving into an even larger
production facility: “[Our goal is to] secure funding, and move into the new space. [We’ll
be] messing around with new tanks. And then hopefully, we’ll be ready in time [to be
distributing] Canada-wide by September 1st.” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June,
2016).
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2.2.16. Calls from local businesses for events.
Phone. In June 2016, Startup A received several requests from organizations to attend
holistic nutrition, health or yoga events. They often responded with a positive response:
“[We get calls for events] all the time. [We] almost always accept. We don’t always
necessarily go, but we’ll always try to give a coupon, or if there are only a limited
number of people going to the event, I will just give them a couple of cases [of our
beverage] and give everybody a free [bottle]” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June,
2016).
2.2.17. Retail store at brewery opens.
In-person storefront. In July 2016, Startup A opened their first retail store attached to
their current beverage production facility. Located in an up-and-coming neighbourhood,
they saw this location as an opportunity to “grow and develop alongside the community…
Just opening the storefront, [it increases] community interaction” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 21 June, 2016).
The people coming into the store were different than those that they had met at the
local farmers’ market: “[There were] a lot of new people, which is really surprising. They
say, ‘oh, I heard about the store, so I thought I’d come in.’ Or maybe they never heard
about the company but they heard about the store, or they drove by often and they were
just in the neighbourhood so they’re coming and checking it out… And we also got to
meet a lot of people who’ve been long time buyers but would never come out to the
farmers’ market or to an event. They never saw us at all. They just bought their [product
name] at one of our retailers” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016).
The walk-ins were mostly “newspaper readers and older people… I guess I
always think newspaper readers are the old souls… They just seem like they’re getting
their news mainstream… A lot of these people came to us because they had never heard
about it, or saw it but never had bought it” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016).
From their first weekend at the retail store, Startup A’s founders learned: “people
still don’t know what our beverage is… They still don’t know what it is or what our
values are. There’s still a lot of room for education. While a lot of [knowledge about us]
comes from social media, I guess it’s not like everybody is on social media, right? So, I
just learned a little bit about our customers and what they know and don’t know about
us” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016).
The hope was that their physical presence would also translate to interest online:
“Just opening the storefront and having that little interaction here, it’s going to create a
lot of buzz, which we’re trying our hardest to make ripple outward through our social
media. Kind of send that buzz out there to the [big city] people saying, ‘hey, I think you
want this.’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 July, 2016).
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Founder M also reflected that in-person interactions allowed them to offer
samples and demos of the product – an important part of their sales pitch to allow curious
and/or skeptical booth visitors to try the beverage and learn more about it before
purchasing: “So I think there’ll always be that demo tasting, [and] one-on-one
interaction where there is the education piece” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July,
2016).
By October 2016, the storefront was still thriving: “It’s crazy. There are lineups
at the door on Saturdays, literally. It’s new customers. It’s old people that just really like
that old school style [that our brand has]…. They come in just to speak to us. It’s so
cool… And the people that shop at retailers…. They want to come into our shop and
check it out…. And some of the young dudes would stop by [and ask], ‘Is this a beer
brewery?’ And we’d tell them no. They didn’t know what [the beverage] was initially,
and then they bought a ton of it…. It’s [having] the bricks and mortar [that makes a
difference]” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
2.2.18. Customer appreciation event.
As they gained more attention, Startup A started worrying that obtaining big
accounts with large supermarket retailers would create tension with their grassroots,
local, specialty grocery store and farmers’ market partnerships, as well as the typical,
independent customer that shops there: “I know that our largest retailer right now,
[specialty grocery store] aren’t big fans of [larger specialty grocery store]… [They are
looking for something] just a little more grassroots, a little smaller. Really, they’re
looking for those local supporters… I feel like getting a new account this big may change
their perception… [But for me], it was a goal of ours to get those specialty grocery
stores. I don’t think [our perception] is going to change. I know it changes things on the
production side [though]” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016).
In-person event. To ensure that these customers and independent retailers felt that
Startup A valued them, they held their second annual customer appreciation event at the
end of July 2016: “So, [the event involves] music and shopping. There are a lot of
vendors, some of which carry our products, some of which are locally made. [These are]
really good businesses that share our values in the way we do business and have a
passion for what we do. They also focus on community and connecting with their own
values. It’s nice to create a community” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 July, 2016).
Posters, radio, postcards, hand-written notes. There were minimal online promotions
for the event, besides being mentioned on Startup A’s Facebook page. The majority of
marketing for the event involved posters, radio, postcards in retail sales bags to individual
customers, and mailed, hand-written thank you cards to their retailer customers: “[We
are] tossing a postcard in everyone’s bag [that buys something at the farmers’ market]…
as well as posters downtown… And we’re going to be sending out [handwritten] thank
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you cards to all of our current retailers, just saying thank you” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 12 July, 2016).
Closer to the event, the startup increased their marketing efforts: “We really
littered the city with ads. I thought we did a really good job of getting [the information]
out. And I think we got a lot of support from media channels getting a hold of us for the
event. And we got a free radio ad all week long that someone said they would do for us…
We posted ads in the sense of [putting up] posters and [handing out] postcards… We
kind of gave them to each vendor and said, ‘please hand these out to whoever you think
would be appropriate’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016).
2.2.19. Potential large Distributor #4 as partner.
In July 2016, there was the potential for Startup A to start to work with a large
organic and natural products distributor (#4). Up until this point, the distributors (#1, #2,
and #3) that they had been working with were much smaller. However, as per, 2.2.14
above, the same issue existed – the worry of having a production capacity shortfall – an
inability to meet the increased production demands in the current production facility that
these new contracts would require: “Ideally our big distribution company will also start
September 1st… I’m starting to actually think of how to say, ‘Hey, we won’t be ready for
September.’ But I think they knew that already” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 July,
2016).
2.2.20. Attempted retail partnership with Specialty Supermarket Chain #2.
In July 2016, Startup A received confirmation that a large specialty supermarket
chain #2, with seven locations would carry their beverage. However, they started facing
issues working with the larger retail chain from the start: “As a small company, it’s tough
doing business with these elephants. The big guys. They came back with ad demands….
They wanted a free fill [to stock the shelves]. And they asked… what’s the discount? It
was kind of funny. It wasn’t even like, ‘hey we suggest you offer a discount.’ The e-mail
was one line. They’re very cold I find. There was one sentence saying, ‘What’s the
discount and what’s the buy in?’… We don’t do that…. I never said we don’t discount, we
will. But not when you kind of just send one line and ask in an e-mail, right?... That type
of cold interaction doesn’t help when you’re busy with other things” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 12 July, 2016).
2.2.21. Increased focus on pairing online social marketing and in-person product
explanations.
Social media and in-person. From its founding, Startup A used some social media,
however continued to use more traditional ways of connecting with customers – through
their personal network: “Just because everyone clicks on Facebook, I try not to let that
cloud my vision as to where our business actually is.… [We spread the news about our
business] through social media, [however really like to rely on] word of mouth and
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flyers. We’re working with vendors who we know to reach [customers]. [While] social
media [helps us] really cast a wide net, [potential customers may say], ‘what is this
thing?’… And [in-person] we can kind of shuffle over to explain what our product is…
It’s still very much a small business and you still have to get out and do that grass roots
kind of stuff” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 July, 2016).
While Startup A knew that they could learn about potential customers from social
media data, they still preferred using traditional methods to reach out to potential
customers: “[It will be good to have] a little data analysis… It’s easy with them for
Facebook and social media and website stuff because they have analytic software that
takes some tallies and comes back [to tell us what] those efforts [mean]. But I think [it
would be interesting to know the impact of] postcards and things like that [still]” (Startup
A Founder, Interview, 12 July, 2016).
However, late in July 2016, after starting to work with a marketing firm, Founder
M realized social media could be a valuable tool for the startup: “What I learned through
all this is how much Facebook truly is a really good marketing tool. The less we promote
things on Facebook, the less people truly know about it. It’s kind of interesting to know
that does help. The word does get out… Really, a lot of our loyal customers and people
that would come out to a grand opening seem to follow us on Facebook or a social media
of sorts” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016).
Posts on social media about their retail store also gained attention in nearby towns
and the local tourism board. “[People said,] ‘Wow! That’s such a cool concept… We buy
it here. We’d love to come see the brewery. And then [the local tourism board] actually
got a hold of us and said, ‘We’d like to put you guys in as a member.’ So, people could
come and check out our brewery retail location [when they visit the city]. So, that’s pretty
cool” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016).
2.2.22. Developed an alcoholic beer beverage with brewery partner.
Late in July 2016, Startup A developed a beer beverage to be sold at their
partner’s brewery. This was to expand into other markets: “we partnered up with a
brewery and did like a half [specialty beverage] and half beer. And it was delicious…
We’ve hemmed and hawed about who we really want to partner with… and it comes
down to values. Just good business people and becoming friends with them” (Startup A
Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016).
2.2.23. Product was placed in more mainstream retail locations.
By July 2016, Startup A had negotiated with more mainstream retail locations,
including a university campus, to gain visibility in a wider market: “So, [around] the
university, and the sports supplement place at the university. We’re going in there
because of the great foot traffic. And then, also the hospital… they may have like 500
employees there that are somewhat health conscious…., not to mention people coming in
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and out of the place throughout the day. So, a great spot to just have the product placed,
right?” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016). This additional increase in sales
meant that production volume needed to ramp up, and that that it was becoming
increasingly important for Startup A to find a new production location.
2.2.24. Purchase of walk-in cooler.
Phone and email. By September 2016, the startup had a new walk-in cooler that
facilitated a slight increase in production. Though the space to make the beverage did not
increase, having the cooler allowed Startup A to produce and store more bottles of their
product before distribution and to take on new accounts that they had been delaying
accepting: “Literally, there’s over a hundred people on a waitlist interested to carry our
product. It’s amazing! But we also need to be organized in doing it… I’m going to
[follow up] this week. I’ll get to actually call in a few others or just respond to emails.”
(Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 September, 2016).
2.2.25. Participation in charity event.
In-person. In September 2016, Startup A had a booth at a local charity bike race to
support the cause and raise awareness about their business.
2.2.26. Contract with Regional General Supermarket #1.
In September 2016 Startup A signed a contract with two locations of a regional
supermarket – Regional General Supermarket #1: “They contacted us… I was super
surprised. Apparently, they are keen to do locally made stuff. They have a quicker
process than [the other large retailer] that we spoke with earlier” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 12 September, 2016).
Having finally expanded their retailer portfolio with the addition of this large
regional retailer, Startup A’s co-founders felt a bit conflicted about how having these new
partnerships with large retailers would be perceived by their grassroots market and
partners: “[Some people will say,] wow, those are stores that value good quality
products, so therefore, yours must be good quality… Maybe at the end of the day, [being
in these stores] makes it more convenient to buy our products… [But] it’s like selling out.
I couldn’t see us selling out because always we’re after doing business a different way.
But sometimes you just have to play ball, right? You have to be offered at [the regional
general supermarket] because it is convenient, and at the end of the day, there’s a huge
market out there that only shops at those grocery stores, right?” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 12 September, 2016).
This conflict of reaching a more mainstream market also spanned into working
with larger distributors: “We can deal with the headaches of not always getting our
products to places. They pay us on time and they allow us to grow. So, they’re more on
our level, I guess” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 September, 2016).
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Despite these worries, Startup A reiterated that it would be okay because they
would be maintaining their values: “I think as long as we just stay on our marketing path
and walk the talk, then… it doesn’t matter who we do business with, right?” (Startup A
Founder, Interview, 12 September, 2016).
2.2.27. Slowed down focus on new customers and concentrated on existing ones.
Phone. By late October 2016, new sales to retailers had slowed and Startup A began
focusing on following up and making sure recurring customers were satisfied: “There are
always good people interested who want [specialty beverage]. [We’re focused] on just
taking care of old customers [now]. Just calling [them to check in]” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 27 October, 2016).
Startup A had accumulated over one hundred retailers as customers and their rate
of growth had not allowed them to keep an eye on whether customers were satisfied: “We
are over a hundred stores and I know we are still over a hundred stores because I just
updated my list last night. But I saw a list on one of our distributors’ [retail store
locations that they service]. Here we are thinking that we’ve got two downtown [shops]
and the last time they’ve ordered was June and July…. Handling things over to the
distributor, I just lose that control that we like to have, the strategic control of partnering
up with the right [retailers]… So, I’ve got this list with all these people flagged, marked
in red saying, ‘Call these guys ASAP. Let’s get the product back on the shelves” (Startup
A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
Founder in-person in-store sampling demonstrations. Furthermore, with on-boarding
new retail partners, personalized in-person demonstrations of the product, an important
part of the business, had been neglected due to a lack of time: “[We have a] demo down
at this awesome little specialty grocery store, which has a huge following and the product
is just rocking and rolling down there. We literally started with them last October and I
think the first words out of my mouth were, ‘We’ll get you a demo really soon.’ And here
it is a year later, [they’re] finally getting the demo. But the demo… we realized is [an]
important [use of] our marketing dollars – getting out there and [saying]: ‘Hey, we’re
[Startup A]. Here, try this.’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
However, given their growth, the co-founders needed to start considering
outsourcing the sample demonstrations to retailers: “Our whole thing used to be [that we]
would go there and we’d do a nice tasting. It’s like we’d chat, but obviously not
anymore…. Sometimes it’s an e-mail. Sometimes it’s a phone call to connect with retail
customers]. So, it’s never really that personal pull anymore. Which, I understand is fine.
But I still want to try to get out there and meet the owners, meet people, right? I want to
get out there and let them know who we are… It’s just a game-changer. I don’t think
there’s any other way that I can explain it” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October,
2016).
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However, the in-person demonstrations by retailers were not successful: “They’re
very corporate-y in their way of selling to you as a vendor of a product… [But] I got the
feedback forms, which I was really happy they did, but it seemed that customers had
simple objections, [and they] didn’t overcome those objections” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 27 October, 2016).
Trained sales representative with similar values. With the importance of demos for
Startup A, they realized that it was important to either continue to do the demonstrations
themselves, or to have sales representatives that promoted their beverage product to end
consumers in a similar way to how they had sold the product: “I’m realizing the
importance of doing [the demonstrations] ourselves… We actually had one of our
distributors that had a sales rep that is perfect… She loves our beverage. And I actually
got to spend face-to-face training time with her…. [She tells customers] the whole spiel
as it should be said. So, she knows how to do that and she knows the values of the
company. She’s able to connect with customers… So, right now, we’re essentially just
paying her cash to do a few demos” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
Email invitation to retailers to visit productions. Startup A wanted to ensure that local
retailers still felt connected to them: “We just sent out our newsletter yesterday to all of
our local retailers and said, you’re invited for a brewery tour.’ We wanted to explain why
we’re different. Not many people responded, but some people came in and we did a tour,
which was nice… We just got more of a connection [from the visit]” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 27 October, 2016).
Face-to-face interactions and phone. The goal of the startup was to continue to connect
with customers that held similar values to them: “It’s definitely partnering with likeminded people and making those connections early while we’re small, having face-toface [relationships] so that they know they can rely on us. [They] can pick up the phone
and talk to us. They can’t do that with [our competitor]. A lot have people have told us
that and I don’t want to lose that, ever” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October,
2016).
2.2.28. Expanding to gain new customers with Regional General Supermarket #1’s
different locations.
In-person and phone. Startup A started seeing success and an increase in sales at the
two Regional General Supermarket #1’s locations: “They’ve gone from one [order] of
each flavor to one and a half [orders] of each flavor, to two. And when we did a demo,
they ordered $2000 worth. Thirty cases last week. So, yeah. They’re rocking and rolling”
(Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
With success in Regional General Supermarket #1 (see 2.2.26), they internally
promoted them to other locations store location: “The other [Regional General
Supermarket #1 locations] contacted us because they already knew about us. And then
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they told the other location, ‘Hey, you should get on this. It’s awesome. It’s all the rage
in the town.’ They didn’t know about us. So, I had to go in there this week… and she said,
‘We’ll carry you. No problem. You should get in with the [broader network of locations
for the regional supermarket.’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
2.2.29. Contacted by Nation-wide Warehouse Retailer #1.
Social media, email, phone. In October 2016, Startup A was contacted by their first
nation-wide warehouse retail chain, Warehouse Retailer #1. The warehouse retailer had
hired a social media savvy product manager who was looking for new products for the
store. She had found Startup A on Instagram: “She’s pretty young and is trying to tell the
old fogies that run [Warehouse Retailer #1], ‘Here’s what the kids are doing these days.’
I went back and forth with her communicating” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27
October, 2016).
The warehouse retailer however had different requirements than smaller retailers,
including the regional and national supermarkets that handled smaller volumes of
products: “I went back and forth [with the product manager], communicating, ‘hey,
what’s up?’ They loved the samples that we sent, so it’s onto the next phase of things. But
the next phase involves us getting an audit from a third-party health and food safety
organization [which we want to do in our new facility]… So hopefully, [they’re okay with
waiting], and we’ll have them on the go [as customers in the future]” (Startup A
Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
However, Startup A was not concerned as to whether or not they would sign a
contract wit Warehouse Retailer #1. Even if signing a contract with this large warehouse
retailer was not a success, the founders believed that the increased rigour in their
operations would improve their legitimacy with other large retailers: “Even if we don’t
[have them sign a contract], I’m happy to have done this audit and be ready to approach
[large nationwide supermarket chain #1]. We’ll be pretty legit for their standards”
(Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
2.2.30. Contacted by large regional organic food distributor – Distributor #4.
Phone. In October 2016, the large regional distributor, Distributor #4, reconnected with
Startup A after several months. This was the same distributor that Startup A had
connected with in 2.2.19: “I’m glad they haven’t gotten back to me [before now]. We still
aren’t ready to work with them” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
To be able to service Distributor #4, Startup A needed to move into their larger
production facilities. They were however excited to partner with them, as this larger
distributor would get their product into smaller holistic retailers that share similar values
to the smaller companies that they already work with: “Small little yoga studios order
from these guys. Right now, our hardest thing is getting into those small retailers because
our smaller distributors want to see a $400 order. And if you’re a small yoga studio, you

Startup A

351

can’t [have such large orders]. So, [working with this big regional distributor] will be
big [for being able to do that” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
However, by January 2017, the partnership with Distributor #4 still had not gone
through: “[It’s okay that we’re not working with them because] they don’t pay you for 45
days, while these other [distributors] are great. Super helpful” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 12 January, 2017).
2.2.31. Organic certification obtained to work with a competing large organic
distributor – Distributor #5.
As part of their growth efforts to have larger distribution of their product, in
October 2016, Startup A went to get organically certified in order work with an organic
distributor – Distributor #5. However, while Startup A still had not moved and were still
located in their old facilities, they were not be able to produce enough of their product to
satisfy the volume of product needed for Distributor #5: “We got ahold of [large organic
distributor]. You have to be certified organic, which kind of prompted us to get certified
organic…But, I’m asking them to [keep us out of their catalog for now] because we can’t
supply everybody. I’ve assured our distributors that they will get the green light once we
start making tons [of the beverage]. They can then go sell it to whoever they really want.
I’ll even give them wiggle room with wholesale prices… We want to work with [these]
bigger places” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
Having become organic certified, by January 2017, Startup A was successfully
partnered with Distributor #5: “they only carry certified organic produce” (Startup A
Founder, Interview, 12 January, 2017). Working with this distributor also gave Startup A
access to other large retailers: “Our distributor set that up, stood aside, and let us give
our spiel for about 15 minutes and they both loved it” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12
January, 2017).
Startup A anticipated that having this partnership would prompt the large regional
organic distributor, Distributor #4 (as mentioned in 2.2.19 and 2.2.30), to have interest
again in working with them: “There is demand for us now that we’re with [Distributor
#5]. [Distributor #4] is going to want us even more so now!” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 12 January, 2017).
2.2.32. Traditional media coverage.
Newspaper. In October 2016, the local newspaper featured Startup A for a second time
as a local entrepreneurial venture. Besides social media, this article was the first publicity
the startup had received since the summer (2.2.11): “The newspaper is always good. It’s
word of mouth. We’re really only on social media. We don’t do much marketing other
than social media followings [now]” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
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2.2.33. Increased used of social media.
Social media and blogs. By November 2016, Startup A was interested to start to use
more social media and blogs to promote themselves: “We have five blogs written [about
us] by the marketing firm… It’s going to be really important for us. And as we grow,
we’re really going to just hammer our story into the eyes of everybody who steps onto
YouTube or Facebook. You know, the ads and all that stuff. We really want to let people
know [what type of company we are]…. It’s just a matter of keeping that artisanal
farmers’ market vibe, and marketing it. I think it will be really cool to be able to educate
everybody on that” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
2.2.34. Planning to attend organic conference.
In-person. By January 2017, Startup A had organized to attend a large organic food
conference where they would get a lot of exposure to potential retail customers: “It’s
interesting. I don’t know. I think it’s weird to think of being at an event where there are
competitors… They’ve got a lot of CEOs and… I know they’re very business-y. But it’s
kind of cool to [be able to say], ‘hey, here we are.’ Not to be afraid… It’s just going to be
interesting to be there…. It’s a pretty big conference for [our retail] customers… There’s
less public [general consumers] there” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
2.2.35. Received loan for new production facility.
In January 2017, Startup A received a long-awaited bank loan that would help
fund their new production facility. When they had first applied for this loan in June 2016,
Startup A thought that they would easily get funding: “So, securing our funding through
[the bank]. I keep saying this. But hopefully it happens this week. They want to see the
marketing plan. So, secure funding, moving into the new space” (Startup A Founder,
Interview, 7 June, 2016).
However, Startup A failed to provide the bank with a business plan and financial
details from the start and it took Startup A several months to put the necessary paperwork
together. When Startup A was contacted by the bank about their financial statements in
late June 2016, they said: “I have the business plan section that the [bank] needs for the
application for our loan. And they actually called me again, which is funny, as they’ve
been calling a lot saying, “Hey, where’s your financial statements?” and all that. So,
they’re really interested also in getting the whole process started…. I’m going to give our
accountant until the end of today, but I’m assuming that by tomorrow, he’ll have our
accounting books all ready to go” (Startup A Founder, Farmers’ Market Visit, 9 June,
2016).
However, come July 2016, there were further delays with the accountant in
getting the finances into the bank. The delay in getting funding affected Startup A’s
ability to find a larger production location to move into: “There are two pieces, to find the
[new location], and then the other piece is the bank, which is all being delayed because
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of our lack of accounting with financial statements and stuff like that. Those take time
[for the] accountant to do” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016).
Finally, in October 2016, Startup A sent their financial statements to the bank: “I
sent off our financial statements, [but the bank wanted some changes]. We’re going to
have the accountant [get that additional information for the months] which were the
rocking and rolling months as far as revenue for us. So, we’ll include that into our
application and we’ll hopefully get our loan. We’re shooting for the full amount from the
[bank], which is $200,000… It seems like we’ll get the thumbs up to be able to get all the
funds” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016).
Only in January 2017, was the loan finally approved: “Our accountant is here
right now and he’s got all the documents for the loan. So, it’s official…. Now, we’re
trying to get [the new production] place up and running to the next phase of things as
soon as possible…. I’m working day and night to do that. This is because demand is
continuing to go up and we’ve been wanting to move for a solid year now. Over a sold
year. This would help us increase production” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 January,
2017).
2.2.36. Signed a contract with twenty-three locations of a smaller Regional General
Supermarket #2.
Event, phone and email. While Startup A had discussions with Regional General
Supermarket #2 as early as July 2015 (no event noted), only in January 2017 did Startup
A finally sign a contract with their 23 locations: “It was July 2015 that they first
contacted us, we went through the whole process. And now, it’s January 2017. And what
really kicked it off was that Veg Fest event in November (2015). We had a booth rocking
line-ups, and there was [the smaller regional supermarket’s managers], higher-ups that
were checking things out. So, they came over and I did a two-minute spiel, like, ‘We’re
Startup A. We’re the bomb.’… He emailed us to say, ‘Hey, I heard about you guys.’ [But
then], we gave him the price and he just kind of hung up the phone… A very cold
corporate feel. But then, this time around, they answered all my questions” (Startup A
Founder, Interview, 12 January, 2017).
2.2.37. Planning for future customers.
With funding secured for their new production space in January 2017, Startup A
decided to refrain from taking on more large customers at the time, and to focus on the
existing relationships. As they had grown to pursue larger supermarkets, distributors and
warehouse stores, it was particularly important to Startup A that their smaller,
independent stores, including natural food stores that were closer to their original vision
of a customer, did not feel abandoned: “I feel that if we were to continue down that road
with [large warehouse retailer #1] and [regional supermarket #1], places like [local
large natural foods stores] would maybe not be so happy. I feel like at the end of the day,

Startup A

354

solidifying these [existing relationships] is a lot more important in the next few months to
come than trying to get our product into [large warehouse retailer #1] or other locations
of [regional supermarket #1]… I don’t want to be getting more customers if we’re not
making more [product]. [Our] number one [priority] is getting our distribution
[organized to meet current customer demand. So for now,] it’s more of the same”
(Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 January, 2017).
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS
This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another
type of customer interaction. Startup A experienced cross-over between platforms for
customer interactions predominantly through their presence of being displayed at various
types of various stores, at the farmers’ market, and through social media. News about
Startup A took place through word of mouth at other events that they attended, in their
own social network, social media, several traditional media articles and on television, and
the fliers that they handed out. From the data collected through interviews and secondary
materials, there were no additional cross-overs of customer interactions between
platforms.
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS
From the data collected through interviews and secondary materials, no additional
stakeholder interactions were noted.
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP
All major challenges, including challenges of production and connecting with
potential customers are detailed above. From the data collected through interviews and
secondary materials, no additional challenges were noted.
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING
By early 2017, Startup A had transitioned to their new manufacturing location.
Their retail store was still in operation and they continued to ramp up production to serve
the partnerships they had built over the past several months.
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Appendix B2. Startup B
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS
1.1. Business Idea
Startup B began in October 2015 as “A venue for creative makers of all types.”
(Startup B’s Twitter page, Accessed 1 March 2017). The co-founders had lived in a town
with a population of approximately 100,000 people. They felt that in North American
mid-sized towns, such as theirs, that there were not enough community-based cultural
opportunities, associated with the arts or technology, available to local citizens to both
observe and to participate in: “The people who [live here], they are the ones who don’t
have the benefit of cultural activities that are more long-term or interesting things that
help you feel a sense of belonging in that community. That’s a very typical problem in
many towns and cities across North America” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June,
2016).
To counter the lack of culture, Startup B wanted to create a membership-based
cultural makerspace – a physical location where individuals could gather, and share
resources, tools, and knowledge on creative projects, network and build both physical and
digital media. The space would include:
•

A café with co-working and community spaces, and would facilitate unscheduled
and informal activities for members, including scheduled workshops for members.

•

Digital media and other tools which the members could use to create creative
media.

•

Studio place for technological experimentation, hardware development and
prototyping ideas across a wide variety of topics: “[It] could be a software. It
could be baked goods and it could be something made out of wood or metal [that
customers create]. It could be artistic or it could have commercial value. We
could also provide advice on how they scale [a business] up and distribute it…
We encourage all the people who come to Startup B to look at things on a
commercial and industrial scale” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).

This makerspace, as defined by the founders, would ideally produce innovative
ideas/products: “We want to turn [Startup B] into something that would consume
innovative makers and produce innovative makers… We need to give you the venue. We
need to give you some coaching and training, and then, also, the digital tools” (Startup B
Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). While the founders of Startup B expected that some
individuals would come in to use the space solely for personal enjoyment, they also
expected that others would use the space to produce products for commercial sale or to
share with the community. The co-founders saw themselves as helping this these
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transactions occur: Let’s say we are the facilitator. Currently, we’re soliciting end-users
and consumers” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
While creating a more permanent makerspace was the main goal of Startup B,
throughout their first year of operation, they organized two pop-up events to simulate
their future space and test it as a MVP. The pop-up events were meant to raise awareness
about Startup B, as well as demonstrate to potential investors the interest in such a
business. After just over a year of operations and two pop-up events, Startup B’s cofounders learned that while there were many people who expressed interest in a
makerspace, their attendance at the two events they organized did not demonstrate that it
would be sustainable to continue operations. Furthermore, the lack of funding to start the
initiative and a desire of the co-founders to have a steady income proved to be a major
obstacle to Startup B’s success. Startup B was closed for business in November 2016.
1.2. Founders
The founders were two Masters students in their late 20s who met while
completing an Entrepreneurship program. Co-founder K had a background in chemistry
and experience in a community centre environment and Co-founder S has a background
in industrial engineering and audio and video recording and self-publishing of written,
audio and video media. Both co-founders were pursuing Startup B part-time while
finishing their Masters’ degree until June 2016, after which they committed full-time to
the startup until closing the business.
1.3. About the Customers
The customers of Startup B were categorized broadly as creatively, curious
individuals of any age or background: “makers [creating a piece of art or technology]
and people who are dabbling or starting off a new business” (Startup B Founder,
Interview, 6 June, 2016). While the makerspace would to be open to anyone who wanted
to come in and use the space, the founders of Startup B voiced that they welcomed more
affluent individuals who would might consider paying for access to the space as
customers: “[People who are affluent are] especially people we would like to bring in
because they are so influential and can spend money to support the community” (Startup
B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes
2.2.1. Founding Startup B.
Startup B was founded in October 2015 when the co-founders felt that they were
not enough community-based cultural opportunities in town and that they wanted to
create a physical location and make tools available to members of the community to
engage in creative activities. They decided that this could be a membership-based
makerspace.
2.2.2. Booth at networking and education event.
In-person. In February 2016, Startup B secured a booth at their first public education
community event. Their presence at the event was to raise awareness about their business
and to gain some customer insight about whether a makerspace would be of interest to
residents in the city: “We were able to talk to a lot of potential customers… at this event...
It was a certain kind of clientele that we don’t necessarily get to meet often. People in
their 40s, 50s, and 60s who are a bit affluent and involved in their community…. We had
a sheet of paper and were asking people to write down… one idea of what they’d hope
they would be able to do there or see [at our makerspace]. And that’s when… we had an
overwhelming number of people come independently [to] tell us they want live music of
different genres from around the world” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
2.2.3. Attended an event for women in entrepreneurship.
In-person. In March 2016, the co-founders attended an event on women in
entrepreneurship. Once again, they used this event exposure to promote Startup B: “We
explained to them that there’s a venue that we’re making and if they’d like to come and
make a program or a workshop, [we would welcome them]... The people who came
around… [were excited about] being part of making [things]” (Startup B Founder,
Interview, 20 June, 2016).
2.2.4. Search for a permanent business location.
In May 2016, to find an affordable business location for the makerspace which
met their threefold criteria of location, accessibility, and size, Startup B approached their
local city council to enquire about the possibility of renting a commercial rental property
from the city’s portfolio of old or abandoned downtown buildings. Their sales pitch to the
council was a claim that they could improve the cultural environment of the community:
“We’re talking to the city and trying to reclaim old buildings or abandoned buildings….
We met with the city councilor [to discuss] where is the best location… If it’s owned by
the city,… we can pay [them] rent” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). While
Startup B wanted to work with the government, they did not see them as a customer:
“They’re not necessarily a customer of ours, but the thing is, that we’re trying to align

Startup B

359

with goals that they have, and the hopes that they have for the city’s…. cultural plan”
(Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
Personal network. The search for a permanent location for their makerspace continued
into the summer. The founders followed up with a local government council contact from
their professional network in June 2016 to see if she could help them to secure a
permanent location: “We’ve known her from before. She just sent us an email yesterday
saying, ‘Let’s meet up this weekend. I want to find out how I can help you.’” (Startup B
Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). However, by July 2016, Startup B was still trying to
connect with their contact to locate a suitable permanent location that satisfied their
criteria: “[Our timeline to find a location is] one month. We’ll move in. Whatever the city
is giving us, we’ll take it” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016).
2.2.5. Started planning first pop-up event.
Concurrent to searching for a permanent location, in May 2016, Startup B began
planning their first pop-up event to raise awareness about their future makerspace.
Given the time it was taking to secure a permanent location, Startup B decided to
organize their first event in a temporary location in July 2016: “We do need to start
planning those popup events…”(Startup B Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016). The goal
was to create an event that demonstrated what the purpose of their future space would be:
“We only provide you the platform and the amenities. It’s up to you to complete the rest
of the event and complete the design” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
The event was going to be held in a temporary location and would involve a day
of cultural workshops including music and crafts, facilitated by individuals within the
founders’ personal networks: “Those people [conducting activities in the pop-up event]
are basically a group [found] from our network of friends and family, but also through
places like [local incubator], [university department], and our alumni. We have a group
of friends who just love to make, create and show” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June,
2016).
While organizing the pop-up event, the search for a more permanent location was
put on hold. Given the challenges that they were facing in connecting with the local city
council, the founders of Startup B thought that the event could be helpful in
demonstrating the benefits of these types of cultural centres to the local city council: “The
one thing that we didn’t manage to do was go talk to people at the city about the
permanent venue. We’ve realized that maybe we can invite them to this temporary event
though so they can get a feel for it” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). Such
an event would demonstrate to the city council that Startup B had identified that there
was interest in a makerspace and what potential customers of the makerspace would
want: “[We want] to be able to articulate, ‘Hey, in the past year, we didn’t just sit around
and daydream.’ We talked to all these people. We did all the research. We’ve built all
these relationships. We got in touch with vendors and tried to estimate the budget…. [We
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learned] customers want primarily a venue where they can experience something live and
active” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).
Furthermore, Startup B realized that they needed to first demonstrate some
success in their business to gain access to external funding opportunities such as
government grants: “These funding opportunities are coming up that we want to apply
to… [But] people aren’t willing to give seed money so you can go do your research and
prove that there’s a market that you can address. They want you to do that on your own
terms, on your own expense. You comment not about what you’re going to do but what
you have done” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016). Success at the pop-up event
would help demonstrate local citizens’ interest in having a makerspace in the city.
2.2.6. Held information booths at student entrepreneurship events.
In-person - Public booth at events. In June 2016, Startup B set up booths at two
entrepreneurship events catered towards students at the local university. Attending these
types of events was important to Startup B to publicize information about their permanent
makerspace and their pop-up events: “How do people find out [about us]? Well, that’s
where we are – going out to other places, talks, people who are conducting events. We go
there, we meet people, we do an activity with them, and then we bring them in [to our
events]… [We] signed up to have a booth and just talk to people who came by…. We met
exactly the same kind of people [as we had expected would be interested in our mission]
– students who are interested to volunteer, run a workshop, or do something in the
future” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).
At these events, Startup B sought out feedback from attendees as to what would
be of interest to them in a makerspace: “That’s why we keep talking to our customers
early on. We talk about co-creation because if I have to make all the decisions for all the
possible circumstances the customers are going to be in, it’s going to be too difficult”
(Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).
From these events, Startup B discovered that there were two distinct groups of
people who could be potential consumers of their makerspace: individuals that would be
interested to learn a topic, and individuals who would like to both demonstrate or teach a
topic: “People want to learn and absorb, and [there are people who] want to showcase
and be recognized... They should be able to feel that they have the ability to quickly flip
back and forth between these two modes” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).
The founders however did not find all feedback received from potential customers
as valuable. They distilled the information that they found was useful to them, and
dismissed suggestions that they felt were inappropriate for their goals. For example: “[At
one event, I spoke with someone] very young and he was worried. [He said,] ‘oh, if you
bring really old people, it’s not going to be so cool.’… We noticed that yes, if you are
young, you think about old people as draggy and boring. And maybe if you’re old, you
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think about young people as noisy and a nuisance. But I think there is a way in which we
can transfer knowledge and stories and improve [interactions between these groups]”
(Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).
Email. At the events, Startup B collected email addresses of people who approached their
information booth to follow-up contact later: “[We had someone say], I’ll sign up for
your mailing list, and, I’ll e-mail to ask about how I can actually participate as a person
doing an activity” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).
2.2.7. Full-time commitment to startup.
In July 2016, the founders finished their Masters’ degree and committed working
on Startup B full-time.
2.2.8. Found a pop-up event location.
By mid-July 2016, Startup B had settled on a location and a series of activities for
their pop-up event taking place at the end of July 2016: “The idea is to have different
things happening at the same time. In the morning, there’s a movie and yoga at the same
time. Then, there’s lunch and a music workshop, and also generic stuff you could go
around and play with, like board games. We’ll have some kind of public art project, and
then later in the afternoon we’re having different workshops. We’re also going to have
open mics or karaoke…. And in the evening, we’re also going to have live music”
(Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
Personal network. To determine what types of activities would be appealing to potential
customers attending the pop-up event, Startup B conferred with their personal network as
to what they, as users of a makerspace, would like to see: “We were usually just asking
our friends what they’d like to see, what intrigued them. And when we went around, we
would look at events to see what was interesting” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July,
2016).
2.2.9. Started ticket sales.
Website and personal networks. Just over a week before their pop-up event in July, the
founders of Startup B had finished planning the pop-up event and had set up an online
store on Startup B’s website to purchase tickets. However, there were limited ticket sales
as Startup B had still not promoted the event. The founders however did not see the lack
of advertising as a hindrance to the success of the event though: “If you do marketing –
people remember it only if it is within the week or week and a half [of the event] because
there’s so much being pushed through social media channels that your advertisement
gets pushed under all other stuff that comes up” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July,
2016).
Social media, flyers and posters. Startup B thought that they would still have time to
promote the event in a variety of traditional ways: “We might be able to use the city’s
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website [to advertise]... We haven’t yet printed any posters and flyers and stuck them
anywhere…. We should also probably put up… a sandwich board… But we know enough
people through our Facebook and other channels so they and their family can come….
With the groups of people who I know. When one member has something that’s going on.
Everyone else will support it” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
Personal network. The founders also expected that people in their personal network
would want to attend: “We’re not starting to [try to] sell tickets for an event, without all
the [events] in place…. So far nobody has bought tickets yet, [but] we hope that our
friends will buy [tickets]” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). However, while
relying on their personal network, would grant Startup B some immediate and easily
attained sales, the founders realized that this was not sustainable if they wanted to attract
attendees outside of their personal network: “Whenever we have done [an event]
previously, we were able to organize within days… So, there’s always somebody in the
network who has enough capacity and is interested. So, our main concern might be,
‘How do we get the message out to people who are not in our network?’ I am concerned
that it would end up as a party with my 100 closest friends on Facebook” (Startup B
Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
2.2.10. Challenges organizing the first pop-up event last minute.
In-person. Having organized the first pop-up event so quickly, several of the tasks were
rushed. For instance, performers for the pop-up event were found last minute, by chance,
while walking down the street: “We listened to a musician playing on the street… we
started talking to him and it turns out he’s been a music teacher, recently retired and has
been performing” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). Also, while Startup B
had wanted to have local businesses selling items at the event, they did not have enough
time to arrange it: “If we had more time, we would love to talk to local businesses in
town… If they came and put up a booth and provided samples of their product, then
people who came to the event would know how to navigate to their business” (Startup B
Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
Phone. Furthermore, Startup B learned that coordinating getting both vendors and
customers to an organized, professional event was more challenging than they had
realized: “There are so many complexities and moving pieces to put together.
Individually, none of these things were hard to organize. Call up a food vendor. Call up a
musician. But to put it all in place in one venue at the same time was difficult when you
don’t have the venue settled and you don’t have the audience settled. If we had one
[location], it would simplify a lot of this” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
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2.2.11. First pop-up event and lessons learned.
In-person observations and discussions. When the pop-up event took place at the end
of July 2016, the co-founders observed the actions of the attendees to learn what the
potential customers of their makerspace would be interested in: “Our main learning was
how do we price things and do people appreciate what we are doing?... The [people] who
came, came only for a few specific things that they liked and [left]” (Startup B Founder,
Interview, 21 July, 2016). However, while the attendees generally seemed to enjoy the
pop-up event activities, the founders did not see them requesting future events: “People
don’t make that leap and tell us, ‘Oh, this should be a permanent thing.’ But if we [say to
them], ‘We want to have [this as] a permanent [event]’, they say ‘okay, I can see what I
would do there” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
Posters and social media. The founders were also worried as to whether they marketed
the event in the appropriate locations. The posters they put up were primarily accessible
to university students, however they had hoped to attract a more diverse audience: “We
went around putting posters on poles and on the street [near the university] and there are
people who saw that and came” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
Furthermore, Startup B’s marketing through social media had less than a two percent
conversion rate, where only about twenty customers bought tickets to the event: “It seems
we were able to reach about 1,000 people on Facebook, of which something like 100
commented and were engaged and shared. And then about 20 people showed up.
Throughout the day, we had 30 people in the venue” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 16
August, 2016).
However, when other stakeholders in the event – including the event space owner
and performers - posted event specific information prior to the event on various social
media platforms, people outside of the founders’ social circle became aware of the event:
“People [that I didn’t know] started liking things [that I posted on social media]”
(Startup B Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016).
2.2.12. Planned the second pop-up event.
With the first pop-up event over, by August 2016, Startup B had started planning
their next event, incorporating the suggestions and observations from the previous event.
The second event would take place in September 2016. They realized that to grow and
justify establishing a more permanent location, they needed to increase the attendance
numbers for this second event: “This time we want to do our marketing and bring a big
crowd… And [give] more advanced notice for people” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 16
August, 2016).
Posters. While the founders said that they wanted to attract local, non-student
populations to their events, much of the advertising and scheduling was organized around
meeting the needs of the student population. For example, Startup B did not proactively
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advertise in locations outside of the university: “I would like to see more children and
parents coming out. I don’t think that was one of the markets we were able to reach
through the ways we were marketing. Those people aren’t walking down the streets
where we put posters. They’re not in the university. I think they’re much more easily
reached with newspapers” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016). Despite this
comment, no newspaper articles or ads were placed to promote the event.
Startup B also scheduled the event on a date that would specifically fit students’
schedules: “Which day of the week, which week of the month, and which month of the
season matters. We’re heavily dependent on the school schedule it seems. One-third of
this town is actually students” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016). It was
important to the founders that the event be held in a student-accessible location, despite
Startup B receiving suggestions to locate the events in a nearby city: “Practically
everybody told us, ‘Hey, what you’re doing would be awesome in [other city.]’ The
artists [that performed at our event] told us that. Other people that came to our event
told us that. People who talked to us tell us that… But students simply do not travel to
[other city], as students don’t have cars or they have to take the bus [very] far… and
they’re one of our key markets for this” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
2.2.13. Lessons learned from second pop-up event.
In September 2016, Startup B had their second pop-up event. By this event, they
realized that organizing individual events, rather than having a more permanent
makerspace for the community, was not achieving the mission that the founders had
hoped to achieve with their business: “We tried very hard to get the word out, make
people enthusiastic about having a place where we can make stuff and come together,
have a sense of belonging. We realized that events quite simply have a totally different
format. Events don’t count as a sort of model of the space we want to create, especially
from the perspective of people attending the events. If people think of it like a one-time
[event], if they’re available on that one day for a piece of it, that’s what they’ll come out
for” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 28 November, 2016).
2.2.14. Had challenges finding permanent location for Startup B and closed business.
Startup B continued the search for a permanent location in September and
October 2016, however they were still experiencing challenges securing a location. In
particular, they were not managing to connect with the city counsellor who had initially
offered to help find a public building that they could rent: “We met this councilor again
at an event. It was very frustrating after four or five times. Every time I see her, she says,
‘Oh, just e-mail me again about it.’ But then you email, and you call and she doesn’t get
back to you” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 28 November, 2016).
By this time, the founders had also learned of other organizations that had tried to
create a similar space, but had run into challenges working with the local municipalities:
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“The city, they’ve had these proposals over and over again… Somehow they spent a few
million dollars [on a previous, similar initiative] and it didn’t work out… So there’s this
over shadow of the [poor] experience in [local town]…. We see people have been trying
[to do something similar] for eight years, and there’s a systematic way in which this has
been pushed aside. We were sort of dissuaded” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 28
November, 2016).
Additionally, Startup B learned of the challenges to gain significant attendances
for events being held in the city. There seemed to be an apathy amongst the city’s
residents that prevented them from attending local events - even those involving world
famous figures such as the co-founder of Apple, Inc.: “A person is trying to run an [event
space] over there. In October, Steve Wozniak had come down to this location to do a sort
of talk. Almost nobody showed up! [He’s] so important… and barely like 150 people
showed up. Even with free tickets for [university] students” (Startup B Founder,
Interview, 28 November, 2016).
Finally, Startup B’s co-founders also realized that while there were a significant
number of people who expressed interest in a makerspace, the lack of attendees to their
events, a lack of funding to start the initiative, and the co-founders’ desires to have a
steady income proved to be major obstacles to Startup B’s success: “I have no money. No
energy to do it. It’s an amazing idea. It’s a brilliant and amazing idea, but nobody is
paying us for it… I don’t think there’s a feasible way for us to do that right now
essentially… We would have to meet somebody who could say, ‘Okay, here is $250,000
for the next two years for you guys to really make this happen. The $250,000 covers your
salaries for the next two years and you do this full-time.’ And then sure. We could
launch” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 28 November, 2016).
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS
This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another
type of customer interaction. Startup B experienced cross-over between platforms for
customer interactions predominantly through advertising to bring customers to their popup events. These promotions took place through word of mouth at other events that they
attended, in their own social network, social media through their own network and those
of the performers at the events, and flyers around campus. From the data collected
through interviews and secondary materials, there were no additional cross-overs of
customer interactions between platforms.
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS
Besides customers attending their pop-up events, the main stakeholders that
Startup B interacted with were the local government council and performers at their
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events. These interactions are outlined above in the case. From the data collected through
interviews and secondary materials, no additional stakeholder interactions were noted.
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP
All major challenges, including lack of engagement from customers and local
government, and lack of available funding are detailed above. From the data collected
through interviews and secondary materials, no additional challenges were noted.
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017
With the challenges encountered to find and start a permanent location for Startup
B, the co-founders decided to seek out other ways to make a steady income and put the
venture on indefinite hold in November 2016: “[The business] really is on hold. But I
don’t feel disappointed about putting it on hold at this point because I know we’re going
to be in the community for quite a while to come. I feel like it will eventually come to a
breaking point [where the city will need this]” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 28
November, 2016).
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Appendix B3. Startup C
“[By using the obituary data from scraping listings, I learned] there are 2.4 million
deaths and no one is leveraging this information.”
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS
1.1. Initial Business Idea
In August 2015, the founder of Startup C started a business that “designed
software to help realtors get leads [on people interested in buying and selling their
homes]” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016). This software was based on
software that he had previously developed for another business he had started three years
ago – an online tutoring marketplace platform that connected university tutors and high
school students.
Through personal contacts, the founder found that most real estate agents were not
making enough sales in a year. To help combat this issue, the founder thought that this
software that would help them access new leads, but that this software would only be
useful if trust was established between all stakeholders for free flow of information to
occur: “Eighty percent of agents in Canada made less than six sales this year. That
means that the majority of them cannot make a living based on selling houses. The
question is, how do I provide [realtors with] more leads of customers with strong intent
to buy or sell a house in the next few months?… That is the problem we’re solving. Real
estate is a relationship-driven business [though]. No matter what technology you use, the
final thing you want to do is to establish trust. So, how you establish trust fast is with that
face-to-face meeting. Technology helps to achieve that goal” (Startup C Founder,
Interview, 1 June, 2016).
While real estate-related software was the original idea for Startup C, over time,
the business idea went through several pivots, or adaptations, and sometimes were
dismissed altogether based on a lack of validation from potential customers of the
websites. The initial business ideas involved trying to get sales leads from others, while
the latter business ideas involved providing sales leads for others via existing affiliate
marketing channels. As you will see in the detailed timeline below, Startup C changed
customer and industry several times, as well as the ways in which they chose to interact
with customers.
1.2. Founder
The founder was a software engineer and formerly co-founded an online tutoring
platform. His knowledge of real estate came from renting our residential properties, from
his father, a real estate investor, and from the mother of his co-founder of the tutoring
business who was a real estate agent. From personal observations, English was the
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founder’s second language and the founder spoke relatively fast. This is noteworthy
because customer interactions I saw suggested that they struggled to understand the
founder’s accent and his message during the conversation.
1.3. About the Customers
With the first business idea, the founder of Startup C focused on real estate agents
as potential customers of the real estate software he was developing. If he brought a lead
to a real estate agent, they would pay him a referral fee. Initially, the founder tried to find
the leads on his own, however, as time progressed, he decided to seek out different types
of non-real estate partners that were in contact with individuals who might also be
potential home buyers or sellers. Startup C then intended to act as a facilitator to refer the
leads to real estate agents. As a compensation for the referral, Startup C would offer these
partners part of the referral fee he would receive for brokering the relationship: “Funeral
directors, marriage directors, graduation – there are different service providers that we
don’t think about being connected to real estate. Which makes sense. They shouldn’t have
any connection with real estate agents. But those are the people I want to focus on. I need
to do research, and I have to get conclusions” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June,
2016).
While the founder of Startup C did not specifically refer to the terms, ‘supply-side
and demand-side customers’, his initial business ideas involved trying to create a
marketplace for real estate sales leads. In this business, the supply-side customers were
those individuals or businesses that could provide leads about individuals looking to
purchase or sell a home. The founder himself also tried to provide these leads at one
stage, however decided to work with real estate industry-related partners (e.g. mortgage
agents) and non-real estate industry related partners (e.g. retirement homes, funeral home
directors) that might be aware of individuals looking to sell or buy a home. The demandside customers were the real estate agents seeking out leads, and who were willing to pay
a referral fee to the supply-side customers. Startup C would take part of that referral fee
as their transaction cost.
In later business ideas considered during the study period, until the end of 2016,
Startup C was still try to get sales leads for real estate agents in different ways, as well as
for contractors. Afterwards, the founder decided that rather than providing leads for
others that had not originally sought out these leads, that they would instead provide sales
leads to businesses that sought out partners through affiliate marketing programs earning a commission by promoting other business’ products. These partners included
home owners looking to sell their property, charities, wedding industry companies,
lawyers, plastic surgeons, dentists, and costumes. The first businesses in which Startup C
saw success in his affiliate marketing websites was the engagement ring industry.
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2. STARTUP HISTORY
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016

Continued use of social media to reach out to
customers
Revisited Idea #4: Some interest by individual
movers
Idea #3: Generating leads for contractors - Lack of
interest
Spoke with funeral directors as non-real estate
partner for Idea #1 - Lack of interest

Founding Startup C - Idea #1: Leads for Real Estate
Agents

Jun-15

Sep-15

Revisited Idea #5: Success in
affilate marketing in wedding
industry

Sought out real estate leads by knocking on house
doors
Idea #4: Creating one-stop address change website Lack of interest by realtors
Checked with real estate stakeholders about interest
in CRM system
Idea #6: Website to highjack other business' website
traffic.

Dec-15

Mar-16

Jun-16

Sought out non-real estate partners to find leads for
Idea #1 - Funeral homes, financial planners,
retirement homes, obituary websites

Sep-16

Dec-16

Continued Idea #5:
Increased affiliate
marketing in other
industries

Idea #2: Web platform for home owners to learn
about neighbourhood - Lack of interest

Idea #5: Started affiliate marketing

Increased focus on scraping data from the Internet

Data analytics to
demonstrate success of Idea
#5: Affiliate marketing
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes
2.2.1. Founding of Startup C.
Phone and email. As defined by the founder, Startup C was founded in August 2015,
with the intention of providing realtors with software that acted as a customer relationship
database, with information about potential customer leads: “I thought, why not apply the
same technology that is already established in the tutoring industry and apply it to the
real estate industry. I thought it was a great idea. Then I talked to a bunch of real estate
agents that I’m connected with, and built it from there. That was August last year. It takes
about two to three months to build a platform, and then I let the agents start using it…
Part of our goal was to talk to users as early as possible. A lot of this affected the
direction we decided to go” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).
The idea arose from real estate agents asking the founder to build business
websites for them. He noticed that the websites that the agents had were not necessarily
generating customers however: “In August when I got started, I saw that agents that I
work with have asked me to build websites. However, the websites they asked me to build
weren’t getting leads. So, I asked, why do they spend so much money on websites that
aren’t generating customers? If they have problems that I can solve by leveraging this
technology… that was my original assumption. But I didn’t do the research. Now I know
that realtors are just building websites because everyone is building one. But even very
successful agents, they find their website still only generates a few hits. It isn’t a strategy
to find customers” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).
2.2.2. Idea #1: Built customer relationship management system for real estate agents to
access leads for sales.
The founder started building a customer relationship management (CRM) system
in September 2015 that took a few months to build. The founder thought that these real
estate agents (demand-side customers) could use the CRM system to help them to get
leads. Multiple agents could access the system, and the founder would also have access to
this system, allowing him to gather information about the sellers and buyers.
The founder started to build the system, and quickly discovered that the real
agents were not interested in a CRM system: “What I’ve found was that a lot of old
agents don’t use CRM at all. They just use their brain and their notebook to record all
their customers. I thought that CRM would be quite beneficial but later, I realized I’d
made a mistake” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).
2.2.3. Checked with stakeholders in real estate industry about interest in CRM system.
Email. Despite having talked to a few real estate agents early in the business, the founder
felt that he had still not talked to the wider market affected by the real estate industry. In
January 2016, he started speaking with several real estate agents and other stakeholders
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involved in real estate transactions (demand-side customers), and realized that he had
mistakenly invested time building a software platform that would not be used or paid for
by these customers: “One of the first mistakes I made was to just build a customer
relationship management system. Why? The platform you’re seeing right now [in June
2016] is not actually the direction that I’m heading. Over the last few months, I’ve been
talking to 98 real estate agents, mortgage agents, financial advisors, and also, some
accountants. It’s all about talking to users. The lessons I’ve learned is talking to users as
early as possible. Think about how much information I can get from an agent with thirty
years in real estate. I can try to squeeze all the information into a thirty-minute
conversation. I wish I’d done that as early as possible to avoid doing those mistakes”
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).
The mortgage agents and financial advisors that were part of the house selling and
buying process were willing to offer a commission for the leads provided by Startup C,
however they were not willing to share information about their own clients – information
that Startup C was seeking to be able to learn more about buyers and sellers in the real
estate market: “After talking to customers for one to two weeks, like talking to twenty to
thirty agents, we see that it was a false assumption [that they would share information].
These professionals always want to get, but don’t want to give. So, if you give them leads,
they may give you a high percentage of commission, but it is unlikely that they will give
up clients. So, that model doesn’t make sense” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June,
2016).
2.2.4. Started to try to get leads for real estate agents independently by knocking on
home owners’ doors to learn more about home buying/selling habits.
In-person, door-to-door. By March 2016, the founder started knocking on house doors
to learn about how likely it was that home owners would want to sell their homes. The
founder wanted to collect data from them as to when they might want to sell their homes,
and to provide this information to agents for a finders’ fee. As an incentive for home
owners to share information about themselves, the founder had prepared free market
assessment reports about different neighbourhood to share with them, however, still
found home owners resistant to communicating with them: “We wanted to test if we give
out market reports [about potential neighbourhoods that they might be interested to move
to], can we gain their trust?... When they say they want to move, we ask a lot of questions
– when would you want to move? After we get that information, we would want to sell it
to the agents. Those are our initial assumptions, but after memorizing all these scripts [to
say to home owners when knocking on their doors], and going out to them, I got rejection
after rejection. Because they don’t have interest… And they ask my motivation, because
they already know how these things work. And my answer does not make sense to them
and they end up not being interested… They have not met me in the neighbourhood and
they will not share this information… My advisor said… just go out and see if [home
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owners] want to tell you the information. If not, you’re just wasting time trying to connect
with agents” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).
Despite being turned down initially, the founder continued trying to knock on
doors and continued to get negative responses: “I found that there was no response. ‘I’m
cooking dinner or I’m eating right now [is what the home owners said]… What I learned
during that process is that I really need to define a pinpoint for consumers to get trust as
fast as I can. No one would release information unless they can trust me” (Startup C
Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
2.2.5. Founder of Startup C decided that testing assumptions is important for him.
In early June 2016, the founder of Startup C became very reflective about how he
would test the assumptions he had. He began to gather information and he decided that if
people did not want to talk to him or did not want to commit as a customer, that his
assumptions were not correct and that he would need to try out other idea: “It is
important to learn and test my assumptions at the same time. We are talking to agents,
and not just gathering information. They wouldn’t just talk to me if I gave them a call and
told them the services I offer. I actually help with their needs and wants and at the same
time, I provide them with information. And finally, I ask them to make a commitment. If a
commitment is not made, then the assumptions I’m making are false. So, over the process
of doing research, I keep testing those assumptions” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1
June, 2016).
2.2.6. Decided to seek out new non-real estate partners to find real estate leads.
From his previous attempts to gain trust from potential home buyers and sellers,
and others in the real estate industry (refer to 2.2.4), the founder thought however, that
non-real estate partners would also know whether individuals were buying or selling
property and would be able to provide leads about potential sales (supply-side
customers). In early June 2016, the founder realized that potential non-real estate partners
had already gained trust from potential home buyers and sellers: “Consumers need to
trust us… We need to get consumer data and we talk to consumers ourselves to get that
data. And then we sell this data back to realtors that would purchase the data. [The
customers we would have] depends on the strategy. If you were to partner with data
providers that give you data, the data would be given to real estate agents. Then we
would have one customer. But we might need to talk to different people. Like, for example
family divorce lawyers… If we were to maximize their underutilized data [about their
clients], they could refer us to a [real estate] deal [from someone’s house being sold],
then we could give them 50 percent commission if the house is sold. But then, divorce
lawyers become my target client, because most likely, if someone is getting a divorce,
they would sell their house… So, we don’t just look at customers. We look at why we are
doing this and what problems I’m solving. We provide leads to agents... Every buying
and selling position is triggered by life events. Divorce, disease, new marriage, new
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babies, graduation. All of those life events have a lot of service providers that can
partner with us [and provide leads]. Yet, they don’t know the value of that data [that they
have]… They don’t think about how to maximize their customers’ value” (Startup C
Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).
This resulted in the founder’s goal, as of June 2016, being to learn more about the
real estate ecosystem: “My goal for the summer is to figure out the ecosystem and develop
partnerships with data providers. And really validate my biggest assumption – That by
partnering with data providers that this can translate into leads, and then leads can
translate into sellable data with the agent” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).
2.2.7. Spoke with funeral directors as the first potential non-real estate partners, with
the intention to find real estate leads.
LinkedIn. By the second week in June 2016, the founder of Startup C had reached out to
several funeral directors over LinkedIn as their first potential partner to find real estate
leads (supply-side customers; refer to 2.2.6), however did not had much success: “I’ve
been talking to funeral directors last week to see about that market. Two said no. The
other eight had no response… LinkedIn is the best way to connect with other people. I
have sent requests to 200 to 300 people. Thirty people accepted my requests and most
people don’t respond at all… After thirty-three, there are only fifteen people who are
funeral directors in Toronto. Of those fifteen, I got two rejections and two positive
[responses]. What [they] told me is it is against company policy. I’m looking for a
complementary partnership between real estate and funeral directors… This [is meant
to] help funeral directors to generate new revenue streams through commissions with
realtors” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
By mid-June 2016, the founder of Startup C had spoken with the two funeral
directors and had received positive responses about providing leads for his real estate
platform: “[I asked the funeral director] how many customers have been asking you
about this after-care service? And then he said, about two to three clients per month.
That’s pretty good…. We can get something done. [I asked him], do you think that’s good
for us and he said yes… At the end of the call, he asked me to send him an email with a
demo. But I don’t really have a demo. I just have testing. So, I [have] spent the last two
days creating a demo video…. And the [other funeral director], he had already seen
certain realtors doing that. He had been wanting to do this for years and asked me about
my plan… So, once we create the video, I’ll probably push that out to him as well”
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 15 June, 2016).
Phone. The founder was also concerned that perhaps the reason he was not able to
contact funeral directors was that they were not on LinkedIn: “The majority of [funeral
directors] are likely very old. And don’t see LinkedIn as a necessity to generate leads. So,
maybe I need to contact them over the phone” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 15 June,
2016). He believed that finding alternative ways to reach out to non-real estate partners,
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including calling them and visiting in person, was important to gain access to the market:
“There are different levels of sales. Elephants, deer, rabbits, ants. Funeral homes are
deer and elephants. If one is a $5000 opportunity, it’s a good opportunity and I can go
there and have a conversation with them [in person]” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 15
June, 2016).
However, phone calls where not always successful for the founder. In a phone call
with one of the funeral home directors in late June 2016, the founder of Startup C spoke
fast to complete his sales pitch. The funeral home director could not initially understand
what the founder was offering, particularly with the founder’s heavy foreign accent.
Despite these communication challenges, in the end, the funeral director did want to learn
more: “[I said,] ‘It would be a win-win situation for realtors and funeral directors. Does
your group of funeral homes offer any after care service?’ Then he said, ‘Sorry, you’ll
have to repeat that… Uh, are you a realtor?’ [He didn’t understand that] I’m not a
realtor. I’m an entrepreneur. A data scientist. And what I do is that I found opportunities
that are complementary for different industries. [I said,] ‘I’ve been working on this for a
few months with realtors and funeral directors… The realtor provides up to 25 percent of
the referral fee. They have expertise dealing with clients in that situation before. At the
end of the day, I feel like funeral homes would need to have one-on-one conversations
with the realtors… Once they sell the house, everything you can see in the CRM
dashboard. After it’s sold, you’d get an instant notification.’… He said, ‘I think
conceptually it makes sense. We have lawyers and people who do wills and life insurance
people. I guess the realtor is one part of closing off the estate. I just don’t know how
many opportunities there would be for you’” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June,
2016).
Email. By late June 2016, Startup C had received interest from three more funeral home
directors about possible partnerships. He concluded however that having only five nonreal estate partners did not provide strong enough confirmation of business idea #1: “Five
out of the twenty people that I contacted are interested. I think there’s some potential. But
unless it’s validated and I get a strong confirmation – I still need to test [the idea
further]” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
2.2.8. In touch with potential partner who also created market assessment reports.
Email. The founder contacted another company’s founder that created market assessment
reports similar to those that he had wanted to offer (refer to 2.2.4): “It totally blew my
mind. He does neighbourhood reports… He is struggling to monetize... That’s why he
approached me. He has already committed so much, and now wants to leverage this
technology” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). Nothing came of this
discussion.
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2.2.9. Lack of interest from potential non-real estate partners to share leads and from
individual home buyers and sellers to share information.
By the second week in June 2016, Startup C had spent several months speaking
with people who might provide leads about real estate sales. These included potential
partners (refer to 2.2.6 and 2.2.7) that could provide leads, as well as individual home
buyers and sellers. From these conversations, he learned that despite a few positive
responses from funeral directors, most of the people he had contacted were not interested
in providing information about potential real estate buying and selling leads: “I’ve
already talked to ninety-eight professionals in the past two months, thirty something
realtors, twenty something financial advisors, and twenty something mortgage agents… I
found that no one wants to give up anything. People only want to get” (Startup C
Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
Email. Rather than giving up the idea, the founder decided to continue to seek out other
non-real estate parties that could be potential partners to find real estate leads: “This is my
approach. I’m trying to diversify different sources of opportunities. I [won’t] heavily
invest into one…. This is the fastest way to test MVP. And with those analyses, I learned –
well, with retirement homes, those are not the people to talk to because they are a big
organization and it’s hard to reach the CEO. Divorce lawyers – they are hard to talk to
as they are very conservative and not open to conversation. Immigration lawyers and
consultants – they may not be immediate partners. I want to identify who I can partner
with… At the end, moving forward, I’d like to test [different options] and see how it goes”
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
2.2.10. Idea #2: Explored whether individual home owners would be interested in a
web platform to learn more about their neighbourhood houses.
In contrast to previous attempts to learn about the selling intent of homeowners by
knocking on the doors of houses (refer to 2.2.4), the founder wanted to see whether
individual buyers and sellers of homes would pay for information about different
neighbourhoods: “[We want] to give consumers a transparent platform to make
independent decisions. So, right now, if you want to buy a house, you never question why
you need an agent. But if you had all the transportation information, would you still find
an agent?” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).
On a new website platform, the founder wanted to see if homeowners would be
willing to share information about their home and any renovations that they had done:
“The purpose behind this was to see if homeowners would be interested to know how
their neighbours maximized their property [through renovations]. This is the information
that real estate people can’t really provide… You can put in a description [about your
house] and create transparency in real estate” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 15 June,
2016).
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The founder also realized that while real estate agents might prefer to not have
this information be public, that it may actually help create more openness across the real
estate industry and help facilitate discussions on home value: “The thing is, a lot of
realtors are actually really scared. This would open up a lot of data [to the public]. But,
it may be a good time to sell [the idea] to them – increase their defense. I could start
discussions with the real estate board, that defends exclusivity of real estate owners… [to
show them that] using the data I’ve opened up will get them a lot higher profit... It’s
something that realtors can use that’s meaningful. It allows them to engage homeowners
in conversation” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 15 June, 2016).
Social media - Facebook. By late June 2016, Startup H had started reaching out to
homeowners in homeowner Facebook groups to ask whether they wanted more
information on housing prices in their neighbourhood: “One of the homeowners
responded and is interested. I asked her some questions: ‘Would you be frustrated after
spending money and effort after spending money on renovations and having no
appreciation on your house?’ She said yes and gave me her email address to sign up for
this.” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
The founder found however that they were not getting enough of a response to
make pursuing this project worthwhile: “But I see over 80 percent of people don’t
respond to my message because they aren’t in the industry and don’t really care… Twohundred messages and seven positive responses. And ten rejections. But the rest of the
people don’t care at all. There’s not a need… After I found out that, I thought, maybe it
makes sense to stop, rather than putting in more effort validating this. I should change
my gear and focus elsewhere. I can still work with these funeral homes [that I’m already
in contact with], but I will stop contacting other ones” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22
June, 2016).
2.2.11. Contemplating best method to reach potential customers.
Social media. By late June 2016, the founder of Startup C started to question whether he
was using the correct media to reach out to potential customers. He had been focused on
using social media to have one-to-one conversations, and while these messages were not
proving to be that effective to communicate with customers, he was skeptical that he
would get better feedback from more open, one-to-many community forums: “I started
thinking, maybe I should drop those strategies with Facebook and LinkedIn… I found it
very difficult to talk to customers. Facebook – I did it. LinkedIn – I did it… And other
channels – I’ve thought of it. Online [community] forums, Reddit, home improvement
forums – I would invest too much time and the engagement rate is too low… And then
these other channels, they aren’t going to be as effective as LinkedIn and Facebook.
Those channels I can have one-on-one conversations and have maximum feedback and
know who actually reads it” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
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The founder also ruled out ads as a primary mode to connect with customers:
“Facebook ads and Google ads are worse. They are just yes or no [in terms of showing
that people are interested” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
2.2.12. Idea #3: Generating leads for contractors.
Another idea that the founder of Startup C had in late June 2016 was to collect
information about individual home owners’ renovations and intent to have renovations
done on their house (refer to 2.2.10), and to make the data available to other stakeholders
that might find it useful – such as contractors seeking out leads for renovation work: “I
asked myself – Can we generate leads for contractors? It’s not much to identify that
people have unfinished basements. But being able to get to know them, getting to know
who wants to renovate. That’s more powerful. I [can do that if] I step forward and
contact home owners… [We’re looking to see] how much the house value increases after
renovation. I can create a professional document and deliver it to homeowners by
knocking on doors…. I’m not too worried about figuring out how to make a commission
yet though…. It’s best to provide it for free and get feedback. I can knock on the doors
and tell the home owners that the goal is simple – I just provide this information for free
and ask – do you think it’s important to make additional income for a rental property? If
so, would you like to schedule an appointment with a contractor to get an inspection
totally free? If they say yes, the monetization already happened. That’s the goal I’m
trying to achieve here” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). Nothing came of
this idea when contractors were contacted because the founder realized he was not getting
the information needed from home owners for this to work successfully.
2.2.13. Idea #4: Creating a one-stop address change website.
Also in late-June 2016, founder had another idea for a business. He realized that
while exclusivity of information was important for realtors, that Startup C could possibly
create a one-stop address change website – where individuals who were moving could be
directed to how to change their address on various bills, services and official documents,
such as drivers’ licenses. The founder saw this as an opportunity for realtors to offer this
their customers as an incentive to work with them: “It may be helpful to provide them
with a valuable package. There’s a lot of cost in relocating. You need a handyman,
landscaping, cable, Internet, tech support, furniture. If I can provide a package and 10
percent off, it could help the realtor get more leads. You are the only one why can
provide this package and you can test it” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
Email. However, after emailing potential real estate agents to see their interest, there had
not been much of a positive a response to validate this idea: “I know from the nine people
I sent a message to [about this], only one responded. And not very promptly. Maybe he’s
busy. The assumption is pretty good then – demand isn’t as high as I expected… I need to
find more insights and feedback before going through these steps… The number one step
is to validate to see if agents can tell me if it’s right or not… The big thing is, I want to
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reject this idea as fast as possible, rather than hoping it works and holding on [to an idea
that won’t work]… I just assume that I will lose this opportunity. It’s better than hoping it
works. Then I can reject this and move onto the next idea. If you hold on, you feel very
discouraged. I’d rather get a rejection than get my time wasted. So, in terms of facing
these opportunities, I know when to quit and when to move on” (Startup C Founder,
Interview, 22 June, 2016).
2.2.14. Idea #1 continued: One funeral home on board as a potential partner to find
real estate leads.
At the end of June 2016, Startup C had one funeral home interested in offering
referrals to real estate agents and six real estate agents willing to share a referral fee with
them if directed leads (refer to 2.2.7).
2.2.15. Idea #1 continued: Attempted to partner with financial planners, retirement
homes, websites that host obituaries, and retirement planning websites to find real
estate leads.
Phone, email, LinkedIn. In late June 2016, the founder was still trying to connect with
additional potential partners to find real estate leads (refer to 2.2.6 and 2.2.9) and
received a limited number of responses: “I tried with financial planners. I sent out thirty
letters and got three responses. They were positive and they want to chat with me… I
want him to make a small commitment as to whether he would use a referral tracking
system…. I also tried with retirement homes. I called and find that the concept is hard to
explain. I was rejected by receptionists at funeral homes so I decided to use an email
approach. I sent about ten to twenty emails and got one positive response. That response
amazed me. She is quite interested in paying me a referral fee. I’ll give you 75 percent of
the referral fee if you can get me clients. [That’s huge]… I also checked a ton of websites
– obituary websites and retirement websites.. and I’m also contacting media companies
starting companies for obituaries. Other partnerships I think will work include people
like a retirement planner that I contacted via LinkedIn. There are two big value
propositions but I think he’s taking his time…. The majority of people don’t seem
interested, so I don’t really care [to follow up with those parties]… The thing is, if
they’re not responding, they’re not responding for a reason. Maybe they’re busy. Maybe
their company is too big. Many reasons. So, I’ll follow up and see what happens. If I see
a pattern of them not being interested, then I’ll move on. I can’t conclude too many
reasons. Maybe they don’t like to deal with me in general. Maybe it’s the approach that
I’m taking…” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 29 June, 2016).
In the cases where the founder had received a positive response, such as when
speaking with the COO of a retirement home in July 2016, he found it was not a large
market: “[The COO of the retirement home] would offer me 75 percent of the referral fee
for sending clients to the retirement home. She’s more interested in receiving referrals
than sending them out [for people looking to sell their home]. I see this as an opportunity
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to move forward and help her do referrals, but I learned that it’s not a big enough
market. There are only 53 apartments in those buildings. And there aren’t that many
empty… I looked back and thought – should this be something full time? I realized, no,
this may be an add-on” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 29 June, 2016).
2.2.16. Phone call with real estate agent to explain referral fee process.
Phone. By late June 2016, the founder of Startup C had five real estate agents (demandside customers) interested in receiving referrals for a fee. He still hoped to gain more
interest from the real estate agents he had contacted, however was struggling to do so.
After a phone call with one realtor, he realized several of the doubts that realtors may
have been having: “She basically asked everything. She has doubts. She doesn’t
understand the referral process. Eventually, I think she understood everything I said, but
I think she still has doubts” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 29 June, 2016).
2.2.17. Idea #5: Started considering changing to a new business model – Promoting
online retailers through affiliate marketing ads on customized websites.
With all the challenges with the real estate lead referral business model – Idea #1,
accessing supply-side customers that could provide leads and demand-side customers, the
realtors, interested in paying a referral fee, by July 2017 the founder had become
frustrated and was starting to seek out other ways to earn money, such as affiliate
marketing. With affiliate marketing, Startup C would build websites and refer visitors to
other business’ websites: “I’m considering doing affiliation ads – that have higher
revenue. I’m negotiating and they are offering me certain rates. So, I thought, it’s worth
a try, even if it only counts if someone lands on a specific link, rather than on a while
website… I [still] thought it may be a sustainable option” (Startup C Founder, Interview,
29 June, 2016). Furthermore, the founder decided to focus on businesses that were
already offering referral fees for affiliate marketing leads.
Website. The founder started brainstorming websites and themes for the websites that
could attract traffic: “I came up with four ideas to build my own website that would
attract traffic… I can then partner with industry partners to get revenue from ads. And
then, I can test these ideas out [by seeing who comes to the site], rather than spending
lots of money on it” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 29 June, 2016).
Though affiliate marketing was new for the founder of Startup C, he was willing
to experiment with these four websites: “The worst case scenario, none of these work and
I use some marketing gimmick to create money… I want to start earning $2000 a month.
I learned that I need to tie all my goals to revenue and set up the worst case scenario…
Right now though, I just want to focus on this and try it out. I need to remind myself, it’s
okay to quit. It’s about continuous learning to make a sustainable living” (Startup C
Founder, Interview, 7 July, 2016).
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Affiliate Marketing Industry #1 - Homes sold by owner. While he had no specific
industry in mind, his experience in real estate lead him to initially think about creating
real estate related websites: The first [website] is… for people who don’t want to sell
houses through real estate agents because they don’t want to pay agents. We are putting
the home owner first…. I built it on the weekend, so I can test it quickly. And [with other
sites], I just change the images and text for testing and change the domain name”
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 July, 2016).
Online classifieds and messaging. He then tried to attract people who were selling their
house on their own to the website, however received limited interest: “I went to [the
online classifieds] and mass messaged home owners with a message: ‘Hi, I saw your
listing on [the online classifieds] and I understand the frustration that you must have
putting pictures up and re-posting ads. At our site, we’ve been providing advice to home
owners to sell their homes themselves. I’d like to invite you to check out the resources
here.’ … I had only one response, and that was a realtor. That’s not a good sign. People
aren’t interested. Maybe they already tried this approach on their own. They don’t want
to spend the money on that. Or they have ugly pictures. It’s [just] not working” (Startup
C Founder, Interview, 7 July, 2016).
Affiliate Marketing Industry #2 – Charities listed on obituary websites from funeral
homes. The founder also thought that people wanted to be able to do something special
on behalf of people who had passed away, but are not always sure what to do. By
scraping the internet for obituary websites, the founder was able to gain lots of
information about individual memorial websites: “I built a website… I find a lot of people
regret that they haven’t done enough for the people who have passed away. So, I wanted
to create a way for people to express that on a website, say, send [the deceased person’s]
kids to camp. [This] can be passed on to the next generation… I haven’t set up the
payment part though because I want to first see if people will do it” (Startup C Founder,
Interview, 7 July, 2016). The founder however ran into road blocks with both
administration on the obituary websites not approving his posts. Furthermore, most
visitors only tended to visit obituary websites one time: “The problems I encountered
were that 30 percent of the websites need an approval of the post. So, you won’t
necessarily be approved… And then, another problem I found was the timing issue…
People don’t come to the site more than once” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 July,
2016).
Affiliate Marketing Industry #3 – Wedding industry. Email and web forms. The
third industry that the founder wanted to build affiliate partnerships with online
companies with affiliate programs in the wedding industry: “I’m building a wedding
[website] by putting together information on registries from different websites. And then,
I can partner with wedding planners, jewelry stores, etc. to capture people who go to the
site and see if people have intent” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 July, 2016).
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Affiliate Marketing Industry #4 – Lawyer registry. Finally, the founder also wanted to
build a registry that allowed individuals to search through a database of lawyers. On these
sites, lawyers could pay to be featured in a more visible area of the website: “For the
ones that pay, they get promoted up in the listing” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 July,
2016). He did not follow up on this avenue as later, another website was found that
already did this (refer to 2.2.19).
2.2.18. Realizing that timeline for affiliate marketing could take a long time.
In a discussion with his advisor in mid-July 2016, the founder of Startup C
commented that it would possibly take too long to receive validation on the success of
affiliate marketing with the industries that the founder had planned to build websites for
(refer to 2.2.17): “The legal one and the wedding industry – [my advisor] suggested it
would take too long to test the MVP… and he questions whether the real estate route is
the best route. He doesn’t really see it as a possibility” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13
July, 2016).
As a result, the founder initially concentrated on other industries that he was
familiar with, including funeral homes and retirement homes: “I think over 70 percent of
the funeral home websites don’t have monetizing options on their websites. For example,
buying flowers and lighting candles. Think about this - when you look at your colleague –
you’re not likely to go to his funeral, but you may buy flowers online… And I also see
retirement homes as competitive” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016). Nothing
came of this exploration.
2.2.19. Idea #6 – Building a website that rated realtors.
While building and testing the affiliate marketing websites in July 2016, the
founder of Startup C stumbled across a website that featured and rated lawyers. Seeing
this site validated his thoughts that such a website could be duplicated in other industries.
Furthermore, he saw the potential to use these sites to also make money through affiliate
marketing of legal services: “And there’s the potential to work with legal industries. You
can never see lawyers’ success rates. But this website, you could see win rate and hourly
rate. What I found was that hourly rate doesn’t really have correlation with the winning
ratio. The company [that put up this website] already raised $100 million in a few
years… But I came up with this idea before seeing this site. It wasn’t inspired by this. We
have different industries, but similar tools can be used. I can look at various options for
this solution. But it will take a long time to gather this. Maybe the MLS (an association
for the professional services of realtors) won’t be happy with this [in the real estate
industry]. They may shut down some publically available data. And maybe the consumer
will still rely on relationships, not on stats” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July,
2016).
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Data scraping. To capture the information for these websites, the founder turned to
technology to scrape data from the Internet: “I can use machine learning to capture this
information. [For instance,] I can connect this information to charities – charities right
now don’t have any way to understand how to increase donations. [By using the obituary
data from scraping listings I learned] there are 2.4 million deaths and no one is
leveraging this information… [There could be] a lot of donations to a heart foundation”
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 20 July, 2016).
The founder particularly wanted to create a real estate related website that showed
the performance of realtors: “The top one [is] the realtor one. The open platform that
shows real performance of all realtors… The number one option I want to test is with
home owners. I can test it with people who own a house. Then push the prototype and test
their reaction” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016).
Email and Website. To test the idea for a website that rated realtors, the founder checked
with home buyers and with realtors. When the founder tested the website with a few
home buyers in his personal network, he received positive feedback: “I asked people for
their feedback and a bunch of open-ended questions. And I asked them, have you seen
something like this before. I’m trying to validate this process. I want to see if including
statistics in the website would change your choices… what I’m finding is, this is
something that hasn’t been done before. And they would 100 percent use this as a
reference” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 20 July, 2016).
Email and phone. However, by late July 2016, it was becoming obvious that realtors
would not be willing to pay for a product that rated them: “Coming back to realtors, they
have [shown] this fear of exposing this data. And if they don’t understand or trust the
program – well, I’d be concerned. Because they are the ones that are supposed to pay us.
If we don’t get their trust, how can I actually monetize the company? And if I can’t
monetize, what I am I doing?” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 27 July, 2016).
Given the lack of interest from realtors, the founder decided that rather than focus
on the realtors as customers, they would instead focus on home buyers and sellers: “I
came up with a bidding platform that provides transparency. Where the seller uses the
platform for free and then buyers can go to the platform. Everyone in the transaction can
see what is happening…. It only takes us a day to build. I’m more worried about whether
this is successful” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 27 July, 2016).
However, by August 2016, the founder of Startup C had dismissed the idea of
building this tool for real estate. There was little demand from both home buyers and
sellers and from realtors. His mentor had also said that the website was not going to be
helpful: “My mentor told me that if you build up a tool for the public for real estate,
there’s not really demand. No one is going to compare their realtors. They’re going to
look for listings online” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 19 August, 2016).
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2.2.20. Decision to seek out fast validation for websites for affiliate marketing (Idea
#5).
By July 2016, the founder of Startup C realized that he wanted to validate or
discard the business ideas for affiliate marketing that he was working on (refer to 2.2.19)
in a short time. From a book, he got the idea of how he could do this: “I’m reading a
book about building a product and testing the validation in just five steps. It asks
questions like – how can you deliver the product without making the product? I realized
that I could make a quick prototype to test” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July,
2016). It was also important to the founder to receive validation from his advisors before
proceeding: “First, I want to check with advisors to see what they think. All the ideas
right now are biased” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016).
Website online testing. The founder decided the best way to get fast validation was to
test whether there was interest in the websites being built by finding several people
online, rather than contacting individuals, one-to-one, in-person or over email to test the
websites: “Another thing I found is, the cost of testing with mass audiences is a lot
cheaper than testing with individuals. So, I realized, if that’s the case, can I test a lot of
my assumptions in a short amount of time by launching these sites and see what
responses I get?... By building a website, I can test for validation... If I spend all this time
building a site, months in fact, how can I shorten this time?... What I’ve learned is,
validation comes two ways – building a website and showing it to them, or talking to
them first… They’ll be very critical of why this is needed. I need to provide as much
information as possible to the individual consumer [so a website would be helpful]. But
what I realized is, you don’t need to make the whole website. You just need to test one key
assumption. If it’s tested and successful, you build on top of it” (Startup C Founder,
Interview, 27 July, 2016).
2.2.21. Revisiting Idea #4: Creating a one-stop address change website.
By August 2016, the startup had dismissed the idea that they would be building a
real estate related site. By using Google Key Words, he filtered out potential ideas for his
next website and decided to revisit the idea he had in June 2016 about the need to easily
change addresses on various personal documents (refer to 2.2.13). Within a few days, he
built a website that helped people change their addresses: “It’s a hassle changing your
license, health card, and insurance. People treat it as a norm. But people don’t question
the extent of the problem. And this is actually a great problem for me to solve… I’ve
already built [the site]. I’m testing it very quickly to see if there’s a demand” (Startup C
Founder, Interview, 19 August, 2016).
Data analytics. Based on a book he read (refer to 2.2.20), the goal of the founder was to
test websites quickly to see if they would be validated. He tried out different
advertisement campaigns to test his address change website, and concurrently realized he
could get a lot of information about individuals when they sign up for his service. By not
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reaching out to speak to visitors to the website, he was saving a lot of time: “Initially it
cost me $25 to do this. I got Google’s platform for $100. And I got results right away.
The three emails here are the people who signed up. I can see what they signed up for,
cable, magazines, etc. Even their email address tells me a lot of information. Every day I
get ten to twenty signups. I’ve gotten sixty-four emails and spent two to three days
building the back end. This is amazing. [When I was] talking to professionals, [this
process] took three iterations and three conversations to get to the point of, ‘Hey, I want
to use this.’ It takes time to get action. But here [with this online method], I get action
right away. And it tells us so much information about this. I can look at how long they
stay on the site. Based on this, I can get a lot of information. You can never get this
information, even talking to professionals. And, it’s extremely low cost. You get sales
right away too… People are just giving their information to me. It’s just like interacting
with customers!” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 19 August, 2016).
By September 2016, the founder of Startup C was on the third version of the
address change website. Concurrently, he was still trying to get a partnership with realtors
to use it as a tool for their customers.
2.2.22. Idea #7: Building websites that highjack other business’ traffic and re-selling
them back to original business owner as sales leads.
Website and email. In September 2016, the founder built websites that mimicked other
companies’ websites. When a Google search was done for the original business, traffic
would also find Startup C’s copycat website. If a visitor landed on the copycat website,
the founder of Startup C planned to sell these visitors back to the original business as
sales leads: “I can highjack someone’s traffic and provide them with new leads. If they
say yes, boom [this could be a great way to get referral fees]! This can apply to all
businesses. Real estate. Lawyers. Plastic surgeons. Dentists. Funeral homes. Any
[websites] with low volume [traffic] – I can help them convert [visitors into customers]
faster” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 9 September, 2016).
By October 2016, the founder had tried building a copycat website based on a
plastic surgeon’s name however the surgeon had no interest in the sales leads from
Startup C: “I wanted to do lead generation with the plastic surgeon… So, for example, if I
typed this doctor’s name into Google, my ad shows up before the real information
appears… For five to ten plastic surgeons, I created a few leads. After a few weeks, I was
trying to get responses and no one responded. Even when I gave the leads for free. I
guess they don’t care because they have too much business already” (Startup C Founder,
Interview, 24 October, 2016).
2.2.23. Revisiting Idea #5 – Affiliate marketing of wedding industry product.
Website. By October 2016, the founder of Startup C had pursued another affiliate
marketing opportunity by building and launching a website that would provide education
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on engagement ring purchases to potential grooms (refer to 2.2.17). This website had
affiliate marketing partners that they featured on the website. The founder thought that
through appearing as an impartial website, that individuals shopping for jewelry would
feel more comfortable trusting the partners that he was suggesting. He ended up receiving
positive validation for this assumption, and referral fees were earning him $2000 per
month: “Using long-tale key words, I can advertise them, and do a pay-per-click
business model. So, for example, this site is for men who are buying an engagement ring
who want to propose. They usually struggle how much they should spend. There’s usually
a goal of two to three months’ salary, and then there’s a question of style, insurance,
etc…. This brings in $2000 per month… People who go directly to the online jewelers’
website – like James Allen – people aren’t necessarily convinced. They need a third
party… I’m making on average $100 per day. I’m sure that could be increased. In one
month, I made much more than the past eleven months. So, I’m quite excited about this
opportunity to have more affiliation partnerships. Money is good validation. I think this
idea is pretty much validated. And I want to continue to have millions to ensure that this
is good” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 24 October, 2016).
Data analytics. The founder decided that the number of clicks detected on the website
would indicate visitor interest to the site, and that measuring these clicks provided better
information than having actual conversations with potential customers: “I can see what
people are clicking on and where they are. And if they don’t proceed, it’s an indication
that they don’t feel comfortable with the information. It helps me analyze users’ behavior
and do better integration… I save a lot of time by not talking to these people. Why are
they not clicking? What pages did they visit? There’s no lie. I can see what actions [they]
have [taken]. I can see different users, different countries, different devices. I can see that
people don’t feel comfortable landing on [a certain] page” (Startup C Founder,
Interview, 24 October, 2016).
Through creating a simple website quickly and making it live, the founder of
Startup C was using this as an opportunity to test the market and his assumptions about
the website: “Right now, I have two assumptions. Number one, they don’t feel
comfortable giving information [on this webpage that they are not progressing beyond].
Two, they don’t like the page set up at all. The more clicks there are, it’s easy to validate”
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 24 October, 2016).
With this positive validation of receiving referral fees, the founder realized that
instead of creating his own businesses, of which he tried several different options, that he
could instead focus on the affiliate marking to make money: “Over the [past] months, I
kept promoting new ideas. But those are very dangerous. It takes me so much time to
invest time into them. And there was literally no validation. And then, after I got
validation, I had to sell it to individuals and get trust from them. And getting trust from
professionals [that I was trying to sell the websites to] is even harder than getting
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individuals to purchase online. So, the question is, why am I creating new projects?
There are merchants that desperately need help in creating sales. This thinking has made
me evolve into a situation where I don’t create new projects. I just let them go. And
[instead], I help merchants increase sales… This situation has been validated… Anything
else, I’ll focus on it eventually, but there’s a lot of down time in those options. This option
lowers the possibility of rejections. Right now, I’ll keep exploring other options to make
this [, the affiliate marketing,] sustainable and lower the risk. Right now [the focus] is
jewelry. What about cars? Online services? Wheelchairs? Supplements? I want to keep it
diverse and see how that goes” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 24 October, 2016).
2.2.24. Continued Idea #5 - Affiliate marketing with different industries.
By November 2016, the founder decided to continue affiliate marketing with
other partners that have existing affiliate programs, such as with the engagement ring
companies (refer to 2.2.2), rather than trying to create new affiliate partnerships with
businesses not currently seeking out affiliate partners (Idea #1, real estate agents, refer to
2.2.2; Idea #2, individual home owners, 2.2.10; Idea #3, contractors, refer to 2.2.12; Idea
#4, realtors for address changes, refer to 2.2.13; Idea #6, plastic surgeons, refer to 2.2.22):
“Instead of plastic surgeons [that were not seeking out new leads], I’m going after
businesses that already have open affiliation programs. Amazon is one, for example. This
is much easier” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 November, 2016).
While the founder worried that affiliate marketing partnerships could not be
scaled, he felt websites could have multiple partners, or that several websites could be
created as he continued to find new partners: “These link encryptions allow me to
promote the business [within my websites]. I also keep finding more and more partners. I
think it’s pretty much automated right now. So, [I’ll continue to] onboard new partners,
optimize the process and make money” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 November,
2016).
He also decided that while his minimum viable product – the basic website – was
enough to validate whether the idea worked for affiliate marketing, the websites would
need to be enhanced to ensure increases in traffic in the future: “I also need to build up a
bunch of engagement ring content [on the website]. The engagement ring is just one part.
What process would I need to put on the website? Buying engagement gifts? Then they
could go smoothly to one of my sites. Right now, they still see my site as an ad on Google.
I want to give them more trust and lower their doubtfulness. [Providing more
information] is one of the ways” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 November, 2016).
Data analytics. Adopting the use of more detailed technologies allowed the founder to
also see what visitors to his website were interested in: “I can use heat maps to see where
people go on a website, and where they hover over. I can see that they explore different
engagement ideas. And then, maybe I can find out that these people stay on the site

Startup C

387

longer to find other resources… I can look for a pattern and promote it better” (Startup C
Founder, Interview, 21 November, 2016).
Advertisements. Once he knew there was interest in such a website, the founder started
using more advertisements to promote the website through social media: “I can also
promote on Facebook. I can be more diverse. Most people click on things because they
think the page is innovative and that we have a different approach. They already trust
what we’re providing to them” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 November, 2016).
2.2.25. Used data analytics to demonstrate success of affiliate marketing websites.
Website. By December 2016, the affiliate marketing websites were going well and
referral fees were being earned by Startup C. The founder had realized that to test for
validation of a website, it was simple enough to launch it see if there was a response. He
prided himself on the site’s ability to get its own recognition: “I found I was spending too
much time building the product. Not actually facing customers. Which is interesting. But
the product doesn’t need to be perfect. It’s all about pushing the product. It will allow
you to get more feedback and iterate from there. That’s the first mistake I made… Also, I
realized there’s more profit to be had with a monopoly. You want to share little with
others and you don’t need press to share your success” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21
December, 2016).
Data analytics. He had decided that emails were also not necessary to communicate with
potential customers – just using data analytics that reported Google searches, heat maps,
and more: “I’ve tried to send people emails. But all this effort I’ve had, it can be undone.
You don’t really need to [communicate via email] to validate your idea. You contact
these people and you want to get their feedback and see if they have a demand to see if
they’ll actually use your product. But right now, I can validate macro and microtrends
using technology I have on hand to find out more. I’ve been making data-driven decisions
– all the great ideas by founders are guesses. If all the business plans are guesses – what
we need to do is use data to prove what’s right and what’s wrong. I’m using Google
search volumes that indicate demand. The more long-tail keyword searches, the larger
the demand… I spent so much time and created so little value [with my previous
attempts]. Why would I go back to that now?” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21
December, 2016).
The data analytics also allowed the founder to fine tune the website to improve
visitors: “I’m making iterations with different topics and different settings. And I want to
see what the engagement rate is. I use heat maps and recordings to see how people with
different interests have different interests in spending… This allows me to have a clear
direction of how to go forward. It allows me to capture high engagement [of visitors to a
website]” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 December, 2016).
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2.2.26. Expanding on Idea #5 - New affiliate marketing website for costumes and
continued focus on testing the market.
With the success of their existing websites and affiliate marketing (refer to 2.2.23
and 2.2.25), the founder wanted to expand the creation of websites for affiliate marketing:
“It will take me a long time to mine this direction… It shows it has become a sustainable
business model already. And finally, I think the onboarding process. It’ll slow down in
the future, but it seems there’s no ending to it [now]. I’ll do it until I have to stop… Even
if there are exciting new business opportunities proposed by my advisors – I’ll focus on
this. It’s much more important than others” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 December,
2016). The founder also noted that the mentors had no objection to him pursuing affiliate
marketing for his startup: “No one is telling me to stop so that’s good advice” (Startup C
Founder, Interview, 21 December, 2016).
Website. He decided to focus on creating a website for costumes based on TV show
characters: “There’s a particular market that I see there’s a business opportunity – TV
shows. Say, you see something and you want to dress up like a character – like Misty – a
Pokemon supporting character. IT ends up with low competition for costumes to deal
with the market. There’s over three million visitors in traffic over two years. It’s simple.
You click on a character and they show you the clothing item. They don’t have inventory
at all though. They direct you to Amazon, and then anything you purchase, they take five
to ten percent. It’s very clever. You make so much profit and create so much volume for
Amazon. So many TV shows do this. They’re generating so much traffic” (Startup C
Founder, Interview, 21 December, 2016).
Data analytics. By the beginning of 2017, the founder of Startup C had already planned
to validate the model to see whether there was interest: “A fancy website isn’t correlated
with more traffic. That’s what I’m finding. I’ve been doing some research and then
launching websites in a day. And then I can go out and validate… What I can do is
scrape the data. And then, it gives me a huge advantage” (Startup C Founder, Interview,
21 December, 2016).
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS
This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another
type of customer interaction. While Startup C at times had advertisements, and messaged
potential customers through social media, emails, phone and in-person, all these
interactions were meant to direct potential customers to a specific test-version of a
website. From the data collected through interviews and secondary materials, there were
no additional cross-overs of customer interactions between platforms.
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4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS
Mentors. In contrast to other startups in the sample, the founder of Startup C was heavily
reliant on advice from his mentors: “I have one advisor at… the largest incubator in
Canada. He is not just an advisor, but more committed. I have another [local advisor].
He has much more active commitments [to the startup]. We are three people working
together on this. And I’m the one working full-time” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1
June, 2016).
At times, the mentors had opposing views however: “[Mentor #1] looks to money
to validate. And [Mentor #2] is a long-term vision guy. He doesn’t’ really care about the
money right now. I prefer [Mentor #2’s] solution. With him guiding me, I’m learning a
lot, I can reflect” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016).
By late 2016, the founder had developed a partnership of sorts while working with
these mentors: “[Mentor #1] has been working with me. We chat every week… He’s
introducing new opportunities after seeing my hard work over the past year, and we’ve
moved from monthly to biweekly meetings. He’s giving me direction now. Rather than
general oversight. I think that means more dedication and flexibility” (Startup C Founder,
Interview, 24 October, 2016). From the data collected through interviews and secondary
materials, no additional major stakeholder interactions were noted.
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP
All major challenges are detailed above. From the data collected through
interviews and secondary materials, no additional challenges were noted.
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017
In early 2017, the founder continued with affiliate marketing. His biggest
commissions remained with the engagement ring website he had built in October 2016
(refer to 2.2.23), with a recent commission of $3500 from a single sale. The partnerships
with mentors have continued, however the meetings with Startup C have decreased over
time. While the affiliate marketing websites are successfully bringing in funds, the
founder continued to explore starting business opportunities in real estate, however had
not committed to anything when we spoke.
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Appendix B4. Startup D
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS
1.1. Business Idea
First launched in November 2015 under a different name, Startup D was a marketplace
that facilitated the connection of property owners of available downtown rental spaces, or
venues (supply-side customers), to consumers needing a short-term rental for event
purposes (demand-side customers). The founders considered Startup D to be part of the
sharing economy – a peer-to-peer sharing of access to good and services – creating a
marketplace akin to the ride sharing service, Uber, and AirBnB, the online marketplace
and hospitality service.
Rather than launch in larger cities, Startup D wanted to predominantly operate in
mid-sized cities. Not only were the founders familiar with the community needs of their
own mid-sized city, they felt that Startup D would help foster economic development in
these cities – one of their own personal goals: “Mid-sized cities are more receptive to our
business because we’re more seen as an active and cultural stimulator, which is
something that mid-sized cities are begging for, because they don’t have a lot of cultural
activities or economic development growth. So, us going there is almost like a service to
them, whereas in [large metropolitan city], they don’t really care because things are
already happening there” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016).
The idea for Startup D arose while the CEO and COO were working in the notfor-profit sector and were unable to find affordable, interesting venues for events they
were planning in the mid-sized cities they worked in: “Why can’t you rent a vacant space
or an underutilized space for a lot cheaper, saving a lot of money, and be more
interesting, more unique?” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). They
also had the goal to improve the economic and cultural development in mid-sized cities –
such as the city from where they originated: “What our platform does is, it actually
enables cities to increase their cultural and economic activity because it allows
entrepreneurs to get access to the spaces to bring their ideas to life, and allows for those
that are looking to put together cultural events to actually make it happen instead of
going through all sorts of bureaucratic processes. It’s sort of like, an engine for
community, with the economic development, and that’s the way I really see this as
making an impact” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016).
They reached out to some event planners for their thoughts and found: “During
the first months we reached out to some event planners, just hearing feedback from
people, [and hearing they were interested” (Startup D, 2 June, 2016). The founders
speculated that while right now, there was limited competition in the event rental space,
there would be even fewer competitors of venue marketplaces in these mid-sized cities,
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and they would be able to grow Startup D and develop a name for themselves quickly:
“So, [these cities] are developing, in this rapid growth phase. And developed cities are
fully-developed. Like they’ve gone through all the things that a midsized city would go
through… in the midsized cities, the opportunities are starting to bubble up or people are
desperate to make sure those opportunities are bubbling up... I think we have the ability
to gain huge market share because we have less competitors in this space… I think you
can have a way larger splash or impact in those midsized cities” (Startup D Founder A,
Interview, 3 August, 2016). However, Startup D was also unsure how open potential
demand-side customers in these mid-sized cities would be to their business model: “In
bigger cities, there’s much more acceptance of sharing economy style models and this
unique business arrangement” (Startup D Founder D, Interview, 19 July, 2016).
The three founders described Startup D as:
a)“an online marketplace for short-term rentals or commercial spaces”,
b) [a way for] people in [mid-sized town] that have great ideas, want to do great
things, and… we enable those things to happen”,
and c) “the marketplace to book, discover, and list pop-up events and art spaces.
You’re kind of like un-limiting social entrepreneurs, artists and innovators in the
city. It’s really about that, un-limiting the world. It’s making awesome spaces
more accessible, making things more accessible for entrepreneurs to do cool
things, allowing unique, creative spaces for artists to access” (Startup D Founders
A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016).
1.2. Founders
The company was co-founded by three serial entrepreneurs who met through a
non-profit focused on economic development of small communities. The COO was aged
27, the CEO was aged 23, and shortly thereafter, they were joined by a CTO and software
architect/developer, aged 18. All three co-founders had other part-time obligations (either
contract work or school), however, all three spent at least 50 percent of their time
working with the startup.
1.3. About the Customers
Because this is a marketplace, there are supply-side customers offering goods or
services, and demand-side customers, looking to purchase these goods or services. This
section describes each of these customers for Startup D.
1.3.1. Customers – Supply-Side
The supply-side customers of Startup D were owners or property managers who
had unused space to rent out. These included a range of venue spaces in the city: “There’s
a whole range of commercial spaces obviously in every city. And then you have art
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galleries, restaurants, and shops and co-working spaces. You just have empty spaces
sometimes. You have retail spots and then… there are just so many spaces [available]”
(Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). The spaces available would range
in size and characteristics: “We definitely want really big spaces, but we also want
smaller spaces as well because needs are really diverse, so spaces have to be diverse at
the same time to meet those needs” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016).
Several venue owners were interested to list their venue space with Startup D
because they struggled with having underutilized space that was expensive to maintain:
“We had a bunch of people try to list their space, so bunch of churches. Again, side
revenue stream for churches, especially traditional ones that have enormous amounts of
space with declining [interest]… And then some tech companies… they had some
underutilized space, I think like 3,000 square feet that they didn’t need, and said, ‘well,
we could rent it out for office or events, whatever it is.’ So yeah, super diverse set of
people but it often is like underutilized space side revenue streams, small to mid-sized
companies, like probably in the 1 to 20 person size”(Startup D Founder D, Interview, 19
July, 2016).
Initially, Startup D concentrated on securing large commercial supply-side
customers. They thought it would be an easier way to get access to several properties at a
time: “We always felt that we would have to launch with a lot of space already or else
people would see [the web platform] and it would look empty and they wouldn’t be into
it. So, we thought it would be a great idea to launch with a [commercial]partner who has
a lot of spaces… But [they are] awesome in certain ways, but quite hard to work with.
They have a much higher need for due diligence… and I think the money he is making out
of renting spaces is little, relative to what he makes on being a property owner” (Startup
D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016).
In contrast, the founders quickly found that they preferred working with small,
independent property owners and managers. Throughout the interviews, a variety of
reasons were given for this:
•

Negative past experiences working with large supply-side customers: The
founders of Startup D were hesitant about working with large, traditional venues
such as hotels and commercial real estate because of the negative past experiences
they had when working with a large supply-side customer: “I have been finding
that dealing with large commercial real estate on the supply side is actually a lot
more frustrating than sole proprietors who just own a single space and want to
rent it out to us”(Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). In
particular, they wanted to avoid the bureaucracy and formality that comes along
with working with larger customers: “We’ll see if that ends up not working longterm. I think it might work as long as it’s small, but if you ever get to the [large
international hotel chain], I don’t think it will work at all because they have way
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more process and policy. And in many ways, [Startup D] exists to undermine
those companies” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 13 July, 2016).
•

Interest in working with supply-side customers that were supportive of their
goals: Startup D also preferred to work with people who had similar goals. When
speaking of smaller, supply-side customers, they described them as: “those are the
people who kind of get us. We thought it would be great, as I said before, to go
after the [large commercial real estate company] of the world and onboard like
40 to 100 spaces at once. And yeah, it just didn’t work at all. Not our segment.
They don’t do this” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 13 July, 2016).
While having supply-side customers on the site was important, it was
particularly important to the founders of Startup D that the supply-side customers
were invested in making the business model feasible. They realized that
independent, smaller space owners would benefit more from being supply-side
customers and typically had more unique spaces: With the larger supply-side
customer, the commercial real estate company, he usually just says, ‘No, no
music,’ and something like that. It made us realize that he doesn’t care about this
revenue. The space costs $300 to rent. That is like realistically nothing… to a
multibillionaire. So, it’s like he doesn’t care, so all of this bureaucratic stuff is
just annoying him. Whereas [the smaller supply-side customer] is willing to do it
because it’s like paying the lease of his space. He’s able to keep the space for half
a year longer because we’ve been sending him rentals. So, it actually matters to
him and he’s willing to make it work, and it’s a bit more personal…. So, it’s cool
things, like the small art galleries, like a person who owns a single commercial
space rather than a hundred [that we want to work with]. That was a big
learning. We realized our supply side customer segment changed” (Startup D
Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016).

•

Preference for unique venue spaces: One of the goals of the founders was to
create a database of unique event spaces, architecturally interesting buildings,
which would differentiate their business from their competitors on the
marketplace: “Because they’re all the same, they all look nice, they’re all small,
they all look [to be] around the same price. So, unless you have huge demand,
then all your value is lost” (Startup D Founder D, Interview, 19 July, 2016). They
believed that having unique spaces for rent would be a big attraction to demandside customers: “We’re trying to have tons of weird and awesome spaces. So, it’s
not just photography studios, it’s not just dance studios, but if we can get like old
warehouses and if we can find air crafting which, of all things, we’re trying to like
focus on right now. If we can get a farm filed, it doesn’t matter what it is, it
doesn’t matter if people will ever use it. It’s just like making them keep clicking
through and hopefully, keep envisioning what their ideas [are] in a greater
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diversity of places. I think that’s what’s going to kind of set us apart from kind of
these big competitors” (Startup D Founder D, Interview, 19 July, 2016).
Furthermore, it was important to Startup D to have a diversity of unique spaces:
“We [would] like to have a diversity of sizes. We definitely want the really big
spaces, but we also want smaller spaces as well because the needs [of potential
demand-side customers] are really diverse, so the spaces have to be diverse at the
same time to meet those needs. So, yeah, it’s not like we’re pinpointing one, but
we just want like, very unique spaces. Ones that would make you just say, ‘Wow!
That’s really cool. I would want to do something in there.’ ” (Startup D Founder
A, Interview, 20 July, 2016).
While the Startup D would make money through charging the demand-side
customers a fee, the supply side customers were essential to attract to the web platform
first: “Revenue is only generated through renters, the people using the space. But that
doesn’t mean we don’t spend time trying to on-board properties onto the online market”
(Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). The goal was to have at least 20
spaces available in a city before launching. After this time, the interactions with supplyside customers would then ideally only take 20 percent of Startup D’s time: “We want to
make sure that every time we go into a city, we’re interacting with the supply side 20
percent of the time…. Then we’re ready to just focus on the demand-side to make sure
we’re actually generating activity [rentals] within the spaces” (Startup D Founder A,
Interview, 20 July, 2016).
1.3.2. Customers – Demand-Side
Demand-side customers for Startup D were individuals who sought out and paid
to use the event spaces provided for hire through the web marketplace. The founders
anticipated that these customers would be younger, internet-savvy individuals, from the
ages of 18 to 40 years of age. They included: “not-for-profit executives and people who
are planning events. Like, we’ve had a bunch of bridal showers in spaces. People doing
music videos, photo shoots, pop-up retail. It’s actually a super diverse bunch of customer
segments. So yeah, I’d say it’s that diverse. There are like the pop-ups, then there are
events that are like large-scale fundraisers of small 30-person events” (Startup D
Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016).
The diversity of demand-side customer needs was particularly a focus for Startup
D: “We have a whole range. We have musicians, artists, those who want to put up a
retail store, pop-up retail store, maybe a restaurant or those who need co-working space
or meeting spaces, those that need a hall to do a conference, those who need spaces for
weddings. I mean the list goes on, right? So, there’s where a whole range of people we
want to interact with. Our biggest customers would be on the demand side. That’s like
80% of our focus because that’s where we generate revenue” (Startup D Founder A,
Interview, 20 July, 2016).
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2. STARTUP HISTORY
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016

Growing Interest only from Demand-side customers

Launch of Web Platform Marketplace
Attracted Supply-side Customers through Word of
Mouth and Personal Network

Pokemon Go/Startup D Map Promotion
Cease and Desist and Shut Down

Losing Loyalty of Supply-Side Customers
Founded Startup D

Sep-15

Jan-16

Apr-16

Jul-16

Oct-16

Worked with Government to Develop Startup

Newspaper Article and Simple Online Web Form Put
Online
Testing First Live Transactions with Customers

Feb-17
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes
2.2.1. Founding of Startup D, First Month of Operation.
Website and blog. The first time that Startup D launched was in November 2015, under
a different name. At the time, the website was not yet established as they had envisioned.
Startup D was not yet an autonomous marketplace, where supply-side customers could
post their event space and demand-side customers could interact with supply-side
customers directly through the site.
Email. Instead, the founders had to manually match supply-side and demand-side
customers: “The original platform was very manual. We literally shuttled emails back
and forth between the space owner and the renter…. We needed the automated platform
for it to actually be a good customer experience [though]” (Startup D Founders A, D, M,
Interview, 2 June, 2016). At the time the website could be described as follows: “It was
essentially just a map with the photos of the spaces and if you wanted to book it, you’d to
email us and then we’d do it. So, otherwise, it was just like a fancy map, but even then,
people thought it was like this incredible website” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 11
November, 2016).
Newspaper, blog, and social media. In their first weeks of operation, Startup D had 44
commercial properties available for rent through one partner – a large local real estate
and development company - and approximately 30 individual space owners looking to
lease an underutilized spaces for events they were holding. The founders promoted the
business through their network, a large media event and social media: “When we
launched, I was asking everyone on Facebook… - essentially like, ‘You know, here’s a
thing I’ve been working on. Give me some feedback on it.’ And some people gave some
awesome feedback related to that. And then once we started having some customers
going through [the platform], they’d say, ‘Oh, I wish the platform had this. I wish it did
that.’ ” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). They also had two
articles written about them in a local newspaper and blog that gained them some
publicity.
Despite the manual nature of their current operations, in the first few weeks,
Startup D had facilitated 33 bookings (connections between supply-side customers and
demand-side customers), and had received customer feedback from both sides. By
launching in November 2015, before committing to building a fully functioning online
marketplace, Startup D could first test the concept of a venue marketplace.
2.2.2. Startup D served a cease and desist by regional real estate board.
One month into operation, in December 2015, the startup was served a cease and
desist by the not-for-profit organization that regulates the trade of real estate in the
region. The not-for-profit believed that Startup D had violated the Real Estate and
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Business Brokers Act, and was receiving commission on real estate without a proper
license.
While receiving a seize and desist order was not favourable, the founders realized
that at the rate of growth they had experienced during a few weeks, that operating the
business manually would not be sustainable long term. The pressure to have an
automated web platform intensified as their demand-side customer base increased, and
the founders found it difficult to manage their needs through the manual temporary
process they had in place: “It got so much interest, but we’re doing everything manually,
and it was just getting a little out of control. We were all working other jobs and were not
expecting the kind of manual work we’re doing. It’s almost like we would start dropping
the ball a lot more. We needed the automated platform for it to actually be a good
customer experience” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016).
2.2.3. Shut down original business, started building web platform, and offline bookings
continue.
In December 2015, the founders shut down the website and planned to take six
months (until June 2016), to re-brand, reorganize how they approached the business, and
to create an autonomous marketplace platform. During this time, they brought on their
technical co-founder, the CTO, to develop the software the business would need to scale.
Despite this setback, the founders believed that the results of their initial launch
demonstrated that Startup D could be viable and that their minimum viable product – a
marketplace for event spaces – would attract both demand-side and supply-side
customers.
Rather than closing the business completely or pivoting to another business
direction with this setback, the founders decided to partner with local government to
better understand their concerns, start contributing to the discussion on regulations in the
recently formed sharing economy, and ultimately, to reduce the likelihood that they
would be affected by other setbacks in the future. In addition to their experience working
with NGOs and in event planning, the founders had a background in local politics, and
therefore, already had connections to start to work with local government.
At the time, the founders still had customers approaching them to seek out spaces
to rent. They continued to facilitate transactions manually, using email to match supplyside and demand-side customers. While Startup D wanted to incorporate feedback from
customer interactions into their web platform, at this stage, they were cautious as to what
type of feedback was relevant. Most importantly, they did not want to over-cater to the
needs of customers that were not necessarily representative of all customers: “We also
didn’t want to overbuild towards one specific customer segment if we didn’t really need
it. Because we don’t yet know if that kind of thing [that the supply-side customer is
requesting] is going to be really common” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2
June, 2016).
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2.2.4. Newspaper article written about Startup D generates publicit and interest from
customers.
Newspaper article. By mid-June 2016, Startup D was already starting to get some media
attention when a local newspaper wrote their second article about the founders; the first
one being written about their initial startup. This attention created awareness from both
potential demand-side and supply-side customers who subsequently reached out to the
startup for venue hire. While the founders were happy with the article, they were still
building the web platform and felt the pressure was on to launch: “We’re kind of nervous
that this one was coming out before we’re launching, just because… we wanted it to
happen under our own terms and we weren’t ready to launch it. So, it kind of forced our
timeline, which actually is okay, I suppose... We’ve gotten a fair amount of exposure from
it, but the problem is, we’re not live, so it wasn’t awesome timing” (Startup D Founder M,
Interview, 22 June, 2016).
2.2.5. Delay in second launch of Startup D’s web platform and continued manual
matching of supply-side and demand-side customers.
By late June 2016, Startup D had hoped to launch but were experiencing several
issues with the software development process and still needed to secure some supply-side
customers with venues available to rent: “We’re finding some bugs. We worked through
them last night and then we’re getting we’re getting potential spaces on board through it.
But before we launch, we need at least 10 to 20 spaces so it doesn’t look empty when
people go there” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
Online website form. In the meantime, while their web platform was not yet functional,
they wanted to take advantage of the media attention they had received. Startup D created
an online form on a simple website that helped the founders to facilitate booking event
spaces: “Our website is basic... It goes to a Google form and you essentially fill in your
space description.” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 22 June, 2016). While Startup D
was predominantly focused on attracting supply-side customers before the web platform
went live, they still had demand-side customers having events that were being attracted to
their web form: “If we just look at our data, we have only events [and not other reasons
why people are renting spaces]. But I think that is a localized phenomenon like [midsized city name] and [other] mid-sized cities” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 22 June,
2016).
Data analytics. In the meantime, Startup D was using Google Analytics to capture
information on visitors to their website: “We have pretty good analytics. Google
Analytics is pretty good. It’s free. So, we can track the city, the demographics, gender
and interests because Google loves giving up your personal data. But in terms of
individuals, [we only get that information] if it’s a signup” (Startup D Founder D,
Interview, 19 July, 2016).
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This manual matching of supply and demand-side customers continued into July
2016. Even large events that could bring in substantial revenue were contacting Startup
D: “It’s slowed down, but it still happens. We’re doing a booking in an airplane hangar
[for the Fall, for example]. It’s a fashion show from New York that needed an airplane
hangar so we found the perfect location” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 13 July,
2016).
A month later, in July, the Google form was still being used for supply-side and
demand-side customers to enter their information about spaces and space needs into the
simple website: “We sort of made that splash page just really quickly because we got the
[local newspaper] article and we wanted to make sure that, in case people were going to
our website that, we were able to capture their requests. So, we put together a Google
Sheets type of thing, like questionnaire. And if you wanted space, you would just fill it
out. We had seven requests from that article, even though we were anticipating
nothing…” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016).
2.2.6. Received suggestion from customer to automate search for supply-side customers
using technology.
Word-of-mouth, personal network, databases, and email. Startup D had been bringing
supply-side customers to their site from June 2016, predominantly through word-ofmouth and personal connections in their town. They realized however that to grow, they
needed to find a more automated way to find supply-side customers. With a suggestion
from one of their current demand-side customers. Startup D explored the possibility of
searching publicly available databases to find and automate the process of contacting and
on-boarding supply-side customers: “And so we started finding all of these aggregators.
Some of them are funded by government, not-for-profit. The list is like 10,000
photography studios in America, in like maybe twelve different cities [that we could have
as customers]. And so then [CTO developer] built an API (application program
interface) which scrapes the database. Also, our competitors don’t protect their data, so
we have all of their data as well… So, it’s an API that scrapes all the photography
studios. And then the next part we have to build is their profile, and show what it would
look like – the description, all the pricing based on all that stuff and their contact
information is there. We send it to them and say, ‘if you wanted another distribution
channel to get more bookings, this is what your profile would look like on [Startup D’s
web platform]. If you’re interested and the information is correct, hit ‘yes,’ and that’s a
supply immediately. So, it would be a way of like, very, very quickly getting supply. But
we never would have thought of that if it wasn’t for [embedded independent supply-side
customer] saying to us, ‘there are more of us in the world essentially.’ Yeah, customer
feedback has been like the most valuable thing” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 22
June, 2016). Despite excitement about this technology and the suggestion from a
customer, this was not initially used by Startup D.
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2.2.7. Testing of web platform with embedded supply-side customer.
In-person. By July 2016, while the web platform had not publicly launched, Startup D
had one supply-side customer that they had a strong relationship with that was willing to
test the web platform from a customer perspective to assess what issues might exist: “We
had one customer going through out site and trying to break it. It’s been awesome
because he’s been giving us a ton of feedback and it’s like we can show him more
unfinished product than we would probably [show] to the public…. I want him to look at
it more so because he is the one that has seen it for so long… In general, he kind of gets
this world and he gets the business and wants it to exist, wants us to succeed, and also, I
guess he probably sees us like reciprocation for giving him so much business” (Startup D
Founder M, Interview, 13 July, 2016).
2.2.8. Slow on-boarding of supply-side customers.
By July 2016, Startup D had ten supply-side customers and their details integrated
into the web platform. However, because of the delays in launching the web platform, the
founders had noticed that the supply-side customers were getting a bit restless: “We’ve
started to pull back a bit [in talking to supply-side customers] because I think we’ve had
so many interactions saying, ‘[the launch] is coming soon.’ It’s like I think some of them
might be losing faith [that we’ll launch], and when that’s going to happen. So, I want to
hold back [on interactions] until we can actually [launch] with them” (Startup D Founder
M, Interview, 13 July, 2016).
Personal connections. In the meantime, there were still a few personal contacts in their
professional network, not-for-profit organizations, showed their interest in being supplyside customers for Startup D. The startup was willing to take them on the web platform:
“His space is like a pop-up retail incubator and an event space… He wants to list the
unutilized space… and then there’s [other not-for-profit organization]… They have three
other floors [in their building]… As that expands, and when there’s unutilized space,
she’s going to list that on [Startup D]…. Another thing we have is the free option, [to
offer spaces for free], as this started off to benefit the community. [Another not-for-profit
organization] has a large boardroom that could probably hold 20 to 30 people. So, we’re
listing a couple of free spaces too” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 13 July, 2016).
2.2.9. Prioritizing building the basic web platform software, despite requests from
supply-side customers.
In-person and email. By July 2016, all founders of Startup D were concerned about how
slowly the web platform was being built and they began prioritizing which features were
being built into the web platform. The CEO found that some supply-side customers were
asking for very specific features that not everyone would need, and started saying no to
them: “I don’t remember what [the request] was, but it was tangential to our core goal…
We kind of sat down and said, ‘Well, day one, this is a lot.’ [Their requests] are likely
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only going to benefit them. If you start to build software only for your big clients, you end
up with very specific software code for their needs, and you lose mass market ability
because you’re going to have such a focused feature set. So, we said no to them... I think
a lot of software companies can get very caught up in their early client” (Startup D
Founder D, Interview, 19 July, 2016).
The CTO was also concerned about the time it was taking to develop the web
platform. The goal was to launch at the end of August 2016. For him, the most important
focus became having a working platform, rather than focusing on special aesthetic
features: “Although there are other features that may look nice if immediately shown to a
client, it would be best to focus on the one that would prevent the entire platform from
functioning” (Startup D Founder D, Interview D, 19 July, 2016).
There was in the meantime, substantial frustration between the co-founders on the
delays: “We’re waiting for our CTO to finish the website. There are a few bugs that need
to be taken care of. And a couple of other features that still need to be built out… One
big, big, big challenge we’ve had throughout the past couple of months has been
estimation time and being able to manage software development… You estimate like four
to five days and then it takes two weeks. It’s kind of frustrating” (Startup D Founder A,
Interview, 20 July, 2016).
2.2.10. Potential on-boarding of unique large factory space as supply-side customer.
Late July 2016, Startup D was offered the opportunity to have a former large
factory as one of their supply-side customers. The founders were excited for the potential
of the location. It was both unique and historic, and could be revitalized as a rental venue:
“It used to house 800 employees. It’s one million square feet, and has 30 buildings… It’s
just incredible, the space…. The idea is that those spaces are going to be listed on our
platform. And people who want to put together events or who want to use the office
spaces out there for co-working or starting their own retail business [could]…. We’re
looking at a very unique and niche end of the market” (Startup D Founder A, Interview,
20 July, 2016). This opportunity eventually fell through.
2.2.11. Growing interest from demand-side customers.
Despite not yet launching the automated web platform, by late July 2016,
demand-side customers continued to contact Startup D for spaces using the Google form
through their simple website: “We had someone who wanted to open up a seafood
restaurant… for two weeks. We had someone who wanted to do their organization’s 50th
anniversary celebration.. a fundraiser… [and] there’s someone that wants to do a
birthday party… Honestly, it’s all over the place” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20
July, 2016).
While Startup D accepted these customers, they decided however to not actually
pursue customers at this time because their web platform was not ready yet: “Well the
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trouble we’re having right now is our product is still not launched. The beta is still not
launched. And so, if we don’t have the product ready, we can’t necessarily go after our
customers, which is unfortunate. But in the meantime, we’ve had the opportunity to really
sit down and rigorously plan everything. I think that will go a long way. I think it’s really
worthwhile because planning will give us like more of a structure and more of a clear
path to be able to acquire the customers when the product is ready” (Startup D Founder
A, Interview, 20 July, 2016).
2.2.12. Discussions to include rental insurance on the web platform.
Supply-side customers often requested that demand-side customers renting the
space had insurance for the events that they wanted to hold in their venue spaces.
However, it was generally challenging for demand-side customers to find insurance,
particularly when they were organizing an event within a short period of time. This
prompted Startup D to search for insurance companies to partner with on their web
platform that would offer event insurance. The challenge was that customers expected
that event insurance would be available almost immediately after filling out a form
online. In response to this issue, the company actively sought potential insurance
companies whom they could partner with to offer insurance quickly through their web
platform during the application process.
Within a few weeks, by mid-July, they were in talks with ten different insurance
companies: “We’ve been able to strike a deal between ten different insurance providers,
pulling in a certain amount of money to make this happen. So, it’s massive value for our
company because it’s a value proposition that really does differentiate us with our
conversation… [having insurance] created for a sharing economy company like us”
(Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016).
Seeking out rental insurance agreements also appeased the sharing economy
regulatory body that the startup was part of. The agency found other sharing economy
companies, such as Uber and AirBnB, had failed to address insurance needs and were
pleased that Startup D had considered this: “They were also very impressed with the fact
that we solved the insurance problem that other sharing economy companies haven’t”
(Startup D Founder A, Interview, 3 August, 2016).
2.2.13. Use of worldwide gaming phenomenon, Pokemon Go, to promote Startup D’s
name.
Supplementary website. In July 2016, there was a smartphone game, Pokemon Go, that
was launched. The game blended digital and real worlds, where using GPS location
features of the phone, individuals playing the game would walk around town, and with
the phone detecting specific locations, they could ‘catch’ characters in the game. To take
advantage of the excitement around the game, the startup temporarily launched a Startup
D branded map associated with the phenomenon and aimed to help players improve their

Startup D

403

scores in the game: “Everyone is playing Pokemon Go. Literally the entire globe is
playing this thing… Everyone is freaking out because this [Startup D’s map] is really
cool. Now, I can cheat my way through getting Pokemon [characters]. And then, we can
use this for [promoting Startup D]… So, we’re getting all these people on board, why not
just promote [Startup D also]?” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016).
2.2.14. Working with local government to develop Startup D.
By July 2016, the government had put together a new committee to create
regulations around businesses in the sharing economy, such as Startup D. Startup D,
having connections already with the local government bodies, wanted to stay connected
and to become part of the committee to ensure that they were contributing to the vision of
the industry: “We’re looking to get an exemption from the council, which would be
additional value if we have the government approval exemption of our company… We’re
most likely also going to be on a sharing economy committee at a provincial level with
AirBnB and Uber, coming up with legislation to take care of grey areas that involve
companies like us. This will be huge value because the connections we get through the
committee will be incredible” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016).
The next month, in August 2016, Startup D’s founders spoke with their local city
councilor to put city’s unutilized venue spaces on their web platform, making the
government a supply-side customer. This would benefit Startup D in gaining more
spaces, as well as furthering one of their goals of improving local economic development:
“So, the [provincial] ministry is like 100 percent supportive of our company. They want
to help us out, they support us… We also recognize that the future is the sharing
economy, and that the ministry and basically all these government departments in the
province are moving to basically accept the sharing economy” (Startup D Founder A,
Interview, 3 August, 2016).
Word-of-mouth and media. The founders also believed that having support from the
local government in their mid-sized town was likely to get media and word-of-mouth
attention that would benefit their growth and that this was support that they would not get
in a larger city: “In [our mid-sized city], when something is happening in the city that is
now, you can get the support of the mayor and heads of all these Economic Development
organizations, whereas in [nearby large metropolitan city], you’ll never even get to talk
to those people… I think you can have a way larger splash or impact in those mid-sized
cities” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 3 August, 2016).
2.2.15. Discovered that supply-side customers were advertising their space on other web
platforms.
Online various websites. By August 2016, Startup D realizes that their current supplyside customers were posting their venue spaces on multiple competing platforms. To
counter this, rather than trying to force supply-side customers into an exclusive
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relationship, they focused their efforts on attracting demand-side customers: “I think
that’s going to happen. We’re going to have a million competitors and everyone’s going
to go all over the place. We’re going to steal all their competitors’ spaces. They’re going
to steal ours. We’re going to do everything we can to stop them. I think, in the end, the
ones who will win are the ones who can provide the most demand, like the most rentals
for that space owner… Our priority is going to be on the demand-side. I think everything
we’re doing is to ensure that we’re having like an 80 to 20 ratio [, demand-side to
supply-side customer focus,] in terms of focus, time, resources, everything” (Startup D
Founder A, Interview, 3 August, 2016).
2.2.16. Reaching out to demand-side customers.
Online advertising. To generate demand, in August 2016, they started trying different
forms of marketing: “[We’re trying] many different marketing experiments. From
CoolCall, we have Lead List doing some different promotions. Whether it’s events and
promos using Google Ad Words, Facebook Ad Words, or the other ones on there. There’s
a list of [options]... There’s more than a hundred” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 3
August, 2016).
Internet scraping for leads. Startup D also started to develop software that would
automate the search for leads on the Internet of individuals who are looking for venues or
have venues to rent out: “Imagine something that searches through Twitter and social
media for people who are looking for a space… like a bunch of different keywords and
phrases. It can [use a]… machine learning network to tell you whether there’s a lead or
not… Then, it essentially is always scraping through the Internet, finding leads and then
tweeting about them and Facebook messaging them…. They’ll always be automating
demand and they’ll always be linking people talking about spaces to our space” (Startup
D Founder A, Interview, 3 August, 2016).
2.2.17. Delay of web platform launch and continued development.
By late August 2016, the web platform still had not launched (see last delay in
section 2.2.5). While Startup D had initially intended to launch in May, five months after
the cease and desist, the founders did not believe that they had captured what the
customers were looking for on their marketplace yet: “We haven’t had enough users to
add features and get feedback on it. We’ve definitely de-scoped things. Our technical cofounder has the tendency to make things over-complex. The thing is, it could have been
more simple, taking a day, rather than a week” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 24
August, 2016).
Though their next launch date was scheduled for September 12th, 2016, they
missed it. The delay was being attributed to the time it was taking to develop the
software: “The software in general has been taking a ridiculous amount of time, but
there’s actually nothing we can do about it, I would say, because we don’t have the cash
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to hire and we don’t also have the ability to do programming ourselves and code
ourselves. We just have one developer and we have to work with him to the best of our
abilities. But we’re hoping that we can launch sometime in September, the beta” (Startup
D Founder A, Interview, 8 September, 2016).
Website. The same Google form on their website that had been used for the past months
was still being used by Startup D in September 2016: “If you click on [‘I have a space’],
a Google form would pop open so if you have a space, you could fill out exactly what you
would fill out on the website. That way we have your information, and we know that if
someone on the demand-side is filling up the form and saying, ‘I need a space for this,”
we have a database of spaces already. It’s a lot of manual labour, but I think that’s
something we have to do anyways because there’s no website” (Startup D Founder A,
Interview, 8 September, 2016).
Word-of-mouth and news articles. Even with the delays in launching the automated
web platform, there was still interest from both supply-side and demand-side customers.
The supply-side customers had spaces that they were keen to rent out, and demand-side
customers were seeking spaces to hold events. Concurrently, word-of-mouth and news
articles continued to raise awareness about Startup D. The startup had demand-side
customers approaching them: “People are requesting a space and… it’s tough given their
timelines to find a space where they can rent for a day” (Startup D Founder A, Interview,
8 September, 2016). This early customer demand meant that the founders had to continue
their manual customer-to-venue matching process in place of their yet to be developed
automated process.
2.2.18. Testing first live transaction with demand-side customer.
By November 2016, Startup D still had not launched their web platform, however
were ready to test their first live transaction with a demand-side customer that was
seeking an event space. If the platform had not been nearly ready, the founders would
have had to done the match manually: “We’ve tested everything and everything works.
It’s just like it would be the first time a customer uses it and see how she interacts with it.
Like, “what makes sense? What doesn’t? And integrate that feedback as well [before we
launch]… Mentally, everything makes sense to us. Like we built it, but it doesn’t make
sense to someone else the first time they see it and so we need to almost test that
assumption” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 11 November, 2016).
Online web platform and in-person. Startup D had six supply-side customers with their
venue spaces posted on the web platform. They felt that this was enough for testing the
interest and viability of the platform however: “I don’t think you need a lot more than
that. We might do a couple of weeks of sales and to see if we can get a couple more
spaces. But if we got up to 30, that would be more than enough, and then we’ll just go on
demand as much [as possible], because that’s really what matters to getting money on
the platform. And then as we deal with demand, they’ll let us know what they need spaces
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for and where we have holes in our spaces [available]… I think right now, it’s about
getting enough so the platform is useful and doesn’t look empty, and then go on demand”
(Startup D Founder M, Interview, 11 November, 2016).
2.2.19. Public launch of web platform marketplace.
Online web platform. In December 2016, Startup D launched their long-awaited web
platform marketplace. They had kept delayed launching it several times, until they
realized finally that it just needed to work, even with a few bugs: “I had a friend tell me,
if you wait until you're proud of it, you've waited too long. You need to get it out while
you feel uncomfortable. You're going to change stuff anyway, so might as well get it out.
It works, that's all that matters.” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 19 December, 2016).
While they had a few initial bookings from demand-side customers, they did not have a
flood of bookings at the beginning: “We have lots of people viewing profiles, some people
trying to book. Not a ton. A couple” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 19 December,
2016).
In-person. At the same time, they also spoke with a friend, a potential large demand-side
customer, who ran training sessions around North America. He was interested in making
multiple bookings, two-thousand each year, for workshops across Canada. This was seen
by the founders of Startup D as a potential opportunity to adjust their business model to
one that is reliant on return business, rather than consistently new bookings: “While our
current model is open, and if someone needs a space, then great. And maybe that’s cool.
But maybe that’ll only be 20 percent of our revenue. And maybe we’ll be looking for
these big clients that are huge space users. A bit more sustainability. So, it’s been
interesting. I’m not going to count the eggs before they hatch. There’s a lot of things that
could go wrong with this. It’s a cool opportunity though… But I’m trying to answer the
question: when are you diverting and being distracted… or are you just following a
business opportunity? Because if you go massively changing the site, the question is, do
you even care about that 20 percent [, the originally envisioned customers]… It’s a shift
in how we’ve been thinking about demand-side customers” (Startup D Founder M,
Interview, 19 December, 2016).
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS
This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another
type of customer interaction. Startup D experienced cross-over between platforms for
customer interactions predominantly through word-of-mouth and in-person discussions
that drove customers to their website. While they had some advertisements, they were
minimal and not a major focus to drive traffic to the website.

Startup D

407

4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS
Besides customers on the supply and demand-side, the main stakeholders that
Startup D interacted with individuals in the not-for-profit and government sectors in their
local town council. These interactions are outlined above in the case. From the data
collected through interviews and secondary materials, no additional stakeholder
interactions were noted.
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP
All major challenges, such as the delays in developing the web platform, are
detailed above. From the data collected through interviews and secondary materials, no
additional challenges were noted.
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017
By early 2017, Startup D’s web platform was still up and running. They were
attracting lots of demand-side customers by experimenting with different types of
marketing: “We started experimenting with marketing, different marketing channels just
because we want to find out where we’re getting our cheapest price and therefore we can
maximize that. So, we did that for about a month and kind of January and a bit of
February and now we’ve kind of found that best is Facebook, or the best is Kijiji free and
[we] built an auto posting bot… People freak out, they love some of these spaces, they’re
discovering new areas of [the city] they didn’t know, they’re sharing it with friends,
tagging their friends. There’s like a ton of engagement on their ads” (Startup D Founder
M, Interview, 23 March, 2017).
The data that Startup D was collecting on the business using Google Analytics
showed that growth was quite strong on the demand-side, however not as predictable on
the supply-side: “We understand how to get demand pretty well now. I have measurable
conversion rate and I predict. We spend this much money and we’ll get this much ish
money back, which is really valuable as far as doing projections. So now, it’s not based
on the BS. When people say, ‘It’s busy in the market. If only we had 1% and get all these
spaces.’ Now, we actually have data and we can say if we can grow in this market, drive
this much demand and probably get this much money. But supply side, it’s like chaos. I
have no idea how replicable, repeatable way of getting supply. It tends to be very
relationship-based” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 23 March, 2017).
In-person meetings, personal relationships, hand written notes, emails. In contrast to
the online attraction of demand-side customers to Startup D, while a few supply-side
customers came in through social media, most of them had to be hand-curated to the site
using more traditional methods, including through personal relationships, in-person
meetings, hand written notes and direct emails: “Hand signed letters, we send them out to
every church. Well, not every church, but a lot of churches, coffee shops, art galleries,
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and actually a bunch of small business lawyers, small business real estate lawyers and
small business accountants and bookkeepers. I figured they see real estate transactions
that are happening on the lawyer side or they know when there’s underutilized space or if
their clients have rental income… Email and calls and LinkedIn and Facebook ads and
Google ads - I think that’s everything we’ve tried with them. But it really - I don’t know. I
kind of want to just hire a bunch of people who are usually political canvassers and just
unleash them on a city because I think that might be what you need, because it seems to
be you need to talk to a person, in-person about it. You need to see the space. People like
to talk about their space. I don’t know. It stinks because it has this kind of small model
but maybe that’s the model that works. So that’s what it is” (Startup D Founder M,
Interview, 23 March, 2017).
The founders attributed this to the supply-side customers having different
backgrounds than their demand side customers: “Yeah, [the supply-side customers] tend
to be older, 40 to 55. I would say more conservative. It’s interesting. Demand side is all
kind of liberal sided, creative, not always but mostly. And then yeah, supply side is much
more kind of conservative business minded older adult like 40 to 55 I would say” (Startup
D Founder M, Interview, 23 March, 2017).
Despite having growing competition in the large metropolitan cities, the founders
of Startup D were conservative about their growth and want to continue to learn from the
process of growing: “I think I’m like in this -- trying to be too safe and that’s like figure
everything out in [our city] and then grow from there. Some [people] would give me that
advice like, “Don’t try to grow too fast or you’re just going to spread yourself thin.” But
I actually think we have enough information now. I have enough information from our
customers right now that product roadmap wise, the next year I think I know what we
need to build. Like from a text side, I don’t think, yes that will take longer to do. We don’t
have a development capacity. But I think the most important thing to learn now is how
other markets respond to us and how we can grow in them, because if we don’t know
that, we don’t know how to grow a business. So, it doesn’t matter if we have a great
profit at that point” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 23 March, 2017).
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Appendix B5. Startup E
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS
1.1. Business Idea
Startup E was founded in April 2014 to develop a mobile phone application
software platform (from here on noted as “app”) to connect online video game players
(also known as “gamers”), playing team-based video games. The purpose of the app was
to create a friendly community and to promote better and repeat interactions between
online gamers: “[We want to be] creating better online gaming experiences for the end
user and for connecting them. We want our users to meet new people – our motto is
discover, connect and engage. It’s not about that one-time connection” (Startup E
Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June, 2016). Another goal of Startup E was described
as: “By connecting you with like-minded gamers whenever you choose to game, you are
given the freedom to play your favorite games with confidence that the person you're
playing with won't rage or have conflicting playstyles. Or at least has a mic.” (Reddit)
Previously, solutions to finding a gaming partner outside of an online gamer’s
local social circle involved posting on computer desktop-based website forums. However,
finding a gaming partner this way was considered time consuming and did not always
yield a solution: “people would post on a forum – ‘I’m in EST, I live in Canada, I’m 20, I
play these games, and like to play them in this way.’ You’d have to search through [the
posted messages]. It may have taken you weeks before you found someone you were
interested in playing with. This just didn’t work.” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June,
2016). Furthermore, in contrast to these computer desktop-based website forums, Startup
E intended to be a mobile phone app. Individuals often had their mobile phones with
them, and the founders felt that having a mobile-based app would increase interactions
and messaging: “people playing Xbox on their couch can have their phone – and they
don’t need to go to the computer to post something online. Or they don’t have to try to
figure out a forum. And then you can also get notifications… The whole system made
sense.” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
1.2. Founders
Startup E was founded by two cofounders in their early 20s who met at college as
roommates. Founder R was studying business administration leadership and Founder D
was studying civil engineering and computer systems technology. They shared a common
interest of playing videogames, and when they were both planning to move out of their
residence, they shared a common issue: “We started to realize, I was going to go back
home, and we weren’t going to have those places to sync up our play time as often to
knock on the door and say, “hey, are you free to play right now? There are a lot of
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people in this world that are around the same age, and are going to connect the same
way we connect. So, how do we find them?” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June,
2016).
1.3. About the Customers
1.3.2. Customers – Demand-Side
The typical users of Startup E’s app were described as: “young males, aged 18 to
late 20s, maybe early 30s… I define that community as people wanting to come together
to play the game and discuss playing the games… We don’t want to reach out to anyone
who would bring about a negative connotation to the brand… We’re trying to be a
positive, community oriented [app]” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June,
2016).
At the time of writing (early 2017), Startup E had over 100,000 registered users.
By downloading a mobile app for personal use, there was an associated contract of terms
and conditions, however no money was being exchanged to be a member of the gaming
community.
The initial goal of Startup E was to build a large user base on the app to
demonstrate validation of the idea for creating a community of gamers, and to observe
how users of the app connected with the community. The monetization strategy had been
developed at the time of writing, however it was not yet in operation. The terms customer
and user were used interchangeably by Startup E. This use of terminology is reflected in
the case.
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2. STARTUP HISTORY
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016
Full Time Commitment
App Alpha Live #1 (300 Users)

Data Analytics & Streaming
begins

App Beta 1.0 Live
(#4)

Korea Trip

App Alpha 2.5 Live (#3)
App Alpha
2.0 Live
(#2)

Founded

Apr/14

Jun/14

Sep/14

Video Blogging Started (7500
Users)

App Beta 2.0 Live (#5)

Kickstarter

Dec/14

Full Time Affiliate Finder
Hired (14,500 Users)

Mar/15

Jun/15

Sep/15

Funding ($20k)
Funding ($60k)
Startup Accelerator
Funding ($52.5k)

Dec/15

Mar/16

Jun/16

In App
Interactions
Began

Sep/16

100,000 Users

Dec/16

Mar/17

Funding ($200k) Lead Developer Left (19,500
Users)
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes
Though Startup E was founded in April 2014, it took a few attempts to develop
the first version of the app from scratch, and several updates on later versions over time.
Each time a new version of the app was built, it went live – in other words, became
accessible online – and gained registered users.
The software development of the app occurred in stages. Until August 2014, the
startup was pre-alpha – where the software had not yet been tested. The alpha version of
the software – the first phase of the software that was tested - was available between
November 2014 and March 2015. After March 2015, the beta version of the software was
available (first closed and then released publically in May 2015). In the beta phase, the
software still had some bugs in the software code, however, most of the features of the
software were complete. The software versions were noted in the process diagram by the
term Going Live (GL) and by their version: GLα; GLα v2.0 Closed Alpha; GLα v2.5
Public Alpha; GLβ0.1 Closed Beta; GLβ1.0 Public Beta; GLβ2.0 Public Beta. While
there were incremental updates after GLβ2.0 Public Beta, the site rarely was nonfunctional during them.
While most interactions with users of the internet-based mobile phone app took
place through the Internet, there were a diversity of types of interactions – both online
and offline - that occurred during the new venture creation process. These interactions
were one-to-one interactions with users or one-to-many interactions with users – initiated
directly by the startup, via affiliate partners that promoted the startup, or by users.
2.2.1. Startup established.
Startup E was founded in April 2014. The two co-founders had lived together and
when one friend was moving out of their residence, they realized that they would no
longer have immediate access to someone to play team-based video games with. After
searching for options online and finding limited options besides posting messages on
desktop website forums, they decided to develop their own app. At the start, both cofounders worked on the startup part time - with one co-founder working, and the other
still in school.
2.2.2. The first version of the app (GLα) was designed and built and created business
plan.
By May 2014, the cofounders had designed a prototype for the app, however
needed to hire someone to code and develop a working app. The initial search for
developers involved the use of an online classifieds website. While a first version of the
app was built from May to August 2014, the developer used was not reliable and did not
work for the startup for long: “We’re not developers. I can piece something together, and
he can too, but we need a product. It was okay. We needed someone to build this for us.
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We drafted up a business plan and drafted out what we wanted staff to look like, and
started reaching out to people. We started off on [large online classifieds website], trying
to get quotes from people. We had no idea… literally no idea. We settled on the first
guy… we had a terrible experience with him, where he just took our code and didn’t give
it back to us. And said, ‘I want $7000 now.’ So that was a bad experience. And so, we
realized, we can’t just get people on Kijiji… we need to find people who are in this to be
part of our team. Not just people who want that lump sum of money” (Startup E Founder,
Interview, 8 June, 2016).
2.2.3. GLα – Alpha – version of the app went live and was promoted to hardcore
gamers.
Website, mobile app, blogs, online community forums. At the end of August 2014,
GLα, the Alpha version of Startup E’s app, was launched (Reddit.com/r/[Startup E]).
After promoting the site on gaming blog sites and online community forums associated
with playing video games, the alpha version of the app received 300 downloads before it
stopped working. Even with this setback of the app not working, the initial downloads
offered validation to the co-founders that there was a community of gamers interested in
their app: “We were reaching out to a lot of different gamers, just on blogging sites,
Reddit and what not. They were really interested in what we do, though we didn’t have a
product. We ended up getting a couple hundred users before it broke completely… at this
point, we had a bit of validation, so we said, let’s try again” (Startup E Founder,
Interview, 8 June, 2016).
The online community forums were set up with the intention of specifically
gaining feedback on the app: “this Subreddit [sub-forum] will be used to obtain, share
and discuss feedback on Startup E’s personal matchmaking app, a better way to find
gamers. Startup E is being made with a clear but ambitious goal; to improve the online
gaming experience of every game that has a multiplayer or co-op mode. This isn't going
to be easy (but someone has to do it) and we'll need to constantly get feedback from you
guys to make sure we really are making online gaming fun for you again!” (Reddit).
2.2.4 The second version of the app (GLα v2.0) was developed and built.
In September 2014, Startup E hired the second developer to build the next version
of the app, GLα v2.0, however this developer only worked with the startup until
December 2014.
2.2.5 Startup E engaged with Steam – an online community forum - and release of
GLα v2.0 - Alpha version 2.0.
Private network, website, mobile app, blogs, online community forums, social
media. Startup E continued to engage with gamers to test out their gaming app. To
connect with users, they posted their first gaming-related picture on social media in
Instagram in October 2014, and created an online community forum on the website
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Steam – a multi-player community gaming platform that is computer desktop-based: “We
went on there, and we created our own community and connected with other gamers. And
we started inviting people to this group and started talking about the app with them. And
a lot of them were like – ‘hey, I’ll meet new friends. Cool.’ So, we kind of reached out to
people in these different communities. It was kind of the goal to bring them on, and it was
kind of spammy, in a way, but we were really personal about it. We customized our
message” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
In November 2014, GLα v2.0 of the app was launched. It was first tested with
private testers for bugs in the software, and then promoted in two online community
gaming forums: the forum used to promote version 1.0 of the app, and another, larger
online multi-player gaming community forum. This resulted in the user base for Startup E
to grow to 1500 users.
2.2.6 One co-founder committed full-time to Startup E.
With this validation of users, in December 2014, Co-founder R decided to quit
his current job and commit full-time to work on Startup E.
2.2.7. Kickstarter crowdfunding campaign and public release of GLα v2.5 - Alpha
version 2.5.
Website, mobile app, online crowdfunding platform, social media, online
community forum. In January 2015, Startup E built its Kickstarter campaign with two
new developers. The public version of the new app, GLα v2.5, was released in February
2015, and from February to March 2015, Startup E held an unsuccessful crowdfunding
campaign where they had aimed to raise $20,000, but had only managed to attract 10
percent of that: “Honestly, we spent so much time building a great campaign, we forgot
about marketing our campaign ahead of time... Lesson learned. I guess if we did a
campaign today, it would have been so much better, but we looked like so many
campaigns. We had a professional video and some content that we wanted people to see.
We just had no strategy to get people to look at the campaign and [get them to] back us
during that month... We thought, wow, people are actually wanting to see something. It
was pretty exciting but disappointing because we didn’t get the money. We got zero. Just
a bit of exposure and some hyped gamers that are still on our platform today” (Startup E
Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
2.2.8. Startup E moved to a startup accelerator, received angel funding and released GLβ0.1 - Closed Beta version.
Family and local entrepreneurship network, in person and news articles. In March
2015, Startup E moved to work out of a local startup accelerator. They also received
$20,000 in angel funding from family and an $1000 college associated entrepreneurship
award (Startup website).
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Website, mobile app, social media, online community forum. The startup released
their beta closed version of the app for testing with a small group of gamers (Online
community forum).
2.2.9. Won annual university pitch competition.
Pitch competition, in-person, and news article. In April 2015, Startup E won $5000 in
a local university pitch competition (Company website/pitch competition website). While
they had an alpha version of the software developed, the founders pitched the next
version of their app based on potential market size: “our beta platform was basically not
there yet. At this stage, we had research; market research saying we surveyed x amount
of gamers. I don’t know how many people [cofounder] reached out to, maybe 500
gamers… We basically sold them on market size. So, 300 million gamers. And now, we
know that number better. [There are] about 220 million North American gamers [that we
can target]” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
2.2.10. Release of GLβ1.0 - Public Beta version.
Website, mobile app, social media, online community forum. In May 2015, Startup E
released the public version of their beta software (Online community forum).
2.2.11. Accepted into entrepreneurship program and second angel funding investment.
Family and local entrepreneurship network and related news articles. In June 2015,
Startup E was accepted into an entrepreneurship program and received a $30,000 grant,
and another $30,000 angel investment from family (Startup E’s website).
2.2.12. Received grants and loans from various organizations.
Local entrepreneurship network and publicity, national entrepreneurship network
and elated news articles, and national (government) business development bank.
July to September 2015, Startup E received a $2500 grant from the local entrepreneurship
centre and $50,000 in loans from two different national funds (Startup E’s website).
2.2.13. Release of GLβ2.0 - Public Beta version.
Website, mobile app, social media, online community forum. In August 2015, Startup
E released the public version of their beta software, Version 2.0 (Online community
forum).
2.2.14. Local grant received.
Local entrepreneurship network. In October 2015, Startup E received a $5000 grant
from the local business development bank.
2.2.15. Change in app format to increase user engagement.
In December 2015, Startup E realized that they still not attracting enough users on
the app for gamers to instantaneously find someone to play with when they went on the
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app. They realized that while they wanted to have users find a gaming partner in real
time, they needed to grow their user base. However, to do so, they first needed to attract
users to the site by providing a functioning platform that mimicked the old list-based
forums for finding gamers to play with: “This whole real-time aspect, where you pick all
these options, and get matched with people – we realized will never scale unless 10,000
users come on tomorrow. [Otherwise,] you would be searching forever. Not that we were
naïve, we knew this, but we needed at least one game that [gamers could successfully find
other gamers to play with on the app]. This was our plan. But we had this platform that
wasn’t taking off because we couldn’t get people there at the same time. And we literally
started [proposing to users that they] ‘post stuff’ and you could filter with hashtags. We
had specific criteria [for hashtags], like [a way to specify other gamers’] skill level. We
went away from real-time and went back to list-based. As much as it felt like we were
stepping back, it definitely changed things completely, and worked so much better. We
think we can add back some kind of matching system in the future, [when we have]
enough users…. It was still a challenge because sometimes people wouldn’t post for a
day… It’s picking up, but…we’re still needing more users” (Startup E Founder,
Interview, 8 June, 2016).
2.2.16. Increase in one-to-one and one-to-many social media use.
Family network. Startup E had told their angel investors that they would have one
million users on the platform by May 2016. However, with the rate of user signup, that
was not looking likely and they did not want to lose the angel investment offer of
$200,000 from family, contingent on meeting their target number of users. This was the
push they needed to try to increase users on the platform by both connecting directly and
widely with users on social media.
One-to-many social media posting. Startup E had their first Facebook post in June
2014, first Instagram post in August 2014, their first Twitter post in January 2015. Their
social media posts gradually increased over 2015, and by December 2015, Startup E had
moved from re-posting text and articles from others to posting unique gaming images on
their Facebook page (Startup E’s Facebook page), and increased their Twitter posts in
January 2016 (Startup E’s Twitter page).
Social media direct messaging. To get more users on the platform, Startup E realized
they needed to increase awareness of their app with the gaming community – an age
category that was highly connected with social media. Already, several users interacted
with Startup E using direct messaging on social media: “It’s a lot of private messaging
actually. On the Twitter account, on the Instagram accounts. Not so much on the
Facebook account…. They send us private messages. And it’s interesting because it
allows us an extremely close and personal type of communication with our audiences
which we strongly emphasize” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
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Startup E experimented with accounts on an array of social media platforms –
Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and Snapchat. They also created different accounts on
these social media platforms, sometimes for different games: “We started with one
account, and then one day, we said, why don’t we just have more accounts? And now we
have over seven Instagram accounts, reaching out to hundreds of gamers daily. That’s
when we brought the interns on. One day we had over 400 [users] to get back to. We
were like, this isn’t possible. This is too many people. But these are people that if we talk
to them, they may download the app. We want to be very active, but it was crazy. At that
moment, before it got out of control, we were bringing on 100 new users a day. And it
was scaling. It was 20 percent more users – it was brilliant. It just hit a point where we
capped out… so we’re wondering if we can scale things further” (Startup E Founder,
Interview, 8 June, 2016).
It was challenging and time consuming to focus on one-to-one direct and
personalized messaging with users. To make messaging easier, Startup E tried to
streamline the process by creating scripts for communications: I came up with this entire
script for Instagram. It’s worked out so unbelievably well…. I look for their profile, I look
for their name, if they have a full name. I’ll call them by their first name or by their
profile name. And I came up with a script with all the different responses for all these
different situations… I’ll look at people’s photos that they’ve uploaded and I’ll make a
comment to show that we care about them. And maybe they’ll care about us. I was talking
to this guy last week and he was the father of a son about to go into high school. I was
looking at his profile and there were pictures of his son’s graduation. And I
congratulated him. And he said, ‘wow! Thank you so much. He’s going to be doing this.’
And that’s how we connected. So, it’s helped so much in that sense” (Startup E Marketing
Manager, Interview, 9 June, 2016). Personalization of the messages online was still
important though: “People are saying, this can be automated, but we want the personal
touch too. And people have asked, is this a bot? And we like to tell them no. But the
question is, will this scale? People want shout outs, but we don’t always have time for
that… We don’t go through comments [on these sites], we prefer direct messaging”
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
By June 2016, Startup E’s social media strategy had been successful in
developing strong relationships with users that they connected with: We’ve been able to
understand our users. Talking to users on Twitter and Instagram. If they haven’t tried
[the app] out, I ask them if I can explain. If they have tried it out, I ask them if I can
explain, and if they’ve tried it out, I ask them how it went. We always receive some good
feedback… It’s a bit more time consuming, though I personally enjoy it… It is also the
most cost effective way to onboard new users and retain existing ones” (Startup E
Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016). They could also target different types of
customers on the different social media platforms: “We are compiling a list of Facebook
groups relevant to what we do. We aren’t going to [just] pretend we care. We obviously
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want to be part of these communities. We could look at it as infiltration and that we are
coming in. But it is what it is. It’s something that should work… Snapchat has really,
younger people using it. But do a lot of gamers use it? We don’t know [and want to find
out]” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016).
By June 2016, the startup had 7500 users and was growing at 100 users a day.
However, these users were not regularly interacting with the app: “If we had 7000 people
on and live and active on the site, we’d have a stream of content going up on the app.
Which it isn’t. It’s more like staccato. Every hour, every two hours, you’ll get something
posted” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
Throughout the summer of 2016 though, having one-on-one relationships with
users was still very important to Startup E: “We’re still growing, we’re establishing
relationships. People just like to reach out to talk. It’s like a friendship in some way… the
one-to-one is still very important…. People aren’t going to care about your product [if
you try to push it out there fast]. You have to sit down and learn who they are and talk to
them. Otherwise, you’re just going to be another tech company with an app” (Startup E
Marketing Manager, Interview, 7 July, 2016).
However, by December 2016, interacting with individual users directly and
frequent messaging were not scaling to substantially attract users: “we couldn’t get over
100 to 200 users a day, and we can never get a steady rate coming it…. We still managed
to get to what we were doing and at the end of the summer, had 14,000 to 15,000 users”
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
2.2.17. YouTubers and Twitch streamers were initially unsuccessful affiliate partners.
Startup E realized that customized one-to-one messages, while somewhat
effective, were not helping them to reach out to a larger audience in a time-effective
manner: “We’re doing this one-to-one approach now. And that’s pretty tiring. You reach
out to people, talk to all these individuals in one day, depending on what you’re doing,
you may talk to 50 to 60 people. At least half of them will probably be converted to the
app. But it’s time consuming. The benefit is, it’s personal. It’s very established. You get
relationships with people on a personal level. But, this one-to-many approach allows us
to just promote the app. And instead of us hitting one person at a time, 80,000 people can
see it all at once. This is valuable in terms of efficiency” (Startup E Marketing Manager,
Interview, 7 July, 2016).
To access a larger customer base, Startup E wanted to partner with affiliate
partners that would recommend their app to gamers. The startup believed that videos
were a better way to reach their target market than written blogs: “As sad as it is to say,
people enjoy videos instead of reading. And if you’re a video gamer, you’re going to be a
very visual person…. This is more conducive than getting someone writing a blog post
about us. That isn’t to say there isn’t value, we do have people writing articles about us
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that they share. But with YouTube, there’s an ease of accessibility. It doesn’t take that
long for a YouTuber to say something about us. They can just upload something in the
same day and say something about us. So, that’s where we’ve been focusing” (Startup E
Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016).
The startup focused on working with streamers and video bloggers. Streamers
were video game players who stream video of the video game they are playing live, often
with live chat options that allowed for communicate between viewers and streamers.
Video bloggers, also known as gaming Youtubers, were personalities or celebrities that
have gained popularity from videos on games on the video-sharing website, YouTube.
They decided this focus on using bloggers, streamers, and YouTubers to reach
more potential users was essential: “we’ve been trying to push the product every day now.
Now, we’re focused on that one-to-many approach. We are reaching out to bloggers to
reach one-to-many rather than spending that time talking one-on-one to gamers. We need
to scale. Our challenge is… we wish we did these things sooner. But instead of looking
back, we need to look forward. So, it’s been great. And now, our product is there. We
haven’t updated our product in the past month” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June,
2016).
Streamers. In January 2016, Startup E partnered with its first streamers. This was not
successful however: “We realized, we couldn’t get a million users one-on-one or talk to
them. That would take forever. But what we could do is talk to 200 streamers each, and
get them to take on 5000 each, because they all have tens of thousands of followers… We
created this streamer feature in the app. So, people can connect with these streamers
when they weren’t live streaming. We thought it was great… We poorly executed though.
We had five streamers – honestly, one really big one… and it came down to that we
weren’t ready for someone like him. They weren’t interacting with the app the way we
wanted… We’re removing it now because it’s so dead… They weren’t bringing people on
because maybe they didn’t see the value [of connecting with users]… it just wasn’t
working the way we wanted… we didn’t update the feature at all and we [still] needed to
fix the rest of our core platform for the new features and stuff” (Startup E Founder,
Interview, 8 June, 2016).
Video bloggers. While bringing streamers onto the app was not successful, Startup E did
not give up on the one-to-many approach of attracting users to the app. By mid-June
2016, the startup tried another approach to reach a wider audience of gamers by working
with video bloggers on YouTube that pre-recorded videos about video gaming: “Looking
at competitors and stuff, why they grew so much was actually that they had partnered
with YouTubers that had subscribers that posted content frequently… We wanted to do
these partnerships with people and it’s just a matter of the product not being ready. And
now our product has been ready for the past couple of months… These are YouTubers
that have around 10,000 to 50,000 subscribers. They are posting content daily… So even
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if we were plugged at the end of the video or if we had a banner anywhere, even in the
description, that would be huge for us. We’ve been spending all this time on Instagram,
one-on-one, trying to get our 50-100 users a day, but it doesn’t scale. That’s our biggest
challenge. We are therefore, spending this time making this partnership. If we have 100
users watching a video, we can reach them… That’s what we’re pushing right now.
That’s what we need to work” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
Famous video bloggers had the most viewers, however, it was a challenge for
Startup E, as a relatively unknown company, to gain their attention: “[Video Bloggers]
who have 10 million or 100 million [users], these people never reply to [our messages].
So, we’re going to just go for people who are approachable. We watch their videos and
stuff and we want people who will interact. We want people who are there, because they
like the community… and we’re going after specific [popular] games” (Startup E
Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). Furthermore, it was challenging to get these video
bloggers and streamers as engaged partners without an allocated budget to pay for them:
“You still need to help out these Youtubers in some ways. And it’s tough when you don’t
have a revenue stream coming in” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 7 July,
2016).
To attract video bloggers, Startup E developed a processed search to connect with
their ideal audience of potential users: “Basically, I go through and see their publications,
see if they’re relevant and then contact them. It’s heavy on PR. I ask them if they want to
conduct a review on our website… We call this a one-to-many response. It saves us so
much time. [And] we could have some clout. If someone writes something good about us,
not only are all these eyeballs going to be seeing it, it could be hugely influential. They
will see people they read [regularly] say something huge. Ideally, it would be tech media
websites that conduct reviews or feature articles of gamer-related services… We are very
aware of the fact that they can write a negative review and they may be critical. But we
want them to be. We are still in beta and it’s not a full complete product yet, so there will
be bugs. Our experience so far is that people can be critical. You have to look at these
websites to know who they are writing for though. There are a lot that are garbage”
(Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016). There was also a question of
how many YouTube channels was appropriate: “For now, we want to be on a variety of
YouTube channels. In the future, if we had a really big deal with one person, we wouldn’t
say yes to other YouTubers” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 7 July, 2016).
YouTubers and streamers typically attracted teenage boys however – younger
than the average video game player that Startup E had been targeting: “we used to have
an average [user age] of 23 years of age, but after this push for new users, I think it will
be different, [much younger]… I think the younger generation is likely to share the
information in high school and with their friends. But I don’t necessarily want to ruin the
experience for someone that comes up… because the average gamer is in their 40s. I
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don’t want someone in their late 20s to keep getting paired with these young people and
have a bad experience [on the app]. We have a way to take care of that – like add a
hashtag for adults only. Or mature, or whatever. So we have a strategy to handle it”
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
By September 2016, the startup only had about 14,000 users, very far from their
goals of 50,000 users. They had hoped that using video bloggers would help reach that
goal by the end of the year: “If we bring that formula forward and bring it on, by the end
of the year, we’re on track to hit 50,000 a few days after Christmas. That would be
awesome because that was our goal in September. And now the goal is getting away from
us and we were frustrated. On social media, Instagram, we couldn’t scale it. So, the
Youtubers started coming and we’re getting closer” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13
December, 2016).
Startup E was still struggling to find video bloggers or live streamers willing to
partner with them however: “We tried reaching out to people, but people would never get
back [to us]” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). The problem was that
they still needed to figure out how to incentivize streamers to promote their app. Initially,
they tried to unsuccessfully pay per demonstration: “the conversion was terrible. We
didn’t think it would be that bad” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
This resulted in deciding to pay them a bonus payment to streamers for promoting their
app, “to show that we’re serious” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
To improve their search for streamers, Startup E hired someone who had
experience working with streamers: “The guy we brought on, he’s really trying to be
really good at it. He understands the role of the whole e-sports side… He scaled what we
were currently doing, basically tenfold. It was crazy! He took it to the next level, so we
were getting way more users. It was crazy! It was ten times the results and ten times the
accounts. We were doing alright. It was less quality, but it was more quantity” (Startup E
Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). They ended up bringing on a streamer who was
quite successful in attracting users: “he brought on 500 people watching him live, and he
brought a hundred people or so [to our app]” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13
December, 2016).
However, they felt as the streamers they were engaging were typically not the
right match to find users: “We have to pick the right person to be a brand ambassador for
us. This one guy was amazing!... but we reached out to ten people, and [the others] just
weren’t that good… So then we tried others, but they were so inconsistent in replying
back. I thought maybe it was about the money, but we couldn’t figure it out” (Startup E
Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
This prompted them to change to focus back to video bloggers that recorded their
videos and the videos stayed published online. To incentivize the video bloggers to
feature the startup in their video, they refined their affiliate payment method: “What we
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realized is that we needed to provide them with a signing bonus to make them
comfortable… [The Youtuber will] post a video basically, there’s a signing bonus, and
then affiliate pricing [every time they mention us]. And, once the contract is over, the
video is still on YouTube and we’re going to get views. But then, we’re not paying for it”
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). Within a few months, by November
2016, their first successful YouTuber had brought in around 5000 users.
Paying video bloggers was expensive however and Startup E realized that they
needed to figure out how to gain the most returns on these affiliate partnerships: “We’ve
never had a marketing budget. We’ve never had a marketing budget. This month, we’ve
spent some of our money to see if this [marketing strategy] is possible and it is. So, we
need more money to do that. Our plan is to be spending $200,000 on YouTubers, and
essentially have 50% of them stick around. Our goal is to go after 200,000 active users
and have 100,000 of them stick around each month. Sure, some of our users will drop off,
but there will also be some viral people that will share with friends” (Startup E Founder,
Interview, 13 December, 2016).
2.2.18. Increased focus on receiving feedback on app.
Email. While Startup E did not regularly use email to contact users, users were sending
them emails regarding issues that they were having: “We do a support e-mail [address]
that they could reach us at. We say, any need for help, you can just e-mail us. So that’s
where a lot of feedback on bugs and issues comes in. I would say [that is a] big way we
understand what our users want” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June,
2016). User interactions were also evaluated through the trial and error process: “Our
approach to them is pretty much the same with the email template we’re going with. But
we need to switch that up as well to see what works. Then, based on people who respond
– [we] go with the one that’s working” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
Survey. Startup E also put out a survey for their users to complete: “Oh, also surveys.
Surveys are something we’re putting out more recently… The questions basically have to
do with different features we’re thinking about. [We want to ask:] ‘What do you think of
this? What can be done with it?... What would make it worth your while? Would you want
to see it? Would you not?’” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
The survey went out Mid-June 2016 to get feedback from all users that had
downloaded the app: “Four hundred responded. We gave away a copy of Overwatch, [a
popular video game,] to one person as incentive…. And [with] 200 people, each one had
a sentence for these features. So it took hours to go through them. It was amazing
feedback… To be honest, it was a lot of re-assurance that we were doing okay. We knew
what we wanted to do, and they kind of reinforced that these are features they did want.
People pay so much for feedback and the fact that we paid $70 for one copy of the game
– It was so worth it. We’re really happy with that” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22
June, 2016).
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The survey not only generated feedback, it also generated interest in the app: “We
had 1000 people open our app that day. Which was really good. We typically have 300
people on the app in a day. And a lot of good messages back to admin. That was pretty
crazy. The community that we’ve built is really good. And the feedback we’re receiving is
really positive” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). The founders also thought,
“It will make us look like we really do listen to consumers” (Startup E Marketing
Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016).
2.2.19. Organizing in-person gaming events.
Gaming Events and Social Media. Being present at and hosting gaming events that
promoted virtual interactions between users and Startup E – either within the app or on
social media - was another way for the startup to gain awareness about their app. The
startup hosted their first gaming event in June 2016, associated and sponsored by a car
company. The event was “not so much to get new users, it was to connect with users”
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
After the event, they started thinking more about putting on their own events, and
partnering with others holding events, “but it’s a lot of work we put into these things, but
not a lot of return” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). The benefits however
were “being on the ground floor and talking to these people, one-on-one. And I think
what helps, and what we learned is, to put a face to a brand, makes people trust you
more… One thing we noticed is that the interactions seemed greater when we uploaded
photos after the event. People could see us and interact with us. An event was conducive
to far greater community and awareness about your brand” (Startup E Founder,
Interview, 22 June, 2016). This affected their decision to target future events towards
serious gamers and to promote it on social media: “because of the style of the game, you
don’t really find casual people just dipping their toes in. For future events, ‘we’d address
these [serious gamers] and market it in a way to get at their desire to get a prize, to beat
other people. Their desire to be featured by [Startup E] in some way. We’re going to be
posting all this stuff on our social media networks… we have some idea of tagging them
in the photos – it’s a really interesting way to engage with the community, in the now.
Talk to them, reach out to them on Facebook” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview,
9 June, 2016).
Video game testing event. Startup E also chose to go to a game testing night. At this
event, video game developers were offering the ability to test out games before they were
released: “I can’t think of one negative that comes out of it. I see it as a free pass to get
the company visible. Get our name out there” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview,
23 June, 2016).
Gaming Meetup Groups. There were also groups of gamers that gathered socially to
play video games together in-person, rather than independently at home. These were
organized within communities such as universities or gaming meetup groups within a
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city: “There are meetups that meet in the local area. It’s pretty neat. Gaming is a fairly
isolating activity. A lot of people want to make new friends. It’s interesting with these
communities. We go in often and say, hey, you guys enjoy games. Why don’t you check
out our app?” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016).
2.2.20. Incorporating customer feedback.
Email, in-app messaging, social media messaging. Incorporating user feedback into the
app was particularly important to the cofounders. By June 2016, Startup E had received
so much feedback through emails and personal messaging that they needed a way to
organize how they evaluated it: “We always have suggestions coming in. And when I talk
to them personally, I just keep track of how many repeats of suggestions. So, we have this
person looking for this. And then the next five people will say something similar to what
the first person said. We have these suggestions come up repeatedly. So, the only thing I
can say in terms of defining what is important or isn’t important is frequency of
suggestion…. Ideally, we should go by frequency, but the reality, to be honest, right now,
it’s what the team wants to put in” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June,
2016).
By mid-June 2016, Startup E had started to include features in the app that users
requested, such as: “when you go to play, you’re limited by the number of tags you can
use. When you go to actually request to play with someone, there’s actually just one
button of that app to send a person a request. You can’t actually explain why you want to
play with them or why you’re a good match for them. So we’ve added in that feature as
well. That one is probably the most important [user recommendation]” (Startup E
Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
While early versions of the app were built and re-built a few times, as the app
gained users, the founders began to face challenges of deciding how much more they
could adapt the app: “We built the [product web] site for hardcore users, and now we
find we are attracting casual ones that want certain features. Right now, the system
doesn’t allow you to change features, so we have to decide whether we want to rebuild it
or not [for these other potential users].” (Startup E’s event, July 2016.) This finding
played a role in triggering innovation in Startup E to develop a way for different types of
video gamers to distinguish themselves from players that may not be similar or
compatible.
2.2.21. Users promote business.
Advocate users. By July 2016, Startup E had attracted a few users who wanted to act as
advocates for them: “People ask things like, can I promote you on my Facebook or on my
Twitter? They’re promoting it to people online or in-person. I say, ‘absolutely, any and
all promotion is appreciated. If you’re willing to post something about us. We can re-post
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that on our own accounts so your profile has thousands of eyeballs” (Startup E Marketing
Manager, Interview, 7 July, 2016).
User generated content. Gamers used the app as a platform to show off and demonstrate
their gaming skill. This ends up being a great way to gain exposure and awareness about
the app: “We want our own users to generate content themselves. It’s gotten a lot of great
user feedback… We have ‘Spotlight Focuses’ on a person and a game. Not only the
person who’s post you posted is excited. You have the community engaging, saying, ‘this
clip is awesome. Wow! That was cool.’ And people tagging their friends saying, ‘check
this out.’ It’s a different attempt at community relations” (Startup E Marketing Manager,
Interview, 7 July, 2016).
2.2.22. Focus on improving retention of users through in-app interactions.
While the number of registered users was growing, the challenge for Startup E
was retaining users and having them return to the site. By December 2016, the startup
was saying: “We think we can hit 25,000 by the end of the month. The thing is, we have a
lot of users coming on. So, we’re classifying them as monthly active. But they’re just
joining. But of our registered users, 50 percent are monthly active” (Startup E Founder,
Interview, 13 December, 2016). To improve retention, Startup E started new features that
promoted user interaction including, in-app push notifications and campaigns.
In-app push notification. Even as Startup E grew and adopted more one-to-many
communication methods, in-app communication – both reaching out to users and the
ability for users to submit feedback continued to be important for the startup. The push
notifications could be sent at any time: “You don’t use the app for four days, we can send
an alert to say, ‘hey, we missed you…’” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December,
2016).
In December 2016, Startup E started push notifications to prompt users to engage
with the app, however found that a very small percentage were actually reacting to these
notifications: “We sent the notification and they replied to it. Those were good results.
The challenge is, we sent 300,000, and 0.3% of all replies [approximately 900 replies]
were actually influenced and [had individuals] react because of that notification. That is
terrible…. What was interesting is that the power user doesn’t mind seeing that many
notifications. And, what was interesting was, the feature stuff worked, it was just sending
too much irrelevant data. So, we stopped [sending many notification]” (Startup E
Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
In-app personalized, direct messaging. Despite limited responses to in-app push
notifications, personalized messages sent directly to users were still well received: “I
personally reply to everyone on the app. And getting that feedback and understanding
what my customers are saying, directly to me. I think that makes a difference… I mean, I
tell them I’m the co-founder and they say, ‘Oh my god! How is it possible that the co-
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founder is talking to me? That’s insane!’ And indirectly I get so many people to rate the
app because I’m talking to them. It’s just crazy. It’s not scalable. But getting feedback as
the founder at the stage that we’re at, it’s still manageable. It’s not that crazy. I just did
it, [I messaged a user,] on my phone, on the go” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13
December, 2016).
In-app campaigns using push notifications. The startup tried to run a few campaigns to
encourage users to invite other users to download the app in exchange for features to
enhance your in-app profile. These campaigns were not that successful: “We’re only
getting 30 [people] a day through this link [for the campaign]” (Startup E Founder,
Interview, 13 December, 2016). Despite this setback, Startup E started another campaign
in December 2016 that prompted challenges to users to get badges for their gaming
profile. These badges were considered a sign of status to motivate users to complete the
challenges: “We can have push notifications… it basically allows us to have these
campaigns and re-engage with our users in a way we never had access to before”
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
2.2.23. A drop in e-mail use.
By December 2016, the use of e-mails had dropped substantially: “We used to
send e-mails. We haven’t done that in a while. We should probably send another survey,
just asking people to rate the app” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
2.2.24. Use of data analytics to understand how users interact with the mobile app.
Use of data analytics tools. From early 2016, Startup E started to analyze some of the
data based on how the gamers have interacted with the app: “we will have all these
backend insights that we can mine the data from. And actually, we’d love to plug the
technology into the games itself. So, if you’ve never played this shooter game before, but
you’ve played other shooter games, [we can promote that] you’re going to have this
amazing experience” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
Using analytics software, by June 2016, Startup E gained a new way of learning
how users interact with the app. For example, when referring to a feature in the app that
Startup E was excited about: “It’s our core feature – but looking at the stats, only 20
percent of the people have used it. But what else can you do? We noticed it was buried in
communities. [But] we want it to be the very first thing that people interact with on the
platform. The next thing we want to look at is why do users post that they want to play
today, and then not post that they want to play tomorrow or the next day? Is it that they
can’t find people to play with? It’s more difficult to analyze, but something we want to
understand. The only thing is, the average user, 40 percent, posts once. And then the
high-end user posts 30 times. And that’s really good. This new analytics software we’re
using – it’s $600 a month, but the tool itself, literally records people’s screens…. It
records all interactions… it’s mad to be able to see people use your product. You can’t
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ask for anything better than that! [It also] tracks where they mis-clicked… It’s the most
intense software we ever came across” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
Having access to so much data on their customers’ interactions with the app was
exciting but also overwhelming at the start: “[The analytics software] doesn’t present it
in a way that’s very understandable. We haven’t been able to create a bundle of users
that convert… But we see 20 percent of people aren’t actually completing the signup
process. A lot of those things we didn’t see [before]. But now, we can actually see it.
There’s so much data, it’s really overwhelming. So, I’ve spent a lot of time looking at that
and I guess the insights on that have been really good” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22
June, 2016).
However by December 2016, the founders were more aware of how to use
analytics to learn about their users and their interaction with the app: “We looked at data
from the past… We started to look at patterns. We are developing an algorithm to see
why different players play together” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
2.2. Types of Customer Interactions Noted to be Missing by Participants
Paid advertisements. Much of Startup E’s contact with customers does not involve paid
advertisements: “We haven’t put out any ads recently. Money is the biggest thing now
though [and it is important to conserve]. We have incredibly small resources” (Startup E
Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016).
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS
All user interaction activities were undertaken with the intention of getting the
user to engage with Startup E’s app. However, certain platforms for user interaction
triggered users to interact with the startup in additional ways. For example, the gaming
events that Startup E had were great to gain brand awareness, and an opportunity to repromote the event on Facebook afterwards: “We found that there was a benefit of being
on the ground floor and talking to these people one-on-one. I think it helped putting a
face to a brand – makes people trust you more… One thing we noticed is that the
interactions seemed greater when we uploaded photos after the event. People could see
us and interact with us” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016).
However, Startup E also missed opportunities to reach out to potential users
across platforms for interaction. For example, they did not remember to take the time to
inform users about the launch of their Kickstarter funding campaign: “our challenge was
we spent so much time on building a great campaign, we forgot about marketing our
campaign ahead of time” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
Startup E also emphasized the importance of timing interactions with users in
online community forums with the release of new video games: “Every time we’ve
launched, we’ve failed every time [to time our launches with those of new games]. And
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maybe we weren’t with our heads into it… Someone posted that there’s a [competing]
tool that people can use [to find other players to play a particular game with]. So, we
missed that opportunity. And we can’t miss opportunities like that. So, they’ve become
known for that. And if we post afterwards, we become known as the second guy. So, it’s
impactful. Timing is everything. I think, we just, we talk about it all the time, and we’re
not there. And this [particular game] is the biggest game! Other games are coming out,
and we’ll try to be there. But we’re putting everything into this game because we think
it’s going to be pretty big for us” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
Speaking with the moderators enabled the startup to have their own dedicated
Reddit forum for feedback and communication with users: “If you’re part of the [online
forum] community, then you make the post and then post about your service later… it
depends on if your timing is right. Right now [because we’re not part of the community],
we look like another service. It’s not the best. And we come off as spam. No one really
likes it when you spam your own stuff… [But then, we] asked the moderators. It really
blew up, in a good way. So now, we’re looking at stuff like how do we get users on our
platform” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS
4.1. Family investors
At the time of writing, the startup had gained substantial investment from family
and friends and funding from a few entrepreneurship or startup incubator programs, even
before the app had gained traction amongst users. The one stipulation given for
investment was from family, that wanted to see an increase in users on the platform
before investing. This provided incentives for the startup to think of new ways to attract
users that they had not considered before: “before December (2015), we wanted to have
something done or we would run out of funds. So my uncle, we started taking to him. He
wanted to go in, but he wanted to see results. He wanted to see users on the platform to
prove this is worth it. And then my dad said he’d match it. It was a good motivation
boost. It was a fair chunk of change... They were both going to put in $100,000…. But we
realized we couldn’t push those results anymore, we couldn’t even push it because it was
in a state where we weren’t ready to launch the update yet. So, while at the end of
December, we were happy with the product and could start marketing, it wasn’t going to
be crazy – we weren’t going to get users right away. It still would have taken time... But
then we realized, we couldn’t get a million users one on one or talk to them. That would
take forever. But what we could do is talk to 200 streamers each and get them to take on
5000 [users] each, because they all have these tens of thousands of followers. [The family
investors] thought that was an interesting strategy” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8
June, 2016).
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4.2. Competitors
Competitors were not initially a major concern for the startup. Most competitors
served gamers on desktop platforms, rather than on a mobile phone. On these platforms,
it was time consuming to find a potential person to play a game with, and served one
specific gaming platform (e.g. Nintendo, Microsoft Xbox, or Sony Playstation).
However, when a big gaming company announced at a gaming conference that they were
looking to create a way to find other players through their gaming system, Startup E took
notice: “We take it as a really positive thing because now, an industry leader is seeing the
value in the stuff we’re doing… it’s identical. It’s too similar. We’re scared that when we
launch ours, that they’re going to say, ‘what are you guys doing?’… And if we wait, we
won’t get heard of and [gaming company] blows up, and we look like a copycat of their
service” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP
Overloaded with tasks. Throughout development, Startup E struggled to prioritize tasks:
“There are so many things that need to get done. So, prioritizing things that need to get
done first. Those media channels, we’ve said we wanted to reach out for so long, but we
haven’t been doing it. And it needs to be started… We can’t keep waiting and waiting to
say we’ll do it, until it’s too late… With competition wise, there’s no one we’re afraid
of… [but] if we sit on this and don’t do anything, we’ll lose that arm chair to XBox”
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).
Furthermore, with a lead developer leaving the startup in November 2016, and
one of the co-founders back in school, the other co-founder took on more responsibility in
the business: “Without [the co-founder] there every day, I had to manage the team. That
was my responsibility. We needed [the co-founder]. But now, with him going back to
school, my focus almost has to be that again. But the problem is, this time, I need to focus
on fundraising. That’s where I need to focus my attention. So, the problem is, how can I
do both?... There’s too much I’m doing and I need to focus on other stuff” (Startup E
Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
Technology updates. At the time of writing, Startup E was still regularly coming up with
updates to the app. This meant that the platform was sometimes inaccessible. The
founders were concerned that this would affect user retention: “This is a time where we
have to turn off all users completely and have some down time [in the app]. Which we
don’t do very often at all. So, it’s a pretty big update in that sense. But we’re definitely
trying to take it slow so we don’t overlook anything. It’s been multiple months since
we’ve done stuff like this… [When we did this before], it was going to be down for an
hour, and then it’s down for two days. Results wise, we didn’t have the users to have an
impact [then], where people might leave because they got upset, or whatever, but now,
we do have this active user base, so we have to make sure this goes smoothly” (Startup E
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Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). To handle challenges with updates, Startup E decided
to start using a new server that would provide a backup during updates, and would limit
disruptions in user access to the app. However, this server was not yet in operation at the
time of writing.
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING
Startup E had over 100,000 registered users by March 2017 (Startup E Founder,
Interview, 14 March, 2017). The latest focus of the startup was how they would monetize
the app. They had been debating options in December 2016, however by March 2017,
had not settled on a monetization plan: “So, say you’re scrolling and one of these items
would be a promotion for a new gaming keyboard or a new controller…. No banner ad,
no popup. Another idea is to have a separate area on the app completely dedicated to
game promotions” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). This would be a
new, untested way for the startup to interact with users in the future.

Startup F

431

Appendix B6. Startup F
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS
1.1. Business Idea
Startup F was started with the intention of being “a search engine for loans from
private lending organizations… for loans that are unsecured under $50 grand... in other
words, a loan marketing agency” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016). “Our job
is to connect borrowers with lenders and basically create value for the borrower through
getting them connected with cheap, quick, and efficient loans that best match their
personal needs and financial situation” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016).
The idea for Startup F arose in March 2015, when the founder was in the waiting
room of a doctor’s office and he saw another patient with an emergency medical bill that
he was unable to pay. Curious about the availability of emergency funding options, when
the founder got home, he attempted a few web-based searches for personal loans, and
found that there was no easy way to:
•

search through and aggregate available loans for a particular set of
circumstances, and

•

to get a quick answer to the loan request from loan providers.

This planted the seed of opportunity in the founder’s mind to develop an online
loan aggregator - a loan search web platform where a loan seeker could perform an online
search for a loan, and gain access to an array of lenders with competing interest rates and
terms. The idea was: “Why search [for] one [loan] when you can search many? That’s
kind of our slogan” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016).
The founder envisioned that building an online loan aggregator platform would
require Startup F to sign contracts with several fintech loan providers (supply-side
customers). These loan providers would be integrated into an online platform to
streamline the application process for loan seekers (demand-side customers). This would
mean that when a loan seeker visited the startup’s website, they would complete one short
loan application with their personal details and the loan amount that they were seeking.
Their credentials and credit rating would be verified and could be assessed for loan
eligibility based on the lending criteria provided to the startup by the fintech loan
providers.
A high level of integration between the startup and the fintech loan providers
would allow Startup F to immediately report whether the loan seeker was eligible for a
loan, as well as the loan options and associated terms and conditions available to them.
Once a loan was selected, the information could be transferred directly to the integrated
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fintech loan providers’ online loan platform – rather than having the loan seeker re-enter
information on each loan provider’s website. A partnership with Startup F as a loan
aggregator site would also help fintech loan providers, who in a relatively new industry,
could gain visibility among loan seekers that were not familiar with fintech, and would
ideally help provide credibility and security to the transaction.
1.2. Founder
Startup F was started by a sole founder, male, in his early thirties based in
Ontario, Canada. The founder started off his career teaching English in China, and
quickly became a serial entrepreneur, taking on a business development roles
predominantly in the software and online marketplace industries. While he founded
Startup F, early in the new venture creation process, the founder brought in co-founders
and employees to help build the business.
1.3. About the Customers
There were three types of customers in Startup F. There were supply-side
customers, offering loans, and demand-side customers, seeking loans. The third type of
customers were intermediaries – local businesses through which a loan could be offered
in a consumer finance transaction.
1.3.1. Customers – Supply-Side
For Startup F, a supply-side customer was a financial institution that provide
loans to individuals. While the initial goal was to work with banks and traditional
financial institutions, the founder found that it was taking a long time to create these
partnerships. He instead decided to work with emerging fintech loan providers that were
using technology and innovation to disrupt personal and commercial finance: “All these
fintech companies are coming out and disrupting the banking business. So, we thought,
why wouldn’t BMO or Scotia [established banks] or somebody want to compete in this
area? Wouldn’t we want the banks to be able to come out and account for some of this
type of business? But it takes forever to get to talk to someone at the bank. [That person
that you talk to] doesn’t make decisions. There are three other people that need to be
involved in that decision. It takes a few months before that happens. I’m not playing this
game. It takes too much work” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016).
By May 2016, the founder of Startup F had found eleven potential fintech loan
providers interested in being part of the loan aggregator platform. The number of lenders
grew to twelve lenders by September 2016. While interest from the banks continued, their
integration would require additional work and changes in government regulations
associated with the financial industry. By December 2016, banks had still not committed
to being a supply-side customer with Startup F.
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1.3.2. Customers – Demand-Side
The direct to consumer model focused on individual loan seekers (demand-side
customers) looking for a short-term loan for a variety of reasons, including: “people
looking for money for weddings. People looking for money for home renovations. People
who want to go on vacation. That sort of stuff” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May,
2016). The ideal type of demand-side customer for Startup F were individuals in their:
“mid-20s males, with relatively good income. Computer savvy. A go-getter. Someone
that’s keen and thinking on their feet. Women the same age. Research is showing that
they are not people that go to a bank teller. [The ideal customer] doesn’t go to a bank
and doesn’t know who the person [behind the counter] is… So really, anyone who can
get on the web and is looking for a loan – we want to serve them” (Startup F Founder,
Interview, 19 May, 2016).
Startup F was not worried about attracting loan seekers: “People who want money
will do anything for it. That’s what we’ve been learning through our market research.
People want money and they’re going to search, ‘I want money.’ That’s why you see the
line up at cash money – 550%. And that’s just insane. And people go for it” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016). However, once the web platform went live in July
2016, Startup F saw that the typical demand-side customer was in a lower income bracket
than originally anticipated: “[they have] poor credit, which is something I kind of
expected, but not as much as I’ve seen. I’d say probably about 85 percent of applicants
are coming from poor credit. Typical age is 30s, equally male and female…. A lot of them
are coming from Hamilton, Burlington, Brampton. Outside of Toronto” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016). By September 2016, the same tier of customer was
still approaching the website: “those with terribly abysmal credit scores – who’ve applied
to hundreds of places, and have been declined… They troll, and they’re looking for
money, anywhere they’ll get it” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016).
1.3.3. Customers - Intermediaries
In addition to their direct-to-consumer business model, Startup F was interested to
partner with local businesses (intermediaries) to offer their customers consumer finance
loan options. These businesses would include industries such as home renovations,
veterinarian clinics, dentist offices, and wedding planners – all industries where an
individual might need a short-term loan.
The founder explained that partnering with local businesses such as veterinary
clinics as intermediaries would involve offering a commission to the local business: “Vet
clinics are perfect because if you’ve got a sick dog, you’re going to pay. Whereas if it’s
another business, they maybe need to wait for it and there could be the loss of the sale.
So, we’re really thinking vets are perfect. They’re really a low-hanging fruit there.
Somebody comes with a sick pet – ‘Here are your options.’… Do they offer financing?
No, they take credit card [and cash]… So, [if Startup F were an option, the vet clinic
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would be] providing their clients with options to pay for the services [by finding a loan
with our loan search engine]. The vet clinic is able to do the surgery, they make more
money. And the individual [pet owner typically] gets a loan that’s cheaper than what a
credit card can [offer] and [they] get immediately approved to cover that... and they’re
happy because their animal is getting better… And [this relationship with the startup
means that] vet clinics - for every sale that goes through - that’s 50 bucks [that they
receive as commission]” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016).
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2. STARTUP HISTORY
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016
Web Portal Intermediary
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Web Platform Go Live
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Intermediary Search Begins
FinTech LP Search Begins
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Feb/15

May/15

Sep/15

Dec/15

LP Web
Platform
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New
Marketing
Agency Hired

FacebookAd
Campaign Begins

Call Centre Expansion

Conference
Networking

>3570
Successful
Loan
Applications

Focus Group

Jun/16

Oct/16

Nationwide
Press Releases

Hire Customer Service
Call Centre Personnel

Jan/17

WebPlatform
Search Engine
Optimisation

Apr/17
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes
2.2.1. Face-to-face interactions seeking intermediary businesses for consumer finance.
In-person meeting. Shortly after coming up with the business idea, in October 2015 for
Startup F, the founder spoke with local businesses (intermediaries) to see if they would be
interested in offering their customers consumer finance loan options. In June 2015, the
founder physically visited local shops and offices in his home city, such as home
renovators, veterinarians, and wedding planners, to see if they would be interested in
offering their customers the ability to search through a range of loans available to them
through the startup’s loan search engine. Offering a loan search engine would be an
alternative way for customers to purchase on credit – in comparison to traditional,
formulaic financing options offered at shops, using credit cards or other loans. The
founder received positive feedback from business owners during these visits: “I drove
around [town] and tried to speak with business owners. [I] thought that home renovators
would be [the] best [partners to work with] because [they] have easy to access [to] the
[home] owner [that may need a loan to complete renovations on their house] … [The
issue with current consumer financing options is] declines. And rates that aren’t
agreeable [for their customers].” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)
While businesses showed interest in Startup F’s idea, because the web platform
was still not ready yet, to reduce potentially damaging partnerships with intermediaries,
the founder held off on further developing these relationships: “Maybe launching [to
businesses] might be something I want to wait on because [otherwise] I have a business
owner who’s logging on the user service and they’re having a bad experience. I don’t
want to lose all future potential business from that business because of the issue…. It’s a
little bit of a different risk if it’s the odd guy who’s coming here looking for a loan.”
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)
2.2.2. Fintech loan provider search, follow-up and creation of business partnership.
Social media. By October 2015, Startup F had set up a local office to work from and
started contacting potential fintech loan providers (supply-side customers) via LinkedIn:
“Every lending company I could find, I’d search in LinkedIn and on Google to find
companies and find out what’s going on and who doesn’t have traction yet. Let’s get
them on there. X person can lead me to Y. I’m in a fin tech cluster group on Linkedin, so
I’m there and am kind of working on that. I have eleven vendors that I’ve contracted. So
that’s pretty cool.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016)
Phone and emails. These messages were followed up by phone calls and emails to see if
the fintech loan providers would be interesting in supplying loans in an aggregated loan
marketplace. The startup’s goal was to get at least twelve loan providers signed up to be
part of the loan aggregator.
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2.2.3. Startup web platform development began.
In December 2015, development of the loan aggregator web platform began in
India. Startup F initially intended to launch in mid-May 2016, when they joined a salesfocused startup incubator, however there were several delays in launching due to
technical difficulties during the web platform development process and integration with
loan providers’ online systems.
2.2.4. Loan provider integration began and technical challenges encountered.
Loan provider integration began around March 2016, concurrent to the web
platform development.
Phone. While Startup F communicated with the web developer and loan providers by
email, it was easier to have phone calls to clarify any issues: “On the other side [of the
call] was a [website] developer from one of our lenders.” (Startup F Founder, Interview,
13 July, 2016) These calls were not always easy though: “That was a hell of a call on
Friday to get, especially when we [thought] we were ready [to launch].” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016) This came from the challenges associated with
integrating the IT infrastructures of the loan providers and the startup. In May 2016 the
startup found, “a number of our lenders have some infrastructure in place and we’re
working with them to connect with their infrastructures. And then, a lot of lenders don’t.
So, we’re working on that and it’s been a challenge.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19
May, 2016)
Phone, in-person, e-mail. While many fintech loan providers were open to meeting and
working with Startup F, they also faced resistance from some loan providers that were
skeptical of the necessity to integrate with the startup: “one of our lenders has tried to put
us to the grinder in terms of not wanting to do any integration. They don’t want to invest
in any type of [web platform] developing until we can show them [that we are getting] a
return on investment, until we can show them [that being a loan provider on our site] will
be valuable for them. And we’re trying to create value on our site – but these people just
want us to send the [loan seeker] over to them, and they would have to re-enter
information onto their site. There’s no real integration. So, that’s an ultimatum.”
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016)
2.2.5. Online advertising starts and focus on search engine optimization.
Paid online advertisements - Google. In May 2016, Startup F began marketing directly
to end consumers through Google Adwords. Their initial goal was to have a soft launch
in Southwestern Ontario before expanding to other markets: “[We’re working with a]
marketing agency. We’ve committed $5000 towards [reaching our target market].”
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016) While Startup F worked with a marketing
agency to develop their ads, they were uncertain whether this was the best agency to
attract loan seekers once they launched: “I really don’t know if they’re going to be able to
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spend ad dollars well enough to create conversions or really get some traction and I only
have limited funds. So, do I put money with them and go with them, because I’ve been
working with them, or do I consider dropping them and go with this team who already
has experience with lenders and working online?” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 13
July, 2016)
One of the goals of hiring a marketing agency was to ensure that loan seekers
understood that Startup F was a loan search engine, and not a lender: “This guy I’ve been
talking to. He still gets confused and still thinks [a lender] is a search thing. How do I get
people to know who we are [and how we are different]?... We need to shift the site to
better let people know that we’re a search engine. So, how do we do that?” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)
In its first week live online in July 2016, Startup F did not have much initial
traffic visit the site. The founder attributed this to the marketing agency they were
working with: “the marketing agency that we’re working with to do all of our Google
advertising kind of dropped the ball. So, they’ve spent about a thousand dollars, and
from the thousand dollars, a bunch of people went to the site but they didn’t actually
convert. They went there and left.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016) The
founder also concluded: “Google is not a good revenue channel for us.” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016)
Paid Ads - Facebook. Poor results with the former marketing agency triggered Startup F
to hire a new marketing agency before the end of July 2016. This agency began targeted
advertisements through Facebook and briefly considered video advertising on YouTube.
They started to look at ways to reconnect with potential loan seekers that visited their
web platform by experimenting with remarketing: “The other thing we need to develop is
the re-marketing program. So, anybody that goes to our site and does something, we now
need to follow them around the internet with ads…. We have to develop that... My hope is
that we’d be able to convert them through this, and bring them back to the site. You
remind them what is going on and you show them value. All that sort of stuff… We have
to play around to find the right ads that cause traction.” (Startup F Founder, Interview,
29 July, 2016)
This switch to Facebook resulted in more visits to the web platform, however the
potential customers were not the clients that Startup F had anticipated: “we’re seeing
again the high volume to get to the app[lication], but we’re seeing [a limited number of]
conversions. So, something’s better about Facebook…. [but then we started getting
people with] very, very, very terrible credit. A higher volume of terrible credit. What’s
going on? We can’t operate like this. We’re a loan placement agency and we’re not
placing any loans.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016)
Search engine optimization. Another challenge was understanding how search engines,
such as Google and Yahoo, were placing the startup as a web-based loan search
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aggregator. As of July 2016, Startup F did not feature prominently in these search results:
“right now we’re on page 18. So, what we want to do is show up when somebody says
search loans, find a loan, that sort of stuff… One thing is going to be getting the site
registered on different databases to find [our] location. So, [we need to] register on Yelp,
Yellow Pages, Google Business, TomTom Maps.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July,
2016)
By October 2016, Startup F began further optimizing their search engine
placement: “We’re creating better fine-tuned ads, so that we’re getting our ad position
higher. And we’re doing search engine optimization – SEO - work and getting a showing
in results. I’ve hired a company in Moldova who’s doing SEO work for me. I’ve paid
them $250 or something…. And they’ve basically created all this content. Now, Google
indexes it over time to better place the website [in the search engine results]… They
create all this content and they post it for the Google bots to find. And the Google bots
find it as actual content.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016)
In November 2016, Startup F continued testing to see what was the best way to
get loan seekers to look for loans on their web platform and then, to convince them to
complete the loan application: “But yeah, it’s about growth, right? We’re doing 500
bucks a day in marketing. It’s growing… the sky is the limit. Where can we find the max
amount for the best conversions based on the search volume? And then, where can we
better mine other opportunities that may not be in search – that are banner ads or other
types of ads that people are getting? So [we’re] building, and [will] see what happens.”
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016)
Paid-Ads – Google. After a month of trying with Facebook ads and continued search
engine optimization, Startup F started promoting themselves with Google ads again:
“Here’s what I’m thinking happens. Right now on Google, we’re extremely relevant… If
somebody is searching personal loans… and they see your ad at the top and they go for
it… We get them there and one-third of them convert to completing the application, which
is really cool… It’s about volume, right? We receive good search volume, we sell out to
people looking for loans, and we’re an alternative.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22
November, 2016)
2.2.6. Web platform testing involving family and friends – “Dummy” consumer testing.
In-person. By late May 2016, Startup F had hoped to launch their web platform.
However, the initial version of the web platform was still not completed. The founder
also wanted to test the loan aggregator with family and friends before it went live
publically to loan seekers: “We’re launching on Wednesday. Over the next week and a
half, anyone I know, I’m going to try to get on the site to test and see where our issues
are. [Our goal is] to come up with a big document that says this is what we need to do.
Version 1. And do it another couple of days later. And then Version 2. And then Version
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3. So basically, the 1st of June, maybe another week after that, [we’ll be ready],
depending on how the testing goes.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016)
Word-of-mouth by family and friends. Testing the web platform also increased word
of mouth about Startup F through personal relationships with family and friends. Even
before the platform was launched, the founder was approached by personal connections
looking for loans: “I have a lot of people asking me for loans now. A lot of people are
coming up to me independently, ‘oh, so you’re here to get a loan?’ They’re like, ‘Yeah, I
need a loan.’ My sister knows someone who needs a loan. He’s been waiting for me to
get Startup F up. There’s a need.”(Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)
2.2.7. Checking for web platform integration - Additional web platform technical issues
found.
Email, phone, web platform. By June 2016, Startup F encountered more delays in
launching the loan aggregator – both from technical issues in developing the web
platform and from the fintech loan providers. There were frustrations dealing with bugs
on the web platform and in the ongoing integration with loan providers’ web platforms:
“It’s nerve-racking getting these lenders onboard, [and I’m] concerned that our systems
aren’t working correctly. We already brought one lender onboard a few weeks ago and
the whole system crashed…. So, we had to rebuild it again. Basically, we had to delete all
the lenders and re-add them… What other glitches are hiding in the system if that’s
there? How do we test for that?” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)
Startup F had been focused on integrating the fintech loan providers into their
website, but there were also delays on the side of the lenders: “My whole sprint has been
[to] get the lenders signed up, [and to] influence them to invest time [for] the integration.
But now, one of the lenders is saying it is going to be six weeks for them [to integrate]...
The issue is that they’re on a completely different [web platform] system that we can’t
hand off [data] to.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016) This led to frustration
over ongoing delays in launching the business: “Yeah, we’re supposed to launch – it’s
been a couple of times, right? On the 15th of May, that didn’t happen. The 1st of June, that
didn’t happen. Last Monday, and this past Monday [we didn’t launch], and the next
Monday [we won’t launch].” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)
At the time (June 2016), Startup F had four loan providers that had integrated into
their startup’s web platform. With these delays in the integration process, the founder
wondered whether it was an option to launch with fewer lenders than had been
anticipated: “maybe we’ll [wait to have all lenders integrated to] do the whole thing, or
maybe we’ll wait for six weeks, or maybe we’re going to have just a smaller number of
lenders. So, instead of launching with twelve, we may launch with four, and then bring
the other guys on as they’re ready to integrate. I’m kind of leaning towards that [last
option] a little more.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)
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However, the founder was also worried that launching too quickly, with a lack of
loan provider integration or challenges arising when potential loan seekers accessed the
web platform would be perceived negatively by loan seekers, and that this would affect
their potential commitment to a loan: “If there’s an issue, we’ll see drop off at that point.
But that customer typically won’t be back – at least anytime soon. Maybe they’ll come
back after a year or two.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)
Phone and web platform. By mid-July 2016, one of the loan providers discovered
security issues with the site: “It’s even worse that we didn’t find it [ourselves], and one of
the coders from our main lender found it. Yeah, [this is] trouble… We did some digging
and we found other huge liabilities… Now I’m having to deal with follow up with one of
our lenders. They want their guy to look over all of our code.” (Startup F Founder,
Interview, 13 July, 2016) Not only did the security issue result in another delay in
launching the loan aggregator, Startup F worried that it affected their credibility with the
lender: “[This lender] is the first company that fully integrated with us. They’re at the
highest level of integration, so they’ll pre-qualify all the information… They’ve been
really keen this whole time. If something happens there [and they become dissatisfied the
web platform], then I feel there’s some damage [to our relationship].” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016)
2.2.8. Startup F’s web platform goes live and loan seekers attempt first loans.
Through the web platform. The web platform went live online at the end of July 2016.
Startup F launched with twelve loan providers signed up to work with them and six
integrated on the website.
E-mail and newsletters. To capture e-mail addresses for future contact, by July 2016,
the startup had implemented a pop up window on their website that offered a newsletter
about personal financial management: “It’s cool because now, we’re capturing addresses
of people who didn’t sign up. So, those people will go into another bucket of people that
we’ll market to, obviously... You use it as a lure to bring people back to the site. You send
them interesting tidbits of information about something in the loan industry.” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)
2.2.9. Initial integration issues with loan providers became more obvious and needs
testing.
Data analytics. When the web platform was first launched in July 2016, Startup F started
to track how many loan applications were completed using data analytics tools, and at
what part of the website did visitors disengage using data analytics tools. The founder
started observing several issues with the loan aggregator platform that made visitors not
complete a loan application. These visitors were termed ‘lost customers.’ First, while
there were several visitors to the web platform, few were starting or completing a loan
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application: “a bunch of people went to the site, but they didn’t actually convert or do
anything.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)
Furthermore, data analytics told Startup F that most visitors to the web platform
were on mobile devices: “87 percent of the people coming to our site are on mobile…
Mobile conversion is much different sometimes.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July,
2016) These tools were used to study how visitors to their web platform interacted with
the interface: “And then, I can see whatever you type… I can click on this and it’ll take
me to the exact page you’re at. It won’t take me to where you’re entering all the
information, but it’ll show me exactly on the site where you are... So, I can track people
through the site. I can see where they drop off.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July,
2016) “We’ve implemented heat mapping on the site... You get all these analytics to learn
what’s going on.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016)
In addition to the insights from data analytics, issues created by a lack of
integration with loan providers became more obvious. If loan seekers needed to enter
their information multiple times, both on Startup F’s web platform and on the selected
loan provider’s website, Startup F observed: “If they go through our application on our
site and then they have to click a link to the lender – and then have to start the
application process again – [there is a] huge drop off [in completing the loan
application]. So, what [the lenders] are seeing on their site is that the people who have
clicked on [lender name] are getting to their landing page, and they’re not doing sh*t [to
complete the next application].” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)
Third, another integration issue arose when the criteria given to Startup F resulted
in a loan provider pre-approved all applicants on Startup F’s web platform but then
declined loan applications when loan seekers re-entered information on their own
websites: “They [,the loan provider,] approve everybody [on our site], without asking us,
without telling us anything… Then, they [,the loan seekers,] apply, they get declined, and
they don’t come back to the site. So, there’s huge drop off actually. We’ve sent through
about twenty different applications [that the loan provider pre-approved on our site], and
every single one of them was declined… From those declines, we didn’t get a conversion
at all. So, they weren’t coming back to our site, or they were and were basically seeing
an increase in rates, and saying, ‘Wow! That’s a pretty sh**ty rate drop’ and they’re not
[completing the application].”” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)
Fourth, a lack of integration also occasionally resulted in one single lender
showing up in the search results: “When somebody is coming in with good credit and
they’re searching for a good creditor, the only option that’s showing up for them is [one
loan provider]. So, it’s not really a search engine then.” (Startup F Founder, Interview,
22 August, 2016)
Finally, without integration, Startup F was not always getting paid their referral
fee: “We’ve been having some issues tracking down the loans that had been approved
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through other lenders because they are not specifically integrated to the degree we
wanted them to be integrated at yet… So we’re just kind of in a bit of an interim situation,
where it’s difficult to bill. We’re just sorting through what is the best way we can – just
sending people emails and saying, ‘What’s going on? Who’s been approved?’” (Startup
F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016)
Web platform and email. By August 2016, one month into the web platform’s live
operations, loan seekers were still facing challenges on the web platform due to poor loan
provider integration. Though some loan seekers dropped off the site without
communication, some contacted the startup with complaints: “They sent me an email
today to say, ‘It’s really disappointing. We thought you guys were going to be ready for
the end of June. Now it’s the end of August, and now you’re telling us September.’ We’re
having a fall off with people. They’ll go through the app and they’ll get the good credit
option and there’s only one lender shown. What the heck is this? I thought this was a
search engine. I thought it was going to show me a number of options. So, that’s a
burning fire I need to deal with.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016)
Web platform. Despite incomplete and rejected applications on the web platform, as of
September 2016, the lack of integration was not affecting new potential loan seekers from
coming to visit the site: “They’re coming. They don’t know [about the level of lender
integration].” At the same time, Startup F was still waiting to get more of their lenders
fully integrated: “Really, we only have one primary lender who’s up right now. So, it’s
kind of hokey…. One kept telling us that they were getting their website built, but it’s
taking them forever to get that working.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 September,
2016) In general, however, the lenders were seeing this partnership as an opportunity:
“the lenders are all really keen and excited about where we’re at and what’s going on.”
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016)
2.2.10. Follow-up on incomplete and rejected applications – Hired call representative.
Phone. The founder believed that these integration issues were what limited the number
of applications being completed in July 2016. When Startup F noticed that there were
potential loan seekers that visited the web platform and were being declined, or that they
did not complete their application, they decided to follow up with these ‘lost customers’
over the phone: “We do have all the applicant’s email addresses and contact
[information] for members. So, next week, I’m going to have this guy that I hired to call
all of them, email follow up after a couple of days, and then call again to figure out what
led them to our site, why then they went through the application, and ultimately got
declined… [I want to] tell them, ‘Well you can come back. We have other loans
applicable to you.’ We’re trying to sell and close to those people, right?” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016) Following up with ‘lost customers’ was personally
important to the founder and Startup F hired its first employee to phone who had
attempted a loan application: “A lot of other people are still in the pipeline that we’re
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going to follow up with and hopefully, be able to convert a quarter of them.” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016)
However, there were a few challenges in doing this. First, it would take
manpower and time to contact these loan seekers – and Startup F had limited resources at
the time. Furthermore, the startup only captured email or phone contact details if the loan
seeker had started an application and entered this information into the web platform.
“This [list of loan seeker contact information] is only the people who have gone through
the search. So, they’ve come to the site, they’ve clicked on the button saying, ‘Let’s
search loans.’ They’ve entered all their information and completed the profile. They’ve
checked the button that says, ‘Okay for [startup name] to contact me and I agree to all
the terms of privacy.’ And Boom, they’ve gone and seen results... Those are the folks [we
can follow up with].” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)
The goal of reaching out via phone was to create a relationship with the demandside customer: “One thing is gratitude. Let them know that we’re grateful for their
business. We appreciate that they came here and picked us instead of going over to
independent lenders. Help educate them and, have them maybe talk to other people about
what we’re doing.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)
By August 2016, a salesperson had been hired to phone the loan seekers who had
initiated an application, but had not yet completed it: “His job is not to help close those
people. He’ll get a commission for every sale that gets closed that he’s dealing with.”
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016) This was an unexpected expense for
Startup F: “I really wasn’t thinking that we’re going to have a lot of people come to the
site and not complete the application. It just never really crossed my mind as to how we
were going to manage that and what we are going to do about them. My idea was,
they’re going to come through – it will all be automated. They don’t get touched by
anybody and there’s no salesy person on the other end dealing with that. But there are a
huge number of people that are coming on and not moving forward.” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016)
Even into September 2016, Startup F was still experiencing issues with potential
loan seekers not completing their application: “So, we see a lot of people coming to the
application and dropping off right away. So, our biggest issue is [that they are] not
completing [the application]. Once they’ve completed the application, we tend to be…
really good at following up and getting them placed. There are a lot of folks in the
pipeline… At some point within those steps of the application, they’re falling off, the vast
majority – so maybe 90 percent. And 10 percent are going through and completing [the
application], right? So, we do see there’s an interest… They’re looking for a loan… And,
we’re learning that people are inherently lazy, right? They really don’t want to enter tons
of personal information. They want something that’s quick, easy, and done.” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016)
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2.2.11. Visiting businesses interested in providing consumer finance.
Phone, in-person meeting. In July 2016, the option to work with business owners who
wanted to offer their customers consumer finance loans was revisited. Starting with
phone calls, Startup F quickly learned that communication with businesses that may be
interested in offering consumer finance loans were much more successful if conducted inperson: “I haven’t had time to talk to the companies that I talked to last summer. I had the
interns call, but they didn’t have a good experience. It’s hard to talk to [these small
businesses] on the phone. People think you are trying to sell them a loan, and they close
off. Really, the key is going and visiting a business, like a furniture store, bringing a
laptop, and saying, ‘we talked last summer. The website is up and we want to get you set
up. I’m talked about bringing on commission-based sales people to help with this.”
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016) By August 2016, Startup F was organizing
to develop their consumer finance arm of the business: “Getting a sales team together to
help me connect with businesses across the country who basically want their clients be
able to cover the costs of services.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)
Conference networking. In September 2016, Startup F attended a veterinarian
conference to connect with businesses that might be interested in consumer finance
options for their customers: “we have a booth there. We’re going to go and talk to a
bunch of vets.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016)
2.2.12. Self-promotion through owned media.
Self-published articles on website. By June and August 2016, Startup F had published a
couple of articles on their web platform that explained the industry and purpose of the
business. “I published a couple of articles on [not going to Pay Day lenders] on my blog.
I have these articles on the site.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016)
Press release. The startup also had a press release in August 2016, with the intention to
raise awareness about the business. “It went across the country. So, it’s on Yahoo News,
on National Post, that sort of stuff.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016)
2.2.13. Meeting with lenders.
In-person. While most discussions with lenders were via phone, by August 2016, one of
their lenders had requested a meeting to offer suggestions on ways to improve traffic and
secure loan seekers coming onto the site: “They were going to be there and said, ‘Come
up, we can meet at Starbucks. We’ll have a chat about the future of financial technology.’
So, I kind of dressed down… and I showed up and they’re like, ‘Actually, how about you
come up to the third-floor boardroom?’ They come back in, I sit down, and the COO, the
CEO and three of their investors are there.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August,
2016) This meeting in particular solidified to Startup F that they had lenders that were
serious and committed to this partnership: “[I’m] happy that we have [the lender’s]
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resources. They’re committed to us being successful.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22
August, 2016)
2.2.14. Using a family and friends focus group to understand site issues.
Focus group with family and friends. By September 2016, Startup F’s founder decided
to hold a focus group with about twenty-five family and friends to understand some of the
key challenges and bugs in the software that may be affecting conversion rate: “I’m going
to have some people doing it on their phones, as well as on their laptops. And then, we’ll
glean some insight from that – what people are struggling with, what is bothering them,
and then basically, we’ll be fine, based on that.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16
September, 2016)
In this session, they learned of issues with the web platform that they had not
heard before, such as incompatibility with hardware and length of time to complete an
application: “We realized the app [version of the software] isn’t working in Android
phones. And the vast majority of people who are coming to our site are on Android
phones [not to the desktop version of the website]. And nobody has told us that the app
isn’t working. ‘It doesn’t work? I’m not going to tell them. I’m just going on somewhere
else.’ So, we were lucky we had that event where we could see that’s what was going on.
The other piece was ‘The app is too long! You’re asking too many questions! I don’t
understand this part. It’s hard to estimate credit score. So, we decided, okay, let’s
revamp. And we hired this company… to revamp the app, using input from our meeting
here and analyzing other people that lend online (competitors). For me, the main goals
were deconstructing, pull[ing] apart what is needed, what isn’t needed, and strip out as
much as we can to make it as short as possible.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16
September, 2016) Furthermore, how the user-friendly was the website was also a
consideration: “Look[ing] at how the mobile setup works, you’ve got to kind of scroll to
click on the spot where you click select. [It’s not easy]… So, we added an “apply” button
[in a pop-up] window [so it would be more visible.] It’s just huge [for getting people to
complete the application on their mobile device]!” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22
November, 2016)
This feedback greatly improved the percentage of completed applications for
loans by demand-side customers by 16.5-fold: “[Of people who visited the site, those that
were completing the application made up only] 2 percent every day… Now that we’ve
redone [the web platform], 35 percent of the people who land on our site complete the
application!” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016)
2.2.15. Earned media attention.
Magazines. Even before launching, Startup F was interested tofeatured in traditional
media: “[The incubator] has some very good tools that I could utilize to help me with the
launch. They could get me media stuff and get me in touch with [business magazine].”
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(Startup F Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016). Eventually, once they’d launched, the
founder and Startup F were featured in the October 2016 issue of a local business
magazine. The article triggered both local businesses and individuals to contact Startup F
into November 2016: “We’ve got a number of leads from the city who are interested,
because we’re doing two things, right? We’re doing the direct consumer lending, but
we’re also doing the business financing that’s helping business owners supply their
clients with financing cover. So, we had some leads coming through that – which is
cool.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016)
2.2.16. Expanded customer service call centre to follow-up on ‘lost customers’.
Phone. Startup F realized they needed more than one individual making phone calls to
handle call-backs, required due to the volume of incomplete or denied applications on the
start-ups website: “We only have a phone system. I’ve got to get a system set up for a call
centre. If we can do it on the small scale, we can do it on the big scale… [Following up
with visitors to the site] - That’s just money. Like free money.” (Startup F Founder,
Interview, 22 November, 2016)
2.2.17. Revisiting consumer finance.
Web platform, email, phone. By November 2016, the next focus for Startup F was the
consumer finance model that they saw to be essential for growth of the business: “We do
one sale, we sell to a company. They do sales for us all day long. We partner with these
consumer finance partners and we can come in and we don’t have to sell anything to
anybody. We webshare and create a system that looks great!... [With direct-to-consumer
we] had to show, obviously, that the volume was working, it’s a scalable business. And
we’re there… But for us, we’re understanding now, [there’s a] cost to acquire one-forone. There’s a cost per acquisition for everyone. If we go with scale, small businesses –
great – veterinary clinics, home renovators, mom and pop furniture stores. But if we just
do sales to big companies… [they] bring us in as a financing alternative.” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016)
While the primary focus of Startup F was still on direct consumer lending, they
had started building individualized application platforms for businesses for consumer
finance: “We haven’t launched the formal beta of the consumer finance stuff yet. We’ve
been really focusing on the other side. But that’s happening in the New Year now. So, we
built out the application, the system works, it’s live. We are just going to launch it with a
few home renovators and get them to test it over a few months, and obviously, work out
the kinks before we do a full rollout.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November,
2016) For example, specialized websites were created for veterinary clinics: “the site
changes based on the type of industry. So, the background image will show a
construction worker, or show something else [that is relevant to this business].” (Startup
F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016) By November 2016, Startup F had also
started exploring partnership options with point-of-sale payment terminal vendors, where
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consumers could request instant loans at checkouts of retailers: “We create a connected
payment portal that you can do through our system. It’s plugged in.” (Startup F Founder,
Interview, 22 November, 2016)
2.2.18. Change in loan providers to meet loan seekers needs.
Web platform and data analytics. In the meantime, by the end of November 2016,
Startup F observed that changes in their advertising strategy had resulted in an increased
volume of applicants. However, these applicants were still individuals with poor credit
scores: “We receive good search volume. But we thought we might exist more in the
prime space. We haven’t found that. We’re really in the subprime space. So, we have a
few prime lenders that don’t see many loan applications, [while] our subprime lenders
see a lot… [For those that] are declined, we need to send them to a credit consolidation
company. So, we’ve got to get the setup done really quick.” (Startup F Founder,
Interview, 22 November, 2016) This prompted Startup F to adjust lenders and processes
in the business so that they could satisfy this tier of customer: “So, it’s creating the
system and the pipeline that works, that we’re on it fast enough.” (Startup F Founder,
Interview, 22 November, 2016)
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS
This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another
type of customer interaction. Interactions with the loan providers (supply-side customers)
and intermediary businesses were initiated to secure partnerships and improve the
experience on the web platform. There was cross-over between various communication
tools such as messages on LinkedIn, phone calls, e-mails, visiting conferences, and inperson meetings during the process of on-boarding loan providers and intermediary
businesses.
Interactions with loan seekers (demand-side customers) were predominantly
advertisement based, followed by phone calls or e-mails if they had visited the site. Initial
testing was done on family and friends that visited and interacted with the web platform.
Startup F also used articles, both self-published and earned media (magazine article) to
gain attention to draw potential loan seekers to the site. From the data collected through
interviews and secondary materials, there were no additional cross-overs of customer
interactions between platforms.
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS
Besides the three types of customers, there were family and friends, competitors,
mentors and incubators noted by Startup F. From the data collected through interviews
and secondary materials, no additional stakeholder interactions were noted.
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4.1. Family and Friends
Much of the demand-side testing, both before the website was live and after, was
done by family and friends.
4.2. Competitors
They currently do not have competitors in Canada, but do have them in the U.S.
Time to launch and gain brand recognition is the largest concern over competitors.
4.3. Mentors
Mentors motivated the founder to connect with clients over the phone, rather than
relying on online communication technologies: “He said, when he first started, he called
every single one of these clients directly. He called them. I mean, a phone call from the
CEO. That’s a big deal, right? So, they call, [and] talk. He’ll talk to them and make sure
everything is going okay and working well, even with that many people.” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016) He also pushed the founder to stop worrying and to
focus on growing the business: “He said, ‘Just focus on growing. Every tech company’s
dream is to grow quick. So, get out there and do whatever you can and do it well. Stop
worrying about that kind of crap.’ That was kind of cool. I mean he really kid of got me
focused on just getting to market. So, trying to push for that.” (Startup F Founder,
Interview, 22 June, 2016)
4.4. Incubators
In June 2016, the founder was in a summer startup incubator. While he received
guidance, he also felt pressure to have sales, particularly in comparison to other founders
in his cohort: “I’m hearing other startups that are gaining traction… one guy on
Kickstarter just got 18 grand in like a day. That sort of stuff is happening.” (Startup F
Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016) The founder also secured a place in an incubator in a
larger, nearby city associated with fin-tech and marketplaces in October 2016 through
reaching out to his entrepreneurial network.
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP
All major challenges are detailed above. From the data collected through
interviews and secondary materials, no additional challenges were noted.
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017
At the time of writing, Startup F was expanding their Google marketing to
increase the volume of applicants to the web platform. Most of the applicants were:
“Typically males… I think their average age is around 35… Mostly, poor socioeconomic
status… We have people applying who are disabled. A lot of blue-collar workers. It is
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interesting because when we launched, we thought we’d be really getting a lot of prime
applicants. And what we understand is that the cost is very expensive to get those people.
Everybody else is trying to get those people as well. So, we’ve really been able to fit in
down here where we can help monetize those people that these other businesses can’t”
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 17 March, 2017). To increase access to this market, they
were trying out offline marketing tactics, including direct mail for less expensive
acquisitions in lower income neighbourhoods.
By March 2017, Startup F had undergone several recent changes to change the
types of customers that they attracted, as well as the volume. More specifically, the
startup had started bringing in lenders (supply-side customers) to meet the needs of
businesses seeking loans, developed partnerships for the consumer finance side of their
business with doctors in the U.S. and veterinary clinics in Canada, and wanted to start
partnering with larger brands: “[We want to be] partnering with brands that people trust
in order to actually let people feel that they can trust us” (Startup F Founder, Interview,
17 March, 2017). They were also developing a mobile phone app that facilitated the loan
seeking process on the go.
Appendix B7. Startup G
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS
1.1. & 1.2. Business Idea and Founder
Startup G was a founded to produce a product that could brew coffee on the go.
The product had been called a portable travel brewer mug, pressure brewer, and a coffee
press, with the founder describing the product as: “an all in one pressure brewer and
travel mug that allows you to brew very high quality coffee and take it with you on the
go” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016). The idea for the product arose from
the founder’s love of coffee and his experiences operating canoe trips. He found that he
wanted great coffee on the go, but struggled to find a way to brew it while camping.
In Summer 2015, as a coffee enthusiast with a Masters in Engineering degree and
specializing in thermodynamics, the founder realized that he could probably solve his
own problem: “I was making coffee one day in the lab [with a competing product], and I
thought, why can’t I just drink out of this? And that’s where it kind of came from. I drink
coffee every day. I’m in thermofluids. I know what [good coffee] is and how the actual
brewing works” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016). He developed a
prototype, and upon the urging of his business course professor, patented the design in
August 2015.
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1.3. About the Customers
The individual consumers initially targeted by Startup G were similar to the
founder – outdoor enthusiasts that enjoyed good coffee. However, over time, during
online community forum discussions with potential customers and camping and coffee
enthusiasts, the founder realized that there were other potential markets that would be
seeking out good coffee, on the go, such as commuters: “Probably just general
commuters [would also be interested]. People commuting every day. They want their
coffee. Someone asked me that on my post. Why are you targeting campers? What about
commuters? I said there’s no sub-Reddit (an online community forum) for commuters,
sadly. So, I’m just starting off in these niche spaces and building my reputation among
cool people. Outdoor enthusiasts. They are more willing to adopt new technologies if it
helps their camping. And then, [after] showing that it works for camping, it could work
for everyday life. [So, we are] starting off in niche areas and then growing into a mass
consumer market” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).
Although Startup G wanted to partner with independent coffee shops, online
stores that offer gadgets, and distributors of coffee related products, the startup did not
look at these businesses as customers: “I guess [name of small independent coffee shop],
if I’m selling through them. [Competitor product] will sell their product through retail
locations or small coffee shops. So, in that sense, they’re a customer. But I’d say the end
user [is our customer]. Because [name of small independent coffee shop] won’t be
buying these to brew in their cafes, but they will be selling to people who enjoy their
coffee on the go... It would be great to sell to that store, but it would be really great to
sell to the distributor, who is going to each of those stores to sell my product” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).
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2. STARTUP HISTORY
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016

Used social media to self-promote & radio show,
blog, magazine, and newspaper features
Continued promotion of Startup G - Social media
ads, blogs, newspaper, university promotion
Continued feedback with online community forum
Observed positive results from
promotions

Met local café to test product
Started getting feedback from online community
forum
Kickstarter campaign launched

Tested prototype with in-person network

Visit to manufacturer in China

Product idea and prototype development

Sep-15

Dec-15

Jun-16

Mar-16

Entrepreneur pitch competition
Contacted blog writers

Feedback and Interactions with customers Crowdfunding website, online community forum,
social media, blogs, data analytics, local cafes, radio,
newspapers, ads, email

Started hashtag SEO campaign

Sep-16

Dec-16
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes
2.2.1. Idea for product, prototype developed, and patent filed.
While the idea for creating, manufacturing, and selling this product – a travel
pressure brewer – arose in Fall 2015, the goal of creating a coffee press was not new for
the founder: “I was already working on something. I had an idea for a self-stirring
French press” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016). The founder developed a
prototype, and upon the urging of his business school professor, he filed a patent.
2.2.2. Started testing prototype with personal network.
Personal network, in-person. Without waiting for the patent to be approved, in January
2016, the founder decided to start acquiring potential customer feedback on the prototype
and the coffee it produced. At this stage, he still did not have a product – just the single
prototype he made in the laboratories on university campus.
He began taste testing the coffee with personal contacts. He emailed the
engineering students on campus, offering free coffee as an incentive to get users to give
feedback on the brewing technique. The comments he received back were both the taste
of the coffee and on the process: “There’s always people that say, why don’t you do this
or that. Small things. But really, it’s just taking their feedback and trying to incorporate it
into their design… A lot of people said they didn’t even need milk with my coffee”
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).
2.2.3. Started receiving feedback from online community forum.
Online community forums. In March 2016, the founder started using various online
platforms to raise awareness about his potential product and to learn what types of
features in a coffee press were important to potential customers. He started by reaching
out to individuals on Reddit.com - an online community where topics of all types can be
discussed - and asked community members on three forums, coffee, tea and camping
gear, what they thought of the portable coffee brewer mug that he was developing: “I did
the same post [in each forum] – ‘Hey, I have this coffee press. What do you guys think?
I’m really not trying to advertise anything. I’m really just looking for feedback.’ So, that
worked out for me. I posted there three times. And I have three of the top six most
popular posts” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016). The forums ended up
receiving 478 comments total (including his responses).
Such interactions made the founder realize the importance of certain features for
potential customers. For example, a leak proof product was highly requested: “Even from
the Reddit post – my latest lid – everyone from the Reddit forums said this has to be leak
proof or they won’t buy it. So, I had to go a few other design changes to make a fully leak
proof lid” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).
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The comments received in the online community forum were somewhat
anonymous and often, quite critical. The founder looked at the comments but was
generally not aware of the identity of the community members making the comments: “I
read every comment. I think the best ones are the people asking critical questions. At first
I thought, these people are just being mean. But I realized they are just being interested.
And if you reply to them well, then… you’ve just built a relationship with that commenter.
To know who these people are – that’s the hard part. Reddit is completely anonymous.
You can’t... they don’t have a profile or anything. Just a user name” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 27 May, 2016).
2.2.4. Entrepreneur pitch competition.
In April 2016, Startup G participated in and won a pitch competition that raised
awareness about the business, gave the startup some funding, and provided valuable
consumer feedback that validated the concept of a leak proof lid, proposed by the online
community forum (refer to 2.2.3): “This is actually right after [name of pitch
competition], trying to get some traction and then just testing this design. The big thing
everyone asked was is the lid leak proof, which it wasn’t. So then, that’s where I came
back and now have a leak proof lid” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
2.2.5. Met with local café to test product.
In-person. After visiting with one café in May 2016, the founder of Startup G learned
that there were different ways in which they could describe the coffee to different types
of potential customers: “Before, I would say [the coffee] is strong, yet incredibly smooth,
but no bitterness. But now, when I’m describing it, I can say, with a medium roast, you
get flowery aromas and a very clean crisp taste. With a dark roast, you can get bold
flavours without being hidden by the bitterness. This is important because I’m targeting
those coffee connoisseurs, and those crossover connoisseurs, and outdoor enthusiasts
that want real quality brew when on the go” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May,
2016).
2.2.6. Decided to crowdfund the manufacturing of the product and work with
distributors.
Online crowdfunding platform. Even though the pressure brewer was still under
development, by May 2016, the founder decided that he was going to promote the
product on Kickstarter - an online crowdfunding platform in mid-June 2016. The funding
on Kickstarter required creators to set a goal amount that they wanted to raise within a
certain time period. At a minimum, this amount would need to be pledged by backers for
a project be funded. If this minimum amount was not met, the project would not be
funded.
The founder wanted to pre-sell the product to raise funds to start a first batch of
manufacturing. The reason given was: “Not only does it give me the funding to move
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forward. It also gives me traction to approach these distributors to say, hey, I sold x
amount in a 30-day campaign. What can you sell to your customers?” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).
Working with distributors. Startup G also started thinking seriously about working with
distributors and direct-to-consumers around this time, to facilitate getting their product
out to shops and cafes: “We have a launch date of mid-June. And that will be a 30-day
campaign. And then after that it will take about six months to production – or actually, to
delivery of the products. And during the six months, we [will] reach out to distributors to
get more pre-sales if possible” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).
2.2.7. Startup G proactively contacted for blog writers.
Blogs. By May 2016, at least two blog articles had been written about the product – a
coffee blog and an outdoor gear blog. The founder of Startup G had proactively contacted
writers and editors to get featured in these articles: “I searched for blogs, messaged the
editors, and they got back to me. I tried to make it as easy as possible to write the article.
I gave them a paragraph, kind of explaining what [Startup G] is. Another one explaining
why it would be good for their blog. Another four quick points about what it brews. Why
it’s better, and a bunch of pictures to make it as easy as possible for them” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).
2.2.8. Using social media to self-promote and landed a visit to a local radio show.
Twitter social media and radio. In June 2016, the founder of Startup G used Twitter to
reach out to a local radio station. This interaction resulted in Startup G being offered a
guest slot on the radio’s morning show the day before their crowdfunding campaign
began: “[My mom] needed something from the grocery store in the morning, so I just
walked over, and the radio station was broadcasting it from there. It’s actually a radio
station I follow on Twitter, and I’ve tweeted at them, before they’ve tweeted back. So, I
said, ‘Hey, you guys have tweeted me before.’ And they said, ‘Oh, why was that?’ I said,
‘Well, I’m actually an inventor of a coffee maker.’ And I explained it all to them. ‘It’s
actually just over at my house right now, like a two-minute walk. Would you mind if I
come over and brew some coffee for you?’ ” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June,
2016).
2.2.9. Continued interaction with online community forum – Building community and
obtaining emails.
Online community forum. There were several posts of communication between Startup
G and community members in the online community forum by June 2016 (refer to 2.2.3).
The founder had posted a video to provide a visual aid of how the product worked, and in
addition to the forum posts, there was also a lot of individual messaging between the
founder and community members about the product.
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Interactions with potential customers in the online community was the founders’
preferred way to receive feedback: “Well, with Reddit [, the online community forum], I
can actually communicate with people and there are probably over 500 accumulated
comments right now. You can’t get that with Twitter, Facebook, or Instagram, or
anything like that because Reddit is really set up for the comment section. That’s where
they have the main post but the main part of Reddit is the comment section, so that helps
a lot” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
Startup G engaged with the online community platform daily: “I literally just
watch [the forum] all day and when someone comments, I’ll reply back, just because
people get more engaged if I’m commenting and they all know they’ll get an answer right
away. So, they’re more likely to actually comment” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9
June, 2016). Furthermore, these interactions were translating to having visitors to Startup
G’s website, and for them to share their email addresses to continue to receive
information about the product: “125 comments of this post actually got me 200 email
signups in two day. Yeah, so you can actually start to see a conversion rate between the
number of people who actually like it and the number of people that actually [sign up for
email updates]. We had 768 [likes on the forum at one stage]” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 9 June, 2016).
Speaking to community forum members also helped the founder distinguish how
their product is different from similar products: “I’m not saying anywhere on my website
that this is like a travel [similar coffee brewing product] but when people ask me on
forums, I say, ‘yeah, I use my [similar coffee brewing product] a lot.’ It just wasn’t the
greatest for taking on the go” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
2.2.10. Media coverage before the crowdfunding campaign for Startup G.
Blogs, magazine, and newspaper. Just prior to the Kickstarter launch in June 2016,
three additional articles were written by other blogs and magazines, plus one by the
university newspaper. The founder concluded that the increased awareness about Startup
G, predominantly from their presence on the online community forum, Reddit, and
associated blogs (refer to 2.2.3, 2.2.7, 2.2.9), were prompting the writing of these new
articles. Validation for the product came however, not through potential readers and
customers, but through the authors of these articles. Startup G’s founder believed that
having an article written about the product would create positive attention about it:
“There are not as many comments on things like that… The best feedback I get is from
the blog writers themselves. If they say, ‘Yeah, that’s a cool thing. We’ll write about it.’ If
they’re not, they’re only going to write about it if they like it. The fact that they like it and
they write about it, that’s good, because then, people will trust them, which is why I’m
really targeting those blogs” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
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2.2.11. Crowdfunding campaign launched and started receiving feedback almost
immediately.
Crowdfunding campaign webpage. Late June 2016, Startup G launched their
Kickstarter campaign to raise money to manufacture the first batch of product (refer to
2.2.6). The target goal set by the founder was to earn $40,000 in a month. On the first day
of the campaign, the funding levels were not as high as the founder had expected
however. This was attributed to the high shipping costs that customers were dismayed
with: “Day one was a little crazy. I think in the first 24-hours, from like 3:00 pm until
midnight, we raised over $16,000, which we were expecting a bit more. We got a lot of
pushback on our shipping costs right now, which I wasn’t expecting. To be honest, I think
we lost probably $30,000 of sales that first day” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June,
2016).
The founder thought that the customers on Kickstarter were willing to buy
random items: “A lot of people that are just on Kickstarter. They just like random pieces
of stuff. I do think a lot of them were not the high-end coffee people, but just kind of that
in-between person [who says,] ‘Yeah, I don’t want to go to Starbucks, but I also don’t
want to spend too much on a full espresso machine or something. I just want to be able to
brew my own coffee.’ ” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).
Online community forum. Feedback also came through the online community forum.
While there were also suggestions about changes in material and size, the founder
justified his reasons for why the product would not change from the current design:
“Yeah, someone wanted a carabiner thing [attached to the coffee press]. And that’s
another thing – if we get a lot of money, we can start adding those things. But, I mean,
every change – especially the stainless steel version one, that’s a whole other product,
right? It has to go through a whole other development stage. These products took me a
little under a year to develop, right? I think now that we have the first product, we’re not
going to take as long with the stainless steel one to make, but still, it’s just a whole other
product that will have its own challenges with manufacturing” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 28 June, 2016).
Customers also messaged the startup to ask for discounts during the Kickstarter
marketing campaign: “Some people are messaging us saying, ‘Why aren’t you offering a
better deal on this? Why are you only offering 10 to 20 percent off what you’re expected
retail is?’ I said, ‘Well, because that’s all we can offer. We’re just a small company. We
can’t afford those margins.’ Companies that are offering 50 percent off retail, they have
their funding already. They’re just using this as a marketing campaign” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).
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2.2.12. Promotion of online crowdfunding campaign.
Spreading awareness about the Kickstarter campaign to potential customers took
place through social media, blog articles, and on the online community forum that Startup
G had been corresponding with (refer to 2.2.3, 2.2.7, 2.2.9, 2.2.10, 2.2.11).
Social Media. Startup G used social media to promote the Kickstarter campaign. Both
posts on Facebook, Twitter or Instagram were used (Startup G’s Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram pages, accessed 3 March, 2017), as well as paid advertisements to promote
Startup G.
During the Kickstarter campaign, social media was used to target specific
markets, however was not as effective in creating sales as the founder had expected:
“We’re getting a ton of engagement on our Facebook posts. I think one of them has over
100 likes when we just released it yesterday at 5pm. But it’s not turning into purchases. I
think it turned into two purchases so far” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).
Blog articles and online community forum. Blogs were used during the Kickstarter
campaign in June to boost sales: “[We are] just kind of experimenting right now, seeing if
we can get that boost and then also looking into still reaching out to more blogs because
we think that would be a big thing. We’re just looking at other Kickstarter campaigns
when there’s a blog post that tends to pump you up just a bit” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 28 June, 2016).
The founder speculated that early blog articles and raising awareness on the
online community forum were largely responsible for the initial list of email addresses
that Startup G could contact regarding the Kickstarter: “It’s kind of hard with the way we
set it up, to actually figure out exactly where because I think most of our sales are really
coming from that initial email list of about 1000 people. So, we probably go, in the first
day, or first two days, probably about a 20 percent conversion rate from our email list,
which is pretty good. I don’t think you could ask for much better, and that’s what we
were kind of looking at. And then, that email list was generated from a combination of
Reddit and blogs and everything” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).
Furthermore, once sales had been initiated in the online crowdfunding platform,
potential issues with the product or sales process started being discussed on the forum.
The founder speculated that this was because the community was considered a safe place
to have a discussion: “The way that I really figured out shipping costs wasn’t through
Kickstarter comments, because we weren’t getting that. We got maybe two or three
comments or messages. It’s from the Reddit post, because, once again, Reddit is a place
where people feel free to comment and that’s where I got a lot of comments say, ‘What’s
up with the shipping cost? Why is your shipping cost so high?’ ” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 28 June, 2016). Over the previous few months, the founder of Startup G had
gotten to know and established a reputation amongst the online community members.
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When Startup G was criticized for high shipping costs, loyal community members ended
up defended the startup and co-founder: “At the same time, because I was engaged with
Reddit and people knew me, people started defending me… A lot of people complaining
about shipping costs got really down voted, and people were saying, ‘Don’t cry about it.
Your view of shipping costs have been ruined by Amazon. This is what small companies
go through’ ” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016). These veteran community
members had been long-standing members in online community forums and were
regularly posting to them: “Especially with those niche forums, a lot of the defending is
from the smallest other SubReddits that I was using. If you’re posting on there, you’re
likely a fairly active poster to actually engage in a small SubReddit like that” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).
2.2.13. Use of data analytics to track crowdfunding website traffic.
Data analytics. With the Kickstarter campaign in June 2016, the founder begun using
SimilarWeb - a digital market intelligence platform that allows for tracking and
comparing website traffic statistics and analytics: “You can literally go onto any website
and then see what their global rank is, what their category is… you can compare [your
website traffic] directly to other Kickstarter campaigns and see how you kind of compare
to see what your traffic level is, and then maybe do some quick calculations as to
potentially how much you can make based off of that” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9
June, 2016).
Once launched, Startup G learned where their customers were physically located
using online data analytics: “It’s mainly from the U.S., actually probably 60 percent from
the U.S. in total. Then, it’s Canada and then I think Britain and then just kind of similar
countries. We have a fair amount in Japan right now. I think we have ten sales in Japan,
so mainly in the U.S.” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016). In Canada, where
the startup was founded, there seemed to also be a friends and family effect. More
purchases were made in the hometown area of the founder: “I’ve got a couple of people
just emailing me after saying, ‘Hey, I heard you on the radio,’ and they’re just asking
about where they can buy [the product]. They had some questions… I think [hometown]
is one of our higher [selling] cities, but at the same time, like I’m from there. So, I don’t
know if it’s just my friends or people listening to the radio” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 28 June, 2016).
When looking at purchases, by July 2016, based on names, most of the purchases
were made by males: “Our market, by far, it’s like 80 percent males. We’re not hitting the
female market at all. We’re not so good at that. Maybe because we’re just a team of
engineers? No, I’m not sure. I mean, I think our product definitely isn’t super
aesthetically pleasing. It’s very functional. So, not to be stereotypical or anything, but
yeah, maybe women wouldn’t like carrying that around as much. That is definitely not
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complementary to any fashion or anything. It’s a very functional device” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).
2.2.14. Visited local cafes for feedback on product and to connect with their customers.
Local cafes in-person. The founder reached out to local coffee roasters and cafés to get
their feedback on the coffee press. The cafes were initially found through personal
contacts, however, as awareness about the product grew, other cafes became more
interested in meeting with Startup G. The types of cafés that he focused on were: “kind of
the single, small local ones, because that’s where the coffee enthusiast will be going.
Those are the people that really care. If you’re going to a roaster to buy your coffee, then
you really care about your coffee. Those are the people that it’s going to be the easiest to
sell to initially, and those are going to be kind of, the influencers, you know. These people
know their coffee. They can actually explain why this is better” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 14 July, 2016).
Startup G specifically only targeted one coffee shop in each smaller city to
maintain relationships with the cafes: “I mean, [other cafes,] that’s their competition.
And I want to keep that relationship with them. I mean, I can do it, but they’re going to
say – they would want kind of more of an exclusive thing at this point” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016). They also use the cafes’ social media followings as
an important customer source: “It’s great because they did have that coffee gear plug that
they’re trying to start up. So that was definitely mutually beneficial, because it gives them
more content for their blog, but also gives more press for me” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 14 July, 2016).
The founder also arranged with another café to offer taste tests of his product, and
to get feedback, to customers already visiting the coffee shop: “I just had a table set up
and I was just giving out samples and letting people try it. So that was pretty cool”
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016). The founder wanted to maintain a strong
ties with local cafes to maintain his ‘local’ identity: “I think probably just doing more of
the [local] stuff, mainly because I like trying different coffees. There are a lot of really
cool coffee shops in [local city], and a lot of cool different roast varieties. But then, I also
like that it helps build my story of local inventor in [local city]” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 14 July, 2016).
2.2.15. Continued promotion of crowdfunding campaign.
During the Kickstarter campaign, the founder of Startup G used several methods
to interact with potential customers, including radio, social media and advertisements.
These are described as follows:
Traditional earned media - Radio. A local radio morning show reached out to Startup
G in July 2016, however, the interview did not go as smoothly as hoped. The founder
concluded that radio may not be the right way to raise awareness about the company, as
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the visuals required to properly demonstrate the coffee press did not work with radio - an
audio-only form of media: “Radio is not worth it. I don’t think it’s the target audience I
want, because it’s very hard to explain how it works, just over the radio, for a very visual
thing. Yeah, radio doesn’t take much” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).
Traditional earned media - Newspapers. Newspaper articles, both university and local
papers were also timed to highlight Startup G in June (O’Kruk, 8 June, 2016) and July
2016 (Caudie, 11 July, 2016).
Online cross-promotion of crowdfunding campaign. In addition to promoting their
own Kickstarter campaign (refer to 2.2.12), the founder of Startup G also discovered that
cross-promotion of another Kickstarter campaign (where Startup G promoted someone
else’s product and they reciprocally promoted Startup G’s product) could be beneficial to
boost interest in their own product: “We’ve had people reach out to us and say, ‘Hey, if
you share our project and update, we’ll share yours.’… At first, we were kind of put off,
and then we found one with a good amount of backers and it was kind of in the same
market as us. It was a camping gear product. So, we did it and it probably got us like six
sales within the half hour of them sharing it. So that’s something we’re going to try for a
while” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).
Advertisements. Later in the Kickstarter campaign, the startup used paid ads as an
additional stream, but with minimal success: “In general, paid ads don’t seem to do
much. It is really just getting us on the popular page on Kickstarter, that’s great…. But
yeah, like daily ads and stuff doesn’t” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).
Despite the outreach to potential customers, not much consumer feedback was
received during the Kickstarter campaign: “Some people are just asking, clarifying about
how some stuff works. Some people are still complaining about the shipping” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).
2.2.16. Finishing crowdfunding campaign.
Online advertising. During the month-long Kickstarter campaign, Startup G advertised
to potential customers daily: “We are making sure to do ads almost every day. We had
that momentum, but I mean, that was very, very time consuming” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 3 August, 2016).
Online crowdfunding campaign website. One week into the crowdfunding campaign,
Startup G had raised $32,000. Just over three weeks into the campaign, they had passed
their original goal of $40,000, and reached $50,000. When the campaign ended in July
2016, 865 backers had funded 154 percent of their original goal at $61,643. Out of these
backers, “65 percent of the people had never bought on Kickstarter before” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016).
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Email. To keep their Kickstarter supporters informed once the crowdfunding campaign
was completed, Startup G continued to update individuals who contributed funding (i.e.
backers) with email updates on the manufacturing process of the product/invention: “The
money should be transferred to us on Thursday. So, then, once we have that, we’re going
to say [to our backers, ‘It’s been two weeks. I just wanted to let you know what’s going to
happen. We already have the tooling design started. I got an email on that today. I
wanted to give you an idea of the timeline. So, tooling will take five to seven weeks. Once
we have that, we’ll be able to actually give you guys some updates on what the final
product is going to look like” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016).
2.2.17. Initiatives after the crowdfunding campaign.
By August 2016 after the Kickstarter campaign had concluded, Startup G began
several different initiatives to continue to gain traction for the product and to continue
sales, namely:
Newspaper articles and social media. After the Kickstarter campaign, the founder of
Startup G continued to raise awareness about the product with various media sources –
both newspapers and online. In September 2016, they met with a university newspaper, “I
was meeting with [university newspaper] to do another article. I mean, there are already
enough articles with my face on it, but, yeah, so then, this one, hopefully, we can share
this and then maybe say, ‘By the way, you can still buy our product.’… There’s one in the
[local city] Business Magazine thing, and that someone contacted me and said they’d
love to hear about the product. We have [a local newspaper article] that just kind of
synced some more attraction on Facebook and stuff. … Right now, it’s not really helping
sales that much. I think it’s helping get some connections, which is good, and then, it just
kind of fills our social media page, because you need to do that” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 7 September, 2016).
Indiegogo. Based on the success of the Kickstarter crowdfunding campaign, Startup G
decided to launch an Indiegogo campaign (i.e. another crowdfunding online platform) in
late July/early August 2016: “After the Kickstarter, we’re going to be launching an
Indiegogo campaign. Indiegogo has their in-demand campaign where if you’re a
successful Kickstarter or successful Indiegogo pre-order campaign, then you can just
continue your pre-orders on their in-demand site. We can just transfer our entire
Kickstarter page over to them and don’t have to change any of our content. So, it’s a very
simple setup. We might wait a week and then say, ‘Hey, we got picked up by Indiegogo,’
get another kind of boost in sales there, and then just leave that for the entire
manufacturing stage until we have our own e-commerce website set up” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016). Startup G did not market their second crowdfunding
campaign: “We haven’t actually done any marketing for that, but we’ve already had 12
sales in the last weeks” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016).
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Hashtags and social media. Using an online tool, Startup G starting to send out
automated direct messages that are relevant to individuals on social media platforms to
drive visitors to their website: “We’re setting up Evergreen posts, so just kind of generic
posts that we kind of cycle through. So, I don’t actually have to be posting every day or
every two days. We have this kind of post, and we can change that like if we find that one
is not doing as well and we could just take that out and put a new one in the cycle”
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016). These posts would trigger replies such
as: “‘Yeah, your product looks awesome,’ and then [people are] buying it on Indiegogo”
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 17 August, 2016).
This proprietary online tool was meant to use different hashtags in social media to
experiment and identify different topics and markets and to make Startup G’s content
discoverable and create the chances that potential customers would engage with them –
either through social media or through Startup G’s website: “We’ll be posting it to our
Instagram, Twitter and Facebook with different hashtags to figure out which ones will
work. Because before we were doing like hashtag campaign and stuff like that, it was
really easy to get the outdoors’ market. But now, how do we get the commuters?
Commuters are a harder market to define. With camping, I can just go to camping gear
topics. There’s no commuter topics. No one is going on a forum, talking about their daily
commute. So, I think it’s a little harder to reach out to them. So, that’s where we want to,
play around with hashtags – as much as I hate saying that” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 7 September, 2016).
Social media for communication. Startup G also used social media to directly
communicate with potential distributors around the World. The founder’s goal was not to
sell to them right away, but instead, to learn from them as to what they were looking for:
“I reached out to some coffee roasters in Australia I just got a list – I found out all the
buyer contact information, reached out to them, got a few of them back to me to set up a
call” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 7 September, 2016). This approach was not meant
to be a direct sales pitch, however: “I think just reaching out to them and just say, being a
friend with this point [is important]. I never said, ‘Hey, I want to sell this to you.’ It was
always, ‘I have this product. It did some good sales on Kickstarter in your market. I want
to learn more about your market.’ They’re not going to be on the defense in saying, ‘Why
are you selling me this product? Give me all the specs.’ They’re just there to help me. It’s
almost similar to what I did with the Reddit posts. I’m not directly selling to people. I’m
just learning from people. And I think people are more open when they’re not being
directly sold to. I mean, it’s never intentional. I think that’s just me right now. I’m not a
huge salesperson. I just like learning that thing” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 7
September, 2016).
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2.2.18. Continued promotion about Startup G.
Throughout October and November 2016, Startup G continued have the business
promoted through advertisements, blogs and, also, a national newspaper.
Social media and advertisements. By October 2016, Startup G had begun to use
targeted Facebook and Instagram advertisements and working with a digital marketing
agency: “We’ve learned some more ways of being able to actually use our email list and
our followers on Facebook to create an audience within the Facebook ads. And then, that
would allow us to have a more targeted campaign where before, we were just saying, ‘all
right, let’s just type in a bunch of coffee keywords and then see if that gets us stuff”
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).
Blogs. By the end of 2016, at least eighteen blogs had been written about Startup G. With
sales going well, the founder attributes many of the sales to awareness raised by the
bloggers’ articles: “that’s what drove our sales, is the fact that we had so many articles
and stuff written about us. We just kind of keep that. I think it’s much easier to sell to
someone through someone, rather than me going and just posting, ‘Hey, buy this thing
that I made’ Instead, a blogger says, ‘Look at this thing. This is awesome. You guys
should check it out.’ Because those [blogging] people already have followers. People
already trust them. I don’t have to earn people’s trust if someone else already has their
trust” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).
Newspaper. By November 2016, a large national newspaper had also learned about
Startup G and had written an article about them (Stanley, 2016, 8 November).
Poster on university campus. Startup G’s founder was also being featured a successful
graduate on different posters on campus: “It’s in the engineering building. In the
[entrepreneurship centre]... Sometimes I feel like I’ve a lot of pressure on me. Like
everyone’s [said,] ‘Oh look at this, he’s really successful.’ I’ve only made two presses so
far and one of them broke as I was trying to brew coffee. Yeah, there’s a lot of pressure.
But at the same time, I don’t know. It’s good. It’s good publicity for me, right?” (Startup
G Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
2.2.19. Visiting manufacturer in China.
In November 2016, Startup G visited their manufacturer in China: “We went
over… and had to have lunch with them in a restaurant right by the factory. And then we
did a tour of the factory. The factory is nice. It’s really good. A lot of it is automated…
It’s definitely safe” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
2.2.20. Seeing positive results from promoting startup.
Social media. By December 2016, Startup G had begun to see positive results of their
social media strategies: “I think really after playing around with Instagram, it seems like
we are getting a lot more feedback or a lot more success when we target more of the
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outdoor gear group than the coffee group.” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13
December, 2016). The founder attributed the increase in product sales to their targeted
Instagram strategy: “Indiegogo picked up the last few weeks. I think it was the Instagram
strategy going more towards the outdoor gear stuff. We also started targeting the people
that follow our competitor, just to see if we could get people saying that they would
switch from our competitor to our product. This last week has been our best week since
Kickstarter!” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS
This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another
type of customer interaction. Startup G experienced cross-over between platforms for
customer interactions through various platforms including: individual in-person
interactions, email, social media, and blogs. Furthermore, more community driven
platforms such as crowdfunding websites and online community forums triggered
potential customers to visit Startup G’s website or other platforms on which they were
featured.
Online community forum, blogs, Kickstarter, email, social media. The founder
anticipated a cross-over of users between online media platforms to raise awareness about
the invention: “That’s where I’m feeling pretty good about it. I have Reddit [the online
community forum]. I’m starting to get some social media attraction and I’m starting to
get some blogs and articles written about me. When the day comes for the Kickstarter
launch, I have all those outlets to reach out to. So, my e-mail list, probably, will get like a
10-20 percent conversion rate on that. But then, I also have Reddit where maybe some
people on Reddit saw the post, they liked it on the day of the Kickstarter, I’ll re-post it,
and then that might get more people that didn’t initially signup to my email, but they’ve
seen it on social media too” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
Reddit and Kickstarter sales. Furthermore, online community members on Reddit had
developed a bond and trust with the founder. This may have influenced their decisions to
make purchases on Kickstarter: “I think a lot of it was from the Reddit post, like people
were saying they tend to stay away from Kickstarter because they think it’s too scammy
[sic] or it’s risky, but since I started early on Reddit, a lot of people were saying that this
probably is going to be the first Kickstarter project that they backed” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 3 August, 2016).
Local cafes and Kickstarter sales. The startup also cross-promoted the local cafes he
was hoping to partner with. The intention of this was if he promoted their products, that
they would reciprocate and promote his product. The products he promoted included
coffee from coffee roasters and other in the travel gear or coffee gear category: “Every
time I go to one of his [café] places, I’ll Tweet out or Instagram, doing Instagram shots
of my press and of their coffee, and make sure that I tag them and everything. And then
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they do the same. Yeah, it works, it works out quite well” (Startup G Founder, Interview,
14 July, 2016).
Local cafes and social media. These cross-promotions with partners also generated new
content on social media: “I think we did get a few sales from that, and that was like, a
free thing. I didn’t have to pay for that… [and I’m] kind of doing a favor as well for the
coffee shop that helped me early on. They share our stuff on social media. We share their
stuff. Yeah, it just gives everyone a piece of the pie, I guess... I don’t think we’re
competitors at all. I think we’re in the same space and I think my backers would be
excited about your [products] and your backers would be excited about mine. I don’t
understand why at this point, we’re both a startup, and cross-promotion doesn’t steal
sales either. They just share sales” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016).
Personal networks and social media. Personal networks and professional use of social
media overlapped in how Startup G was being promoted: “We all have kind of our own
networks, but also a lot of overlapping networks. All three of us were on Engineers
without Borders. A lot of people from there were also Frosh Leaders. So, we kind of have
an in with them too. And then, they’re really good with social media. Even with [Startup
G], when we first launched our social media, I just asked in their Facebook group, ‘Hey
guys, can you share this post?’, and they shared it. So, we have those abilities” (Startup
G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016).
Social media and blogs. There was also cross-over between social media and blogs,
where social media raised awareness on Startup G in another part of the world, and
information about it was promoted on a blog: “We had really good traction from South
Korea for all our Facebook posts, but that didn’t really translate into sales on
Kickstarter. Maybe we got five or six sales at South Korea, but we had so many people
from South Korea liking our posts. And then a Korean coffee blog picked us up, and
actually did a story on us, which once again, got tons and tons of likes, more so than any
other articles that they had at the time. So then, I reached out to that blog, and said,
‘Hey, I don’t really know the South Korean coffee market. Would you be able to share
any information on some roasters or cafes that may be interested?’ And then they just
gave me a list” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS
Manufacturer. Initially, Startup G approached local Canadian manufacturers to make his
product in April 2016. However, two months later in June, he was still struggling to get a
quote from them: “Every time I went to meet with them they would always find something
wrong, and then they’d always say, ‘Uou know, this is going to be really hard. A lot of
people have failed at this. You’re probably not going to meet your priority because you
have too low volume for us right now.’ I said, ‘Okay, well can you at least just give me a
quote?’ It’s been two months since they’ve had my drawings. No quote. I’ve followed up
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with them every week and just nothing. They always say, ‘Sorry, we’ve got some other
projects. We’re really busy. We’ll try to get something to you another week.’ [Then, I
hear] nothing” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
By September 2016, this impasse with the sourcing an appropriate and effective
local Canadian manufacturer still held: “[There was] even a place in Ontario that said
they would get the molds manufactured in China, and then bring it over and make the
parts here. Like, I said, ‘yeah, their prices were great.’ They took ten weeks, [a long
time] to get a quote. So, I’m not going with them. ‘Sorry, if your prices are great but
you’re not able to deliver on anything, and you tell me that I’m not a priority, okay then,
I’m not going to work with you.’ ” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
In contrast, when the founder contacted a manufacturer in China, he encountered
little resistance and a willingness to partner on the project: “I sent them my drawing.
Three days later, I received a quote. And then they’ll say, ‘Okay.’ It’s very obvious that
they know they’re working for me. They’ll ask me things. Some stuff isn’t what they’re
used to and then they just ask, ‘Okay, we usually do stuff like this. What’s the reason for
you doing this?’… They’ll work with you to figure out some other options” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
Once the Kickstarter was completed in July 2016, the designs were sent to the
Chinese manufacturer to proceed with the tooling designs required to manufacture the
product in their factory: “They’re just designing the actual tooling now. They just take my
designs and design a tooling on it… That’s where they’re at now. They should be done
with that by late next week. Once that’s done, they then actually start manufacturing the
tooling. They’ve quoted me 35 business days. So, seven to eight weeks. And that’s just the
first round. And then they do a few tests. I’ll probably get over to Hong Kong at that
point and actually see the products that come off of that tooling” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 3 August, 2016).
By the end of October 2016, the tooling for the project was completed and a few
revisions were still needed prior to the commencement of manufacturing. Working with
the Chinese manufacturers was going well and Startup G was considering building longer
term relationships with the manufacturers: “I think it’s developing that relationship … it’s
a worthwhile investment that [shows] you’re not going anywhere and future sales are a
possibility” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016). By visiting the Chinese
factories, in November 2016 and meeting the manufacturing stakeholders face-to-face
over a series of meetings, the founder managed to build a relationship and efficiently
resolve remaining issues to finalize the production process. The efficiency of these
meetings was in stark contrast to the previous meetings held via Skype with the
manufacturers: “We got a lot of work done that would have taken us weeks to do over
Skype and e-mail. So, just being able to sit down and talk to manufacturers – that was
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big. We actually brewed coffee for them in the prototype to show them exactly how it
worked – they don’t get coffee” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
Distributors. Early partners that approached Startup G in June 2016 included wholesale
online stores: “They’d give us a purchase order, we’d make it, ship the bulk package out
to them, and then they’d take care of shipping over there. So yeah, that’s pretty good…
Something like that would be a good one to kind of get the ball rolling, get [the product]
into the hands of some people, then from there, kind of move onto more conventional
distribution channels” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016). Working with
distribution partners however was not possible until the product was manufactured: “I
haven’t really approached any stores or anything. We got another store from the UK,
another online store that sells a lot of coffee stuff, that said they would be interested in
having it on their site. But at the same time, I have to say, ‘Yeah, I’m interested.’ But it’s
not going to be until like February that I can actually do this. So, now, it’s kind of
playing the game of keeping them engaged with us, so by the time February comes, we
can set it up right away” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).
Email and social media. During the Kickstarter Campaign in July 2016, Startup G
experienced increased interest from retail coffee-related stores, receiving messages from
them via email and social media (Twitter and Instagram): “We have been getting a lot of
contacts from distributors from all around the world, which is kind of cool. So, we had
one from South Africa, just yesterday. We have one from Iran. One from Israel, Australia,
New Zealand, UK, Sweden, and a lot of local shops around here too” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).
Even with an increased interest in their product, Startup G still did not want to
start focusing on solidifying business from the retailers and distributors that were
contacting them until they had started manufacturing: “A lot of people seem interested.
We’re not really moving on anything. Right now, we’re just kind of compiling a list of
people that have contacted us, because we’re not in any shape right now to be saying,
‘This is what our price is going to be. This is how many units we can deliver.’ So that’s
going to be more once we’re back into the manufacturing phase and then my team can
kind of split into me focusing on engineering, and the other guys focusing on business
development and marketing stuff. That’s when they’ll start taking a look at what we can
offer and which distributors seem good” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).
Once the Kickstarter campaign had been completed however, the founders started
reaching out to distributors that had shown interest: “So, now we’re actually like
reaching out to the people who have shown interest and we’re going to see what their
ideas are. ‘Like, you reached out to us, what are your expectations?’ And then we’ll say,
‘This is where we’re at. What do you think of that?’” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 3
August, 2016). They also saw working with these distributors as a way to continue to
fund the manufacturing process: “if you want to order 50, then we can send you an
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invoice in the Fall, once we have our final cost and then you would pay 50 percent right
away, and then 50 percent upon arrival. So then, they’re totally fine with that! So, that’s
interesting – before giving anyone products, we could still start collecting money and
actually use that to keep funding us without having to get [outside] investments – which
is pretty cool” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 17 August, 2016).
By October 2016, the founder had undertaken more in-depth conversations with
potential distributors and received valuable insight as to how he should price his margin
level, though manufacturing had not yet begun: “I actually went to a coffee conference in
Montreal last week and was able to talk to a large distributor that distributes a lot of
coffee gear to just small coffee shops throughout Canada. It was interesting. I learned his
margins may not work for us. In his ideal case, he would buy it from us and sell it to the
retailer for twice as much as he bought it from us, and then the retailer would sell it to
the customer for twice as much as he bought it from him…. I mean, that’s too much. We
then need to take a much smaller margin at the beginning, which if he bought thousands
of units, then that could be okay with us. If not, then the business model might change,
and we become our own distributor” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).
However, these discussions, made Startup G realize it was important to be
cautious in connecting with too many potential distributors: “Not too much right now, just
because I know where the conversation is going to go. I’d be much happier to reach out
to someone once I have a working product. And then, if they like it, then I could say, ‘Oh,
yeah. I’ll send you one right now.’ And again, much better on us and being much easier
to sell” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).
By December 2016, discussions with potential distributors continued via personal
contacts with buyers in Sweden: “They’ll do their own online sales but then, they’re also
kind of a middle distributor. They specialize in bringing unique products from Canada
and the U.S. to the outdoor gear market in the UK and Scandinavia” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 13 December, 2016). However, because manufacturing had not been started, a
lack of product samples to share with distributors remained a problem: “We just need the
samples. Yeah, that’s kind of what the bad part is. It’s some of these delays in the
samples. I told people I could be getting samples by November or December. I also don’t
want to send them a sample that doesn’t work. I mean, like a lot of people that have
worked with Kickstarter and stuff before, they know there are delays and everything”
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).
Government. In August 2016, Startup G applied for startup seed funding through the
government: “If we get the [grant], then we don’t have to take loans or anything. We can
literally just – with that money, do all of our initial orders and then go to be a revenue
generating company after that” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016). In
September 2016, the funding of $60,000 was awarded, which allowed Startup G to
increase production, more than what had been anticipated with the crowdfunding
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campaign: “[We have the] potential to actually do a larger order, larger than the
Kickstarter without getting any initial deposits from distributors or anything, kind of
generate more inventory and see what we can do with sales. So, it gives us a little more in
options... We’re not going to have to be as lean as a startup. We’re still going to be lean,
but just, we can do a little more” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
Shops/Cafes. In August 2016, Startup G also began exploring the possibility of direct
selling to stores (i.e. eliminating the role of the distributor): “If I can just reach out to
them directly…I could just go to every coffee shop and say, ‘Hey, do you want to buy our
product?’ But it’s a time commitment for that. I guess, it’s a tradeoff between how many
individual sales could I do, or if I just get in with them, they already have sales people
and they can move a lot more product than I can. If it’s still within our margins, we can
afford that middleman, luckily” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 17 August, 2016). While
independent coffee shops were preferred, they were also open to working with large
chains: “Maybe like a Starbucks – I would not turn down Starbucks. I’m not afraid of
selling out to Starbucks” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 17 August, 2016).
This made the founder of Startup G began to think about the possibility of having
an online store and holding inventory, or that they could work with a medium sized
chain: “I want to go to something like [mid-sized coffee chain], something that has
enough stores and they can actually buy a large enough quantity and then kind of grow
from there. Once we have them, then we can take a lot more inventory and sell it to the
smaller ones too, but kind of focus on those larger [cafes] that sell or that can buy
enough and sell directly to customers” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP
While Startup G reached out to potential customers early, in-person and in the
online community forum, to gain awareness about the needs and interests of potential
customers, the founder wondered whether the individuals who provided initial input on
the product would return as buyers: “At this point [before the Kickstarter, when we talk to
them], we’re not really offering something. Maybe those people on the day of the
Kickstarter, they’ll remember, ‘Oh yeah, I saw this. This looked interesting.’ Then they’re
more likely to go to Kickstarter” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).
Secondly, the boundaries between advertising, seeking feedback on a product, and
media reviews were easily blurred – particularly in the online world. These interactions
with potential customers were public in community forums. As a result, there was little
awareness about community members that read, but did not post comments, as well as
little awareness about how the existing posts were influencing silent community
members. Furthermore, while the founder of Startup G did some basic data analytics
about visitors to the website, besides names and location, there was little additional
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information available to be collected about customers without using more powerful
analytic tools.
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017
By early March 2017, the manufacturer was already testing the product. While
there were a few setbacks encountered, customers expressed that they were fine with the
delay: “We ran into a few issues with our lids. They came out not quite leak-proof, which
is fine. We caught it early in the production so we didn’t ship everything out… Luckily
though, our Kickstarter backers were fine with it, and even happy about it… When we
updated them on that, we basically said, ‘Yeah, this was something that, because of our
quality control, we were able to catch this early. So, we’re not giving you guys a product
that’s faulty. It’s unfortunate that it’s delayed slightly, but it’s really in an effort to make
sure you guys get the product that was promised to you.’… They usually comment…
Some people email me directly saying, ‘Hey, it sucks that it’s delayed, but I’d rather have
this working product.’ ” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 March, 2017).
Startup G also signed their first agreement with a distributor in early 2017: “We
just finalized our first distribution agreement with $90,000 U.S. minimum. It’s pretty nice
knowing that we’re going to have that revenue. They reached out to us after the
Kickstarter… We’ve had to cut our margins a bit on this one, but basically, we’re still
making money off of it…. It’s really dependent on volume which is why we’re really
trying to get as many wholesale deals as we can. Then we can go to our manufacturers
and say we’ve got all these deals” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 March, 2017).
While Startup G was predominantly focused on manufacturing in early 2017, over
the past months, they had learned how potential audiences reacted to posts either on their
company page or advertisements. With advertisements, they decided that there was no
need to repeat ads with the same audience: “Once you’ve reached everyone in that
audience, and then all the people that want to buy your product from that audience buy it,
then there’s no point in continuing to run ads” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 March,
2017).
To find new customers, they created new lists of potential customers on Facebook
by taking the email addresses of the same people who they had been in contact with
before their Kickstarter campaign and ones that purchased the product: “We still have the
email list from the premarketing campaign, and now everyone that’s bought on
Kickstarter and everyone that’s bought on Indiegogo. I put that email list into Facebook
and then found I create a look-alike audience [to reach out to]” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 13 March, 2017).
However, with posts on Startup G’s social media pages, the founder, through trialand-error, found that the best responses to the product came through the social media
platform, Instagram: “[With Instagram,], it’s just very easy to get numbers… Twitter is
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useless. There’s so much happening on Twitter all the time and it’s just completely run by
bots… As soon as people realize that you can make money doing it this way, then it will
go the same way. Basically, Instagram is less saturated right now [with sales]. Facebook
is good… but just using my Facebook Ad, rather than trying to get people to my
Facebook page and getting them to like my Facebook page” (Startup G Founder,
Interview, 13 March, 2017).
Using the proprietary online tool for promoting the business using hashtags (refer
to 2.2.17) was not getting them the returns that they had hoped for: “I had found just like
nothing was going on with it. Like the results were getting worse and worse over time…
He was not doing any work on it to optimize, as he said. That made me feel taken
advantage of” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 March, 2017).
Startup G also learned to create and use custom URLs in social media posts.
When used, these custom URLs informed Startup G of where the customer originally saw
a message: “If I send someone a link through direct message on Instagram, they can’t
click through. So, either they have to copy-and-paste it… I’ll send a custom URL so I
know that if someone uses that URL, that it was for an Instagram account” (Startup G
Founder, Interview, 13 March, 2017).
Finally, Startup G’s social media was also gaining the attention of small coffee
shops: “A lot of small coffee shops are still reaching out. I mean, that’s another great
thing about Instagram. A lot of small coffee shops are on Instagram and then, if you
follow them, then all of a sudden they say, ‘Oh, you guys! I can sell you in my shop.’
”(Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 March, 2017). While these cafes were not large
enough to deliver to independently, these shops had the potential to be reached with
distribution companies in the future, as long as the startup was willing to take lower
margins: “We know there’s one [distributor that we could work with]. It’s pretty hard. He
wants high margins… So, we either have to lower our costs or find a distributor that’s
okay with taking 10 percent to 20 percent margins” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13
March, 2017).
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Appendix B8. Startup H
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS
1.1. Business Idea
Startup H was a web platform designed to provide comprehensive, personalized
resources for mental health - all online. The founder wanted the business to be: “helping
students discover and access the mental health resources that are best fitting for their
individual situation” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
The idea for Startup H arose in June 2015 when the founder realized that many
individuals, individuals who require it, do not seek out help for improving their own
mental health for students. Furthermore, he noticed that there was often a stigma and lack
of conversation on mental health issues with family and friends: “The idea came from
learning about my friend’s mental health situations and correlating it with my own. I
realized that we never really talked about it and [could have] helped each other. We only
discussed it after the fact” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
The goal of the web platform was to increase access to information and stimulate
discussions about mental health: “There are things that we can do… to address the issues
and provide a better experience for people going through mental health difficulties….
Whether it’s reading about someone else’s experiences, looking for online self-help
resources or counsellors or online peers. There are solutions for that. Or, [our site could
help with] booking a professional. Those are the things that I try to help students find and
[locate] what is most appropriate for them” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June,
2016).
From founding, the business underwent several pivots in terms of how they would
approach this issue and the ideal potential customer for the web platform software.
Initially, the web platform was pitched to university counseling services departments,
with the intention that it would improve on-campus mental health and alleviate some of
the backlog that the counseling services department had that caused students to often wait
weeks before getting access to a counseling appointment. The web platform would
provide articles on mental health, an overview of the on-campus services available to
students, and would offer online e-counseling services to students. Furthermore, it would
be built and customized for each individual university counseling services department.
After a few months, due to challenges of maintaining confidentiality and
accessing e-counseling staff, Startup H adapted the web platform so that it no longer
offered e-counseling, but instead, provided an online chat service to university students to
facilitate searching for customized access to resources on mental health. The experience
of interacting with the web platform would include being directed towards online articles
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on coping with specific mental health issues, relevant to an individual student’s needs,
information on what types of on-campus counseling services and activities exist for
students, and information on additional off-campus counseling services that specialized in
student needs. By the end of data collection for this study (end 2016), Startup H had
pivoted once more. Insurance companies were being explored as potential customers, and
instead of a human chat function, Startup H was developing a chat bot that simulated a
human - so that the insurance companies’ customers could access a customized and
personalized search for mental health resources 24 hours a day, seven days a week
through the insurance company’s website.
1.2. Founder
The founder of Startup H was in his mid-20s when he started Startup H.
Previously, he had a business that promoted physical activity among youth. Having had a
period of depression during his undergraduate degree in Business and Psychology, the
founder noticed that there was not a comprehensive resource available to students to
access knowledge on mental health. He had personally experienced long wait times to
access counselors on campus through university health services, and found this to be a
major issue, given mental health affects daily life of individuals. By the time the founder
started his Masters in Entrepreneurship, he was determined to create a web platform to
improve access to mental health resources for students.
1.3. About the Customers
When Startup H was founded in September 2015, the initial business model that
the founder was focused on, comprised of platform users – university students, and the
demand side customer of the software – university counseling service offices. University
students were the targeted web platform users. While they are not customers of the web
platform, their interaction with the platform both justified its existence, as well as
affected the content on the site. University counseling service offices were the initial
demand-side target customer for Startup H. These offices provide a range of programs
and services appropriate to student mental health needs. These offices can make decisions
on spending on resources to improve student welfare. During the case, the founder was a
student and integrated into the local university community, and believed it would be easy
to access the necessary decision makers: “I decided to focus on universities because they
have the money and it’s a closed system… Although it’s not easy, it’s still easier than
going to a municipal or provincial government to try to sell them software as a service
solution” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
However, by August 2016, Startup H had pivoted towards an advertising based
revenue model. While having students as the user of the web platform stayed the same,
the demand side customer became psychologists that purchased ad space on the web
platform: “Before, the school was the customer and students were the users.
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Psychologists would be secondary customers that I would pursue after getting the school
[as a customer]. But now, the psychologists would be the primary customers. The schools
would be a marketing channel. And the students would [still] be the user” (Startup H
Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016).
By January 2017, the founder had moved away from the sole focus of students as
users, to reach a more general population of users. To do so, he began contacting
insurance companies as potential customers for his web platform. Furthermore, he began
to develop a chat bot – a computer program that conducted conversation via text and
simulated a human conversational partner – that could be integrated into the insurance
companies’ websites and designed as a tool for their customers to better access
customized resources for mental health.
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2. STARTUP HISTORY
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016
Feedback on web platform prototype from
mentors
2nd meeting with University #1

1st meeting with University #1

Spoke with non-university online counsellorsSwitched customers to psychologists
advertising on web platform

Founded Startup H

Jul-15

5th meeting with University #1

3rd meeting with University #1

Oct-15

Started building web platform

Spoke with mentors of potential student
users

Jan-16

Switched customers to insurance companies

May-16

Aug-16

1st meeting with University #2

1st meeting with University #3
4th meeting with University #1 & cold
calling universities
Chat bot development began

Promotion of web platform to users at
University #1

Nov-16

Mar-17
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes
2.2.1. Founding Startup H.
As mentioned above, the idea for Startup H began in June 2015 and was founded
mid-September 2015.
2.2.2. First meeting with University #1 Counseling Services (potential customer) and
research on current mental health solutions.
In-person meeting. In September 2015, the founder conducted an initial solo literature
research on gender and mental health and discovered that men have more difficulty
seeking help for mental health than women. This lead him to the initial idea of Startup H
to help men access better mental health resources.
However, a discussion with a university-based mental health counselor in October
2015 led the founder to change several thoughts on the business, including widening the
target market to both men and women: “[From our discussion, I realized that] this is not
going to just be targeting men. Nobody is going to buy something that targets half of their
own customer” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
The mental health counselor also suggested that Startup H should offer tools to
facilitate online counseling through the web platform: “They liked it. What stood out most
from that conversation was that we’re moving towards online counseling and whatnot….
And then they identified a bunch of challenges like, ‘Are we going to need more staff?
Who’s going to be using the chat? What are the confidentiality issues? How do we secure
it?’ So, [they brought up] very logistical based challenges. It wasn’t so much [that they
were saying], ‘This idea isn’t going to work because of this and this [reason]’” (Startup
H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
2.2.3. Checking to see if the web platform would attract users.
In-person discussions with an on-campus mentors, psychologist, and informal
counsellors on campus. The founder initially proposed the idea of having separate web
pages in the web platform to meet the mental health needs of different types of users: “I
thought we needed a [web page] for athletes, because they experience different problems.
We needed a [web page] for entrepreneurs specifically because they experience different
problems. We need a [web page] to split up men and women, different faculties, different
residences, and whatnot” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). However, while
Startup H could develop in several potential directions, the founder first wanted to see if
there would be users interested in using the web platform: “I already had a bunch of
ideas floating around… I needed to talk to all of these people to see if this was something
that they agree with, or have the money to pay for” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6
June, 2016).
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In October and November 2015, the founder went to speak with individuals
outside of counseling services (including a psychologist) who were in different
mentorship or informal counselling roles on campus and whom were frequently in
contact with students. The individuals were not demand side customers that would make
purchasing decisions on accessing the web platform, but represented students’
perspectives: “We were getting the user perspective from them, not so much the customer
perspective. The customers were counseling services, the Associate Director, and the
psychologist that I first spoke with” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
What the founder learned from these on-campus mentors initially validated his
thoughts that the different student groups needed customized mental health platforms:
“So, I talked to the residence life coordinator, athletic director and different faculty staff there’s a counselor in the faculty of engineering. They were all saying, ‘Students connect
better with students who are like them. Athletes connect better with athletes because
they’ve been through these things. Engineering students talk to other engineering
students because they’re taking the same courses…” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6
June, 2016).
Despite receiving confirmation to proceed with these customized mental health
platforms, the founder decided that one uniformed web platform was more likely to
appease the university customers: “What occurred to me was that would be way too
siloed and too scattered. So, we would have to aggregate everything and break down the
communication barriers between all of these groups [to have] free-flowing information
between everybody on campus… But… it just limits the diversity [of information being
shared] and I don’t think that’s beneficial to what I’m trying to do… [I also] realized that
the people we were talking to were not going to be the ones paying specifically for [the
web platform service]. So, it would need to have to be broad enough to [meet the needs of
campus-wide counseling services]” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
2.2.4. Starting to build a web platform.
By December 2015, the founder started to build a website to support the web
platform for mental health.
2.2.5. Online live prototype and returning to get feedback from mentors as
representatives of users.
In-person web platform prototype demonstration. In January 2016, the founder
brought a prototype of the web platform to show to the students’ mentors he had spoken
with before (in 2.2.3): “It had a homepage [with a few articles]…. There was also a map
of where the [mental health] service locations were [on campus], and also the chat
option was there, but I didn’t put it online [yet]” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June,
2016).
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Startup H received positive feedback on the web platform from the mentors and
faculty of students that could be implemented: “They said, “This looks really good. It
looks welcoming, relaxing and inviting. It makes you feel welcomed.’ They threw out
[ideas on] features they would like to see. ‘Hey, maybe an article about this would be
great for this group of people.’ So, I took [those suggestions] and put them on a list and
am looking for an article to include [on the web platform on that topic] later on….
[Another person was interested in] online booking…. And when we’re ready to launch,
we can help promote it. Stuff like that” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
Having received positive feedback, the founder decided to move forward,
planning a pilot test version of the web platform that could go live in July 2016:
“Hopefully this will be in partnership with counseling services. [We’ll promote it with]
email campaigns. Putting up signage in the [student centre]…. Let’s say July [the
product will be ready.] And then [in] September we can target the first years coming in,
whether through an actual pamphlet or something during frosh week, some kind of
presentation, something to get them thinking [about mental health]. I haven’t thought
about what that is specifically because I’m still grappling with getting the pilot going
sometime in July” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
2.2.6. Attempted and unable to access student user feedback.
In-person. By January 2016, while the founder had received input on what student users
might be looking for from their mentors, when the prototype was built, he had only
received positive feedback from his inner circle of university friends. His plan was to
have a wider group of students test the product, however the student groups he was trying
to work with kept backing out of their commitment to provide feedback on the web
platform: “That’s what I want to do with the pilot to just put it in the students’ hands and
see how they interact with it. I thought about doing focus groups, but then that didn’t
really happen because of the way the term kind of went… I contacted student volunteer
groups… that address mental health awareness. I reached out to them and their
engagement was surprisingly low. But because they’re student groups, they’re dealing
with midterm exams, assignments, and this is something they’re doing on the side. [I
asked them at an event that they were holding,] ‘Hey, this is something I’m working on.
Can I come and get a focus group going?’ [They said,] ‘Yeah, that’s cool.’… And then,
they’d [cancel] – ‘Oh, sorry. We were all busy with midterms and assignments.’ ”
(Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
The founder also realized that obtaining feedback on the web platform in face-toface interactions with students on campus would be a challenge, given the topic of mental
health: “I guess I could have just cold talked to people [walking around on campus]. But
I don’t think that is going to be the best way of going about it. I’m not sure how helpful
the insights would be and how willing people would be to participate…. Some feedback I
heard [about the web platform] was will people openly participate in a mental health

Startup H

480

thing? The student groups [we are trying to talk to] would be easy because they’re all
about mental health awareness. But whether the general population would do something
like that is yet to be seen. The whole point of the system is to be discrete about getting
treatment and possibly discovering what you need” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6
June, 2016).
2.2.7. Second meeting with University #1 Counselling Services (potential customer).
In-person. It was Mid-March 2016 before the founder met again with the university
counselors. The discussion suggested that Startup H was developing a web platform that
would be of interest to them, however that some fine tuning was still needed. They urged
Startup H to learn from existing competitors: “What the meetings entailed was, ‘This
website looks pretty good. They’re impressed by the amount of work you have done.
These are the challenges that we need to address. Go talk to people who are
implementing similar solutions. Find out what they are doing and bring that back to us to
see how we can best implement this” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
2.2.8. Speaking with non-university online counseling organizations.
Email and phone. After the meeting with the counselors, from April 2016, the founder
began contacting other organizations with online counseling capabilities to understand
some of the challenges which they had: “[By] talking to them, [I was able to ask
questions such as], ‘How do you navigate challenges like geographical distance? And
how do you navigate confidentiality? How do you balance that with the need to know
who these people are in case of a crisis situation?’” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6
June, 2016).
These discussions led the founder to start to question whether having their own
online counseling on Startup H’s web platform was going to be a distinguishing factor,
given there were already several companies offering these services. From a student’s
point of view, he understood that the problem that students experienced was trying to
identify, locate and contact these online resources and believed having an online chat
function with an actual person on the other end built into the website would still be
helpful to facilitate this: [From these discussions], I figured out that… the best way to do
things was simply to use the chat as a customer service type thing. It wouldn’t be to
provide treatment. It would be to direct people towards treatment. It’s not that the
challenges cannot be overcome… the market for that is already saturated. So, on a
business standpoint, it doesn’t really work out…. There are companies out there that
offer video counselling…. But the problem remains of how would somebody find this?
How would they overcome the stigma of reaching out to this? Yes, you don’t have to
leave your house. You don’t have to physically walk into a clinic and risk being seen. But
to find out that this is here and to pay for it – it’s addressing some aspects of the problem,
but I don’t think that’s enough because there are just so many different… channels of
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service provision. It just doesn’t seem as helpful” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June,
2016).
The founder also realized that Startup H could possibly partner with existing
online counselors to provide additional options for services to the student users of the
platform, and added value to the overburdened university counseling services:
“Partnering with local private psychologists or other agencies that provide help [would
be important to improve access to qualified counselors]. If a student has to wait three
weeks to speak with a counselor on campus… they could go to a private practitioner,
right?” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). These private psychologists could
then advertise their services on the web platform: “I have 30,000 new students on my web
platform. If there are 20 percent experiencing mental health difficulties, but the wait time
is too long – there are around 10 percent not getting help. This is a huge sales
opportunity to advertise on this platform” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
Rather than selling an advertising partnership directly to psychologists, the
founder believed that he would need to first build and promote a web platform to users.
Once there were users on the platform, he believed he could attract advertising from
psychologists: “I think [these psychologists] would say right now, ‘Well that’s cool.
Come back to me though when you actually have value to me. When people are actually
looking at your website.’” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
2.2.9. Third meeting with University #1 Counselling Services (potential customer) and
first with its Peer Support Group.
In-person. In May 2016, the founder met with the Director of Counseling Services for a
third time and was told that they would be interested to move forward with having the
pilot version of the web platform software developed by Startup H. This pilot however
would be on a trial basis and no payment would be exchanged at this time.
The Director of Counselling Services also connected the founder with the oncampus Peer Support Group - a group of volunteer students who were studying for
degrees in clinical psychology, counselling or social work and who worked with campus
counseling services. The Director proposed that these students help implement the online
chat function (involving a human respondent) of the web platform. However, the Peer
Support Group was opposed to this option, and informed the founder that they felt it
would not be feasible to have the chat function, due to staffing restraints: “‘We don’t have
enough staff for this. We’re not going to go ahead,’ is what they said. So, that’s where I
am at currently. Trying to explain to them that this does not require more staff. In fact, it
requires less staff” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).
Email and phone. While the founder did not need the assistance of the Peer Support
Group to make his web platform a success, having their support could be helpful. To
move ahead, he realized he could just build the web platform, with an online chat
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function, and demonstrate its efficacy himself: “[I could] either try to explain to them
how this will work, or just disregard them and go ahead. I don’t need counseling
expertise with this new direction [that just points individuals to different resources on
mental health]. I can be on the chat myself or find somebody else to do it. I can just go
ahead, launch, market it, promote it to see how it works, or start building the
technological features. So, it’s either continuing to get them on board, disregard them
and do things myself, or simply build and demonstrate efficacy [of the web platform]…
[I’ll follow up with them] within a week, just emailing. And then the next week, it’ll be
calling to say, ‘hey, I emailed you to set up a time to meet?’ It would be on a weekly basis
because I want to get something going by July” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June,
2016).
2.2.10. First meeting with University #2 Counseling Services (potential customer).
Email and In-person. In June 2016, Startup H had its first meeting with an external
university counseling services department, University #2. The founder had contacted a
range of nearby universities at this stage: “It was just [me] kind of picking which schools
would give me a good representative picture of all the different schools… The small one
probably didn’t follow up because they’re small and don’t need my service… I think there
are a lot of different variables… that I’m not even considering what’s playing a part in
that…. A bigger school has different departments that you have to align with and make
sure that everybody is onboard before moving forward” (Startup H Founder, Interview,
20 June, 2016).
In contrast to the informational meetings that Startup H had with University
Counseling Services #1, where he had hoped to both learn about the mental health
counseling needs of the university and sell them a product, this was their first official
sales meeting that Startup H had with an independent university: “I say that this is a sales
meeting, because prior to this, [my meetings with universities] were to understand the
problem…. Going to [University #2], it was strictly [to sell the product to] the university.
This is what I can do. I can reduce cost. I can improve student experience, and I can
demonstrate a commitment to student health. This is the solution that I have. What are
your thoughts on this? It was more of a sales pitch than it was [with previous
discussions]” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).
While the sales meeting with University #2 was well received, the founder was
surprised by the length of time it would take for the university to respond to him about
signing a contract: “[The meeting] went well, but it puts things into perspective in terms
of the length of the sales cycle. She said, ‘I’ll get back to you at the end of July.’ So, a
month and a half [later]… There’s just so many other people that she has to go back and
talk to… I’m not the only [competing business] that she’s talking to. They’re looking to
implement things online for mental health so they’re [in the process] of choosing between
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different projects… I think I did a good job of explaining the value that I bring and my
differentiation though” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).
Despite the delay, the potential offer of a contract gave Startup H confirmation
that it was worthwhile to explore further sales avenues with other schools: “I’m going to
start contacting more schools because, from this conversation [with University #2], I got
a lot of valuable information. I think I can really start opening up that sales funnel
without worrying about messing up too much now. I think I have a good hold of how to
pitch and what to pitch. And what value I’d bring to increase the likelihood of making a
sale” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).
2.2.11. Meeting with non-university e-counselor online community.
Email. From browsing online in June 2016, the founder of Startup H learned that there
was a government body and an online community of e-counseling. The existence of this
community provided further validation that there was interest in e-counseling. When the
founder emailed individuals in the online community to start a discussion however, he
learned that e-counseling was still in its rudimentary stages: “They’ve recognized that
things have to start moving online. They’re not sure how to do it, so it’s kind of very early
stage there…. They’re even earlier than what I’m doing because they’re still figuring out
what training is needed for their staff and what that solution is going to look like”
(Startup H Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).
2.2.12. Meeting with potential psychologist partner.
In-person. Since October 2015, the founder had been in regular contact with a
psychologist about the plans of Startup H. By June 2016, the psychologist was keen to
move ahead with a more concrete partnership, however it was unclear to the founder how
they would define this partnership: “I met with a psychologist who’s really interested in
what I’m doing. He wants to collaborate and cooperate, and I’m just not sure in what
ways. I’m trying to figure out what I actually want to get from a potential relationship
going forward if I actually want to collaborate with him or cooperate with him at all... It
didn’t seem like he was very clear on what he wanted. We’re meeting again in early July
because... we both believe that this is something good, but it wasn’t very clear in terms of
[next] things to do. We’ll meet again to find out what our expectations are if we were to
cooperate. Right now, I’m not sure, does he want to be a cofounder? Does he want to be
an adviser? Does he want to be an investor?... Does he want to be a customer with his
private practice? I don’t know… [I’d like it if I was] just given money and I could say
that I have a psychologist on board. But I don’t think that’s feasible. It would have to be
either advisor, an investor, a customer or a business partner” (Startup H Founder,
Interview, 20 June, 2016).
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2.2.13. Follow up meeting with head of Peer Support Group at University #1.
In-person. In May 2016, Startup H had received resistance from the members of the Peer
Support Group that was meant to help implement the chat function of the web platform
(2.2.9). To better understand their position, towards the end of June 2016, Startup H met
with the Head of the group to try to understand both the resistance from students as well
as to confirm whether the department would reconsider partnering with them: “What I’m
trying to do is see whether she’s still onboard with providing these students to the peer
support program. [If they say yes,] I can go back to counseling services and say, ‘you
brought up issues of support. It can be solved right here if we partner.’” (Startup H
Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). After this meeting however, there was no change in
the decision of the Peer Support group to not participate in the online chat function of
Startup H.
2.2.14. Fourth meeting with University #1 Counselling Services (potential customer).
In-person. After speaking with University #1 Counselling Services earlier in 2016 (see
2.2.2, 2.2.7, 2.2.9), Startup H followed up again with the Assistant Director in early July
2016 to discuss how to move forward to start a pilot development and launch of the web
platform software: “She’s the main decision maker. If she says yes, basically, everything
is a go… With this pilot, I hope to measure how many people are using the platform and
to draw conclusions about whether it’s actually going to help people. I also hope to use it
as some kind of reference for other schools and say, ‘Hey, we did this for [University #1].
This is how it works. These are the stats. This is what we can do for you as well.’ It is
also a way to justify having [University #1] paying me for a fully developed version of the
product.” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016).
Startup H was particularly anticipating the feedback from University #1 because
while they were a potential first customer for their web platform, they were also willing
to collaborate with Startup H to build and test it. This meeting gave them the starting
point for more detailed discussions: “Even if the pilot doesn’t work the way we want it to,
I don’t think they’re just going to [say], ‘No, we’re done with this.’ It’s going to be like,
‘Okay, let’s figure out what you can do to make it better and then come back to us and
we’ll see if this aligns with what we’re doing and what we decisions we need to make
from there.’” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016).
2.2.15. Started sending cold emails to other universities.
Emails. With the pilot version of the web platform software about to be implemented, the
founder of Startup H thought that this was also a good time to begin following up with
other leads with universities he had in July 2016, having found their contacts online:
“Cold email seems to be working quite well. Phone calls don’t seem to be working as
well…. [With email,] I’m able to articulate the benefit that I can provide and then I can

Startup H

485

follow up in the same email thread if they don’t reply and if they have something to check
back on” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016).
2.2.16. Fifth meeting with University #1 Counselling Services.
In-person meeting. In mid-July 2016, the fifth meeting that Startup H had with
University #1 Counselling Services set a timeline for launching the pilot during
orientation in first week of the school year in September 2016: “It looks like Frosh Week
[orientation] would be a pretty solid timeline because that gives us August to figure
something out” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). While the meeting helped
University #1 to make decisions about the web platform features that were in line with
Startup H’s vision, it also raised issues that would create more delays in launching the
pilot at University #1.
One of the outcomes of this meeting was the interest of having Startup H develop
a chat bot program – simulating a human - on the web platform that would eliminate
issues of hiring humans to interact with users on the web platform: “[Counseling
services] realized there are confidentiality [issues]. That’s a whole mess. We’re going to
use it for customer service and admin stuff. And then they said, ‘we don’t have enough
people for this.’ So, now they’ve moved on to an online booking system. And … a chat,
like a Siri chat bot, intelligent AI type of thing, great… [It’s] weird because that’s what I
was pitching [the chat bot] to all the other schools [to solve quick questions] but it
seemed that [University #1] wanted to use a chat, so I said, ‘yeah, we can go ahead with
that.’ Eventually, things worked out to my own vision of how the product would fit into
their service offerings” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
2.2.17. First meeting with University #3, Dean of Students.
In-person. Startup H also met with University #3 for a sales pitch in July 2016. While
they received positive feedback, the university was cautious to proceed due to a previous
negative purchase experience: “I went to go meet [other local university]. They like the
idea and they want to see how the pilot goes with [University #1 Counseling Services].
Previously, they bought a similar solution from an insurance company, but nobody used
it because it’s from an insurance company… They’re very cautious now” (Startup H
Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
2.2.18. Partnered with health researchers at University #1 to test web platform during
pilot.
Email. In July 2016, Startup H’s founder found researchers interested in using his web
platform to perform academic research. The research would aim to improve access to
counseling services in student populations, where the health researchers would monitor
users of the web platform when it was launched in September 2016. The founder was
excited for this opportunity to have research to test the efficacy of the web platform: “I
messaged a bunch of researchers. I invited them to use this pilot as an opportunity for
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their own research… It’s like free primary research right here for me to say, ‘okay, yeah.
It just works” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
2.2.19. Sales on hold to other potential university customers.
In July 2016, Startup H decided to stop contacting other potential university
counseling services customers. The universities that they had been in contact with wanted
to first wait to see how the pilot with University #1 (see 2.2.2, 2.2.7, 2.2.9, 2.2.14, 2.2.16)
went before making a decision to purchase access to the web platform: “The feedback
that I’ve been getting is that everybody is just waiting to see how [University #1] is going
to do. Once I mention a pilot, they’re like, ‘great, yeah.’ They want to know how the
metrics are before they take a look… So, I’m going to do the pilot, I’m going to focus on
this, and then, go back or not go back and open up the sales funnel so that I’ll have a
more robust sales pitch and that would speed things up on that side” (Startup H Founder,
Interview, 21 July, 2016).
By August 2016, the other universities that the founder had reached out to had
still not responded to him: “I talked to [a range of regional universities]. They haven’t
gotten back to me… It was one of those [scenarios] where they said, ‘Give me a brief
description.’ I did, and I got no reply. I didn’t follow up with them because I was working
on the pilot with [University #1] and I just forgot about them…. I really want to see how
the pilot goes here [University #1]. And then iterate on what we currently have before
going off to the other schools. I can’t really just accelerate the process that we have until
it’s more refined” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016).
2.2.20. Use of data analytics.
By July 2016, the founder has started to track visitors to the site, even though he
was not yet promoting or advertising it: “I can check page views but I don’t know where
they come from…. So, 31 page views. I have no clue. Yesterday it was eight. Today, we’ve
had four already. Who are these people?... We can’t capture it with this software. That’s
what the pilot is going to do” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).
2.2.21. First change in customer type - Making web platform free to universities and
switching to an advertising-based business model.
Despite several meetings with University #1 and other universities they met with,
over the past 10 months there was a lack of commitment from universities to purchase
access to the web platform (see 2.2.2, 2.2.7, 2.2.9, 2.2.10, 2.2.14, 2.2.16, 2.2.17). Instead
of pursuing university counselling services as potential customers, in August 2016,
Startup H began considering to offer access to the web platform free as a service to
universities so that they could promote it to their students: “I think with the way that
things are going with schools, it might just be better to offer them something for free.
They are open to the idea [of the web platform for mental health], but I think making a
purchase is going to take infinitely longer [to convince them]… I’m thinking, ‘Okay. First
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of all, why would a school pay for this? It has to be different enough and has to have
value.’… This would require overhauling their entire system… I didn’t see that as a
feasible next step. To try to simplify [the software], I thought, instead of having a
customizable software package for the school, it would just be a site – ‘here are the
features. These are what the students can do with it. Can you help promote it?’ That
would be an easier sell and wouldn’t cost them anything. They just have to see it and
agree that this is potentially something that could help their students” (Startup H
Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016).
Phone and email. To generate revenue, Startup H would instead allow local
psychologists and therapists to advertise on the web platform: “[We’re] taking a slight
pivot [to have] advertising by psychologists and therapists as… a primary revenue
stream... One of the psychologists here, working for counseling services, is about to
retire. He’s willing to pay a bit of a fee to advertise for September…. This is an
opportunity to provide recommendations for psychologists and therapists and clinics
outside of the school. I think that would provide value to private [mental health]
practitioners. [But], I have to contact a bunch of local practitioners to get their opinion
as to whether this is something that they would be willing to pay for. The first
[psychologist]… he likes me, and there’s no doubt that he’s going to be putting down
money. But is that representative of everybody in the market? Not really sure… I’ve
compiled a list and [I’ll] start making calls or emails maybe tomorrow” (Startup H
Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016).
2.2.22. Promoted web platform to users during student orientation at University #1.
Though the business model had changed to provide the web platform free to
universities, it was still important to assess whether student users at universities were
interested in using the web platform.
Business cards, posters, fliers. Startup H intended to devote much of advertising time to
raise awareness of the web platform within University #1 community during first year
students’ orientation week in September 2016. This would include posters, business
cards, and fliers being circulated on campus: “I think it’s critical [to promote the web
platform during this period] because these are fresh students who do not know that this
didn’t exist before. So, it would just be in their minds that this is something we have here
[at the local university]…. It’s going to start at orientation… That will be like a soft
launch and we’ll iterate on that. And in the first week of school – it would be like, boom!
Everywhere…. It won’t be the full features. The chat function won’t be there, but it would
be a page that… directs people towards counseling services or different health or
wellbeing services. It will be really useful to… see how many people visit the site, what
do they click on” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016).
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2.2.23. Developing chat bot software and attempted to increase user adoption.
By October 2016, Startup H had brought in a technical co-founder to develop the
chat bot suggested by University #1 Counseling Services (in 2.2.16). While the software
was still under development, there was a demo developed to allow users to see how it
would function.
Posters and business cards. In December 2016, Startup H began working with student
residencies to increase the user adoption of the web platform by the students on campus:
“The residence life coordinator has been really interested in what I’m doing. She’s been
putting posters up in her residences and printing business cards to leave in random
places. Students can, if they’re just sitting around, can pick them up and become curious
about it. I’m trying to push user adoption, and then on the financial side, be able to
[show to customers], ‘this is something that you would be interested in looking into. Here
are our results.’” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 January, 2017).
2.2.24. Second change in customer type - from universities and advertising to
insurance companies.
In December 2016, Startup H begun to broaden their customers and users of the
web platform. Rather than continuing to focus on universities and advertising, they turned
to insurance companies as potential customers of the chat bot. If successful, Startup H
would incorporate the chat bot into insurance companies’ web platform. This would
allow the chat bot and customized mental health resources to be accessed by a larger
group of users, not just students. The founder believed that reducing costs to access
mental health resources would be of interest to insurance companies that often paid out
expensive claims for mental health treatments. The founder believe that these cost
savings would provide a business rationale for insurance companies to purchase this
software: “Insurance companies are in it to make money. They have these resources and I
can decrease your payouts for insurance claims to psychologists because psychologists
cost a lot. So, if I were to address the problem quicker, then you don’t have to pay out as
much” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 January, 2017).
Phone and email. They met with one insurance company (Insurance Company #1) and
received positive feedback from them on the general idea of the web platform and chat
bot, however by December 2016, the web platform still needed further development: “So,
I just called and emailed [the insurance companies] and said, ‘Hey, I’m working on this
web platform… They were immediately interested. They contacted me back and said,
‘Hey, we’re actually looking into building something similar on our own. We want to
know how you’re tackling it from the AI side…. We can focus on the user side and the
user interface and then you focus on the AI.’ They said that we were a bit too early stage
[though]. I think their presumption of our technology was that it was actually… an
intelligent chat bot… They thought it was a lot dumber and more of a search function
than what it actually was. [They wanted] an actual sci-fi artificial intelligent bot… The
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misconception was a huge factor in why they decided not to move forward…. But the
technology just isn’t there. The best AI chat bots are still messing up from time to time….
And I just don’t have that expertise. But in the future, yes. I do want to be pushing that
piece. But at this point in time, we don’t need to have an actual intelligent software
program. It just needs to respond adequately” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 January,
2017).
Another insurance company (Insurance Company #2) however was not as
convinced about the added value of a chat bot and wanted to learn more: “They asked,
‘Why do we need to add a chat bot to this online platform?’ I am not sure if most
companies are worried about [a chat bot], unless they are very forward thinking….
Because our technology is so new, they don’t really see the value yet. That’s something
that needs to be communicated… The main thing I want to convey is that my technology
is valuable and I can deliver on my value proposition of reducing cost to provide service
that increases the health of their clients” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 January,
2017).
If insurance companies were not a feasible customer however, it was uncertain to
the founder of Startup H as to what other types of organizations would be appropriate to
approach next: “I’m not sure what would be the next step… if the insurance thing falls
through… I’m not sure where to go next. But the feedback I’m hearing is that the
technology is too early still based on that conversation with [insurance company]”
(Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 January, 2017).
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS
Most of the discussions that Startup H had with potential customers used
traditional methods – phone or email to establish initial contact, followed up by in-person
discussions. One-to-one contact with these potential customers allowed the interaction to
be more personalized, and allowed the founder to both gain feedback and assess the needs
of the customers and to personalize the sales message. Startup H had minimal online
interaction besides its own website and a series of articles re-posted on Twitter.
Interactions with potential users were also more traditional – through business
cards, e-posters, and television posts on campus. While the founder began tracking visits
to the website, at the time of writing, few decisions on Startup H were made based on the
data analytics collected.
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS
Interactions with potential customers (university counseling service offices,
psychologists interested in advertising on the web platform, and insurance companies)
were important to develop sales and to have regular meetings that contributed to the
evolution of the web platform over time. In addition to potential customers however,
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Startup H had several stakeholders that it interacted with to get a better idea of what users
were looking for and what features to offer on the web platform.
To better understand potential users of the website and what they would be
interested in, the founder reached out to both student users, as well as the mentors and
informal counsellors outside of counselling services that students may interact with and
confide in. These included faculty members, student residence life coordinators, and the
campus athletic director – individuals who interact with a variety of students on campus.
University #1 Counseling Services encouraged an on-campus Peer Support Group
to work with Startup H. Their resistance eventually lead Startup H to move away from
offering online chat functions, with an actual human individual on the web platform, to
developing a chat bot.
To test the web platform and gain structured feedback on its potential efficacy,
Startup H also started a partnership with on-campus health researchers. If successful,
Startup H would be able to demonstrate a positive impact of the web platform to potential
customers.
Finally, interactions with other psychological and counselling services shaped
how Startup H changed and adapted their business. To better understand what other
online counseling organizations were doing, the founder both emailed and phoned other
e-counsellor online communities, and interactions with a psychologist triggered the idea
of a business model where psychologists and therapists could advertise on the web
platform. This psychologist, along with a potential partnership with not-for-profit mental
health organizations, would help bring legitimacy to Startup H.
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP
The biggest challenge faced by Startup H was not being able to gain commitment
from potential customers at the university without first demonstrating the efficacy of the
web platform.
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING
By early 2017, Startup H had scheduled two demonstrations in April 2017 to
demonstrate the chat bot they were developing. The demos were with two health
insurance companies that were interested in wellness. While the chat bot was still under
development, the meetings were to verify interest in the software and the potential to use
it in their current client web platforms. While (Insurance Company #2) (referred to in
2.2.24) wanted more information, Insurance Company #1 was urgently seeking out such
technology. The founder however was concerned about being rushed to deliver a quality
product: “[I’m worried] that companies would make a commitment and we would need to
deliver quite quickly to match their schedule. I’m hoping though that we have a bit more
time to create something more quality” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 17 March, 2017).
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Furthermore, Startup H believed that getting their first customer secured would be
the most important for the business to survive: “It’s important for us to get that first
customer. We think that after that, things will start snowballing. I don’t think it really
matters who that first customer is. Most of these insurance companies will be beneficial…
There are only a handful insurance companies so right now, it’s not about sitting on the
phone and opening up that sales funnel at this time. It’s more about getting that first
[customer] right now” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 17 March, 2017).
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Appendix B9. Startup I
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS
1.1. Business Idea
Startup I was founded as a website design company in May 2015. Over time, their
vision adapted to become “a full suite marketing service that offers tangible results doing
analytics integration. We connect our clients with the right people so they can build the
businesses that they want to” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016).
One of the initial goals of the business was to have open communication and
collaboration with potential customers: “When you deal with your customer, that’s when
the changes happen. Because if you’re resenting your customer or they’re resenting
you… there’s a problem. And if there’s miscommunication – anything goes wrong, I’ll
make a note of it… Our whole business is collaborative and adaptive. Because if there’s
one thing that’s going on, I want to make sure it’s collaborative and adaptive to run
smoothly. Some of our worst projects were because we hit roadblocks and I wasn’t able
to adapt. But now, our goal is to be an integrated process where they give us money and
we get things done” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016).
1.2. Founders
Startup I was founded by two males in their early 20s. After a bout of drug use
and depression, Founder T sought out help from family and friends once back on his feet,
he went back to school and showed talent for web design. He was offered the opportunity
to build one of the university team’s website’s. After several tries, he realized he could
start a business making websites. The founder applied to the small business program and
met a co-founder at a small business summer company program. In 2015, they decided to
create a partnership to work together on Startup I. Co-founder T had a background in
media information technology and interactive media design. Prior to founding Startup I,
he was a freelance writer and a competitive athlete. Co-founder A had a background in
graphic design and animation. He had also started his own animation business that was
running concurrent to Startup I. The two co-founders believed that they had a strong
partnership from the beginning: “I think what brought us together is that both of us work
extremely hard and [co-founder A] is very talented and I’m talented at what we do. We
get along, and we’re friends, though [when we met] we weren’t really friends at that
point… It’s a great partnership and we complement each other very well in that sense”
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016).
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1.3. About the Customers
When asked to describe their ideal customer in May 2016, the founders replied: “I
would like someone that has $200,000 of revenue, and who isn’t trying to nickel and dime
me, someone who understands what we’re doing. Someone who’s business savvy”
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016). The founders really wanted to
have business savvy clients: “I think we should try to hit people who are 30 and over
because they know business. They have more experience…. We need to be picking clients
who are dedicated, who are creating content, who are doing cool stuff because we say we
work with them. They have their own traction, instead of us [creating it for them]”
(Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
From founding, the founders sought out clients3 that they could grow with and
learn from: “Our whole motto is ‘Let’s succeed together.’ So even though we’re trying to
make money and run a business, we want to pick the right clients we’re going to grow
with. We’re past the point of ‘hey, if you give me some dollars, I’ll do it for you.’ Now it’s
“Are you guys going to keep growing? Are you going to be a business in two years and
why are we going to invest our time into you?’ ” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview,
19 May, 2016).
However, the actual clients that Startup I had were very different. Most came
through the founders’ personal network or referrals, and these potential clients often had
limited funds and knowledge about digital marketing. This difference between the actual
clients they had and the ideal customer that they desired created substantial frustration for
the co-founders, as highlighted in the case.

3

The founders referred to their customers as clients.
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2. STARTUP HISTORY
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016

Built technology and processes to minimize client
communication
Designed new company website

New website launched

Started emailing project proposals to potential clients
Starting projects too early, Being declined by
potential customers, Lack of funds to improve
website
No change in client type
Desire to attract high-end customer

Started tracking website visitors and client emails

Founded
Apr-15

Jul-15

Oct-15

Jan-16

Apr-16

Jul-16

Oct-16

Started proactively seeking new clients
Full-time commitment to startup & reliance on
personal network for clients

Moved into a new office

Started to question marketing industry, declining
non-target customers, and started waiting for signed
contract from clients

Continued reliance on personal network for clients

Dec-16
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes
2.2.1. Founding Startup I.
Startup I was founded in May 2015. They built their website for their business,
but for an entire year, until the following May, both co-founders were working on the
business part time as they finished up school and work obligations.
2.2.2. Launched only ad campaign and received traditional media coverage.
Paid Media. From May to September 2016, the startup ran their only ad campaign (as of
March 2017): “I did one ad campaign that started… last summer and that was it… Right
now, I don’t know why I’d drive ads for… my site… There’s… nothing to capture [client]
information or make them engaged or anything right now. That’s why we haven’t really
done too much of that because it’s pointless right now” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7
September, 2016).
Newspaper, magazine and television. In August 2015, one of the co-founders was
featured in a local newspaper article about his personal life and Startup I. The startup was
also featured in a local business magazine in June 2016, alongside some of the startups in
the summer incubator that they were in. Later in December 2016, the founders were
asked to be on a local television talk show that interviews guests in the local community.
2.2.3. Full time commitment to Startup I.
For a year, the founders had been working on Startup I part-time (refer to 2.2.1).
However, when they were accepted into a university-base incubator, as of May 2016,
they committed to working on the startup full-time.
After a year of operations, Startup I had developed processes on how they
interacted with customers, both before they became clients, and during the website
development process. These exchanges were often time consuming.
Printed proposal packages. In May 2016, Startup I was hand-delivering customized
printed proposals to potential clients for marketing projects. Creating customized
proposals took time, and there was no guarantee that the client would accept it: “We had
taken a whole week to put together this booklet. We staged a photo shoot inside here
where we took all the whiteboards and made a long panoramic photo where we covered
the whiteboards with algorithmically businessy [sic] looking things, and art things as
well. I thought it was really cool. And we put all this energy into a project proposal… He
said the proposal was very impressive, very nice looking. It obviously didn’t do its job in
my opinion. If it had, [the potential client] would have said yes” (Startup I Founder A,
Interview, 7 June, 2016).
Email. Much of the communication with potential clients took place over email: “I use a
variety of methods. But, typically, we originally connect through email (most of my life is
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spent on email), we schedule a phone call, and then get together in person. Email is my
favourite because I can create templates and do some copying and pasting for similar
situations so it is more scalable” (E-mail exchange with Startup I founder, 4 April, 2017).
Phone calls and in-person meetings. Phone calls and in-person meetings were often
used as a follow up on on-going conversations: “Phone calls and in-person get-togethers
require you to be fully present and engaged. The in-person meetings can also require
travel and more stress than email or phone but are obviously the most effective for
closing sales. I do obviously enjoy the person-to-person relationship as well, so the final
meetings in person are great.” (E-mail exchange with Startup I founder, 4 April, 2017)
While these meetings were an excellent way to learn a lot about the clients, they took a
lot of time: We’re meeting clients and see what they like and don’t like, and then we take
a week, make the changes and then see what happens” (Startup I Founder T, Interview,
24 June, 2016).
2.2.4. Startup I relied heavily on personal networks for clients.
Personal networks, phone, email. For several months, the founders at Startup I relied
heavily on their personal network to find clients, and often took on clients that
approached them, rather than seeking out new ones. By May 2016, they had a regular
stream of clients approaching them: “A good and diverse range [of customers contacted
us]… I’ve never cold called a person in my entire life… [This one client], I’ve known him
for six years. That’s what I mean. The more I do – I’ve planted so many seeds with
people. They keep seeing what we’re doing and they’re eventually going to ask [for us to
do a site for them]. I could easily do six sites for $1000 right now” (Startup I Founders T
& A, Interview, 19 May, 2016).
2.2.5. Desire to change target customer and business model.
Despite having access to a number of potential clients in their network, several of
these clients were seeking inexpensive websites. The founders constantly felt under time
pressure and undervalued for their efforts: “Most of the time, we do [websites for] clients
for $1000 and we have to scramble to get all of them done. And it ends up with us staying
for late nights, hurting ourselves, and putting ourselves into a state of duress. I still enjoy
the grind but it would have been nice to finally have that client [that pays us more so we
can] say, ‘Hey, we made it.’ ” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
In May 2016, Startup I’s co-founders set their sights to attract wealthier clients
that wanted higher end, more expensive web-based marketing services, such as digital
marketing and data analytics. Startup I wanted to offer high end, data analytics software
tools to their customers to improve their understanding of their online market and visitors
to their websites. However, the customers that were approaching them, those in their
personal network, were not knowledgeable about such higher end marketing services:
“It’s a lack of education on the part of the customer. And that’s why I’m trying to bring
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numbers into the game. Because when it’s a [web]site and it’s not something you can
grab onto, people don’t understand why it’s worth so much. So, I’m trying to prove the
value through the numbers [that show how their performance improvements]... If people
can see a number they will be happy…. I was trying to explain to one of my old clients
though, about engagement rate, click-through-rate, and he said, ‘I have no idea what that
means.’ And that really clicked with me that I need to come up with a really simple
explanation of how this stuff works” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May,
2016).
The co-founders wanted to become more selective in accepting clients: “We’re no
longer taking on $1000-$1500 websites anymore. We kind of… we can’t. We phased that
out. At a minimum, we’re looking at clients that can spend $7500… We’re fine enough
not to take a bunch of crappy clients that are going to take up our time. We can work on
our own brand – which is worth more. There’s no point in working on a crappy brand”
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016). Despite these wishes, they did not
change their processes at this stage.
2.2.6. Desire to improve Startup I’s company website.
A year after their first website was built, in May 2016, Startup I decided that they
wanted to build analytics into their own website to demonstrate to potential clients that
there was value in using data analytics software tools. In addition to adding in high-end
tools, the founders believed that their current website was still fairly basic and did not
reflect their capabilities as web designers: “I made [our site] last May. It’s terrible. Well,
it’s not terrible, but it’s not good. I don’t want to market [Startup I] too much before I’m
happy with [our website], because I don’t want my client to come onto it and [get the
wrong impression]. Not that it’s bad. By all means, it’s a very nice site, but it needs to be
more than that… Working on our own site [and improving it] is going to help bring
better clients. I want people to go on the site and get goosebumps” (Startup I Founders T
& A, Interview, 19 May, 2016). Despite talking about improvements, they were not made
at this time.
2.2.7. Starting on projects before contract commitment and declined proposals.
Email, phone, project proposal. For example, in June 2016, Startup I would sometimes
start projects for potential clients, even before they accepted a proposal for them to work
on a website: “Even though they didn’t pay us yet, I was already designing the website,
taking photos, setting it up, and animating a few pages to see what it would look like.
Stuff like that. Poured my heart out really, so that the moment they say yes, I’m like,
‘check out everything we got.’” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016). This
happened with several clients, including a musical instrument manufacturer: “The
proposal will be out to him this Friday, but I’m already in contact with all my rock star
friends to say, ‘Hey, [there are great instruments here.]’ We obviously need to pay people
to play these [instruments]…. And I’ve already started to work on the website and it’s
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really cool. It’s very clean, but it’s also radical… So, I’ve poured a lot of hours into that
already” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
While the co-founders at Startup I knew that that starting these projects before
receiving client confirmation was not a wise business decision, they continued to do it: “I
wish I could stop. I do it for every client. Prospective clients. Clients we haven’t even
talked to yet. I just see their logo, their branding. I get an idea for them, and I make it.
And low and behold, four hours go into this logo and they don’t even want to meet with
us” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
However, in June 2016, three of the printed proposals that they put together for
larger clients were declined. These potential clients had contacted them through personal
connections. The founders believed that they were looking for a discounted price:
“[Founder]’s friend’s dad owns [big potential client’s business], and that fell through. I
think they wanted someone that would do a website for $500. Then… another proposal
went to [big local beverage company] and one to [big real estate agent]. The real estate
agent would rather give it to us, as [a competing marketing agency] said that they would
do it for $5000, but he thought [we were going to charge him] $500-$1000. And
unfortunately, [big local beverage company], we heard from him yesterday. He took what
we said back to the other guys we were competing against and they undercut us even
more [and didn’t give us the contract]” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016).
Despite these declined proposals, the co-founders believed that they just needed to
find the right customers to work with: “I think we’re on the right path… we’re putting
together great stuff. But it’s just a matter of time before we find that person who will trust
us to put together something for them, and they align with us. And if they give us money
we’ll do a nice job... There are people that want to hire us every day, but I want to work
with better budgets and what not” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
2.2.8. Startup I continued to rely predominantly on personal networks for clients.
Over the Summer 2016, Startup I’s cofounders increasingly demonstrated their
aversion to the engagement in traditional sales methods – especially the concept of “cold
calling. They continued to rely on clients approaching them from their personal network
(refer to 2.2.4): “The big thing for us is lead generation. I don’t want to be cold calling
people. It’s not what [Startup I] is about. I thrive more on connections, meeting people,
networking events. I know it’s a numbers game and you have to keep calling and stuff.
But it’s also a matter of reputation management too” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 8
June, 2016).
Networking events, in-person. However, most clients were found through personal
networks, Startup I’s founders realized that they should start reaching outside their
personal network, and wanted to create new relationships to find potential clients. By
June 2016, they had started to attend networking events, to meet people in person and tell
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them about their business before seeking them out as a client: “I want to know the
companies and hopefully have a connection [with them]…. There’s a ton of meetup
groups that put on events here…. I’ve probably gotten five contracts just doing stuff like
that… Not obviously right away. But people ask where they’ve met me, and they can see
what we’re doing. It’s a lot easier to do that then to cold call people and break into their
sphere and they don’t know you. It’s a lot easier, even four months down the road and
they say, ‘oh, I met this guy and he’s obviously doing good things.’ I think it’s a much
more natural way to grow your business” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 8 June, 2016).
2.2.9. Started emailing project proposals to potential clients.
Email. By late June 2016, the startup had learned that hand-delivering proposals that they
were creating (refer to 2.2.3) were not cost or time effective: “We don’t give out
proposals in-person anymore. We were dropping off proposals and not getting a
response back early enough. And we’d hear back a month or two later” (Startup I
Founder T, Interview, 24 June, 2016).
2.2.10. Lack of funds to improve Startup I’s own company website.
By June 2016, Startup I was focused again on improving their website. The cofounders wanted to hire developers, however, did not have the funds: “We have a lot of
people asking for work, but we’re just two people… We’re at capacity for our work. It’s
almost a chicken and egg thing. We need bigger budgets, but then I need a bigger team so
we feel comfortable getting that budget” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 24 June, 2016).
2.2.11. Founders of Startup I show preference for email and minimal interest in social
media.
Social media and email. Despite the increasing trend of using social media to promote
businesses, Startup I’s co-founders were not keen to use it: “I was never that extroverted
on social media. Facebook isn’t Facebook [to me]. I just use it to play Mousehunt. It
doesn’t click with me to have followers in Twitter and Instagram. I want to come off as a
professional, but not just because we have a lot of followers. If social media wasn’t
around, I don’t think I’d care about it. Unfortunately, I have to leverage my way through
and have to navigate through” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).
From founding, Startup I had accumulated only few original social media messages
across Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. The main communication with potential clients
remained email: “I spend [a lot of time] behind the scenes dealing with things, and
sending email is huge” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).
2.2.12. Started to decline taking non-ideal clients.
Phone and email. In July 2016, Startup I was still being approached by potential clients
that did not have much money and wanted inexpensive marketing services: “The not-forprofits are approaching me. But if we’re working this hard for not that much money, I’ll
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be a bitter person. And I don’t want to be a bitter person” (Startup I Founders T & A,
Interview, 6 July, 2016). This passive approach to getting clients was a was a point of
pride for Startup I: “I’ve never done that much outreach. I’ve never once reached out to
somebody and cold called in my life. I have gotten here by not doing it. I think it speaks to
the business. The work speaks for itself… People have every opportunity to come to us...
I’m not going to waste time working for free. I’m not going to do that stuff if they’re not
interested” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016). They were still taking
on clients in their personal network: “We’re also doing [a website for] a company I’ve
worked with for a long time,… and then a good friend I went to school with who has a
pending patent on a product” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).
They were however having some negative interactions with their current clients:
“Some clients are trying to undercut us. They’re not paying their invoices on time. It’s
just not that much fun. That hasn’t happened that many times, but it’s happened enough”
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016). This motivated the founders to start
turning away close contacts that were seeking their services, but that were not in their
target market: “I’m going to have to turn away friends and people that know me. I mean,
cool, we’re friends. But how does that help me [professionally]?” (Startup I Founders T
& A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).
2.2.13. Started to question being in this industry.
By July 2016, the co-founders started to question whether being in digital
marketing was the right industry for them. In addition to the growing competition that
they faced, the potential clients that they were interacting with did not understand the
analytics component of the business and the founders themselves were struggling to learn
the technology: “At the beginning, I wanted to become a marketing agency, and now, I’m
seeing every problem with that… I’m finding all these issues with research that
marketing firms are facing, with client relationships and stuff. I feel like my vision has
kind of come off, even with the response I’ve had with some of my clients. I was trying to
get into some of the analytics with my clients, and she stopped me and said, ‘I have no
idea what you’re talking about.’ Because she said that, that really hit me. [Also], the deal
is, I don’t [even] know what the click-through-rate is. I’ll talk about that stuff, but I don’t
know… And literally, clients don’t [know about that stuff]… [They] don’t care about the
click-through-rate… [And with] project management tools, I haven’t seen a solution for
people yet. I’ve seen people with more money than me that are still trying to solve that
problem” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).
2.2.14. Designed new company website for Startup I.
Website. By July 2016, the improvements that Startup I had wanted to implement in May
had still not been completed (refer to 2.2.6). With the challenges that they had been
having attracting new business, they launched into building the new site right away:
“When it comes to the [existing] site, it’s good, but it’s not good enough. We’ve learned a
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lot of stuff since then. And we’ve been talking about re-doing it since May… a long time,
and last weekend, something just snapped and I started working on it… This is going to
be a really nice tool for us… Now every piece on the website has a reason and it feels a
lot more professional.. It’s going to be a lot easier to have people come to us… I’m
waiting for the new site to capture the leads” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6
July, 2016).
While the website design was sent off to developers by the end of the July, it still
did not meet the original vision of providing advanced data analytics on site visitors and
options for collaboration with their clients, however: “Essentially, [we’d like to have] a
real time, live collaborative dashboard that you can go back and forth and basically talk
back and forth with clients to build a landing page that you agree on… What I would like
to transition to is a software service, basically… But [current customers] can’t pay me
enough to manage it. So, we need to have bigger clients [before we] can do that” (Startup
I Founder T, Interview, 22 July, 2016).
2.2.15. Started waiting for signed contract from client before starting project.
Email. While Startup I had been starting projects for clients before they received a
commitment from them, in July 2016, they made the decision to actively wait for a
deposit and a signed contract before starting work for a client (refer to 2.2.7): “We have
taken a more stern approach to dealing with clients. Rather than being loosey goosey.
We’re no longer relying on promises. We will wait until the contract is signed, and we’re
no longer working until we have a down payment. No ifs, ands, or buts about it. If the
client asks, ‘Why haven’t you gotten started?’, we will say that we didn’t get a down
payment. If we don’t get anything, you don’t get anything” (Startup I Founder A,
Interview, 22 July, 2016).
The co-founders also started completing projects based on the clients’ specified
needs and budget, rather than putting maximum effort into creating a cutting edge
website, even if it was not asked for and found that the clients and themselves were more
satisfied: “Before, I thought, top down. They need everything… Now, I say, what is their
budget and what gives them the best bang for their buck?... Now, I do my research and I
get the feel for that audience and tailor it to that audience. It feels more custom and more
deliberate” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 22 July, 2016).
2.2.16. No change in client type.
The co-founders believed that clients would continue to approach them: “We
don’t work at getting clients. They come to us. I don’t do any advertising and people
listen to us” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 22 July, 2016). Even though relying on
their personal connections and community to bring them clients was not currently
bringing them the growth that they had desired, the founders believed that this approach
would eventually pay off: “The community is really coming together where we are

Startup I

502

working. I’m really embedded in it. Right now, we may not be reaping rewards as much
as we want, but people [in the community] are going to be ambassadors for us” (Startup I
Founder T, Interview, 22 July, 2016).
By September 2016 however, Startup I was still working with clients that they did
not find ideal: I’d like to be working with different clients who have money, who are
invested and are having growth and want more growth… [Our current clients are] a little
unprofessional. And then we built up this nice thing for them, and they’re just not going
to use it. We’re like, ‘they don’t have enough money to either pay us to continue using it
the right way or, they don’t have the understanding or dedication to do it
themselves…[We] can’t go broke trying to help other businesses succeed when we have
our own business to make succeed” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
2.2.17. Started to proactively seek out new clients.
Even into September 2016, the co-founders found that they were too focused on
satisfying existing customers’ needs, rather than attempting to develop new sales leads: “I
should be calling people… to try to start up our new projects but I’m so focused.. on our
old ones... But that’s one thing that we definitely do need to focus on, lead generation….
A lot of our stuff really just comes to [us through] referral and we don’t really do that
much marketing” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
The nature of the business model, whereby clients were being referred to Startup I
through their personal networks, often left the co-founders conflicted in two ways:
•
•

A feeling of obligation to take on low value contracts out of loyalty to personal
network, and
Prevention from being exposed to higher value contracts.
“I think the problem is [that] those referrals are still not the projects that we
want to take on. We want to get [into] that bigger atmosphere… Poor people
hang out with poor people, or successful business people hang out with other
successful business people. It’s just the way it works. So, we need to get out of
that [poor] sort of circle…” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September,
2016).

They decided it was important to actively start reaching out to their list of contacts
on their database to begin generating new business leads: Thursdays, we’re going to do
more of a lead generation day. So, whether calling leads that we have in our CRM
already, or actually going to network downstairs [in our office building… to connect with
the community” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
By October 2016, when they had moved into a new office building, Startup I also
hoped that their new location would connect them with the higher tier clients that they
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had aspired to have: “Here, it gives us an opportunity to be with people in the city…
Everyone in here is just really well-connected. It’s definitely a really good opportunity
for us” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
2.2.18. Started to build processes and technology to minimize client back and forth
communication.
Website. By September 2016, the founders were still spending a lot of time
communicating with clients before they had committed to work with Startup I (refer to
2.2.3). They decided that to become more efficient, they would build Startup I’s website
to be the primary point of information and interaction for customers: “This will give us a
lot more help moving forward. Once everything is set up, [the website] gives us an actual
system… If you want to go through the site and tell it what you’re looking [for]…. It’s the
machine that gives you the number [price]. It’s not me… That’s [our way of telling the
client that] this is our system and these are our prices” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7
September, 2016). The founder anticipated that having the website set up would even
minimize email contact: “[The content for inbound marketing], once it’s set up, we don’t
have to be sending out manual emails out to every person that comes to our site. It’s
already set up. I really like that… The results that people are getting from it are really
incredible if it’s done the right way” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
However, by November 2016, Startup I was still working towards building a more
automated website. They realized that they need to continue to take on available clients,
corresponding in-person and via email, to continue to survive: “I don’t want to take a
bunch of money from [this potential client] when I know he’s starting his business and
just getting traction. I don’t think that’s right. I would much rather just help out…
There’s where I struggle because we’re still one foot into building a technology platform,
and one foot into doing our [regular] services” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7
September, 2016).
2.2.19. Started in-bound marketing by creating media content online.
Web content – Articles and videos. In September 2016, Startup I began creating articles
and videos to eventually post on their new website, including workshops and tutorials.
The founders hoped this content would be indexed in Google’s search results and would
draw more visitors to the website – a technique known as inbound marketing: “We’re
creating a lot of content and Google is indexing that content, and [this inbound
marketing is] just a different way of basically getting leads and actually getting clients,
[in contrast to] a lot of other people who are focused on cold calling or Facebook ad
campaigns… Once they’re done, it’s sort of done. You have to pay for Google
AdWords… Once you stopped paying, you lose that…. [Instead with having content],
you’re basically holding up your site with all these key words and just a ton of content
that eventually, when it’s big enough, when someone searches anything, it will be
relevant to your site…” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
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The founders also believed that clients were indirectly asking for features of
inbound marketing for their own websites: “I realized [they were saying], ‘we want a
better search engine optimization, we need content, and we need a blog. We need more
traffic on our site.’ All of this can be achieved with inbound marketing” (Startup I
Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016). They believed that having inbound marketing
on their own site offers credibility to them as a business: “I think there’s still a little bit of
education process and we’re doing that sort of with our site too. How can we recommend
doing that stuff if we don’t do it ourselves? It’s hypocritical” (Startup I Founder T,
Interview, 7 September, 2016).
Social media content. By September 2016, Startup I had also started to increase their
presence on major social media sites (Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram). Their social
media sites were often associated with the content that was created and posted on their
website, and also included content such as photos of the co-founders on a photoshoot:
“When you’re creating content, create more content, like take an Instagram post that
we’re creating content” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).
2.2.20. Startup began tracking website visitors and client emails.
Data analytics and email. While they still needed to incorporate analytics technology
into their website (refer to 2.2.5), by November 2016, Startup I started tracking customer
interactions by looking at clients’ interactions using email and the website. The
cofounders began paying close attention to how visitors interacted with each page: “[We]
can see [visitors’] IP addresses and can see how long they spend on each page and look
at every page. I can see even where they left or why they were halfway through the
checkout with all their information entered, but, they’ve left. But I don’t know why, you
know what I mean? It could have been that they didn’t want to buy, they had second
guesses or they didn’t have money, or their kid distracted them and they had to leave”
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 2 November, 2016). With current clients, email
remained a major form of communication that they could get data from: “I track my
emails so I can tell when [the potential clients are] looking at [the proposal we sent]”
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 2 November, 2016).
2.2.21. New website launched with different business model.
Website. In December 2016, Startup I’s new website launched. One of the main goals of
the website was to remove the client project proposal process, typically seen at marketing
agencies: “No more big retainers. No more lengthy onboarding process. No more agency
overhead built into our pricing. Our team delivers top-of-the-line on-demand marketing
services so you can grow your business” (Startup I’s website. Accessed 1 February,
2017).
For months, the founders had wanted to use technology of a new web platform to
both improve the internal business processes, as well as to replace some of the direct
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communication, face-to-face and email, that they have been working with customers on.
This new website had the goal to simplify the pre-contract process and communication
with potential clients: “I’d still be dealing with clients and stuff. But this is where my
tiredness and pay is coming from. If [we have this] software, I’m not limited by dealing
with people face-to-face” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 24 November, 2016).
The co-founders incorporated an e-shop, detailing marketing services and prices:
“We have built it all into our site, just like you are browsing on Amazon” (Startup I’s
website. Accessed 1 February, 2017). The founders have also created articles as content
on the website with the intention that it brings people to the website: “We have tons of
content and free resources. Check them out” (Startup I’s website. Accessed 1 February,
2017).
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS
This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another
type of customer interaction. With the exception of a few publicity pieces, Startup I
experienced little cross-over between platforms for customer interactions as most clients
approached them for services. Only in late 2016 did the founders of Startup I start
seeking out clients in-person and through email contacts. Eventually, when their new
website was built, and content (articles, blogs and videos) that they had created became
more searchable. Potential customers could then buy services through the website, after
which the founders would contact them directly.
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS
Besides the data collected through interviews and secondary materials in this case,
no additional stakeholder interactions were noted for Startup I.
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP
Startup I had challenges connecting with their ideal type of customer: “I want to
choose the right ones. I want instead ten ones that are helping cover costs, plus their
growing businesses, not twenty-five small ones that may not be there in ten years, and
that are eating up my time and not making me money. So, that’s sort of where I’m at right
now” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016). They also often felt that they
lacked capital to grow: “We make enough money, pay for our own expenses and stuff, but
we can’t scale up. We’re not making enough to scale up” (Startup I Founder T, Interview,
24 June, 2016).
The founders also held back from fully engaging with potential customers out of
fear and out of pride. An example of a fear was: “The one thing we are very scared of is
that we get an answer from [large local company] – he says yes [that he wants to work
with us]. We get an answer from [real estate agent] – he says yes. We get an answer from
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[local musician] – who says yes. And all of them want the biggest packages. I’ll admit, I
already had that fantasy” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016). They have
voiced fear that they would not be able to complete projects for these clients: “I’m scared
to approach big clients right now, knowing that our process isn’t strong enough” (Startup
I Founder T, Interview, 24 June, 2016).
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017
In early 2017, Startup I continued to create websites and marketing for their
clients. Startup I’s business continued to be stable into 2017, however they still sought to
find bigger clients: “I don’t complain about our clients, our clients are fine. It’s just I’m
looking for a little bit more, I’d love to get into more scalable companies where we help
from the start. They can reach to thousands or a million dollar in revenue and we build
up with them” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 10 March, 2017).
While Startup I was well known in their network, the co-founders realized that
they wanted to build a more public reputation online to attract more customers: “Even
with this platform, I’m really trying to build that trust up. So, if you know, you’re
purchasing a package or whatever, it’s getting fulfilled. We’ll have the reviews on the
site, testimonials. It’ll be very, very seamless, very transparent, and no question that
we’re up to the task if it’s going happen” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 10
March, 2017).
As part of their growth, rather than continuing as a marketing agency, the cofounders began referring to Startup I as: “the world's first technoculture company. With our
full production studio, we provide services that embrace innovative technology to deliver
authentic, original content” (Startup I’s Facebook page. Accessed 3 March, 2017) The
content created on Startup I’s website included informational articles and videos, focusing on
topics such as step-by-step how-to video processes to creating a website, meant to serve as
examples of the content that the startup could create for their clients.
The e-store interface on the new website – through which services could be
purchased directly through their e-store - also allowed Startup I to collect more data on
their customers; information that the founders had been keen on accessing: “I can track
everyone who’s bought a blog post from us, so every single person who bought a video
from us and everything. So, it gives me so much more power to understand that. I’m
pretty excited about that” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 10 March, 2017).
As hoped (refer to 2.2.17), Startup I was also being referred to new, higher-tier
clients through people in their new office building: “There was a lawyer who was on the
fourth floor with us. So that was a referral. She wasn’t actually involved with that. She’s
part of the law association, … just saw us working up there and really liked us and then
brought that guy in, the actual guy who runs it. So that was still I guess I consider it a
referral, but it was sort of cool because we don’t actually know her. She just kind of
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heard of us from being in the [office] space” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 10
March, 2017).
Despite growing substantially over the past few months, the founders of Startup I
still worried about growing too fast though: “My big fear is that we’re going to have a
client that could change our life who comes to us and we’re not ready and we screw up
the project. That’s my greatest fear right now, that we take on too much, we mess up, we
wreck our reputation or wreck someone that I wanted to work with who could have
connected us to more people and we’ve tarnished that reputation” (Startup I Founders T
& A, Interview, 10 March, 2017).
To alleviate some of the burden as they grow, the founders had hired one
employee, and decided that their next steps with Startup I would be to create an online
marketplace to connect freelancers and individuals seeking digital marketing services:
“So, my idea is to basically do that and we will provide resources for both the
companies; the contractors and freelancers to get better at their craft, and then the
companies to actually understand what we’re doing. Connect them in the middle. I have
much more of on-demand service model. When we finish this, you’ll be able to come to
the site and just actually basically it’s like going to Amazon you can purchase a service.
It’s like checking it out. So, you can just buy a blog post for 150 bucks” (Startup I
Founders T & A, Interview, 10 March, 2017).
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APPENDIX C. PARTICIPANT TERMINOLOGY DEFINITIONS
Note: There are several terms used by entrepreneurs, particularly in the technology
sector, that may not be familiar to everyone. I have included definitions of some of that
terminology here.
Alpha testing – the testing of the first versions of software that may only have basic
features. The software may be unstable at this stage.
Affiliate marketing: A type of marketing in which an individual or business earns a
commission by promoting other people’s products
App – short for an application software, especially as downloaded by a user to a mobile
device.
Application programming interface (API) – the tools and protocols needed to build
application software for end users
Beta test – the final stage of testing for software and other computer products before a
product is released commercially. Beta testing follows alpha testing.
Blogs – an online website that allows for informal commentary on a particular topic
Chat bot – A computer program used over the Internet that simulates human
conversation
Customer – person or organization with whom a contract for a sale of goods or services
has been agreed upon4.
Customer knowledge development – the process of learning about customer
preferences through various interactions and observations, including probing and other
activities (Joshi & Sharma, 2004).
Customer participation - the extent to which the customer is involved in the creation of
the business
Crowdfunding – A request, to a large group of people for a monetary donation, typically
using web technologies that facilitate transactions. This donation may be to fund an
idea, or may be in exchange for a future reward, service or product (Gerber et al.,
2012). Individuals making the donations are funders. Examples include Kickstarter,
Indigogo and GoFundMe.
Customer interaction: communication event between organization and customer

4

This may be a verbal or written contract.
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Earned media – free exposure generated by the startup, including press releases,
articles, blogs, fliers, features on radio shows and other “guerilla marketing” tactics
(Blank, 2012)
Facebook – an online social media and social networking site
Fintech business – an emerging type of financial institution using technology and
innovation to disrupt personal and commercial finance. In the context of this thesis,
this business is a supply-side customer to one of the startups that that provide loans to
individuals.
Funders - Individuals who support crowdfunding campaigns with the intention to
support creators, engage in a community, or who want to obtain rewards.
Gamers: Individuals who play video games
Gaming: Playing video games
Go live (computing) – to become operational
Growth Hacking – A process of experimenting with both product development and
marketing channels to increase users/customers of a business, and often involves using
less traditional marketing channels such as social media, blogs, and viral marketing
Instagram – an online social photo sharing site
LinkedIn – a social networking site that connects people based on business and
employment oriented interests
Operational and tactical feedback – responses or information received from others that
affects the everyday activities that an organization uses its resources to achieve their
objectives
Online Community forum – a virtual community over the internet where members
interact, post, comment, and collaborate
Paid media – when exposure to media is purchased, in terms of advertisements that are
online, mailed out, TV or radio, in-store promotion
Search engine optimization – A process that changes how visible a website is in a web
search engine’s results.
Social Media – Technology used through the Internet that creates networks and
communities, and facilitates the sharing of ideas and information.
Stakeholder – an individual or group who can affect or is affected by an organization’s
ability to achieve its objectives (Freeman, 1984; Lumpkin, Moss, Gras, Kato, &
Amezcua, 2013)
Steam – a desktop computer based community for video games
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Strategic feedback – responses or information received from others pertaining to any
aspect of the business that affects the business concept and overall scope and direction
Streamers – video game players who record their game and stream the playing live,
often with live chat options to allow for communicate between viewers and streamers,
and with gaming–
Traditional Earned Media – These include radio, television, newspapers and magazines
Twitter – an online social media and news site communications are limited to 140
characters
User: a person who does something with a computer, software, or service with the goal to
accomplish a task or do an activity
XBox – a home video game console manufactured by Microsoft
Youtuber - personality or celebrity that have gained popularity from videos on games on
the video-sharing website, YouTube.
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APPENDIX D. PROCESS MAPS OF STARTUP’S NEW VENTURE
CREATION PROCESS
Nine process maps, one for each startup in the sample were created to better
understand the process. Note that the process maps are too large to be stored and printed
in a single sheet of letter sized paper. They have been saved as a separate supplementary
content file for this dissertation. Business Process Modeling (BPMN 2.0) software
(https://bpmn.io) was used to create the process maps of the startups in this sample.
Basic symbols used in the process maps are noted below.
Exclusive Symbol - Used to denote when a decision is made to pursue one path over
another.

Parallel Symbol – Represents when two tasks are taking place at the same time in a
process.

The objects are connected by connecting objects in the BMPN diagram. These may be
any of the following

Artifacts – Artifacts denote information in the model. Examples of artifacts used in the
process maps of the startups in the sample are noted below.
Data objects - Includes data in the process.

Data Input Symbols – Indicates that data needs to be include in the business process

Data Output Symbol – Indicates that data was produced during the business process

Data Collection Symbol – Indicates that data was collected during the business process
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APPENDIX E. EVENT LISTING MATRICES FOR NINE STARTUPS IN
THE SAMPLE
Because this study is process-oriented, I generated a time-ordered event listing
display that allowed for the transforming of data, condensing, sorting, and linking it over
time (Gheradi & Turner, 2002). For each case, a crossing of two lists helped in
understanding flow, location, and connection of events. The matrices are event listings –
a series of concrete events listed over a chronological time period.
Note that the event listing matrices are too large to be stored and printed in a
single sheet of letter sized paper. They have been saved as a separate supplementary
content file for this dissertation.
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APPENDIX F. CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS META-MATRIX
A cross-case analysis is meant to deepen understanding and explanation of a
scenario (Miles & Huberman, 1994). A mixed strategy, involving stacking comparable
cases was used. Using the within-case analyses that have a standard set of variables,
matrices and other displays were used to understand each case in depth.
The case-level displays were stacked into a partially ordered meta-matrix, where
the data from several cases is brought into one big chart, condensing it further using a
standardized format that allows for systematic comparisons to be made and pattern
clarification. Further analyses were conducted based on what patterns were seen in this
meta-matrix.
Note that the cross-case analysis meta-matrix is too large to be stored and printed
in a single sheet of letter sized paper. It has been saved as a separate supplementary
content file for this dissertation.
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